


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China Series

John S. and Caroline Service Oral History Project
Volume I

John S. Service

STATE DEPARTMENT DUTY IN CHINA,
THE McCARTHY ERA, AND AFTER, 1933-1977

With an Introduction by
John K. Fairbank

An Interview Conducted by
Rosemary Levenson
1977-1978

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John S. Service

*Pencil sketch by Burton Silverman
Headed New Yorker profile by E. J. Kahn, Jr.,
April 8, 1972*

not turned over any documents to Jaffe but had only discussed "normal and proper background information" with a man he believed was a legitimate journalist. A federal grand jury in Washington, D.C., declined to indict him.

The incident was one of a series that dogged Mr. Service's career.

"Jack" Service, as he was best known, was typical, in many ways, of the group of American policy experts who became known as "the China hands" in the 1930s and '40s.

The child of American missionaries, Mr. Service was born and reared in China, leaving him fluent in the language and knowledgeable about the country's social and political systems.

In the waning days of World War II, Mr. Service participated in the "Dixie Mission" as a U.S. Foreign Service officer. During the mission, a group of American military officers, along with Mr. Service as a political expert, visited the headquarters of Chinese Communist leader Mao Zedong at Yanan.

Mr. Service reported to American authorities his assessment that Chinese Nationalist leader Chiang Kai-shek was vulnerable because of corruption and that the Communists would probably win the Chinese civil war.

He was then ordered back to Washington by the U.S. ambassador to China, Army General Patrick Hurley. Hurley later accused Mr. Service of handing secret U.S. documents to the Chinese Communist leaders. Almost immediately after Mr. Service's return, he was arrested

in the Amerasia affair.

That case made him a personal target of McCarthy, a demagogue who sought to use the issue of communism to advance his political future.

In 1950, McCarthy charged Mr. Service with having "well-known" Communist involvements. After a series of loyalty examinations, Mr. Service was dismissed from the State Department in 1951 when a Civil Service Commission Loyalty Review Board declared that a "reasonable doubt" existed about his loyalty. However, he appealed and was again cleared of disloyalty charges in 1955 by a federal judge. He was rehired by the State Department in 1957.

The Chronicle editorialized at that time: "Vindicated he has been; let the fact be fully and unreservedly acknowledged."

He served as a U.S. consul in Liverpool, England, and retired in 1962. He then returned to academia, becoming library curator in the Center for Chinese Studies at the University of California at Berkeley, where he remained until his second retirement in 1973.

Mr. Service later visited China as a guest of Mao and other leaders. He reported on his impressions for The Chronicle, among other newspapers.

He is survived by his three children, Virginia McCormick of Chevy Chase, Md.; Robert Service of Washington; and Philip Service of Flagstaff, Ariz.

Funeral arrangements have not been announced.

— Stephen Schwartz

John S. Service

John S. Service, who became famous as a target of Senator Joseph McCarthy because of his controversial views on U.S.-China relations, died of heart disease Wednesday at a rest home in Oakland. He was 89.

Mr. Service first attracted public attention in 1945, when he was arrested by the FBI on an espionage charge. He had been recorded in a compromising meeting with Philip Jaffe, a Soviet agent and editor of a political journal called Amerasia.

Mr. Service argued that he had

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INTRODUCTION

The Chinese revolution was bound to revolutionize American China policy. United States foreign service officers who announced this obvious truth were treated as revolutionaries. It was a classic case of punishing the bearers of bad news.

John S. Service was the officer closest to the Chinese scene, who saw most clearly the trends among the Chinese people and did the best reporting on them. Being the best reporter made him the worst offender in the eyes of those who could not see the revolution but feared "communism" as our ideological enemy.

What emerges most clearly from Service's oral history is his lack of concern about ideology. His activist nature was cast in a mould of practical, humanist virtues. He was like his father, Roy Service, who as a secular missionary built up the work of the Young Men's Christian Association in Szechwan province. From his earliest years Jack Service had before him the example of a father and mother who kept busy serving their Chinese community. Supporting reform was part of their calling but the human needs of the moment, helping individuals, took precedence over the more abstract goals of Christianity, to say nothing of revolution. China to them, as to their eldest son, consisted of people with problems. Their faith was in gradual change for the better, progress, not in any scheme or panacea.

A second notable aspect of Jack Service's life was its absorption with China. He grew up there and his year at the Berkeley high school, his college days at Oberlin, and his later assignments in Washington, New Zealand and Liverpool, like his business career in New York City, were all overlays of his original experience in Szechwan. Becoming a track star, holder of the mile and half-mile records at Oberlin, was merely an addendum to his learning to hike twenty miles a day with his father in the mountains west of Chengtu. Grit and stamina were part of his natural style.

Of course, as he points out repeatedly, an American boy in west China did not live like a Chinese or with Chinese. He had no Chinese playmates. He enjoyed the special status of being a foreigner who was by treaty law a privileged character. Belonging to the foreign echelon of the Chinese upper class no doubt contributed to his high standard of conduct. Like an Englishman in colonial India, he was on his mettle to be a superior person. Courage, pertinacity, reliability were expected of such people. Added to this, the YMCA was a fellowship built on Christian principles of international brotherhood and uplift. The result made Jack Service a natural leader of any group he was in but a leader who won his spurs by achievement. He was a genuine democrat and fond of his peers as of people generally but he was also committed to being the top performer among them.

Another trait from childhood was the pioneer spirit of the American missionary in China who had to handle problems of clean housing and water supply, medication of ailments, education of children in the boondocks, diplomacy with officials, warlords and bandits and in general maintain a life in two cultures. This called for resourcefulness, innovation and above all, initiative.

While Jack Service's early life no doubt inculcated these exceptional qualities, it is still true that sociology, though it tries, cannot entirely account for personality. What comes through in this volume is Jack Service's sheer ability to deal with people and things and get results. His rise in the business world of the SARCO steam trap company (1952-1958 between his dismissal and reinstatement in the foreign service) is almost a laboratory experiment to test out whether a man so able at official administrative and diplomatic tasks really has what it takes to compete in business. It is an extraordinary story, underplayed as Jack recounts it, an almost romantic tale of adventure and success, except that the reader soon realizes some of the problems overcome: how does a newcomer helicoptered to the top level of a long-established firm make his way among jealous older employees? How does he master the steam-trap technology and see that the several scientific variables that make a steam trap work can be more efficiently put together? How does he know his legal position and with a lawyer defend his interest? The answer is simple: Jack Service's acute intelligence and personal drive made him truly omniscient.

That an officer of such ability and China background should be reporting the decline of the Kuomintang (KMT) regime and then the rise of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) as its rival for power was America's good fortune. The message came across loud and clear for China hands like Gauss, Stilwell and Marshall. (General Marshall had had a tour of duty with the Fifteenth Infantry in Tientsin). The obvious validity of Service's reporting in the crucial early-forties (1942 to 1945) was undoubtedly a factor in the State Department decision to mediate between KMT and CCP in the hope of heading off civil war in China.

Many observers reported as time went on. But Service was the official first on the scene and closest to it, in reporting both the KMT decline and the CCP potentialities. This helped General Marshall's decision in 1947 to abstain from intervening to try and save Chiang Kai-shek. This abstention, after Ambassador Hurley's folly in 1945 in committing the United States to Chiang, was a major achievement in American policy making.

It is hard for us now to realize the inertial momentum of the American support of the Nanking government that had developed during the 1930s. To call the American position in China the fruit of Anglo-American imperialism under the unequal treaties is an easy dictum to utter, like all attaching of tags to characterize historical epochs. The difficulty in viewing the American record in China lies in its ambivalence. So much of the American activity in China during the imperialist era was not only well-intentioned but downright helpful! Extraterritoriality, which kept Americans

under the legal jurisdiction of their own consuls in China, began as a practical necessity when the Western intruders came in force and demanded that China's empire join the outside world as a nation among nations. The unequal treaty system was a mediating device that lasted a full century (1842-1943) until China, after five foreign wars and two revolutions, did indeed become a nation.

American and other merchants and missionaries helped this process of drastic change. After our recognition of the Nationalist government of the KMT at Nanking in 1928, many felt that modern China had reached modernity (i.e., was following our example). To such people, it was a severe blow to find twenty years later that China's evolution was moving on from "nationalism" to "communism."

The fact was that the Chinese common people were still to be brought into political life. Where the KMT after 1928 had given up its mass organizations and settled in as a new bureaucratic elite, the CCP in the 1940s learned how to mobilize popular support more thoroughly than ever before. This was the fact that Jack Service reported, which so many of his countrymen could not accept.

Americans in China had become part of the old order that was on the way out. History had given them their heyday in China for half a century after 1898. Now it was over. The Rockefeller-supported Peking Union Medical College, the Boxer Indemnity Fund fellowships bringing Chinese talent to the USA, the widespread panoply of missionary hospitals, schools and colleges, the Sino-foreign collaboration in distributing kerosene and tobacco, our score of consulates to oversee our treaty rights, all were headed for the dustbin of history. It was not a palatable message to convey.

The American establishment in China, part of the foreign establishment generally, was a society in itself, with its racecourses and churches for Saturday and Sunday, its summer vacation resorts in the mountains or at the seashore, a foreign-officered Customs service supervising foreign trade, foreign gunboats at the ports and on the Yangtze, and all the exoticism and squalor of China at hand to provide servants, offer a market or a constituency, and be guarded against. Several generations of Americans had enjoyed their experience of China, as Jack Service did too. But now the revolution wanted to wipe it all out and create a new China without foreign privilege. Thousands of Americans who had lived and worked in China, and millions back home who had supported or enjoyed their ventures at second hand, felt a prospect of loss and opposed it as evil. History could not easily be turned around.

As one follows Jack Service's career through thick and thin it becomes evident that the same qualities that made him the preeminent bearer of bad tidings also equipped him to survive the attack on him that the bad tidings evoked. Looking back on it he professes to be content, and well he may. He

has had two careers, one as a brilliant performer at the varied tasks of foreign service, obviously headed for class one and high position, the second career as an officer unjustly condemned and cast out in disgrace who step by step made a living and fought his way back to reinstatement and vindication --a second success story piled on top the first. This is a record that will stand for a long time.

Jack Service would be the first to agree that no records are made without pain. Perhaps he and his wife and supporter Caroline would also agree that it is even more painful to be the chief supporter of a record breaker than to be the protagonist himself. Nevertheless, they survived intact and their story is a triumph.

John K. Fairbank
Francis Lee Higginson Professor
of History, Emeritus

June 1981
Harvard University
Cambridge, Massachusetts

INTERVIEW HISTORY

Nixon's visit to China in 1972 was a major turning point in Chinese-American relations. The hostility of American public opinion to the Chinese Communist regime had been extended to American Foreign Service officers and other "China Hands" who predicted, in the 1940s, that Mao Tse-tung would defeat Chiang Kai-shek and his Nationalist regime. In April, 1972, The New Yorker published a long profile on John S. Service by E.J. Kahn, Jr., entitled, "Foresight, Nightmare, and Hindsight." This article, publication timed to precede the Nixon visit, was the opening trickle in what has become a flood of information on Chinese-American relations over the last forty years. As in the 1940s and the McCarthy period, Jack Service was once again headline news. But this time the journalists came not to accuse and blame but to praise. And, two Asian wars later, to regret America's lost chances for a foreign policy that would have included China instead of isolating her. This was what John S. Service and his colleagues had recommended during World War II, based on their observations as American Foreign Service political officers in wartime China.

It seemed appropriate that Jack Service should be given the opportunity to speak in his own voice, in an informal and extended fashion, about his years of experience in China and much more. Also, that his wife, Caroline Schulz Service, whose memoirs form volume two of the Service Oral History, should give her perspective. Both Jack and Caroline were hesitant. It is fortunate that they agreed, and now, five years from the inception of this project, both of them are glad that their own viewpoints are plainly stated.

Funding

Paul Casamajor of the University of California's Forestry Department proposed that the Regional Oral History Office of The Bancroft Library record Jack Service's memoirs. Mr. Casamajor had been a student colleague of Jack's forester brother, Bob, and had just read E.J. Kahn's book, The China Hands. Professors Chalmers A. Johnson and Frederic E. Wakeman, Jr., faculty advisers to this office's China Series, enthusiastically endorsed the project. The Center for Chinese Studies gave a small seed grant, and a letter to the Oberlin College Alumni Magazine of July, 1976, brought additional donations from the Oberlin "family," Jack and Caroline's alma mater. Major funding was provided by Rockefeller Foundation grants. Assistance is gratefully acknowledged from the Frank Schwabacher Fund of The Bancroft Library for photographic illustrations.

The Interviews

The interviewer and her late husband, Joseph R. Levenson, professor of Chinese history at the University of California, Berkeley, had known the Services since 1962 when Jack and Caroline returned to Berkeley. In fact, Jack had turned up as a student in Joe's classes, somewhat to the chagrin of a professor teaching Chinese history who yet had never been to China. The warm friendship with which we started these memoirs deepened and widened as Caroline's and Jack's lives were explored in depth; the interviewer learned much about grace and courage under pressure.

Caroline was interviewed first as Jack was recovering from a heart attack at home, and he became somewhat familiar with the process of oral history as conducted by this office. However, he did not read any part of his wife's memoir until his own was completed. We had a preliminary luncheon meeting to discuss strategies, and settled on a chronological, narrative format. Jack was assured that the interview transcripts would be appropriately edited so that additional material could be inserted, dates checked, and other details smoothed out.

Agendas were prepared and submitted to Jack before each interview or group of interviews. He made revisions, the most embarrassing of which was Chungking. "Chunking," said Jack, "refers to frozen chop suey."

Fourteen interviews of varying lengths were recorded between March 28, 1977, and November 14, 1977. The interviews were all held in the Services' beautiful house in the Berkeley hills, usually in the breakfast room with its view of the Golden Gate, and the hummingbirds flying in and out to their feeders. Sometimes the sun would drive us down to Jack's cool study where his immaculate files were easily available. Midmorning, we would always break for coffee, cookies, and informal anecdotes which the interviewer was sometimes able to persuade Jack to add to the record. Jack was always well prepared with notes and documents. After the first interview, there would generally be addenda or corrigenda to previous sessions, which would be recorded before we started on the main interview. Jack's generally low key delivery did not mask the periods of high adventure and deep emotion.

Editing and Completion

The tapes were transcribed, edited for continuity, and returned to Jack for revision. He was able to check the accuracy of his memory due to his excellent filing system for the voluminous papers he has collected, all of which he has promised to The Bancroft Library. Unfortunately there is a significant gap. All his personal papers on the Yen-an period (1944-1945) were destroyed at the height of the McCarthy period.

The manuscript was final-typed, proofed, and indexed. Professor John K. Fairbank, dean of Chinese historians, generously agreed to write the introduction, and completed it promptly in spite of all the demands on his time. The process of illustrating the memoir was fascinating and frustrating since so much excellent material had to be omitted. However, the illustrations, illustrative materials, and appendices have helped to enrich an already important narrative.

Three color videotapes were recorded of Jack Service at home. They are deposited in The Bancroft Library, as are the original interview tapes. Wade-Giles spelling of Chinese names has been retained for consistency, since pinyin was introduced after Caroline Service's memoir was completed.

The Services have stipulated that their memoirs remain closed except with written permission of the interviewee until January, 1988. *

Special thanks to Teresa Allen and Marie Herold for much more than their excellent transcribing and final typing. Their constructive criticisms have much improved the volume. Ruth Baseman made a splendid presentation of the many photographs she was asked to place on each page of illustrations.

Rosemary Levenson
Project Director
China Series

June, 1981
Regional Oral History Office
486 The Bancroft Library
University of California at Berkeley

* Jack Service's memoir is open for use.

I CALIFORNIA AND CHINA

[Interview 1: March 28, 1977]

Family Background: Protestant Settlers and California Pioneers

Levenson: I'd like to start, Jack, with asking about your family background. Who do you want to start with, your father or your mother?

J. Service: I can say they were both white, completely Anglo-Saxon, and Protestant, WASPS in other words. My mother's family was New England Puritan. It went way back. I'm not sure just how far back, but one of my ancestors on her side fought in the American Revolution and was given a sword by General Washington, which is a bitter point in our family because it was supposed to be handed down to the eldest child in each generation. My mother was the eldest child in her generation, but because she was a woman, it went to the oldest male descendant which is a thing that rankled forever! She was a premature feminist or an early feminist, shall we say.

Her grandfather was a forty-niner, joined a party, left Boston, went to Vera Cruz, I think, in Mexico and across northern Mexico. He was sick, was nursed back to health by an Indian woman, and wrote a book about it which is quite a collector's item. It is called Travels to California* or something like that.

*Asa Bemont Clarke. Travels in Mexico and California. comprising a journal of a tour from Brazos Santiago, through central Mexico, by way of Monterey, Chihuahua, the country of the Apache on the river Gila, to the mining districts of California. Boston, Wright and Hasty, printers, 1852.

Levenson: What was his name?

J. Service: His name was A.B. Clarke. I'm sure The Bancroft Library has the book, or if not, we can give them one. When we were having our hard times in the steam trap days [1950's] we needed some money and we sold one copy for \$250 or something like that.

My grandfather became a banker, small town banker in San Bernardino. My mother, Grace Boggs, was the eldest child. She came to the University of California at Berkeley, and was quite a prominent woman on the campus in the class of 1902.

My father's father, John Service, came across the plains in 1859. He wasn't quite a forty-niner: he was a fifty-niner. His ancestor was a poor man, poor boy really, who came from Scotland about 1817. Eventually the family migrated across to Michigan. My grandfather came from Michigan when he was about nineteen with a wagon train across the plains.*

Of course, the gold rush was over. He was a rather canny and careful fellow. He got a job driving wagons of hay and supplies from the Sacramento Valley over to the Comstock Lode which was just developing. He spent several years doing that, saved his money, and then bought land down in the San Joaquin Valley near Merced, Modesto, and Turlock.

Roy Service and Grace Boggs, University of California, Class of '02

J. Service: So, my father grew up on the farm. He was one of eleven children, eight of whom grew to adulthood. He was the first in any of his tribe to go to University. I've never understood just why he was determined to go to University, but he was. He came up to Berkeley. His father didn't see much point in it but he wasn't going to object or oppose it. My father was in the class of 1902--the same as my mother. He became quite a well known athlete, big man on the campus, president of the senior class, president of the Y[oung] M[en's] C[hristian] A[ssociation], which in those days really was something.

*John Service, Pioneer. Prepared from his own words and records by Fred Field Goodsell, with the assistance of the children of John and Julia Service. Waban? Mass., Privately printed, 1945.

Descendants of John and Julia Service

1. JOHN SERVICE, JR., was born January 18, 1839, in Canandaigua, New York. His brothers and sisters are:

- Sarah, b. May 7, 1837—d. November 30, 1923.
- Edward, b. March 29, 1841—d. February 19, 1909.
- Robert Thurber, b. January 29, 1843—d. April 26, 1920.
- William Bernard, b. April 14, 1845—d. April 17, 1918.
- Katherine Ann, b. February 5, 1848—d.
- Isabelle, b. October 31, 1850—d. January 20, 1925.

John married Julia Irene Warner, July 3, 1867. The marriage license was obtained in Ophirville, California. Julia was born January 12, 1850, at Medina, Michigan.

Their children are:

- 2. Walter Warner Service, b. April 26, 1868, at Ceres; d. November 22, 1878, in Weston, Michigan.
- 3. Lewis Hall Service, b. April 27, 1870, at Ceres.
- 4. Wilber Pomeroy Service, b. June 5, 1871, at Ceres; d. November 19, 1878, in Weston, Michigan.
- 5. Hubert Elwin Service, b. May 15, 1873, at Ceres.
- 6. William Roscoe Service, b. October 22, 1874, at Ceres.
- 7. Ida Irene Service, b. March 24, 1877, at Ceres.
- 8. Robert Roy Service, b. June 4, 1879, in Weston, Lenawee County, Michigan; d. September 29, 1935, in Shanghai, China.
- 9. Lulu Karolena Service, b. January 29, 1881, at Ceres.
- 10. Lynda Rose Service, b. December 16, 1883, at Ceres.
- 11. John Henry Service, b. August 30, 1888, in Auburn; d. May 3, 1908, in Palo Alto, California.
- 12. Lawrence Edward Service, b. March 3, 1890, in Auburn.

Second Generation

3. LEWIS HALL SERVICE (John (1)¹) was b. April 27, 1870, at Ceres. He married Pauline Cristine Harder, December 6, 1889, in Modesto. She was b. June 19, 1870, at Banta, California. Their children are:

- 13. Walter Wilber Service, b. October 28, 1891, at Ceres.
- 14. Leonard Hubert Service, b. September 4, 1895, in Peoria, Peoria County, Illinois.

5. HUBERT ELWIN SERVICE (John (1)¹) was b. May 15, 1873, at Ceres. He married Flora Amanda Ward, September 6, 1899, in Ceres. She was b. June 8, 1881, in Stockton, California. Their children are:

- 15. Elwin Hubert Service, b. August 6, 1900, at Ceres.
- 16. Ward Elbridge Service, b. January 3, 1903, at Ceres.

6. WILLIAM ROSCOE SERVICE (John (1)¹) was b. October 22, 1874, at Ceres. He married Estella Updike, October 21, 1900, in Modesto. She was by. August 7, 1879, at Turlock, California. Their children are:

- 17. Newell Turner Service, b. November 15, 1904, in Modesto.
- 18. Vivian Irene Service, b. September 16, 1906, in Modesto.
- 19. Grace Evelyn Service, b. November 26, 1907, in Modesto.

7. IDA IRENE SERVICE (John (1)¹) was b. March 24, 1877, at Ceres. She married Frederick Henry McNair, December 31, 1908, at 1740 Oxford Street, Berkeley. He was b. October 28, 1872, at Mt. Morris, New York. Their children are:

- 20. John Frederick Hastings McNair, b. December 31, 1911, in Berkeley.
- 21. Virginia Irene McNair, b. June 15, 1914, in Berkeley.
- 22. Constance Julia McNair, b. February 28, 1919, in Berkeley.

8. ROBERT ROY SERVICE (John (1)¹) was b. June 4, 1879, in Weston, Lenawee County, Michigan. He married Grace Josephine Boggs, June 30, 1904, in Independence, Iowa. She was b. November 26, 1879, at Independence, Iowa. He d. September 29, 1935, in Shanghai, China. Their children are:

- 23. Virginia ~~Leone~~ Service, b. August 26, 1905, in Berkeley. She d. March 4, 1906, on the Yangtse River while going to ~~Lehng~~, China. *Shanghai*

*

- 24. John Stewart Service, b. August 3, 1909, at Chengtu, China.
- 25. Robert Kennedy Service, b. May 8, 1911, at Chengtu, China.
- 26. Richard Montgomery Service, b. April 21, 1914, at Chengtu, China.

Partial genealogy of the Service family from John Service Pioneer.
Prepared from his own words and records by Fred Field Goodsell, with
the assistance of the children of John and Julia Service. Privately
printed, 1945, Waban (?) Massachusetts.

20. JOHN FREDERICK McNAIR (Irene (7)² John (1)¹) was b. December 31, 1911, in Berkeley. He married Laura Don Collier, August 5, 1932, in Redwood City. She was b. September 25, 1910, at Weldona, Colorado. She d. December 1, 1937, in San Leandro, California. No children. His second marriage was to Ruth Banks, June 16, 1940, at 1062 Spruce Street, Berkeley. She was b. March 28, 1912, at Gas, Kansas. Their child is:

49. Patricia Louise McNair, b. January 12, 1942, in Berkeley.

21. VIRGINIA IRENE McNAIR (Irene (7)² John (1)¹) was b. June 15, 1914, in Berkeley. She first married Joseph Arthur Bourdon, April 12, 1935, in Tacoma, Washington. He was b. November 7, 1912, in Seattle, Washington. Their child is:

50. Barbara Irene Bourdon, b. May 13, 1938, in Albany, California.

Her second marriage was to Olin Stephen Gordon, November 17, 1944, in Berkeley. He was b. November 2, 1913, in Schulline, Illinois.

22. CONSTANCE JULIA McNAIR (Irene (7)² John (1)¹) was b. February 28, 1919, in Berkeley. She married Albert Byron Sanford, November 29, 1941, in Berkeley. He was b. March 4, 1907, in Rochester, New York.

24. JOHN STEWART SERVICE (Roy (8)² John (1)¹) was b. August 3, 1909, in Chengtu, China. He married Caroline Edward Schulz, November 9, 1933, at Haiphong, French Indo-China. She was b. November 30, 1909, in Kansas City, Missouri. Their children are:

51. Virginia Caroline Service, b. July 3, 1935, in Yunnan Fu, China.

52. Robert Edward Service, b. February 16, 1937, in Peiping, China.

25. ROBERT KENNEDY SERVICE (Roy (8)² John (1)¹) was b. May 8, 1911, in Chengtu, China. He married Esta Jane Fowle, September 15, 1932, in Berkeley. She was b. May 9, 1911, in Berkeley. Their child is:

53. Robert Gifford Service, b. February 25, 1942, in Murphys, Calaveras County, California.

26. RICHARD MONTGOMERY SERVICE (Roy (8)² John (1)¹) was b. April 21, 1914, in Chengtu, China. He married Helen Margaret Gardes, August 24, 1940, in Tsingtao, China. She was b. June 8, 1916, in Akron, Ohio. Their child is:

54. George Wiltz Service, b. February 4, 1942, in Wilmette, Illinois.

27. LYNDA IRENE GOODSSELL (Lulu (9)² John (1)¹) was b. in Berlin, Germany, October 22, 1906. She married Everett Carl Blake, June 24, 1927, in Berkeley. He was b. January 3, 1901, at Faribault, Rice County, Minnesota. Their children are:

55. John Goodsell Blake, b. January 18, 1930, in Istanbul, Turkey.

56. Lincoln Carlyle Blake, b. August 10, 1932, in Merzifon, Turkey.

57. Jacklyn MacCallum Blake, b. March 18, 1938, in Merzifon, Turkey.

28. LINCOLN SERVICE GOODSSELL (Lulu (9)² John (1)¹) was b. in Aintab (Gaziantep), Turkey, February 15, 1908. He married Irene Frances Fogg, September 14, 1935, at West Newbury, Massachusetts. She was b. May 15, 1911, in West Newbury, Massachusetts. Their child is:

58. Fred Field Goodsell, II, b. August 28, 1938, in Woburn, Massachusetts.

29. CAROLINE SERVICE GOODSSELL (Lulu (9)² John (1)¹) was b. June 3, 1912, in Marash, Turkey. She married Richard Bonsall Smith, June 16, 1935, at Merzifon, Turkey. He was b. October 23, 1902, in Middlebury, Vermont. Their children are:

59. Fred Wesley Smith, b. February 22, 1937, in Istanbul, Turkey.

60. Marcia Karol Smith, b. March 31, 1940, in Boston, Massachusetts.

61. Robert Bonsall Smith, b. March 13, 1942, in Westbrook, Maine.

J. Service: There's a cartoon in the yearbook--I think the yearbook the year they were seniors--which shows a young man, obviously my father, wearing a Big C sweater with an obvious Service nose, looking at a notice on the bulletin board. The notice says, YWCA Sunday night prayer meeting; topic, 'the meaning of Service,' speaker, Grace Boggs." [chuckle] They were obviously a well known college couple. I may be a little bit wrong on the title, but it was something like that in the Blue and Gold.

Levenson: What sports was your father in at Cal?

J. Service: Mostly track and field I think. When he was here football--what we call football, American football--had been temporarily discontinued and they were playing rugby.* I don't think he ever played football.

Levenson: I didn't know that.

J. Service: You look at the statue down on the campus, just to the south of Life Sciences Building, by a man named [Douglas] Tilden: there's a man standing and someone else is bandaging his knee. They're rugby players. They're not American football players.

My father got into track and field and found that he could do almost anything fairly well, but he was particularly good as a distance runner, middle distance runner. He held the Pacific Coast record for the half mile for nine or ten years. The team went east to what they called the IC4A, the intercollegiates in other words, and he, I think, won the half mile and had the best time in the country for that year. Of course, in present day terms the time is not very exciting. He ran the mile also.

When I was in college I beat his time for the mile, but never beat his time for the half mile. Then, when my son Bob came along, he beat my time for the mile. So, there's a little bit of improvement in the breeding or something, shall we say?

Levenson: Breeding or coaching. [laughter] Didn't your father do some coaching?

J. Service: I don't remember he did any coaching. He may have coached a freshman team or something like that.

*But "From 1906-1914 inclusive, (9 Big Games) Rugby was the type of football played by California and Stanford." S. Dan Brodie 66 Years on the California Gridiron.

Levenson: He coached one of my interviewees who was the class of '05, Harvey Lyon.*

J. Service: It was, I think, just a volunteer thing, helping out. As a senior he may have taken some of the freshmen.

Levenson: What did your parents major in?

J. Service: Well--my mother was preparing to be a schoolteacher. She always told me that she majored in classics, in Latin primarily. But here's an edition of the California Monthly [January, 1927] devoted to Californians in China. They give a list of all the Californians in China. There's various things about them here. You'll see that she is listed as being a social science major. That doesn't sound like Latin to me! Robert Roy Service, natural science, whatever that means.

They were both in fraternities. She was a Phi Beta Kappa and a member of Kappa Alpha Theta, and he was in Psi U and a member of various honor societies.

Student Volunteer Movement: "The World for Christ in our Generation"

J. Service: My father became very involved with the student volunteer movement which was very popular, very strong in those days under the leadership of people like John R. Mott and Sherwood Eddy, E-d-d-y. It was a tremendously optimistic, vigorous, save-the-world movement with the motto "The world for Christ in our generation." Actually in the thirty years or so from the late 1800's--early 1900's--they sent about 14,000 young people abroad.

Levenson: From?

J. Service: From the United States.

Levenson: Under the auspices of the International Y?

*See Harvey B. Lyon: Entrepreneur, Rotarian, and Philanthropist, an interview by Rosemary Levenson, Regional Oral History Office, The Bancroft Library, University of California, Berkeley, 1973, p 15.

J. Service: Well, not all YMCA. The student volunteer movement was led by people in the Y, but a lot of the people didn't go out for the Y. The Y didn't send out anything like that many. That number includes many Christian missions.

But my father was particularly interested in the Y. He and my mother both were nonsectarian. The social gospel, the activist gospel of the YMCA--which was not really a proselytizing idea at all, but a desire to save the world by doing good, setting a good example--I think it appealed to them. A lot of people have compared the spirit of the people going out, their motives and so on, to the Peace Corps.

Levenson: Do you find that valid?

J. Service: Well, it's valid only part way because the student volunteers were making a lifetime commitment. Peace Corps people certainly seek to do good. But there is also an element of excitement and seeing the world. And after two or three years they can expect to come home and carry on whatever their life career plans may be. Peace Corps work is secular rather than religious, and temporary rather than permanent. The student volunteers of my parents' generation were making a life commitment from strong religious motivation.

There was also a sense of adventure in the whole thing surely. My father and mother were excited about going to China. They hoped to go to China. Their first tentative assignment was to Korea. That was changed to China much to their joy.

Levenson: Why China? What was the pull?

J. Service: Ah--well--China. Because it was a tremendous country, a great challenge, which was on the verge of changing from ancient to modern. It was a great magnet, because everyone was convinced that great things were about to take place there and there was a tremendous, bright future for China.

Levenson: I'm interested because when we get to the thirties and forties and fifties, one sees that there was a special relationship, America with China--

J. Service: Oh, but they had that feeling even then. The Open Door had already "opened." The Open Door notes were history then. There was already this strong American feeling of a special friendship for China. My father's family had had a Chinese cook on the ranch here in California. Father never thought in those days he was going to go to China, of course. But, I think for anybody on the West Coast particularly, China was almost close at hand. It was the obvious place to want to go.

J. Service: There's a lot of talk about imperialism in mission work. Obviously, for a country, a religious group, to want to send missionaries to another country you've got to have a tremendous feeling of self-righteousness or of rightness, of arrogance, self-satisfaction, conviction that you have the right way and others need to be helped.

But, it's hard to see this when you come down to the persons, the people involved. The effect of missionary work may have been to further imperialism, but it's hard to see the actual people involved in something like the YMCA as being imperialists at all.

My father, as I say, went for an organization that always considered they were working for Chinese. It was really the Chinese YMCA. He always criticized, disliked, the whole structure of extraterritoriality and special rights. He didn't want to take advantage of them or use them. He very much disliked consuls being able to tell him when he could go here or there, and he usually tended to avoid getting involved with consuls because his attitude was they would always say, "Oh, don't go. It's not safe." [chuckle]

Then, my father was very pleased to be sent to the extreme far west of China, the furthest west really, the last province before Tibet, the end of the line, where he was to open up a new YMCA. He was the first YMCA man in Szechwan province, which was a province of at least sixty million and maybe eighty million people, a huge, heavily populated province.

There was a sense of pioneering, a sense of excitement. Also, there was a sense of great changes about to take place in China. He went out late in 1905. He graduated from college here at Berkeley in 1902. He had already joined the Y, committed himself to the Y, and they sent him to get some training as a student secretary. So he went to Purdue University and worked there for two years or so.

Then he and my mother were married. My grandfather, my mother's father, was very opposed to the wedding. He had some feeling of status and so on. He was a banker and he didn't like his daughter marrying a son of a farmer.

Levenson: You say status. Would you call that status or class?

J. Service: Yes, yes, class, I suppose. Class or caste, I don't know. [chuckle] Anyway, he refused to have anything to do with the wedding, sort of disinherited my mother. They went off and were married at the home of a favorite aunt of my mother's in

J. Service: Independence, Iowa, where part of the family had remained while some of them came out to California. At any rate, they were assigned to the far west of China and went, as I say, in late 1905.

Levenson: Before we go on to China, what were the religious backgrounds of the families?

J. Service: My mother's family were Presbyterian and my father's family were Baptist. But, I think that the real devoutness in both families was in my grandmothers. I don't think either of my grandfathers was religious. They went to church because their wives wanted them to, more or less. [laughter] That's my own feeling.

I think my mother probably would have been happy in the Unitarian Church. But this was long after my father died. In her declining years I think her religion had become quite intellectualized.

As far as my father was concerned, his religion always seemed very much of a personal and deeply felt thing.

My mother was a student volunteer when she first went to China and felt that she wanted to help my father as much as possible. But, I think she grew gradually away from this as she stayed in China. She was much more the intellectual of the two, much more interested in politics and literature.

My father very soon became completely wrapped up in his work. He had an idea of total and complete commitment. He had committed himself to the Y and he never had any idea of doing anything else. I don't mean to say that he was dull. He was obviously an intelligent person, but he wasn't the intellectual that my mother was. He didn't have the interest in intellectual things that she did.

He had an enormous zest, a gift, for friendship. He excelled in small groups, in person-to-person situations. He didn't have a particularly impressive platform manner, and was not very effective as orator or public speaker.

He had a tremendous competitiveness about him. When the family, he and his brothers, anybody got together, it was always games of one sort or another. There was always the sense of outdoing the other, winning. My father, of course, didn't gamble, but we went through all the card games with great gusto from the earliest time I can remember. They started with something called Five Hundred, which was "Missionary Bridge."

Levenson: What's "Missionary Bridge"?

J. Service: Well, it was four suits of thirteen cards each, just the same as an ordinary pack of playing cards. But, Chinese regarded playing cards as for gambling, so the missionaries felt that they shouldn't use ordinary playing cards, and this other game, Five Hundred or Rook, was invented. You just had numbers--no kings and queens. You didn't have spades and clubs. I forget what the suits were called. But we played "Missionary Bridge," and then my father advanced eventually to whist and then auction bridge. Finally we got to contract bridge. But it took a long, long time for us to go through this process. Along the way we played cribbage and pinochle and any other game you can think of: chess, checkers and so on.

He also had a sense of humor, a sort of dry, deadpan sense of humor, which my mother never really quite mastered. It was very different from her idea of humor, but very characteristic of my father's family.

He was a person with a genuine, warm liking for people. This was what made him, I think, very much loved in China among the Chinese.

Background of the YMCA in China: The Principle of Local Chinese Control

J. Service: I've got a list here, a thing that was put out at one time-- Oh, here it is. When my father went to China the YMCA here at Berkeley, of which he had been president in his senior year, used to put on an annual Roy Service campaign to help support his work in China. (He was always known as Roy in his family and at Berkeley. But my mother didn't like Roy and called him Bob. So all of his China friends called him Bob, and his early friends called him Roy.)

Anyway, this has got a lot of information about him.

Levenson: This is very interesting. [reading] "The University of California's furthest extension work, giving instruction in Bible Study, Sanitation, Engineering, Social Hygiene, and Physical Training--a practical religion."

J. Service: Well, that's the old YMCA--it was a practical religion, a contrast to the old-line churches and missions in China. The Y was something quite new and very attractive to a lot of Chinese. The Chinese were not exactly flocking to the gospel, but there were a lot of things about the YMCA that did attract young Chinese students particularly.

At this time the government was just starting the new schools, the new universities. They had just stopped, or were just about to stop, the old Confucian examinations. The new universities were set up in the cities. In the old days if you were studying for your exams you could do it at home or in your own village or town. But now the students going to the universities had to come to the cities. So you had a new group of university students, middle school students, growing up in these new, modern schools. The YMCA catered especially to them. It ran schools. It did a great deal of work in popularizing science, basic science, which the Chinese were tremendously interested in. The solar system, and how a steam engine works, all sorts of things. The YMCA used to set up exhibits. They had basic science museums and ran lectures. They had specialists for this.

They started the idea of public health in China, swat fly campaigns, things like that. Then they had a lot of education, free education schools, night schools, for children, for all ages. Teaching English--a lot of people wanted to learn English. The businesses needed people who spoke English, the post office, customs, these sorts of services.

In education, physical fitness was just becoming popular. The Chinese realized that in order to compete with the West they had to be strong. I mean not only as a nation, but also strong in their own personal physiques. That's the basis of an army after all. So, the whole idea of athletics was just starting in, physical fitness and so on, gymnasiums, even ping pong.

Levenson: [chuckle] Foreshadowing ping pong diplomacy.

J. Service: Yes. Yes. But we don't need to do a history of the Y in this memoir!

Levenson: No, but in context I imagine that for your father to have been sent out to Szechwan, which was way, way out, there must have been a pretty good YMCA base in the Treaty Ports.

J. Service: Not really. It was all pretty new, because the Y had really only started in China in 1896. So, he was there less than ten

J. Service: years after it first started. They were still quite small even in the cities. They started first in Tientsin, I think. The Y was relatively small.

The Y was unique among Christian mission organizations in China because it always insisted from the very beginning that it had to have local Chinese support and control. The international Y loaned or provided the services of some foreigners, Americans or a few others, but mostly Americans. It sometimes loaned or had donations of money for buildings and so on. But, in each city the first step was to find a group of Chinese Christians who were willing to sponsor it and lead it, act as directors. So, the foreigners were always working for Chinese and the Y depended on local support. You had to get memberships and so on, and it had to be locally self-supporting.

Levenson: Do you know what sort of invitation was arranged? How did they know the Y would be welcome in Chengtu?

J. Service: The Friends' Mission [Quaker] had someone there named Hodgkin, an Englishman. I forget his initials but he became quite well known later on and eventually came back to England and headed up the English Friends missionary organization. But, Dr. Hodgkin was in Chengtu and he knew about the Y.

Not all missions were keen about the Y. Some missions regarded the Y as being a rival, as not being truly religious because they didn't put the emphasis on proselytizing. Some missionaries felt that their only job was to save souls for Christ, and therefore the thing to do was to preach.

But Hodgkin had been working in Chengtu for the English Friends, and apparently he thought the Y would be a good idea because there was a big Chinese university, a government university, just being established in Chengtu. The missions were also talking about combining their various activities into a West China Union University. Chengtu was becoming an educational, student center. I think Hodgkin was the one that first encouraged the Y, or got in touch with the Y to see if they wouldn't consider starting a YMCA in Chengtu. So, there was a friendly welcome in that sense. Hodgkin was still there when my father arrived and helped him. He had mission contacts, but he also had some student contacts and Chinese contacts, so that he was able to help my father.

A Six Month Journey from Shanghai to Chengtu, 1905-1906

Levenson: In 1905, six years before the fall of the Ch'ing dynasty, did your father comment at all on the sort of turmoil that was going on in various parts of China? How was it in Szechwan?

J. Service: My parents didn't get to Szechwan till 1906, because it was a long trip up the Yangtze in those days. I don't know whether Caroline mentioned it or not, but they lost their baby going through the [Yangtze] Gorges, twenty-one days by houseboat with no doctor.

Levenson: No.

J. Service: Well, traveling was a long, slow business. They got into Shanghai actually while there were riots going on, what were called the Mixed Court riots. So, the first night my father was in China, actually was spent on guard duty, because they were staying in a house that was outside the concession. They didn't know what might happen. Actually, nothing did happen. But, there was a lot of antiforeign, anti-American feeling.

They had to equip themselves, and then they went up the river by stages. They went by one steamer to Hangkow, and then another steamer to Ichang. Then, there was no way to go except by Chinese junk, houseboat. Speaking no Chinese, they could not travel by themselves. They found a man who worked for the Bible Society. I think he was taking supplies to the Bible Society, and they traveled with him. Mr. Davey, I think his name was.

They had a small daughter, Virginia, who was born in 1905 before they left for China. She was one of the first children born in Alta Bates hospital. [Berkeley, California] Her picture used to be in the lobby of Alta Bates as one of the first babies born there.

Anyway, the baby got sick--with dysentery, I suppose--and died, I think, five or six days before they got to Chungking.

Then, my father came down with malaria, which he had very badly and continued to have recurrent attacks of. So, they had to stay in Chungking for a long time.

The final stage of the trip was a ten day overland journey by sedan chair. It's about 250 miles from Chungking to Chengtu. They left San Francisco in November, 1905. It was May, 1906, before they finally got to Chengtu.

J. Service: But, this is a diversion from your question--which was what? Do you remember?

Levenson: Yes. [laughter] We're--what--five years before the fall of the Ch'ing dynasty?

J. Service: Oh, yes. I think that things were fairly peaceful under the dynasty as far as Szechwan was concerned. My parents went away every summer to various places. to Omei Mountain. One year they made a trip to Tatsienlu, on the Tibet border. I don't think there was much internal disturbance. There were problems of banditry--but that was always there apparently--and poverty.

Perhaps in 1910, but certainly in 1911, there was a great uproar in Szechwan about railways. There was talk of building a railway from the east into Szechwan province. The Szechwan gentry were extremely desirous, extremely anxious, that this not be given over to foreigners to build. So they raised some money to build a railway themselves.

In 1911, Sheng Hsuan-huai signed an agreement for foreigners to build the railway. This caused a tremendous uproar, riots and so on, locally. This actually preceded the outbreak in Hangkow and Wuchang on October 10. Some weeks earlier in Chengtu there were riots, and all the foreigners were called into a large compound that was owned by the Canadian Methodist mission. We all lived for some weeks in the new hospital that was just finished.

Then, finally things got so out of hand so that there was fighting between various groups. The foreign consuls decided to evacuate everyone. [1911] They all came down river, and eventually my parents ended up in Shanghai. My father was soon sent to Nanking. So he was in Nanking in 1912 for a few months when Sun Yat-sen was setting up the Republic.

The Y was very much in the center of things because many of the people who were active in the YMCA became leaders in the new government, C.T. Wang and people like that. A lot of the people who were American-trained or active in the YMCA were prominent in the early days of the government. After Yuan Shih-kai took over, some of them had to take a back seat.

The Far West of China: A Pioneer Life

J. Service: When my father went to Chengtu, where there had been no Y at all, he had to really start from scratch. At the same time he had to learn Chinese, which he did at home.

He got a teacher who came in every day in the morning. He sat down at a table and read Confucius, the classics, or whatever the textbooks were. The teacher, of course, knew no English and one sort of fumbled or stumbled along.

My father learned to speak extremely well. He was absolutely superb in his spoken Chinese.

Almost at once he was forced to begin speaking. He had to start dealing with workmen remodeling his house, trying to get acquainted with students, trying to widen his circle of acquaintances, trying to call on gentry and leaders in the community because he had to have their support. He had to get people of substance to act as directors and so on. So eventually he became a marvelous speaker of Chinese--local Szechwanese dialect, pure and perfect Szechwanese.

The Chinese used to love to hear him because he was so good and could joke and all the rest of it. My father actually never learned to read and write very well, which puzzles me a little bit because I don't know how he conducted Bible classes. I don't think that he could read enough to read the Bible. How he got along--some way or another. Maybe he had someone else read the texts.

But my mother didn't become very fluent. She could speak to get along socially and with the cook. She had to teach the servants everything they knew. She started with raw country boys from the village, shall we say, who had never seen a foreigner, most of them. She taught them how to cook and make bread. My father loved baking powder biscuits and this and that. So, obviously she could manage. But she never learned to read and write, never really spoke very well.

Levenson: Did you eat the nearest approximation to Western food that the servants could manage, or did you ever eat Chinese food?

J. Service: [chuckle] We lived Western. Once a week we had Chinese food. It was a big event. Saturday noon we had Chinese food. We all liked it. Later on when I got a little older, every Saturday noon we boys would go over to my father's office at the Y and

J. Service: then go out with him and have Chinese lunch, usually with some of his Chinese colleagues, secretaries in the YMCA. This was always a big day of the week.

We loved Chinese food, but the rest of the time we ate foreign. My mother taught each cook. We had several cooks. Finally we got this one man--Liu P'ei-yun, who stayed with my parents then for many years--who became a very good cook.

Everything had to be done. It was like living in a pioneer settlement in a way. The local salt was coarse and very black, gray, so that we used to purify the salt. The sugar was coarse and brown. I don't know how we did it, but we actually refined the sugar. I don't know how my mother ever got it crystallized. The salt I think we just beat up with a mortar.

We bought Chinese flour, but we made our own laundry soap from lye and ash and fats. We bought, or saved pork fat.

Of course, there were no electric lights. We used kerosene lamps. There was no running water. There were no telephones. If you went out, you usually went by sedan chair which meant that we kept our own chair carriers.

We even kept our own cow for many years because there was no way of getting milk which was dependable.. Apparently, we even took the cows to the mountains in the summer sometimes.

But, you lived a very self-sufficient kind of life that required a lot of work and supervision. If you wanted to communicate with anyone else you sent a coolie with what we called a chit, a note, around town.

We had our own well. But all water had to be boiled. The well wasn't very deep. The water table was maybe ten or twelve feet down. All sorts of unsanitary things were going on around, of course. There were no sewers or anything like that in town. So all water that was to be drunk had to be boiled. You ate nothing that was raw, uncooked.

The "Y" as Window to the West

J. Service: It took my father several years of preliminary work before the Y really got going.

J. Service: First my parents started by having classes at home. Chinese students came to their home for classes in English and, if they could get them interested, Bible studies. Most Chinese students wanted just to learn about the West. The West was a subject of great interest to this new generation, this modernizing generation.

They had a steady series of visitors, callers, people who just wanted to see foreigners, or get acquainted with foreigners. Mother had a group of Chinese ladies who used to come in. But all this required a lot of tea, refreshments, that sort of thing.

But I think my parents felt that it was desirable for them to try to live in a foreign, Western way. Earlier missionaries had tried to merge in a Chinese community, had dressed in Chinese clothes, worn queues and so on. This was partly because of intense anti-foreignism. They didn't want to be conspicuous.

But, by the time that my parents came along, the great attraction of the YMCA was that it represented new things. It represented the West, and there was a great interest in the West. A lot of these people that came to the house would have been hurt if they had just received some Chinese refreshments. They wanted to see Western things. They wanted to learn about the West.

The foreign community did some relief work during the war (World War I), ran bazaars. One very popular thing they did one time was to run a coffee and doughnut shop, or coffee and hot biscuits I think. Tremendously popular. Chinese would come in, and some people came every day while the thing was running, because coffee, foreign refreshments, and cakes were something that was new and strange and exotic and exciting.

I'm not sure that my parents were conscious of this. They may not have thought of it. But, certainly they were exemplars of the West and of Western ideas and Western ways of living. So, I don't think my parents felt any guilt about living in a Western way, because this was what they represented and what the Chinese wanted.

Some Chinese came to them and asked them to have a club which used to meet at the house occasionally. A club of men and women together, young men and young women, who were coping with all the problems of getting rid of Confucian ideas of arranged marriages and so on and who simply wanted to meet with some foreigners, my parents in this case, and learn about how man-woman relations, relations between the sexes, were handled in the West, what Western society was like, learning new ways, getting rid of the Confucian ways.

Levenson: Was there any opposition that you recall to this amongst the more conservative Chinese families?

J. Service: I suppose there must have been. I'm sure that these people themselves were subject to criticism from their elders, yes. There was a lot of generational conflict going on all through that period certainly.

These people, of course, were talking about such things as making their own marriages. Mrs. Chao here in Berkeley is one of the pioneers.* She made up her own mind that she was going to marry Y.R. [Chao].+ Of course, he apparently agreed too. But, it was quite a famous early case of revolt against the old Confucian family idea, arranged marriages. It was about the time that we're talking about in China. I'm not sure when Y.R. and Buwei got married, but it was probably about this time.

Levenson: 1921.

J. Service: 1921. Well, we're talking about a little bit earlier than that.

Levenson: Both of them had arranged marriages, had engagements that they had to break.

J. Service: Yes, yes, that's right. But, I don't remember any criticism that was overt or violent or that involved my parents, at least not that I know of.

Levenson: It's an interesting concept when you think of what has been going on at the Y in the 60's and 70's--

J. Service: Yes.

Levenson: --the encounter groups and so on, that already in the context of its period, back in the 1910's, the Y was facilitating relations between the sexes.

J. Service: Oh, yes. That's right. That's right.

Levenson: Do you remember seeing Westerners dressed in Chinese style?

*Buwei Yang Chao, Autobiography of a Chinese Woman, 1947.

+See Yuen Ren Chao: Chinese Linguist, Phonologist, Composer, and Author, an interview by Rosemary Levenson, Regional Oral History Office, The Bancroft Library, University of California, Berkeley, 1977.

J. Service: Oh, yes. There were some of the older people, particularly in small outstations, who still wore Chinese clothes. The China Inland Mission, and some of the more conservative groups, still went on that idea.

But in a place like Chengtu, which was a metropolis, I don't think any foreigners wore Chinese clothes by this time.

There were no hotels, of course, in a place like Chengtu. It was the end of the line, so many foreign visitors stayed with us. In a place like Hangkow or Ichang, which were transit points, the missions would set up a sort of a hostel, a missionary home, or something like that. But, in Chengtu there was nothing like this. People would come to Chengtu for missionary conferences or meetings, or an occasional tourist--but they had to be pretty determined tourists. There was a man named Harry Frank who walked around China and wrote some books about it. A man named Geil visited all the capitals of China and wrote a book about it and also a book about the Great Wall. There was a professor named E.A. Ross from Wisconsin, a sociologist, who wrote a book about China. He stayed there. A lot of people in Szechwan came to Chengtu because they needed dental work or medical care.

Levenson: It seems that your mother and your father entertained a most extraordinary number of guests throughout the year, the teas for students--

J. Service: Yes, well, this was an important part of their work, particularly in the early phase of getting acquainted. I think it tapered off a good deal as children came along and she became more busy at home. But certainly before the Y was set up, formally set up and they had buildings, a lot of Y activity was getting acquainted with students, university students, and university teachers. A lot of this was done at the house.

Always, of course, Chinese called on formal occasions, such as New Year's time. My father's fortieth birthday was a tremendous affair because in China traditionally when you reach forty, you enter on old age, you become venerable. By forty, one should have grandchildren. So, when my father reached forty there was an all-day-long procession of people that came to congratulate him and fire off firecrackers and so on, and they all had to be fed.

One thing I just remembered. In the early days when I was seven or eight, like most missionaries, we had morning prayers with the servants all expected to come and join in. Then, somehow this practice just stopped. I don't remember when or why, but eventually we didn't have prayers in the morning.

J. Service: I think that it was somewhat artificial. Most of the missionaries expected their servants to become Christians. My father may have felt that it was a little unfair to put this pressure on them. It did seem a bit uncomfortable and formal.

We had a wonderful old gardener. He may have been a Christian, a real Christian. Some of the others may have gone through the motions. But, I think that the old gardener probably was the only real Christian.

Eventually my father got separate premises for the Y and it gradually grew until it had fifteen hundred members or so and quite an active program of schools and classes of all kinds. The Y was dependent largely on the goodwill of officials, but also on local support. When they finally built a permanent Y the government actually donated the land. It was quite a large site near the center of Chengtu.

Local warlords usually contributed, helped the Y, were friendly to the Y, attended the Y.

Even before the Republic, before the Revolution, the viceroy came to the opening of the YMCA in Chengtu, which was a noteworthy honor in those days. The provincial viceroy actually attended the opening ceremonies in 1910.

Levenson: Would you say that was a tribute to your father's particular skills?

J. Service: Well, I don't want to blow the horn excessively. I suppose you can say that it was partly because of my father's skill in making friends with Chinese. But the viceroy's acceptance of the invitation was not based on a personal relationship between the viceroy and my father. It reflected the fact that my father had won support of influential members of the local gentry.

Strains and Hardships in Grace Service's Life

Levenson: You mentioned your sister's death. Was this felt in any way to be China's "fault?" Was your mother bitter?

J. Service: I don't think my mother felt that it was China's fault, but it certainly contributed to her very, very strong concern about sanitation and health. Reading things like Golden Inches,* the long, unpublished autobiography she wrote in the 1930's, I realize now, much more than I did then, how repelled she was

*Grace Josephine (Boggs) Service, "Golden Inches," 475 page typescript written 1936-1937 in Shanghai and Claremont, California. On deposit in The Bancroft Library.

Letters From China

The letters which follow, with the exception of those from Miss Soo-Hoo, which were written to a friend in this country, were sent us at the instance of Mr. Arnold. They suggest very concretely

what the daily grind may be on the other side of the world. Two additional letters, from Martha Huffaker Chen '17 and Paul Chatom '14, will appear in the personal columns in later issues.

THE Y. M. C. A. IN CHINA

By Roy Service '02

Roy Service, whose name is very familiar to all alumni and to undergraduates as well, has sent us a most interesting account of his twenty years in China, which is, unfortunately, too long to be included in full. We print the following excerpts, with regret that it has been necessary to omit the most colorful and dramatic portions.

THE work of the Y. M. C. A. in China has developed along pretty much the same lines as in America. Find out what your local Association is doing and you can be sure that in Chengtu we have been doing many of these same things, with variations, of course, because of the different conditions under which we live and work. There are clubs among the grammar school boys. Thousands of poor boys owe whatever chance they have ever had to gain an education to the "Y" free night schools.*



ROY SERVICE, '02's long distance man, seated among a group of Provincial Government officials and prominent citizens of Chengtu, capital of Szechuan, the Texas of China, to whose 60,000,000 inhabitants he has introduced the Y. M. C. A. He is holding on his lap one of the millions of potential Chinese presidents which the province claims.

Lectures and Bible classes and problem discussion groups have been carried on among the students of the government schools. Hundreds of boys have gone out of our Association school into business life or government service. We have had a share, too, in the development of interest and participation in athletic games. We have used lantern slides and the stereopticon a great deal in educational and religious lectures; and have had a good share in bringing in moving pictures for entertainment and educational purposes.

We have pushed campaigns for public health. To popularize "Swat the Fly," we made and gave away thousands of fly swatters. Many have followed our example, so that today in the city of Chengtu the fly swatter is as common a sight as in any American city. In times of epidemic we have co-operated with the police in helping to educate the public on preventive measures. In times of famine, the Association has had a leading part in the securing and handling of relief funds.

Besides the regular lines of work we are called on to give help along special and unusual lines. A merchant wants to appeal to foreign trade. He has written out an advertisement in Chinese. Will we please translate it into English? We do it. Or perhaps he needs a sign in English to put up outside his shop, and wants us to plan out the sign. We do it. A father wants to transmit some money to his son who is studying down river or in Japan or in America. Can we find a way? We can and do. A member has fallen under the spell of a Montgomery Ward catalogue. He wants to send a mail order. Will we please advise him as to the things best suited to his needs, figure out the cost and write the letter and transmit the money? We are pleased. The governor becomes interested in a question of the feasibility of shallow-water motor boats for transportation purposes and for river patrol. Could we secure full particulars for him? We do our best, but it requires letters, telegrams and cablegrams. A business man wants to become the agent for some foreign firm. Will we write letters of introduction and help him to establish connections with them? We do, if we think the man is O. K. and the firm a good one. The provincial government is thinking of floating a foreign loan with certain special taxes as security. The man who brings together the government representatives and the people who have money to loan will receive a very tidy commission, if the deal goes through. Needless to say, a lot of people are willing to act in the capacity of go-between. The Y. M. C. A. has American connections. Therefore, can we not put the government representatives in touch with interested capitalists? We cannot. The best we can do is to write about the matter to the American Consul in Chungking, or pass the word on to the British Consul of Chengtu.



The Chengtu Y. M. C. A., situated in the heart of a city of 500,000 people and boasting 1500 members, is a monument to the work of Roy Service '02. In establishing this "Y," he broke all records for long distance running, reaching a point as far west in China as habitation would permit, on the border of Tibet the Texas of China.

* In 1923 the Association headed a movement of educational and religious organizations which had over 100 of these free schools running at one time with 10,460 poor boys and girls studying in them.

I could continue for a considerable space to enumerate different services that we have been asked to render during these years. As students have returned from abroad in increasing numbers, and development has taken place along the new lines, these unusual requests are more and more taken care of by Chinese outside the "Y." Thus we have been able to give a larger part of our time to the more regular, though perhaps less spectacular, lines of work.

During these fifteen years since the coming of the Republic, there have been frequent periods of disturbances. At such times the "Y" has rendered and still continues to render a special sort of service. When conditions become acute from a political or military point of view the "Y" becomes a haven for civilians in danger or distress. In our membership are leading men of all parties and factions. They know that the "Y" absolutely refrains from any political dabbling, and its neutrality has never been questioned. Because of this fact we have been able to serve thousands of people in troubled times.

My wife and I are entering into our second twenty years of life out here, strong in the faith that China will eventually work her way through to peace and unity and a new life; and that the New China will have important contributions to make to the progress of the world as we move onward to "that far-off divine event toward which the whole creation moves."

R. R. SERVICE '02.

TEACHING AT NAN-KAI

Peitaiho Beach, North China.
July 24, 1925.

My Dear—

. . . . The middle of the summer vacation has arrived, so that at last I can settle down to write letters to patient friends. We are again at the summer resort where we



NETTIE SOO-HOO '17 (Extreme left)

spent so many happy months before, and are getting the thorough rest that we need. I have worked hard, much harder than I would believe possible if I did not go through it myself, but I have accomplished a

number of things I can be proud of. Do let me air my few hobbies, and allow me to tell you how I spent my time and energy this last school year.

Of course I have been teaching regular hours. I try my level best to get ignorant freshmen to write the English language properly, or rather less improperly at the same time that I try to convince descendants of admirers of Confucius that English literature is worth investigating. Incidentally I read about a hundred compositions a week, and when I am not doing this or the others of my odd jobs, I mother two clubs that the students are especially fond of. I can bank my last month's salary (which is almost all gone) that you never thought of me as a severely critical director of a play, or a hopeful believer in the happy quality of sounds that are forced through young throats in singing, and yet in the first semester I coached (really coaxed) a dozen members of the English Club to produce Moliere's "A Doctor in Spite of Himself," which is terribly funny. In the second semester, after much practicing, we managed to prepare a program of twenty-five odd numbers that were

guaranteed to exercise forty voices in various combinations and entertain some three hundred curious spectators, who were come to see our sweet girl singers in their fresh summer dresses and guileless smiles.

China is still upside down, and we have been constantly entertained with wars, rumors of war, actual flying for safety in the face of danger and whatnot. In the last year or so we have been twice forced to seek safety in the city, as defeated soldiers were expecting to work havoc everywhere they went, looting, burning, assaulting and generally creating terror. Our campus being on the outskirts of the city, we were more exposed to pillaging than we would like. At times, these wretched soldiers did get in, but because we gave them food, clothing and a little money—all they wanted—they did no harm. The war is not over yet, but we are breathing a little more easily, as operations are not carried on here now.

NETTIE SOO-HOO '17.

CUSTOMS IN CHINA

September 21, 1926,
Hunchun, Kirin Province,
Manchuria, China.

My dear Mr. Arnold,

I am afraid that I have been rather remiss in answering your valiant appeals for "just a little story," but the truth of the matter is that my own private "Powers That Be"



HUN-CHUN CUSTOMS STATION

have been rushing me about this unhappy land at such a rate in the past few months that I have not had time to settle down and attempt to figure out just exactly where I am, and how I came to be there.

To begin with I was in Mukden, but that satisfied no one but my own humble self, so there was nothing for it but to do a "Ch'u Ch'u kuang-i-kuang" amidst war, pillage and many groans to Wuhu, where I did my best to look wise behind a desk in the Native Customs in that port. Presumably my attempts were so successful that once more these mythical "Powers That Be" thought better of it, and as a consequence I find myself up here in the back of beyond in charge of a small border sub-office. I sincerely hope that I will now be left to stew in my own juice and, I am told, such will undoubtedly be the case.

There is not much to be said for this place, other than that it really is on the map, though far from making any noise about it; in fact it is so small, so quiet and so far away from the toil and trouble of this redoubtable planet of ours that one might almost believe oneself safely dead and buried. But even here we have our "vale of tears," for I am instructed that it is my awful and set purpose to waylay and corral with any and every means at my disposal (unfortunately for the awful and set purpose I have not yet discovered all the necessary means) all movements of cargo back and forth across the Sino-Korean and Sino-Russian frontiers and to levy duty thereupon. For this purpose one has a staff of two foreigners and some twenty Chinese, all to control some four hundred miles of wild and mountainous frontier; dark indeed are the ways of the Authorities.

Yours sincerely, G. M. LANDON '23.

J. Service: by the lack of sanitation, the conditions of the inns, the pigsty next to where you were sleeping, and all the dirt and filth, the general living conditions.

I think that it contributed to her--alienation is too strong a word. But, she dropped out more and more--partly because she got more interested in other things--from my father's work. She became, I think, disappointed. Embittered is too strong a word. After the revolution [1911], for instance, they should have gone back on furlough to the United States. Every six years you were supposed to have a sabbatical in the United States. But the YMCA had not succeeded in getting anyone else to go to West China on a permanent basis. There had been a couple of people who for one reason or another couldn't stay. My father had had to evacuate. [1911] He didn't want to come out, but he had been ordered out. He felt he had to go back to Szechwan. The Y wanted him to go back to Szechwan to get things started again, make sure everything was all right. So, he went back, you see, and it wasn't until 1915, ten years after they went out to China, that he had his first furlough.

He always put the Y first. This is a pattern that was repeated time after time. My mother felt that the family was second, and that he did much more for the Y and gave himself to the Y more than he needed to and neglected the family. It's a pattern that, shall we say, repeated itself later on, in my case I think.

Levenson: Did your father become involved with Chinese politics?

J. Service: He actively supported the students in the 1920's when the Kuomintang was coming to power, the period of the May 30th incident in Shanghai and all the rest of 1926, '27. He was in favor of the foreigners giving up extraterritoriality and the imperialist apparatus that annoyed, that infuriated, the Chinese so much.

Levenson: Did this make him very unpopular with the so-called European community?

J. Service: I'm not sure because I was out of China then. But, I don't believe it did. I think most of the missionaries that they were close to tended to agree with him.

Most of the time we were way up west in Szechwan province, hundreds of miles from any guns or any gunboat. We were at the end of the line. Going up and down through the Yangtze Gorges, if soldiers or bandits were firing from the banks at the boat,

J. Service: they would go up and sit behind the armor plate in the bridge, things like that. But, I don't think there was any conflict between my father and other missionaries.

There were some old-line missionaries, I think, that were less inclined to see the merit of the students' arguments because, the students wanted to take over control of the foreign schools and universities. They thought that the Chinese government should set the curriculum and really have effective control of the mission institutions. I think that probably some of the missionaries opposed that. The Chinese weren't ready yet, was the general theme.

But my father didn't have very much contact with the business people--certainly not in Chengtu. It wasn't a Treaty Port. There wasn't any foreign business community there really.

Levenson: Did the recurrent violence in China affect your daily lives?

J. Service: Well, you see, what happened in Szechwan was that after the Revolution, 1911-12 Revolution, things really fell apart. Szechwan was fought over by a lot of Szechwanese, but also became a hunting ground for people from other provinces, especially Kweichow and Yunnan.

When Yuan Shih-kai tried to become emperor, the revolt actually started in Yunnan, and the leader Tsai led an army from Yunnan into Szechwan province in 1916 to give battle to the local commander, who had bet on Yuan Shih-kai. The Yunnan army stayed on and on in Szechwan. Almost every year, in these years we're talking about, there was fighting going on--this was a part of the life. Some of it was very bloody, some of it not so bad; but almost always with looting, first by the defeated or evacuating army and then, of course, by the victorious army. Each side grabbed what it could.

Sometimes they would persuade the chambers of commerce, the leading businessmen to pay them--a ransom, in other words. But, if the ransom wasn't paid, or even if the ransom was paid, there would still be looting and burning.

Levenson: Did this affect your day-to-day life?

J. Service: Oh, sometimes. There was one period when we all moved down into the ground floor of the house because the compound had mud walls. We moved into the ground floor and lived and slept in my father's library because, in addition to the mud walls, we

J. Service: were surrounded by bookcases. We put mattresses against the windows. There was artillery fire going across the city from one side to the other, from one camp to the other, passing over our area.

There was a mission hospital, an American Methodist Mission hospital which for some reason was not being operated. Whether they just didn't have money or what--I don't know. But, it was empty. The missionary community thought they ought to do what they could. So they opened it on an emergency, temporary basis to take care of the hundreds of wounded soldiers.

I was, I suppose, maybe ten. Anyway, I volunteered. Some of us children volunteered to act as orderlies and fetch-and-carry boys, boy scouts. I remember it was a terrible, terrible thing to see these wounded people. Most of them had been wounded several days before. The fighting was some distance away at that time. The wounds had not been properly dressed or taken care of. So, they were suppurating and so on--awful. I remember having to leave the operating room where the doctor was cutting. I went outside and was sick. I just couldn't take it.

The foreigners did what they could. My father was always helpful in things like this. Several times he actually was able to act as a go-between, mostly to save people that were caught in between the firing. He was known to people on both sides, to officials, to the generals, and so on.

In fact, he was so well known that the British consul general--there wasn't any American consul in Chengtu, never was. The nearest American consul was in Chungking, and that was only part of the time. Most of the time the nearest American consul was six, seven hundred miles away in Hangkow. But, the British consul general made a protest at one time to the American legation in Peking about my father's having contact with officials. The consul thought that only he should have contact with the officials and resented my father's being on very good terms with the local generals, the top people!

Levenson: So, he was doing para-diplomacy.

J. Service: Well, he was getting along. He had to.

Levenson: You describe so calmly a situation that would be truly horrifying to most people--warlords fighting, bleeding bodies being brought in, et cetera. How did this all affect your mother?

J. Service: I suppose it affected her more than us. She was conscious of the dangers. Children can adapt, and like excitement. Let me jump ahead to an episode in the Chungking days. We spent the summers, like most of the foreigners, in bungalows along the top of hills on the south bank of the Yangtze, across from the city. One summer--I think it was '23--a Kweichow general, from the south, decided to take over Chungking. These wars were usually more skirmish and maneuvering than hard fighting. For several days, the defenders' front line was along our range of hills. Then, one night the attackers made a night attack. Altogether, spread about, there must have been a good many thousands of troops. And Chinese make a night attack very theatrical and frightening. Everyone shouts "Sha! Sha! Sha!" ("Kill! Kill! Kill!") and fires their guns into the air or at anything that looks like a target. The defenders fired a few shots but discreetly fled, long before the attackers got close.

While all this was going on, the servants had come into the house--their quarters were flimsy lath and plaster, while the house was brick. And we were all lying together on the floor to get below the level of the windows. Actually, we children were under the beds. The house was dark (we assumed lights would draw fire) and stood on a sort of elevated terrace. A group of soldiers --I suppose a squad--came charging up the steps to the front door, which had glass in the top half. My father decided he had to go out and tell them we were foreigners. In fact, he was shouting that, but the din was so great that the soldiers couldn't hear him.

Just as my father had his hand on the knob, a soldier outside--the leader, I assume--fired his rifle from the hip. The bullet shattered the glass and passed just in front of my father's forehead. But some of the pulverized glass bounced into his eye. He fell to the floor, and thought he was blind. But he was able to tell them we were foreigners and to ask the name of their general. When they told him, he said, "I know him"--which was true. The soldiers were sorry, but we didn't know for several days whether Dad would lose his sight. He didn't. To go back to your question: this sort of thing was obviously hard on my mother.

Levenson: You wanted to tell me about your boyhood in Chungking and an incident that occurred.

J. Service: This was in the summer of 1923 I think. It was actually at the same time that my father was nearly shot by this soldier during a night attack. That morning, we three boys had gone down along the range to see some friends. Foreign houses were

J. Service: scattered over several miles up and down the hills. We took with us a Daisy air rifle which our parents had bought from Montgomery Ward. We met a patrol, sort of an advanced patrol. Apparently these were incoming warlord troops from Kweichow. They were very much interested in our air rifle. They thought it was some fancy, new, foreign type of rifle [laughter] which was very much something they would like to have.

So they stopped us and questioned us and wanted to know about that rifle. Naturally, we didn't want to lose it. So my brother Bob tried to explain to them--he spoke the best Chinese of any of us--he tried to explain that it was just driven by ch'i. "Ch'i" is rather a vague word in Chinese but usually means air or gas.

Finally Bob said, "My brother there--" (I was holding the rifle) "I'll stand here and my brother will shoot me in the chest and you'll see what happens." [laughter] He had a khaki shirt on, I suppose. So he stood bravely--I suppose he was eleven or twelve --and I shot him in the chest with the air rifle. We convinced the soldiers that the rifle was not one they wanted. [laughter] They let us go on our way.

That night, of course, things turned much worse.

Speaking of the effect on the kids, after these various episodes of war, we found we could pick up all sorts of stray bullets, stray ammunition. We started a collection of various kinds of gunpowder, various kinds of bullets. We would pull a bullet out of cartridges that hadn't gone off, you know. Of course, we got many different kinds because every Chinese warlord army had arms from wherever they could get them. There might be old Russian stuff, and old Japanese stuff, and locally made Chinese stuff, different arsenals, different sizes, different kinds of powder.

We'd been having typhoid shots. So, we had a lot of these little bottles that typhoid vaccine used to come in. We had these all lined up, different kinds of powder from these various shells which we quite casually had unloaded ourselves with a pair of pliers. [laughter]

Reading my mother's notes, I was reminded of a time when the attackers had seized a peddler, a man who was at least dressed up and acting as a peddler selling food or something, down at the gap below our house. The road came up to a gap in the hills there.

J. Service: They accused him of being a spy, and they hung him up from a tree this way with his arms behind him [stands and puts hands behind back] and then suspended him, just lifting him off the ground, which is a very painful way, and they they beat him on the back with split bamboo. Of course, he was screaming bloody murder. It went on all day, more or less. We went down and watched. My mother was not very happy about that.

But, you know, China was a cruel place in those days. I think we accepted these things since they were a part of normal, daily life, and they didn't affect us nearly as much as they did my mother or as they did Caroline when she came to China after we married.

Caroline's reactions to China simply surprised me. We were in Yunnan, which was a very backwoods, undeveloped place when we went there in '33. She was much more put off by it than I was. It didn't bother me.

Levenson: Jack, you said you had a few things from our last session that you'd like to expand on a little bit.

J. Service: Well, I felt after we'd finished talking the other day that maybe I hadn't been quite fair to my mother. I'd given the impression that she had turned sour perhaps, or against, the missionary cause that my father was dedicated to. I don't think that's quite fair.

She had, of course, a harrowing introduction to West China with the loss of her child and then the serious illness of my father. She was plagued by ill health. It's obvious from reading her own account that she was suffering a lot of the time. Years later when she came to the States, the doctors at the Mayo Clinic thought she had probably had gallstones. She also had, I think, two miscarriages after the baby died, before I was born.

Probably I didn't mention the isolation of West China, the other day. It took two months usually to get there. That was before the steamer started running through the [Yangtze] Gorges, when you had to go by junk.

Levenson: From--?

J. Service: From Shanghai. It was six months perhaps to get an exchange of letters with her parents in the United States, or anybody in the United States. They used to order supplies, but it might take a year for the supplies to get there. Your magazines, your mail, everything, was always much delayed.

J. Service: There was a lot more housework than I think I mentioned. We lived a pioneer existence. My mother made marmalade from the skins of the oranges that we ate at breakfast. She made mince-meat, and did a lot of preserving.

There were no tailors, so she had to make clothes for all her children, besides her own clothes and the normal things of the house, the curtains and all the rest of it.

We had to do our own laundry, of course, at home. It was the time when men wore stiff collars, and she had trouble getting the servants to starch them properly; so, at times, she did my father's stiff collars and cuffs. It seems incredible to us now that they fussed about these things in West China!

She had to train new servants, really, from the ground up. They had never been in a foreign house before, and they had to learn everything.

So, I think by and large she did have a fairly hard life. Visitors often stayed and stayed a long time, but they were very welcome.

One thing that I remember as a child was that we always ate at the table, the family all together. It was the way my father's ranching family had eaten. They were a big family. My father carved.

It was always an occasion to have guests. I remember hearing my parents ask, "What's the news?" If visitors came from the States that was fine, but even if they came from Shanghai or down river, they had much more news than we had locally. So, there was always a lot of conversation and interest and excitement, having people visit and stay with us.

My mother did go on teaching in the Y even when she had three children at home. She usually taught at home, English, economics, and so on. Also they had night prayer meetings. Sometimes she was asked to teach older people who wanted to learn some English but didn't want to go to the YMCA and join a class with young people. For "face" reasons they would ask her to teach them privately, and this was usually done at home. So she did have quite a busy life.

Levenson: In her autobiography, your mother speaks of Chinese women friends, but she doesn't name any of them, as she does her American and other friends. Was she able to form friendships with Chinese women?

CHENG TU JANUARY 1919

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J. Service: No, I don't think really in any very meaningful way, not in an intimate way. (I have to keep peeling off layers of memory.)

In Chengtu when I was small there were very few Chinese women that were educated. Very few of them had gone to school. Even fewer had learned English to any real extent. Practically none of them had studied in the United States or studied abroad so that it was very difficult to establish communications, rapport. My mother, as I said before, never really mastered Chinese very well. She learned household Chinese, but she never learned enough Chinese so she could develop an intimate friendship, I would guess, with any of these women.

Also, entertaining was quite formalized. Most Chinese entertained at restaurants, and women normally were not included. If you were invited to a home it was usually an official home--and the women ate in the back rooms, they didn't eat with the men--so that it was a stilted occasion.

I just don't think that my mother--although she knew some of these women and they were interested in coming to the house--had friendships with Chinese women that took up very much of her time or were intimate.

Now, when she got to Shanghai [after 1925] things were quite different because in Shanghai there were a lot of Western-educated women, women who had either been educated in Western schools in China or had actually studied abroad. When she got into women's clubs and the women's group activities in Shanghai and in the national committee of the YWCA, she was thrown in close contact with many of this type of Chinese woman, and some of them she did get to know very well. Some of them were American-educated or actually American-Chinese women. But, it wasn't really until Shanghai that I would say that she developed real friendships with Chinese.

The Service "Hotel": Distinguished Visitors and Occasional Tourists

J. Service: Going back to what we said earlier--I've mentioned the fact that there were no hotels in Chengtu. I think that our house became a well known place to stay. It often had people there. Usually they were very interesting people. My father was rather fascinated by Tibet. So, he got to know some of the missionaries up there and was happy to have them stay with us.

J. Service: My father established contacts with some Chinese businessmen who used to trade in Tibet, for them to bring out Tibetan things and so on.

My mother loved to read and she read everything she could get. She ordered books from Shanghai and America. And the local foreigners exchanged books. Talk around the table was usually interesting.

Levenson: What notable "foreign devils" were there, either as residents or as visitors? You mentioned, before we turned the tape on, the [Walter C.] Lowdermilks.

J. Service: Oh, yes.

Levenson: I don't know whether they were up there at the time?

J. Service: I don't think he was, because they got married later on. She, Mrs. [Inez] Lowdermilk, was there in the Methodist mission. There was this E.A. Ross that I was speaking of from Wisconsin. There was a geologist from Oberlin that was out there. There were plant explorers that used to come through, like Joseph Rock, working for the U.S. Department of Agriculture. Occasionally a businessman. There was never anyone there in all the years we were there who represented the American government. No foreign consular officer got up that far.

As I say, we sometimes had a consul in Chungking, but not all the time. But, no American consular man ever got up as far as Chengtu. The British, of course, traveled much more, and they had the British consul there although it was not a Treaty Port.

There were people like [Eric] Teichman and [Alexander] Hosie who traveled for the British and went through Chengtu. They were checking things like the efficacy of the Chinese suppression of opium. But, this was before I remember things. This was the early years when they went through.

There was an American tourist, a wealthy woman named Tracy, Mrs. Tracy from Cleveland, Ohio, who had met my mother in Nanking, in 1912. She came back to China a few years later and went up through the [Yangtze] Gorges and up to Chengtu, which was quite a trip for a tourist in those days. She became a good friend of my mother's. When we came home on furlough in 1915-16, my mother went down to Florida to visit her in Palm Beach.

J. Service: Friendships with local residents tend to become very close when you are so isolated. My parents made many lifelong friendships with other missionaries that were there, mostly American but some Canadian. I think if you live together in isolated circumstances, you do tend to establish--well, you do in the Foreign Service too. You serve in a foreign post with somebody, then you're a friend for life.

The Family's Growing Love of China

Levenson: Did your father "fall in love" with China in the way that so many people did?

J. Service: Yes, I think so. It's a funny thing, how to describe people's attitudes towards something like China. He certainly developed a tremendously strong affection for the Chinese people, the Chinese people he knew and, I think for the Chinese people in general. He felt strongly interested in China, much concerned and involved in China. He was always optimistic about China, that things were going to come out all right. But this was part of his personality anyway.

All of us in China--although we never really were trained or educated in Chinese; we didn't go to Chinese schools; we didn't learn Chinese; we didn't even have Chinese playmates--almost all of us grew up with this strong attachment to China. It is a rather hard thing to account for.

Levenson: Why is it hard to account for?

J. Service: Well, simply because we led a very different, separate life. I never had any Chinese playmates. I grew up in China--spent all my childhood there--without learning to read or write anything in Chinese. I learned to speak Chinese from the servants, but my parents saw no advantage or necessity, desirability, of having me learn to read or write.

We never thought of going to a Chinese school. We eventually went to an American school in Shanghai which tried as hard as possible to be like a school in the United States. It had no Chinese students. It didn't teach courses in Chinese history or in Chinese language.

We lived in compounds separated, isolated, insulated from China in many ways. And yet, as I say, all of us that I know of, or practically all of us, who were B-I-C, Born in China, ended

J. Service: up with a tremendous nostalgia for China, a desire to go back to China, strong feelings of ties to China and particularly the Chinese people.

Now, I think that's the key. I think it's the people. Here's a random speculation. The real contact, clue, key, we had to China was our servants. The servants, by and large, were village people, country people. They came from the countryside into town to find work, and maybe they found work with us.

But, they all had the simplicity and honesty and virtues of peasants, country people. They devoted themselves completely to the family. Well, maybe they were in some ways like the mummies that we read about in the old days of life in the South. But these were not people who had any tradition of servitude. In the countryside they had never acted as servants. When they came to work for us there was never any humility or servility or anything like that.

They were people. They were independent people, and they worked for you, and they looked after your interests. They were completely devoted to the family, regarded themselves as almost part of the family, served the family I would say wholeheartedly. They were just good people. Maybe this has something to do with why so many of us liked China, because really the only China we knew was through our servants.

Jack's Early Memories: Western Style in a Chinese Compound

Levenson: Do you think that's enough about the background?

J. Service: [laughter] Yes, but I could go on and on if you want.

Levenson: What else?

J. Service: I'm over-prepared!

Levenson: Wonderful.

J. Service: Where are we? [reading agenda] Oh goodness, "Early memories." All right.

I was born in 1909. I was very late. Apparently, I was born three weeks or a month later than they expected me. My mother always said I had long fingernails when I was born, a sign

J. Service: that I was, what to say, not premature, postmature.

Levenson: Postmature, or else a mandarin. [laughter]

J. Service: I don't remember anything, of course, until the summer of 1912 when I was three. I mentioned that all the foreigners, including my parents, were evacuated in 1911, late 1911. My father came down to Shanghai, and then went to Nanking.

Then, after a few months in Nanking, he went back to Szechwan. He was very anxious, and the Y was anxious, for him to return to find what had happened and get things going again.

Families weren't permitted yet to return. So my mother went to Kuling which is up a mountain near Kiukiang, near the Yangtze River, and spent the summer there. I got very sick and apparently they thought that I'd had it. I have a vague recollection of a room, a very bare room, which I think was my sickroom. I remember the room spinning around. It's probably my first memory.

Then, after the summer we went down to Hangkow on our way back up the river to Szechwan to join my father. My mother got quite sick in Hangkow. She had recurrent bad health. I think that part of the whole picture of her reactions to China was that she was plagued with rheumatic fever, and, oh, various things. I've got some notes here. We don't need to go through them.

Anyway, she was sick in Hangkow. We had a servant who had been with my mother at the mountain, a Szechwanese, who had come down river with us. He used to take me out to the Bund in Hangkow every day for a walk. I remember the Bund. I remember walking down the Bund--it was an esplanade on the Yangtze--with my mother along with Liu P'ei-yun, this cook of ours.

Sometime in here I remember we were out on a little trip or a walk in the countryside. The paths between the rice fields in Szechwan were very narrow, [gesturing with hands about two feet apart] just maybe wide enough for two people to pass. I remember walking along this path and seeing a rather large, stout Chinese coming towards me and then suddenly finding myself in the flooded rice field.

I remember my mother was absolutely frantic about this because, of course, the rice fields were fertilized with what we always called night soil, human manure, which was raw usually. Therefore, everything was supposed to be highly unsanitary, as it really was. Well, my mother was simply beside herself till we could get someplace where all my clothes could be taken off, I could be scrubbed down, and so on.

J. Service: And her anger that this man has pushed me off the path--I have no recollection of the man actually pushing me off. I just don't remember what happened. He may have jostled me off. He may have just been unfriendly to foreigners. A lot of people were in those days. Or he may have felt that as a child I should have stopped and waited for him to go by, which probably a small Chinese child would have done, would have waited for the elder person, this man, to walk by.

My father, of course, was not agreeing that the man had pushed me off. My mother was sure that he had, out of meanness.

We came back to the States in 1915. I remember some things about coming back to the States. I remember my surprise, for instance, at seeing white men working on the docks. Of course, I had never seen any white man doing this kind of physical work before. The idea had never occurred to me. To see men on the docks in San Francisco loading and unloading cargo was very strange.

I went to the Panama Pacific Exposition. Then, we went out to Cleveland, Ohio, where my father spent the year working in the Cleveland YMCA. I remember first grade in a public school fairly well.

Most of my memories of Chengtu really are when we went back. We went back to Szechwan in 1916, after the summer in America. We lived in Chengtu then from 1916, and I went to boarding school in Shanghai in 1920. So that most of my memories of Chengtu are of the years when I was seven, eight, nine, ten.

Levenson: By then you had a brother, didn't you?


J. Service: Oh yes, I had two brothers. Bob was twenty-one months younger. Dick, Richard, was about five years younger than I was.

Levenson: You mentioned living in a compound. Was this a single family compound where you lived around the courtyard, or did you live in a Western style house?

J. Service: No, it was a Chinese-style house and it was a single family courtyard. It belonged to the Methodist mission. They had had for a while a school, a middle school I think it was, in the next-door compound. So, these two compounds were opened up. They gave that up and the YMCA used it at first for temporary quarters for the Y. Then, eventually, I think we moved over there, and another family came and lived in what had been our house. But, most of this early period we were the only family in this place, the only foreign family.

1. Asa B. Clarke (1814-?), great grandfather, photograph of daguerrotype, 1839, aet. 25.
2. W. S. Boggs, grandfather (1852-1942), and Grace Boggs, later Service, 1886.
3. Virginia Clarke Boggs with Grace Boggs Service, ca. 1889.
4. 1740 Oxford Street, Berkeley, fall 1905. Destroyed in 1923 Berkeley fire.
5. Robert Roy Service, father, 1898.
6. Robert Roy Service at the University of California, Berkeley, 1901.
7. Grace Service in wedding dress.
8. Roy and Grace Service on board ship, first trip to China, 1905. Baby Virginia died en route to Chungking.
9. Grace Service, Chengtu, 1906.

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J. Service: There were several different mission compounds. The American Methodists, the Canadian Methodists, the Friends, would each have their own separate compounds. Each compound normally had one afternoon a week or maybe one afternoon every two weeks for its "at home" in tennis. Everybody played tennis. They'd have tea. We would all go, of course, to the Canadian Methodists on their day and to the American Methodists on their day and play tennis.

My father and mother were very keen that we children should be independent, not wanting to be catered to or looked after, waited on by the servants. This was a big thing. We always had to pick up our own clothes and pack our own bags when we traveled, wash ourselves, and not let the amah give us a bath.

When we had the tennis at our place we always earned money by picking up tennis balls.

Home Studies: The Montessori and Calvert Systems

Levenson: How do you look back on your childhood in China? Was it a happy period for you?

J. Service: Oh, very happy. Yes, certainly. It was an odd life in the sense that it seems odd to have lived in a country and spent all your childhood there, and look back and realize that you never had a Chinese friend! We never played with Chinese children. I think for one thing, that my mother was terribly conscious about sanitation and so on.

Most of our servants didn't have children with them. The family was back--if they had a family--back in the village. I think our gateman at one time, or the cow coolie, did have his family with him. They lived out in the gate house. But, I don't think that the children of the servants would have played with the master's children anyway. I don't think there was that normal expectation.

In any case, my mother was simply obsessed that Chinese children were allowed to do things that we should not do, eat things we weren't allowed to do, and so on, so that we rarely saw them. Sometimes on Sundays there might be a visit to some family, university family or somebody in the Y, something like that.

Levenson: I've got a question down here on the agenda, what was your sense of identity as an American boy growing up in China? I know that's a hard one to answer.

J. Service: Well, how much identity does any child have?

Levenson: That's a good question!

J. Service: It's a matter of looking back on things now, of course, from a long time and a long distance. Looking back I'm surprised at the Americanness that my parents were so anxious--apparently anxious --to instill. We played mostly with American children, as I said, but also with some Canadians. But, we didn't go to the Canadian school. My mother felt that the school wasn't very good. It was just starting in. It was the equivalent perhaps of a one room or two room school in the early days in the United States. The teachers were usually untrained, whoever happened to be available, maybe some missionary daughter who had finished high school but hadn't gone on to college, or a wife who happened to be available.

My mother was a teacher. She had taught. After she finished at the U[niversity of] C[alifornia] and before she got married she had a couple years of teaching. At any rate, she thought the Calvert School was better.

But, also she wanted us to have an American education. She was very definite that we were coming to America eventually. We were going to an American school, American university. There was that feeling of identity.

The Americans always got together on Thanksgiving for instance. There was always some sort of a program on the Fourth of July. It seems odd that we would have, but maybe it's not odd for exiles far away from home to have put this stress on Americanness.

Obviously we felt very different from Chinese. We couldn't play with Chinese, as I mentioned. The Chinese were dirty and unsanitary. Yet, there was never any feeling of antipathy or hostility, nothing like that. My father obviously, as I said, loved Chinese. We liked our servants, and the servants were almost members of the family in some ways.

But, we did feel, I'm sure, a sort of a separateness, if not superiority, to Chinese. We were used to being considered as rather freakish, because if you traveled you were always

J. Service: surrounded by crowds of people, really crowds, who would keep pushing in closer and closer just to see you, just to look at you.

You were always called yang kuei-tzu, foreign devil, but without any particular animosity, because this was the only name that most of these children on the street knew for foreigners. "Look at the yang kuei-tzu! Look at the yang kuei-tzu!" as you went down the street.

Of course, in villages in the countryside, you had no privacy at all. If you had to stop at a restaurant for your noonday meal when you were traveling, they'd keep getting closer and closer till finally my father or somebody would say, "Please move back. Give us some air."

If you stayed in a Chinese inn, they would try to come into the room, but you could close off the room. Then they would wet their finger and poke it through the paper of the lattice windows. [gestures] That lack of privacy bothered my mother, I'm sure, much more than it did we children.

Levenson: Were you curious about America? I know you spent that year in Ohio.

J. Service: I don't remember being curious about it before then. Yes, I suppose we were curious. We read, of course, about America.

My mother was the political member of the family. She subscribed to The New Republic, I think, about as soon as it started. We got other magazines, Atlantic, and something called Survey or Survey Graphic which was published then. Century magazine was being published then. I think I read all of those. We also got things from Shanghai, The North China Herald, a weekly newspaper in Shanghai, and something called Millard's Review, which later on became the China Weekly Review. I suppose we were interested or curious about the United States, although I don't recall being much concerned.

Let me describe the day. Maybe that's the best thing to do.

My mother had started me when I was five on the Montessori system, which I think is sort of interesting, that she, way up in West China, had written and gotten a Montessori preschool outfit.

J. Service: So, I had learned how to read and write--read at least--before I started first grade. I was ready for first grade, and I had that in public school in Cleveland, 1915-1916.

My mother had talked to the teacher in the first grade. Because I could read before I started first grade the teacher said, "Well, obviously little Jack can go quite well. I think he can skip second grade."

My mother decided to order the Calvert School [curriculum], which is a home study system. But, it has only six grades. They do the eight grades in six years. She ordered the third grade in the Calvert system. So, in effect I skipped more than a year, you see.

Every morning the first thing to do, first order of business, was your classes, your schoolwork. The Calvert system sent out textbooks, daily assignment sheets, examination questions. You sent the completed examinations back to Baltimore to the head office and they graded them.

I would get up and get to my studies. As soon as you finished your studies for the day, you were free. So, I was very eager on this. I used to finish up, do my recitation, and I might be through by nine thirty or ten o'clock.

Then the day was yours. I was very fond of reading and my parents had the Encyclopaedia Britannica, the eleventh edition I think. I was very keen on--I'm talking now, oh, about eight, nine, ten years old probably--very keen on looking up things in the encyclopedia, categorizing things. I remember using the encyclopedia to look up all the Crusades and to study antelopes and various kinds of animals, one thing or another leading you on.

Maybe every other day or so we would go in the afternoon to some other compound, always in a sedan chair when we were small. Later on I would walk, but we always had a servant with us. Eventually we got ponies, Chinese horses, small horses. We'd play with children at this place or that place and come home.

We used to watch, of course, what went on around the house. We'd steal cookies from the cookie jar in the kitchen and watch the cook cooking the meals and so on, play around the compound.

Summers in the Mountains

J. Service: The big thing, I think, was the trips that we used to take. My father was very keen on finding a good place for the family to go in the summer. It was accepted that you couldn't stay in a place like Chengtu during the summer months because it was very damp, very hot and humid. There was a lot of disease, cholera and so on, in the summer time. Almost everyone tried to get away.

The family kept trying to find an ideal place, and finally my father found a mountain which rather stood out from the range that was north of the Chengtu plain. It was about six thousand feet high. The top of it had been a place of refuge. If a mountain was difficult of access, the local people would put a wall around the top, and when there was banditry, civil war, or other disturbance, villagers from the area would go up and take refuge.

Anyway, there was this old chai-tzu, they called it, up there at the top. It belonged to a temple in one of the villages near the foot of the mountain. My father rented this place, took a long-term lease on the top of the mountain. First we, and then quite a few people built small cottages up there on the top of the mountain.

When we took over this mountain--when my father started this summer colony you might say--it was completely undeveloped. So we all helped building trails and paths, connecting the houses and going out to scenic places.

We boys used to have a little secret hideout of our own, a little shack in the woods, a lean-to where we would go and fix lunches. Good fun, not too different from American boyhoods in a way, a place in the woods and so on.

So we went there for three or four months every summer. My father would take us up there and then go back to Chengtu--it was two days travel, fifty miles--and then come back, oh, maybe several times during the summer for a weekend or maybe a week or more.

But, always during the summer we would take a trip to the mountains. As I got older, each summer we would go further, explore new mountains.

J. Service: We were exploring. It was new country. Foreigners had never been to a lot of these places before. Each year we got higher, nine thousand, ten thousand, finally quite high. Eventually we got to fifteen thousand feet.

Levenson: You told me you had some footnotes from our last interview that you wanted to add.

J. Service: I think you asked me something about why we made these trips to the mountains every summer. I failed to mention what probably was the most obvious of all. That is, that both of my parents loved the mountains. They had a great feeling for nature. My mother, for instance, had John Muir's books--several of them. I remember reading some myself as a boy, particularly one about a winter trip that John Muir made by himself, climbing Mount Shasta.

This love of the mountains was carried over when we came back to the States, because every summer that we were here we went off with some of my uncles to the High Sierra.

Even in 1916, the family had a reunion at a place called Bass Lake which is a resort lake up from Fresno. But, in 1924 and '25, and again in '27 when I came here on the way to college, I went up with my uncles--my father and my uncles--up to Tuolumne Meadows. In those days that was quite a trip, dirt road, gravel road.

The road down to Lake Tenaya was a one-way road, you know, one hour up, one hour down. I drove with a cousin in an old Model T Ford, and the road was so steep at one point that we had to turn around and go in reverse. The gas fed the carburetor by gravity, so that if you had to go up a steep hill, it wouldn't reach the carburetor. Going backward we could make it.

It was quite a trip, but not nearly as much as when the family first started going there. My uncle--Fred Goodsell, who married my father's sister--has told me about going up with the Service family, camping in Yosemite valley in either 1903 or 1904 when they went by wagon.

The main purpose of these expeditions to the mountains was fishing. They really camped. They took sacks of potatoes and sacks of onions and sacks of this and that. We lived on fish and pancakes. The real purpose was fishing. But, I wasn't very keen on fishing.

J. Service: Every day we would go off to some fishing lake near the meadows, within walking distance. Then, I would decide what mountain I was going to climb. I would spend the day scrambling up one of the peaks around there. I climbed all the peaks within one-day walking distance of Tuolumne Meadows, I think. In '27 my cousin and I climbed Mount Lyell. At any rate I developed a liking for the mountains naturally.

J. Service: When I was growing up in China, the best part of the year, really, was the summer and these trips. Then, eventually, as I got older--when I was ten, nine and ten--why, we'd make a trip to the mountains in the winter because there was always snow up there, at six thousand feet. There was never snow in Chengtu. Chengtu was about fifteen hundred feet in elevation but practically never saw snow. We'd go up usually for, oh, five or six days in the winter time and see the snow.

Levenson: The topography of Szechwan--I remember Chen Shih-hsiang telling me--really does look like some of the fantastic Chinese scrolls. Was your sort of mountain like that?

J. Service: Well, not so much there. Through the Yangtze Gorges you get some of the scenery that you see in paintings. But, these mountains were really more alpine mountains, Matterhorn type. Hang on. [Brings out framed watercolor by A.C. Morse]

This is painted from our mountain. We were out in front of the main range, and you can see the main range back here in the distance. We gave names to these places. These are the Three Muffins over here and some peak called Chiu-feng up there.

[Interview 2: April 6, 1977]

J. Service: The high point of the summer, was when my father took us on vacation. My mother always said my father never took as much vacation as most other men did. But, he would take a week or ten days or so, and we would take a trip up into the mountains beyond our summer resort.

There were usually temples, incidentally, on top of these mountains, either Buddhist or Taoist temples. Both religions apparently shared the idea that the higher the mountain, the closer to heaven. So, there were old temples. By this time, after years of civil war and disturbance, they were generally in deplorable condition, but usually there were a few old monks there. We would stay at these temples.

The Winter Harvest: Ice Cream Making in Chengtu

J. Service: Yes. Let's go back to China for a minute. You asked me if there was anything else I could think of.

The last two winters in Chengtu we made the trip up the mountain. One reason we made those winter trips was that my father had a passion for ice cream. We couldn't have ice cream. There was no ice, you see, in Chengtu.

He had gotten the idea of building an icehouse up on the mountain. There was a caretaker to look after the bungalows, and he would put away ice, you see, in the winter. Then it would either be kept for the summer or we would send somebody up the mountain to bring it down.

Well, it never worked out very well because for one thing the Chinese just couldn't really fathom the wasteful idea of using--sawdust, mainly, for packing ice. They would never use enough sawdust to preserve it.

So, we went up to supervise the building and the filling of the icehouse. The ice wasn't very thick and the only source we had--there was no pond or anything--was cisterns. We had cisterns and we'd take ice. It was quite thin ice. [about one inch thick, gesturing] It never kept till summer. By summertime we never had any ice.

So, what finally happened was that along in April my father would send a man from Chengtu fifty miles up the mountain to bring ice down to Chengtu. We would know about when he should arrive, and everything would all be ready. The custard would be made, and we would expect the man in about four or five o'clock on the second day.

We had an awful time getting ice cream makers. We ordered stuff from Montgomery Ward. Every year we sent an order to Montgomery Ward, and it would take a year maybe for the order to get to Chungking. The first one, my father decided was too small. It was a two quart or something like that. Then, we got another. Finally we got a six quart freezer.

Before the man arrived the custard would all be ready. Then, the man would come puffing in with what was left [laughter] of the load of ice. Then, we would make ice cream.

J. Service: Again it was very difficult to get the Chinese to use enough salt. So, this meant we had to really do it ourselves because wasting salt--salt is very valuable and precious.

But we would finally get six quarts of ice cream. There were five people in the family. So, we couldn't eat it all. People would, of course, be invited in to help share the ice cream, the Yards and other friends. We gorged ourselves on ice cream about, maybe twice a year. All this building of ice-houses and so on, all it would produce was about three gallons of ice cream!

A Geographic and Ethnographic Trip into Tibet

J. Service: In the final year I was in Chengtu, in 1921 when I was just having my twelfth birthday, my father and two other men made a trip that they had talked about for years. It was over the range, and then into the Min River valley north of Kwanhsien and then into what was called "tribes country" where the people were all Tibetan peoples.

It was quite an intellectually active missionary society in Chengtu. [brings out journals] It had a West China Missionary News and the West China Border Research Society which was started in 1922, 1923. I wrote an article for the Missionary News on this trip that I'm talking about.

All these people felt that they were on the edge of things, on a sort of frontier. They were interested in research on the various ethnic groups of aboriginal peoples, Tibet and so on, and a lot of the pre-Chinese groups that were still living in Szechwan, Lolos and others.

Wherever they went, my father and these other people made notes and maps. My father carried a boiling point thermometer, a hypsometer, to get a very precise reading of the altitude, and aneroid barometers--things like that we always carried. Over the high pass, we got a reading of 15,300 feet on the barometer and 15,000 feet on the hypsometer.

All these places we went to in the summer trips were along a range north of where we were, which lay between us and the upper valley of the Min River, which comes down through Kwanhsien and waters the Chengtu plain.

J. Service: My father had heard, from talking around, that there was a trail over this big range that had been used, oh, ten or fifteen years earlier when the Chinese had really tried to put down opium production in West China, all of China. The Chinese had been fairly successful in stopping the production of opium in order to meet the British terms for stopping the importation of opium. As a result the price of opium in the Chengtu plain was very high and people would grow opium back in the mountains and smuggle it out across the mountains into Chengtu, into the Chengtu plain.

Anyway, there was supposed to be this opium smugglers' trail over this range. My father always talked about trying to cross the mountains into the Min River valley. So, this year, finally in 1921, we did it.

But when we started we didn't know very much about the height of the mountain or the distance. Our guide claimed that he'd been over it, but later on it turned out he didn't really know much about it. It took us much longer and was much more difficult and higher than we expected.

We expected a trip of about four days from habitation to habitation, four days to cross the range. We had supplies and food, but actually it turned out to take us a week, seven days. So, we ran out of food.

Levenson: How many people were on this trip?

J. Service: There were four Americans. My father and I and a doctor who had been doing a lot of anthropological work, mostly measuring skulls of the people along the Tibet border. He was trying to prove some theories by skull measurements. I don't know what it was. Then, there was another YMCA secretary, a colleague of my father's, named George Helde whose wife had died in childbirth the summer before. My mother had taken the child down to Shanghai. He'd just come back from the States.

We had, I think, about twelve load carriers because they couldn't carry very much in the mountains. I think a fifty, sixty pound pack was about all they could carry. Even though we were roughing it, for some reason we carried camp cots. My mother had made sleeping bags for us. We didn't know anything about things like mountain boots. I wore straw sandals which was what we always wore in the summer, these Chinese straw sandals.

Levenson: What did your mother make the sleeping bags out of?

Round Top, Behluding
Penghsien, Szechwan, China.
29 July, 1921.

Dear Mother,

I suppose you remember that funny German professor that acted so comical the time you and I were going to the Alumni Reception held in May, 1902, at the old Hopkins residence in San Francisco. Here is a card that I received from him this week! He had written to President Barrows of the University about Dr. Larsen who taught in Chengtu years ago; the President was asked to make inquiries about Dr. L. He had his secretary write to the Legation in Peking; the Legation wrote to him, so I wrote Prof. Putzker a letter. He would seem to be still young, if his handwriting is any index.

The house seems quiet. Bobbie and Dick are changing their clothes in their room and the only other person roaming around is Amah, who is dusting and cleaning in my bed-room. It is 9 a.m. and we have been up since 5--at least I have. Bob, George, Jack and Reg got off at 8.05. (Although Bob has been preparing for this trip for months and weeks still the last few hours are always busy ones with the departure of such an outfit.

[For the three men and Jack they had 10 carriers; each with about 50 lbs on his back. In addition to this each ~~man~~ carried his own food for six days or so. This was mostly in the form of dry corn bones made of the coarse native yellow meal. Then they took a "fu-teo", or headman, who carried a lantern and a few odds and ends. There was a guide, and two servants, both ours. Our table-boy went to do the cooking and the horse-boy went as coolie. Besides all this equipment Bob has sent a load of food to Weichow by the "big road". It has about 80 lbs of canned goods in it. The party ~~struck off this a.m. to go by an~~ opium smuggling trail, over which no white men have ever passed. It is said to be wild and to go into the high mountains. To go from here to Weichow by the ordinary road would take 3 days or 5½. The route they are taking may take 7, and there are practically no inns or villages on the way, so they have to take a tent fly to help out the poor stopping places for the night. These are in what the natives call "cliff nests"---sort of caves under crags. You see with the carriers they make quite a crowd. The men looked a strong, fine lot. They are all mountain fellows and jollied up well with Bob who always likes to start with the men feeling good.

There are two cameras in the crowd, two fine compasses, a ~~new~~ aneroid, which George brought out, hypsometers, thermometers, and what not. It's quite a scientific expedition. Everything they took had to be wrapped in oiled sheets, &c, and of course many things could not go in until the last moment. I had the cook make two 5-gal. oil tins full of sweatback for the trip. Anna Morse had some prepared, also. Then my cook baked 6 big loaves of fresh bread. (The poor thing has baked every day for a fortnight because we ourselves eat lots of bread all the time.)

Reg Morse is very keen to get head measurements, as in this country the aborigines have been practically left alone for all time. They are a new people to the civilized nations. He is taking instruments for measuring skulls, &c. The other day he was up here trying them on us. My "cranial index" is 81.21 while Bob's is 78.9. Reg says I have a "man's head". He is going to try to get some measurements while in there. Bob finally took 14 watches and hopes to barter them for some of the metals they use--pots, wine flasks, &c.]

The two little lads went down the hill a short distance this a.m. and then came back. I had them take off their soiled khaki things so they could put them in the laundry this a.m. As soon as the men left I scoured around and gathered up all the dirty things in the house and set "Old Five" at his work of washing.

[It was quite a job to get the men outfitted in more ways than re bread and sweatback. The latter will keep weeks in tight tins and when they pour boiling water on it and pour it off at once, adding butter or jam it is mighty good and strengthening. They can get no fruit in there ---it's wild, "cactus country", not wet like this side of the mountains---so they are taking dried prunes, jam, &c. They left with two roasted chickens (done in the fireless), cake, cookies galore, hard sweet chocolate, &c, &c. We have been preparing for the trip for a long time. Of course they took a minimum of clothing and only a few white enamel dishes. Reg is taking a tin box full of medicine, so they will be well looked after in case of need. Reg is older than George and Bob. Bob is the toughest and can stand the most, Geo. is next, Reg is older and quite portly. I think he and Jack will be about equal on endurance and Reg will be a good pace-setter.

Jack had sort of a bilious spell on Monday and had to stay in bed all that day. He has been stuffing pretty well since he got home, thinking the home fare better than that of the boarding school. He was quite frightened, I can tell you, because he feared he might lose out on the trip. He took medicine carefully and went slow on his eats. Reg said he was all right night before last and he seemed quite assusual yesterday, so he was fit to go.]

The last week there has been no letter from you. Tell Father to take a tape (or you do it for him) and measure his head around the place where the hat fits him. Geo thinks it will not suffice for him to send us his American "head size"--to use in buying him a hat here. That is one reason that I did not send him the hat this summer. We sent one to the Coast for a friend and it was too small. They have head sizes in the hats, but they are not accurate by our standards. I am glad if Father will like one of those hats---it is nice to know something we can get here that he would care for.

I did not tell you of Bob's wonderful sleeping bags, made of washed silk floss in quilts, sewed up. They are very light and extremely warm. He has two and Jack has two, both of them have oiled sheet covers for them. They also took cots and plenty of "bug powder". After they leave Weichow they are to push on

under the guidance of a servant of Yao Bao San's. This Yao is an old friend of ours--a rich lumber merchant, who brings down logs from the upper reaches of some of the rivers in that high country. His man is now awaiting the party at Weichow.

Bob has taken both his rifle and shot-gun and I hope he will get a little game. He should in such wild hills. The ammunition and guns are heavy enough. He will feel provoked that he took them if he gets nothing. Of course, it is perfectly wonderful for Jack to have this trip, and I cannot be too thankful that Reg Morse is of the party. He is probably the best physician in West China and certainly the best surgeon. In case of accident he can be depended upon to do the very best thing. Besides he was in that country last summer, though not over this opium trail. He knows all the peculiarities of the "arsenic springs", high altitudes, &c., &c. We expect the men back about the 22nd or 23rd of August. Bob has been keen for this trip for years and years but has always given it up for some reason or other. He was all ready last year and gave it up because of George Helde. I am so glad he could go this year. I just did everything I could to help him get off. I know it will do him a lot of good. They intend to make a map of the road with distances. They have pedometers, &c. Geo. just brought out over \$100.00 worth of apparatus from home. Some wealthy Aunt fixed him up. He was elected a Fellow of the American Geographic Society for the map he made last year.

I am knitting a sweater for myself out of some taupe wool Mrs Tracy sent me. It's lovely but rather light weight. I think it will look well with the giddy silk skirt that Geo brought me. I have also ripped up all the old rose sweater that I made for you in 1915, and which you gave back to me. It was soiled and pretty large--had also stretched out a good deal. I have it all wound in skeins and intend to wash it in a few days. Then I shall knit it up again into a sweater, with white wool. I think there will be enough to do a sleeveless one also---if not large enough for me I can give to one of Mabelle's girls. I finished my sports stockings and they are very good looking. I can wear a thin old silk pair underneath if the wool irritates me. I am sending you the foot size taken in the stocking. Please tell Father to get me a pair of LOW brown sports ties to wear with them. I do not want tan. I want very good-looking sports low shoes with flat heels for walking---not too heavy but good-looking. And I hope he won't get them with tooth-pick points. You know I have a narrow foot. Geo. brought me some perfectly elegant shoes, but they are too wide and I have to offer them for sale. He got me three pairs and only one is a fit. It is a pair of black dull leather pumps with highish heels--terribly stylish and attractive. I thought by ordering three pairs from him I would be fixed until I left China, but the brown and the white pair cannot be used.

Lots of love to you both from the three of us left on Round Top,

Devotedly, *Grace*

send post shoes to me at 20 Museum Rd Shanghai

are no improvements here. were in O.K. it is in Shanghai. I expect to have to keep my own chairmen in O.K. - they are chiefly for house use & I don't go to the city.

J. Service: It was called silk floss. I'm not sure what silk floss is. But, it's sort of beaten raw silk. We had a covering of oiled silk to try to make them waterproof, but they weren't very waterproof. We had a tent of some sort. Of course, we had to take along cooking supplies. My mother prepared a lot of zwieback, very dry toast that would keep. We had pancake flour which only needed water. Rice, of course. The men all carried their own supply of rice.

But, the trip turned out to be much tougher than we expected because the trail had not been used and was nonexistent in many places. We had to chop our way through very dense thickets of bamboo at certain levels and rhododendron and so on.

Then, we finally got above timberline and it was foggy, and rainy. We lost our way because in the fog we followed a line of cairns, or ducks, on the rocks that apparently had been made by hunters. Hunters did go up in the mountains to shoot musk deer because musk is quite valuable.

We had to spend the night above timberline and finally crossed a pass at about fifteen thousand feet, as we determined by the boiling point of water, boiling point thermometer. Got down as fast as we could on the other side to get into the tree line, below timberline, so we could have a fire.

One of the men didn't show up, dropped behind. My father and some of the men who were in stronger condition, went out that night and tried to find him, but they had nothing except a kerosene lantern. It was very difficult retracing our route anyway, in the dark above timberline.

The next day they went back up and they found him. He had fallen, slipped. His load had been carried by someone else, but he'd just gotten weak from exhaustion and exposure because of the night we'd spent up at this elevation.

We finally got down into a valley which led into the Min River. But there were heavy rains and we kept running into situations where we had to ford the stream. It was a very deep V-shaped canyon. If the stream came against the wall of the canyon and we couldn't get past, we had to cross the stream. That meant building bridges several times. So, we had to take time off to chase up the mountainside to find something to bring down and build a bridge. We built three or four bridges.

J. Service: We finally got out into the Min River valley and then continued westward into Tibetan country. Foreigners call it Tribes Country. On the Chinese maps it's shown as part of Szechwan province. But the people were all Tibetan people. I've got some old photographs of it actually, a few, not very many. [brings out photographs] Lamaserie and so on.

Levenson: Who took the pictures?

J. Service: I had a little camera, but I wasn't much of a photographer.

I got mountain sickness when I was going up the pass the first day. Then, I had to be carried for a while. But, after a while it left me and I was all right. Then, I was perfectly okay. That was the only time I wasn't on my own feet. I walked all the rest of the way. As I said last time, I achieved manhood at the age of ten, as far as being able to walk a full day's stage!

Levenson: What's a full day's stage?

J. Service: Usually twenty-five miles roughly. That happened to be a long stage. That was a thirty mile stage.

Levenson: How did your supplies last?

J. Service: After we got into populated areas, then we were all right. We just lived pretty much on the countryside. It was only crossing the big divide and then the valley on the other side, that canyon where we were caught by high waters, that we had a hard time. But, once we got into inhabited areas, we lived pretty much on what we could buy, eggs, meat, chicken, and so on.

Levenson: What did you observe of the Tibetans? How much had they seen of Westerners at that point?

J. Service: Oh, there had been a few foreigners up in this valley, but there hadn't been very many. Well, they were just incredibly dirty, as I recall.

We called on a--what the Chinese call a t'u-ssu. A t'u-ssu is a sort of a local chieftain--a small potentate. He was hospitable, polite. He offered us buttered tea which we found pretty hard to take. My father complained afterwards that he had to be polite for the rest of us. He consumed a fair amount. But, it was very rancid butter and had lots of yak hairs floating on top of it. The tea was very bitter and very strong. So, all in all, it wasn't a very appetizing concoction.

J. Service: But, then we got even with the t'u-ssu because we still had some canned stuff at this point. We picked up some canned stuff, I think, that was sent around, not over the mountain, but brought around the Min valley. Anyway, we had a small tin of Limburger cheese so we opened it. But he wouldn't touch it. He said it was rotten! [laughter]

Levenson: About how far was this trip all told?

J. Service: Oh, I don't know. We were on the road, I think, probably for something over three weeks. Mr. Helde made a map of it as we went along, a rough map. He wasn't doing any surveying job, but taking, you know, pocket compass readings and things like that. But, I don't suppose we traveled more than two hundred miles, maybe, or something like that, because some of those days we didn't do very much traveling. Even in the Tribes Country we weren't on the road all the time. We were stopping to see places.

My father was interested in going up there because the timber, the lumber, that was used in the Chengtu plain came from there. They had a forest of real trees, hemlock and so on. He was rather interested in backing this cook of ours who wanted to become a businessman in the business of bringing trees down and supplying lumber for the new university.

My father eventually did loan some money to this cook who went then into the lumber business and brought timber out, down the river. It all floated down the river. But, that's a sad story because the man turned out to be sort of a scoundrel and never repaid my father. My father was not a businessman.

Levenson: I guess few missionaries were--

J. Service: Yes.

Levenson: --except perhaps in Hawaii!

Was there a serious scientific purpose to your expedition?

J. Service: I think that all these people felt that they were enlarging Western knowledge. Certainly old Dr. Morse felt that he was going to learn something by measuring skulls--

The man who made a map was covering an area that no foreigners had ever visited before, over the Great Divide, not up in the Tibetan part. The principal purpose, of course, was pleasure and interest, exploration if you want.

J. Service: But, my father was also interested in collecting Tibetan things. So, he was interested in finding or looking for good things. I don't recall that he got very much on this trip, because where we were was a rather poor and sort of border Tibetan area. Tibetan and Chinese were mixed in most of these areas. The lamasery that we went to was not a particularly large or wealthy one, so that I don't think he found anything really good. That had to come from further into Tibetan territory.

One thing that I didn't say, and that is about all these trips and traveling, which as I say, were sort of high points of life in my childhood, was that always there was the effort to do more and more and more, as far as I personally was concerned --certainly at my father's urging also--to be able to walk further, to do more.

It was when I was ten that I for the first time walked thirty miles in a day. I mean I did the full stage of thirty miles, more than thirty miles, actually 100 li, it's three li to the mile. My father was a great walker and he was always hoping that his son would be the same. It was a great day when I did the 100 li.

"War Games" with John Paton Davies in Chengtu

Levenson: You mentioned the name Davis a little way back, off the tape.

J. Service: Davies.

Levenson: Davies, excuse me. I know how to spell it, if not pronounce it! His name will come up again later, I know. What can you say about John?

J. Service: John [Paton Davies] was a very good friend. He and I were more or less bosom buddies for one period when we were children. He was about a year or maybe eighteen months older than I was.

This was during the First World War. We had a book by a man named [Arthur Guy] Empey, an Englishman, E-m-p-e-y, called Over the Top. This was sort of inspirational stuff, to try to whip up the enthusiasm of the people on the home front back home, describing life in the trenches, but written in a glamorized way.

J. Service: I remember it had detailed diagrams of the trenches with a firing step and a parapet and communication trenches. We had some room in our back yard, so we decided to build some trenches, scaled down to our size I suppose. We dug them out ourselves with a firing step and parapet, you know, those slits for firing and so on. We always had Chinese firecrackers. We bought firecrackers which were very cheap. Light the fuse and throw it across at the other's trench.

Much, much later, when [Senator Joseph R.] McCarthy started on us, somebody who had obviously been in Chengtu remembered this and told, I think Fulton Lewis Jr., that Davies and Service showed radical tendencies very early because they had played "Communist war games" in their childhood in Chengtu.

Levenson: Who said this?

J. Service: I don't know. It must have been somebody who'd grown up in Chengtu--some other child. Of course, some of the missionaries during the McCarthy days went very right [wing], you know. Some of them didn't. Somebody got this story. Anyway, we were accused of being, having Communist tendencies very early because of these war games we played, which were just our acting out this book about World War I trenches!

Levenson: How old were you approximately then? Let's see.

J. Service: Nine or ten.

Levenson: Nine or ten. Well, that is the first mention of Senator McCarthy, and perhaps the most ridiculous.

J. Service: Shall we stop there?

Boarding at the Shanghai American School, 1920-1924

Levenson: When did you go away to boarding school in Shanghai?

J. Service: By 1920, I'd gone through the sixth grade of Calvert School. So, the question was what to do with me. The obvious thing was for me to go down to Shanghai to the American school. My mother went down the river with me. It took, I think, six weeks, a little more than six weeks to make the trip.

Levenson: Good gracious.

J. Service: Anyway, we got to the school late. It was October, late October when we got there. My mother expected me to go into high school because I'd finished the grades. But, I'd just had my eleventh birthday, and I was very late for the school year. The school wouldn't let me go into the first year of high school. They made me do eighth grade over again, which was very boring. It was a bad idea, but there was no help for it.

This school was for American children. About half were day pupils from Shanghai. There were some missionary, but most of them were business and official children. The other half were boarding pupils, and they were practically all missionaries' children.

As I've said already it was single-mindedly trying to be an American school. There were a few non-American, white children, but there were no Chinese. They taught nothing about China. They didn't teach the language or anything like this.

We even tried to play baseball and American football and basketball, but not sports where we could compete with any other schools, because no one else in Shanghai played baseball except for the American community team. We were rather foolish, I thought, in pursuing American sports. That's when I first saw Harry Kingman because he played for the American local community team.*

As soon as Kingman came out to Shanghai as a Y secretary, he began playing for the community team in Shanghai, a local team. Of course, he was far better than anyone else. He was a star. He'd played for the big leagues, I think the New York Yankees. So, he quickly became the star of Shanghai. We were all very much impressed, in fact dumbfounded, to see the way he could throw the ball from first base to third base across the diamond, almost like a bullet, without its rising at all.

He became a pitcher. I don't think he was a pitcher in the big leagues, but in Shanghai he was good enough to be the star pitcher for the local team. So we all knew Harry Kingman, although I didn't see a great deal of him outside of watching from the bleachers.

*See Harry L. Kingman: Citizenship in a Democracy, an interview by Rosemary Levenson, Regional Oral History Office, The Bancroft Library, University of California, Berkeley, 1973, pp 31-39.

J. Service: And football was a similar problem. We had to play against a local pick-up men's team or against the American Navy. If a gunboat or something was in town, they would have a team.

In any case, all these things were quite irrelevant to me, because in eighth grade at eleven, I was still two years younger than anyone else in the class. Also, I got my growth rather late. So, I was very much of a shrimp, and hadn't started really to grow. Furthermore, having grown up in a place like Chengtu in West China, I had never seen a roller skate or ridden a bicycle. I'd never played any ball games. I'd never had any participation in athletics. Being very small and unskilled when it came to choosing teams, I was always the last one to be chosen. I hated ball games and never really participated very much, any more than I had to.

This was why I waited out two years before I went to college because I was fed up with being two years younger than everyone else. I was fifteen when I graduated from high school, and I waited two years before I went to college.

Levenson: Apart from hating sports and being bored in your classwork, how was the rest of school?

J. Service: Well, it was tough at first because everyone had read about British boarding schools and they had the idea of having fags, smaller boys who did errands for the bigger boys. This I found a little hard to take.

Also, just having so many other Americans, I think, was hard to take. I mean I'd lived in a community where I went over to play with the Davies boys one day or the Canright boys another day. I just wasn't used to having so many of my kind.

The whole business of hazing and fags and so on made the first term rather tough, or at least the first couple of months. My name, Service, sounds like Latin servus, "slave," so some boys tried to call me slave, and I had a couple of fights over that. After I was willing to stand up and fight it out, we outgrew that sort of thing.

I was fairly homesick in those first two or three months but there were YMCA people in Shanghai that kept an eye out for me. My parents had a friend who was a classmate at U[niversity of] C[alifornia], who was working in the consulate there, a man named Sawyer. He used to take me out, for walks on Sundays, things like that.

J. Service: I was fascinated really--I became fascinated--just by Shanghai. It was such an exciting and, for me, strange place. Transportation, railways--There was a little railway out near us, not far from the school. We were in the Hongkew section of Shanghai, in rented buildings. There was a short railway that ran through Shanghai down to Woosung. I used to go out and just sit and watch the train. If you put your ear to the rail, you could hear the train coming--or I'd listen to the telephone poles, you could hear the whistling in the wires.

Then I found I could go down to the docks and watch the ships. I used to do that weekends, not always alone, sometimes with other boys. The school finally found out about this and were horrified. You read novels about crime, and the docks and the waterside are always supposed to be the worse places! Here we were young lads, [chuckle] eleven and twelve, spending our Saturdays wandering up and down the docks of Shanghai or going across the river to Pootung.

The second year I was there, we lived in what was really a residence, which had been rented and used as a dormitory. There was a heavy, cast iron drainpipe--and we could get out of our window and go up and down the drainpipe. So when friends were leaving for West China, I used to go down and see them off. Their boats left about midnight.

Eventually the school found out about this because someone reported it to the school. They had seen me down at such and such dock seeing some boat off at eleven o'clock. Well, of course, we were supposed to be in bed by eight, I think, eight or eight thirty. So, this got back to the school, and they were going to expel me. But I couldn't easily be expelled because I lived a month away, a month or more travel away. So, they relented.

I enjoyed Shanghai. I learned how to read some Chinese by the numbers on the cars, because the numbers on the street-cars were in English and Chinese. So my first Chinese that I learned was the numbers.

We had a little bit--not very much--spending money. We used to go off to Chinese shops, little tiny sort of Papa-Mama shops, you know, that sold all sorts of things to eat, various things. This was all strictly against the rules, but we used to buy peanuts, buy duck eggs. Chinese were very fond of duck eggs that had been hardboiled and then sort of pickled in salt. They were very salty inside. Things like that--

J. Service: One year there was a big missionary conference in Shanghai. There was a Scout troop, and I joined it as soon as I could. I was very active in the Boy Scouts and eventually became senior patrol leader, although it was rather embarrassing because I could never become a first class scout since I didn't swim. You see, in my boyhood in West China there was no possibility of swimming, no place to swim. I was a second class scout while I was senior patrol leader.

When the school moved to new premises in the French Concession in my last boarding year, 1923-1924, it was isolated, and there were no stores or anything nearby. So, the scout troop set up a little store. We sold candy bars and things like that. We started Saturday night movies. We ran that partly because we had a very, very active scout leader.

But, in any case, a lot of people were coming into Shanghai from other mission stations, interior and so on. Someone got the idea that they might need help in being guided to wherever they were going to stay, missionary homes or some hotel or somebody's home, residence.

So we set up a traveler's aid post in the main railway station and took care of these people. But, in between train times we would wander all around the yards, and of course, we had great larks.

It gave me--I wouldn't say it gave me--I already had the sense of adventure and of charging about and exploring, from the very beginning, from my father. Of course, what we kids were doing charging around the railway yards of Shanghai, I don't know. [chuckle]

But foreigners could do almost anything, you know. No one was going to stop you. Actually, no one was going to touch us, as I found out. Chinese kids would have been stopped, I'm sure, from running around the railway yard. Chinese kids would steal in there, go in there to pick up scraps of coal, half burned coal, or something like that. They'd be chased away. But, no one was going to chase away foreign kids. Foreigners lived a sort of special life, were special persons.

Levenson: Well, it seems as though you certainly got away with murder at that school.

J. Service: Oh, yes.

Levenson: Was the education reasonably good?

J. Service: Yes, I think quite good. Fair. Most of us did quite well when we came back to the States. You know, most of the children went on to college. Most of the missionaries were college-trained people. There were some that weren't, Pentacostalists and so on. But, in those days they were very much of a minority. So, most of the missionaries--and certainly most of the children that went to Shanghai American School--went on to college, and I think most of us did pretty well.

Levenson: What did you do with your school vacations?

J. Service: Usually people invited me. I don't think that this was arranged, because some of these people were people my parents didn't know. But, my friends would apparently ask their parents, "Well, here is this boy and he can't go home for Christmas. Can't we invite him here?"

This business of having people visiting you for a long time was accepted. Everyone did it. People had to stay with somebody. So, there was never any problem. I always had invitations for Easter and Christmas vacations to someone else's home.

I went to Soochow one Christmas vacation with a boy named Smart. His father died and his mother moved to Berkeley later on. I went out to Shanghai University once with some Baptist people. Several times I stayed with YMCA friends, particularly the Wilburs who knew my parents.

Twelfth Grade and Graduation from Berkeley High, 1924-1925

Levenson: I guess your parents finally got a home leave in 1924. Is that right?

J. Service: Yes, that's right, in 1924, from Chungking where my father had been asked to start a YMCA. It was my father's second home leave, although he had been in China by that time, what, nineteen years?

The original plan was, I think, that the family was going to go through Europe. But, for some reason that couldn't be done. So, we came straight across the Pacific, to Berkeley. My grandparents' house had been burned down in the Berkeley fire. [1923] It had been on Oxford Street in that block which is now an experimental University garden.

J. Service: We stayed up here on Spruce Street with an uncle. Then, we rented a house at Spruce and Rose, and I went to Berkeley High for my last year of school.

Levenson: How did that strike you after Shanghai?

J. Service: Terrible.

Levenson: Really?

J. Service: Oh, yes. I disliked it very much. It was not a happy year at all.

Levenson: What was the matter?

J. Service: Well, I don't know. It was just a huge, big school.

Levenson: About how big then?

J. Service: Oh, it was over two thousand. It was sort of overwhelming for that reason.

Levenson: About how many had you had in your school in Shanghai?

J. Service: Oh, the whole school had been about four hundred, but that included the lower grades and high school. High school was a hundred, hundred and fifty, something like that. I forget, there were something like thirty people in my class there, my junior class, my last year there.

But, for one thing you arrive from a place like China with your clothes absolutely ridiculous, you know, by American standards. I said my mother made our clothes. Even after we went to Shanghai, Shanghai clothes didn't look like anything here.

We didn't realize in China that boys, by the time they're seniors in high school, wear long pants. When I started to Berkeley—I had just had my fifteenth birthday—I was still very much of a runt and I was wearing short pants. I got a lot of kidding about wearing short pants, a senior in high school! So, I got my father quickly to take me out and buy some long trousers, some cords. Everyone wore cords in those days. Of course, they had to be dirty. So, it took me a while to get these dirty enough to be respectable.

I didn't want anyone to know I had been in China because the first time we came to America, when I was six, we were always being embarrassed by being shown off as coming from China.

J. Service: People would say, "Oh, speak some Chinese for us!" or "Get something we can use for chopsticks. Let's see you eat some rice," and this sort of thing. I made my parents promise not to let anybody know we were from China, not make a big thing of it. So, I tried very hard to keep it a secret that I was [laughter] a strange freak from China.

You have no friends. You come as a senior. Most other people have got their friends. And I worked very hard, maybe because I had nothing else to do.

Levenson: Were you behind academically?

J. Service: Oh, no. I did very well.

Levenson: I didn't mean to suggest that, but I mean how good was your preparation in China?

J. Service: I think the preparation in Shanghai was okay. Later on when I started to college I had a problem because I didn't have trigonometry. But, last year of high school here at Berkeley I did extremely well, which was a great boon when I applied at Oberlin which will come along a little later.

Levenson: What can you say about Berkeley High then about the social customs and the mood of the times? America was booming.

J. Service: Yes. Well, I just didn't know quite how to cope in many ways I think. I was, as I said, very young. I was fifteen. I didn't know how to stand up, shall we say?

We had to take gym and I was very awkward at basketball because I hadn't played these games as a boy really. We had to play basketball.

I remember one day a black boy, I jumped up to guard him, and instead of throwing the ball where I expected him to, he threw it right in my middle, purposely of course. [clutches stomach] I mean it was excruciating pain to be hit in the nuts by the basketball.

I remember going up a stairway one day. It was a temporary building where a mechanical drawing class was being held. I was coming down the stairs and a heavy, burly guy--I saw him coming up the stairs but paid no attention to him, and we passed a corner and he suddenly threw his weight against me and grabbed my private parts. Well, you know, this was a shock.

Levenson: Was he black?

J. Service: No, he wasn't black. He was white.

I took mechanical drawing and loved it. It was terrific! I liked it very, very much. So, I bought a T-square and did some voluntary work at home. I was so pleased with it, I took the work done at home to show the teacher. He said, "Oh, now I know who has been stealing T-squares." Some T-squares, drawing material had been taken. So, he accused me of having stolen the T-squares because I did some work at home.

Levenson: How did you deal with that?

J. Service: I was just stunned. I denied it, of course, and said no, I had bought it myself. But he talked about denying me credits, all sorts of hassling. Finally, I got a reasonable grade out of it. But, we were on very bad terms after that. I think he remained convinced that I had stolen equipment from the school.

I got good grades. But I never have gone back to any Berkeley High reunion.

Levenson: Sounds as though you had a rotten time.

J. Service: At any rate, as I say, I got good grades. That was the important thing.

I remember great excitement--it was early '25. Classes were let out and we all went to the auditorium to hear Calvin Coolidge take the oath of office. It was the first time it had ever been transmitted nation-wide by radio.

Levenson: Is there anything you want to say about graduation before we go on?

J. Service: No.

A Sense of Distance from Younger Brothers

Levenson: You haven't mentioned your brothers. You've hardly mentioned your brothers at all. How did you get on with them?

J. Service: Well, yes. It's a sort of a, shall we say, not an unhappy subject, but a subject I'm not terribly happy about. I was two years older than Bob and five years older than Dick. I

J. Service: liked school. I was advanced in schooling, so that our intellectual difference was really much more than the chronological difference.

I was very much of a bookworm when I was a small boy in Chengtu and, I think, probably quite arrogant and hoity-toity as far as the younger boys were concerned. We just didn't play a great deal together. Later on as we became adults, things changed. But, in our youth we didn't really have very much in common. Sometimes we'd play together, but not a great deal.

On our Tibetan trip for instance, this big divide trip, my brothers didn't go. They were too small. I was the only one that went. On the earlier expeditions I don't think they went. I'm trying to think about the winter trips to the mountains, whether they went along or not. They probably did, but I think they rode a chair where I walked. So, there was a certain feeling of, perhaps understandable feeling of, superiority by the eldest I suppose.

Levenson: How did they make out in Berkeley? Did they do better, do you think, being younger?

J. Service: Oh, I think so, yes. I think so.

When we came back, see, I was--Although my brother, Bob, was two years younger, I was four years ahead of him in school. When I was a senior in high school he was in junior high, and Dick, the youngest, was in primary school.

Levenson: What were your career plans after graduation?

J. Service: I had no particular plans nor career ideas. I was just beginning to get some at this time. One thing I was very determined about was that I didn't want to go to college right away. I had, I thought, really lost out a great deal by being so much younger and smaller, physically smaller, undeveloped, than my classmates. So I got my parents to agree that I could stay out for two years before I went to college.

II AROUND THE WORLD IN EIGHT YEARS: SHANGHAI TO SHANGHAI, 1925-1933

Apprentice Architect in Shanghai

J. Service: The sensible thing to do was to go back with my parents to Shanghai. I had liked mechanical drawing very much. The YMCA had an architectural office in Shanghai because they had quite a large building program at this time. This was mid-twenties. They were building YMCAs and residences around China. So, they had an architectural office and through a little parental pull I got a job as an apprentice draftsman in this architectural office. I worked there for eighteen months.

I liked it quite a bit, and I thought for a while I would be an architect. For some reason I convinced myself that to be an architect one had to really be an artist and creative and I didn't have that. So I thought I could be a civil engineer which was related to architecture, but more practical.

Levenson: How was the office set up?

J. Service: An architect named A. Q. Adamson was employed by the YMCA as head of the YMCA Building Bureau. He was a trained architect, but his main function was administrative. He ran the office, made sure things were done.

They also employed a Hungarian architect named Shafer whom my parents had known quite well. He was a refugee. He had been a soldier in the Austro-Hungarian army during the First World War. During the Russian Revolution they broke out of the camps, or no one kept them in the camps. He and a lot of other Czechs and so on worked their way clear across Siberia and finally got to China.

J. Service: He had come up to Chungking when my parents were there on a contract to survey a motor road from Chungking to Chengtu. So, they had got to know him. One way or another he had gotten a job in this YMCA Building Bureau. He did most of the designing, actual architectural designing.

Then there was a crew of draftsmen, most of them Chinese except myself.

Levenson: What tradition did he design in?

J. Service: Most of the houses, the YMCA residences, were very utilitarian, perhaps a trace of European. He built the foreign Y in Shanghai which is Italian Renaissance, I suppose.

Levenson: Eclectic?

J. Service: Eclectic, yes, but more Italian Renaissance than anything else.

Levenson: What were your functions?

J. Service: I was simply, as I say, a very junior draftsman. I was given jobs of working up floor plans. Shafer would give me the rough layout and the size of the rooms, and I drew the very simplest type of detailed floor plans.

I don't think that we had to conform to any particular building codes, certainly not in Chinese cities. We probably did have to in the [International] Settlement of Shanghai. We were building one building there, and that's what I worked on most of the time, the Foreign YMCA in Shanghai. It was a big building, I think about ten or eleven stories, which for Shanghai was big. There were several Chinese YMCAs in Shanghai. Then there was a Navy YMCA which was built to take care of seamen, particularly navy seamen.

Levenson: Did you get out to the building sites?

J. Service: I don't think the Foreign Y was started because I was still working on the plans. [laughter] So I don't think that I actually saw it under construction. I didn't get to any of the other sites because they were all inland or elsewhere.

Levenson: I was wondering if it was the custom for architects to supervise the building.

J. Service: Yes. I think that the YMCA Building Bureau usually had someone to supervise, just as here.

Levenson: Right.

J. Service: The bureau made the contracts and, of course, you have to have some representative to supervise, make sure the contractor fulfills the contract. But, who that was in Shanghai I don't know, because there was no one around when I was there. It may have been Adamson himself that would go out and check. I don't know.

Levenson: Do you have any idea how the fee system worked? Did you get ten percent or was it on a flat fee for work done?

J. Service: This was an office of the YMCA, and people were simply paid by the Y.

Levenson: Salaried?

J. Service: Salaried, yes. I assume that the Y was having enough of a building program going on that it paid them to hire their own staff, rather than work on any sort of a fee system.

I actually worked in the office building of the national committee of the YMCA. The national committee had a building in the downtown area of Shanghai. We were on one of the top floors of that.

A Blank Period, A Fairly Quiet Year

Levenson: This was an exciting period in Chinese history. How much did you see of what was going on?

J. Service: Well, actually, you see, I missed most of the excitement because the 1925, May 30, demonstrations took place when we were still in the States. It was just about the time I was graduating, just before I graduated. I remember my parents being very concerned and very alarmed at what was going on, reading the newspapers. But, by the time I got to China in the fall of '25 the excitement was over.

Then, the Northern Expedition was starting in 1926, coming up from Canton. Chiang Kai-shek was leading one wing. I remember our house boy that we had in Shanghai, our cook boy,

J. Service: being very concerned, very excited about it--he was obviously a patriot of the Nationalists--and talking to him about how good these people were. Most of the foreign press was treating them all as Reds and Bolshies. Chiang Kai-shek was called a Bolshevik and so on. But our cook was very pleased and excited about it.

Then I left Shanghai in late '26 to come home. I was actually in Shanghai from September 25, 1925, until December 26, 1926. Then, I came on a long, round the world trip to go to college. I actually read about the events of the spring of 1927 when I was in Paris. I remember buying the Paris Herald Tribune and sitting there--in front of the Madeleine, I think it was--sitting down and reading all these exciting things about the attacks on foreigners in Nanking and so on. But on the whole, except for the fact that the Northern Expedition was starting and people were beginning to be concerned about what seemed to be the anti-foreign thrust of the Kuomintang, it wasn't a terribly exciting time.

There was a build-up of foreign troops in Shanghai. There was alarm. Almost every country was bringing more forces into Shanghai by the time I left. But, it really wasn't until '27 that the big crunch came. So, I came in between.

Levenson: What did you do with your spare time and how did you live?

J. Service: Well, I remember very little about it. It just was not a very exciting period, sort of a blank period.

I lived at home with my parents. I had a bout of asthma, quite a serious bout of asthma. I had jaundice that year, went into a hospital for several days. They didn't know how to treat jaundice. But, otherwise it was a fairly quiet year.

In the summer of 1926, my parents went to Tsingtao where they rented a cottage. Tsingtao was one of the places where people from Shanghai went for the summer. But, I couldn't get that much vacation, of course, so I only went up for a short while.

A friend of theirs, a Methodist missionary who later on became a bishop, was going to Peking. So, I went up to Peking with him, summer of '26, and we had, I forget, maybe a week in Peking.

J. Service: But, the most exciting part of that trip was that--The fighting had just stopped between Feng Yu-hsiang's army and Chiang Tso-lin's army. Feng, the so-called Christian general, who had a very good army, well trained troops, had withdrawn from Peking, had been forced out of Peking by Chiang Tso-lin. He withdrew northwestward up the railway to Nankow Pass and then fortified himself. Finally after some very severe and heavy fighting he had been driven out of the Pass northward into Inner Mongolia.

The railway had just been opened up. We got on one of the first trains to go. It was terribly crowded and we managed to get ourselves onto the cow catcher of the locomotive. It was a huge locomotive. This was the only railway in China that had American locomotives. It was because of the very steep grades. They had thought that American locomotives, being heavier and more powerful for the Rockies, would be better.

So, it was a great locomotive with a large platform out front. We had, I suppose, eight or ten people, all crowded on to this platform, in front of this huge, puffing, snorting, double-barrelled steam engine, went up through Nankow Pass and so on. That was a lot of fun.

We saw the trenches and saw the battlefields. There had been a lot of serious fighting.

Some of the Sights of Peking

J. Service: My missionary guide was very much interested in the plight of the women involved in the night life of a city like Peking. So he took me on a tour of the brothels of Peking. Being dragged around by a missionary--who, of course, was not doing any business, he was just going around and talking to the people, the girls and the madams, and just observing--was a bit bizarre, it seemed to me.

Levenson: What did he hope to accomplish?

J. Service: Well, I don't know. I assume he had a sociological missionary interest in the conditions. He obviously had done it before.

Levenson: How did the situation strike you?

J. Service: I think we better take this thing out of this!

Levenson: Okay. I'll make a note. Can you really see anything wrong with that? Gladstone did it after all.

J. Service: Yes, well, it just seemed like an odd--It seemed to me to be a strange thing to do. I was curious in a young way, I suppose, but I had never really--I knew such things existed, of course, but I had never thought of visiting a brothel before. We went all through the places outside the Chien men [the old main gate of Peking's Tartar City].

Levenson: How did you react to the brothels?

J. Service: Oh, if you mean was I attracted or excited, no. I was just sort of perplexed as I recall, curious. I don't remember having any very strong reaction.

Levenson: What did you parents say about that?

J. Service: I never told them. I never told them, [chuckle] just as I never told my parents about these other incidents. My parents never knew about these things in high school I talked about. You feel sort of ashamed that you don't react or don't defend yourself, but it all happens so suddenly that you can't. So, you just feel ashamed of it afterward I think. But, this thing, there didn't seem to be any point in telling my parents about it.

I saw the main sights of Peking. You couldn't see very much of the Forbidden City, but you could see the Temple of Heaven.

The man I was with stayed with someone in the Bible Society, and they had an old Dodge which was a famous car. It was a Dodge touring car, about 1924 or '25 model, which apparently was a very sturdy car. It wasn't a four wheel drive or anything like that, but it would go on the worst kinds of roads and was very popular in North China and Inner Mongolia. Roy Chapman Andrews was making his trips about that time, and this was the kind of car they used. I remember riding around Peking in this old Dodge touring car.

Levenson: Was there anything else you wanted to say about those China years?

J. Service: I don't think so.

A Long, Solitary Tour Through Asia and Europe

J. Service: I had the idea of studying engineering in college. It was always taken for granted I would go to [University of California] Berkeley. No other place was ever suggested. But if I was going to take engineering, I needed trigonometry and I hadn't had trigonometry. So, we planned that I would come here to Berkeley for summer school.

Levenson: This was in--

J. Service: Nineteen twenty-seven. I had always wanted to make the trip through Europe. It had been talked of in '24, been impossible. So, it was planned that I would travel alone from Shanghai as far as Ceylon, and at Ceylon I would be picked up by some people from the YMCA coming on a following ship. Then, I would travel through Europe with these people.

But after I left Shanghai their plans were changed by the YMCA. They were told they couldn't take the time for the trip. They had to go directly to the United States. So, my parents telegraphed me, did I wish to go on or did I wish to come back? I could do either one. Of course I decided to go on.

The ship went to Singapore. I left it there and went up through the Malay states. At Penang I got a British India boat to Burma, spent a little while there, went up to Mandalay and back, and then to India.

There were YMCA people in all these places, and my father had written to some of them. So I could always check in with the YMCA people, and they helped me plan my sightseeing.

When I got to India I went to Calcutta and a very nice man there helped me plan my India tour, which was quite an extensive tour eventually.

I traveled along, had a sleeping bag, a sleeping roll, and I spent nights on trains when I could--a very sensible thing to do.

Here are some pictures of India. I got up to Darjeeling. I had quite a trip, Taj Mahal.

Levenson: Did you make comparisons in your mind between India and China? How did India impress you?

J. Service: I don't remember too much. I remember being very depressed. I did not like India, never have liked India. I'm sure my feeling was the same then, that it was so much more of a hopeless place than China, the attitude of the people.

But, I've been to India so many times since that it's a little unfair for me to try to really analyze what was my feeling at the age of seventeen, except that I never felt the affection or closeness or sympathy with the people of India that I do for the people in China.

Levenson: Did it bother you that it was a colony?

J. Service: No, I can't say that it did. To be perfectly honest I thought the British did a good job of running it, the railways and so on, were good.

Then I picked up another steamer in Colombo, Ceylon, and went on to Europe. The ship landed in Genoa. I had talked to people on the boat--it was in March--and decided the best thing to do was to take another boat down to Naples, then come north with the spring.

I had gotten a guidebook by this time and looked up pensions, cheap. So I went to a rather modest pension in Naples. At the first meal--they had meals served at a long table, family style--there were two American women right across the table from me, and talking away about San Francisco, San Francisco Bay.

I said nothing because no one said anything to me. But, at the end of the meal one of the ladies leaned across the table to me and said, "Do you speak English?" I said, "Yes, I speak English and I come from the same part of the country you people come from." So, they were quite interested.

We chatted a bit. They had just arrived in Naples and I had just arrived in Naples. So, they said, "Well, we're going out this afternoon to Pozzuoli," I think it was, near Naples. "Would you like to come along?" I said, "Fine." They said, "Well, meet us down here in the lobby in half an hour."

When I came down there was a young American woman with them, a very attractive young woman. They asked my name to introduce me. I said, "My name is Service." One of the women looked surprised and said, "Younger brother of Roy Service?" I said, "No, son."

J. Service: It turned out that both these women were schoolteachers in San Francisco and had been classmates of my mother's and father's at Berkeley. The young woman was a ward of one of them, a singer. She'd been singing in the San Francisco opera, minor parts. But, she had done well enough to get a job, a learning job, in the San Carlo opera company in Naples for a year.

She was going to take some time off and travel around Italy with her guardian and her guardian's friend--these old, old ladies they seemed. [chuckle] They were in their mid-forties, I suppose, if they were in my parents' class because at this time my parents would be forty-seven.

At any rate, I sort of tagged along through Italy with these people and then spent a week in Switzerland. It was April and you couldn't do much climbing. It was between seasons.

By this time I had gotten the idea of bicycling through England. I went to France, but I didn't like France because the French that I had had in the American School I found was very little help when I got to a real French-speaking area.

Sixteen Hundred Miles by Bicycle Through England

J. Service: So, I was keen to get to England. My parents had some friends whom they'd known in West China. They were Friends with a capital "F," Quakers. I went to them and told Mr. Silcock that I wanted to take a bicycle trip.

He tried to talk me out of it. But, when he saw that I was really determined he said, "Well, I've got an old bike downstairs in the cellar," [laughter] which he dug up. It was a real old, heavy bike, but it had a gear shift which was quite unusual for those days--only three speeds, though, not like the present ten speed things.

Eventually I set off to make a tour of England, probably having never ridden a bicycle more than five miles in my life. I'd only learned a year or two before, in Shanghai. The first day I got from London to Oxford. The second day I could barely walk, just barely could walk. [chuckle] I had discovered to my great surprise that England was almost all hilly.

J. Service: He helped me plan the trip. I laid out a terrific trip, and eventually I did about sixteen hundred miles by bicycle. I was on the bicycle for a month.

I started off with a big rucksack on my back. I'd bought a rucksack in Switzerland and I thought that was the thing to carry. I soon realized that the thing to do was to get it off your back and onto the bike. [chuckle] But, I made friends. You meet people along the way that are also cycling.

I joined a cyclist touring club in England. They have guidebooks of places to stay, bed and breakfast places, you know, lots of people that take you in. In those days at least they took in bicyclists. This is before youth hostels or anything like that in England I think. It was very reasonable, very cheap.

I had a terrific time, except that in the Lake Country on the first of May, I ran into snow. I climbed, what is it, Helvellyn in a snow storm--I didn't have proper clothes for that cold weather, nor proper gloves, but eventually things got much better. I got up as far as the Trossachs in Scotland, then came down the east coast. Of course, it would have been a lot easier if I had started up the east coast because the east coast is flat. I could do a hundred miles a day without too much trouble there if I wanted to.

I saw lots of cathedrals. I think I've still got some pictures, a few. I had a camera but, goodness, there are not very many. [showing photographs] That's something that, an enlargement. But, here are some pictures. What's that? Is that Wells? It's probably on the back.

Levenson: Ely. Very nice.

J. Service: Oh, that's the lakes.

Levenson: Very few people in your pictures, Jack.

J. Service: Oh, well, I was taking pictures of buildings. It's true. I think this is probably still true. Although the pictures I've taken in China in the last two trips do have people. There's Salisbury which is the best. Salisbury and Durham, both very different, but both, you know, gems.

Levenson: Yes.

J. Service: But, it's true I wasn't taking pictures of people, in those days.

J. Service: The roads were not terribly crowded in England, although they weren't very good either. A lot of the time I was off the main roads. I had a terrible time when I tried to avoid going through Birmingham. Of course, the maps in England are fantastic. You buy all these maps that are two miles to the inch, the Ordnance Survey, half inch maps, which show every road and every path. But, trying to avoid Birmingham turned out to be a nightmare because all the roads radiate in toward the center.

I was wandering around in some small village quite late at night looking up and trying to read the signs on a building. Suddenly a voice behind me says, "What do you think you're doing?" or something like that. It turned out to be the village bobby and he wanted to know who I was, [chuckle] where I was going, why I was looking up at the building.

I said, "I'm lost." He said, "Where are you trying to go?" I told him what village or town I was aiming for. He said, "Which direction do you think it is?" Of course, I pointed in completely the wrong direction.

But he felt sorry for me and they let me sleep in the police station. They gave me a bench I could lie down on, and I spent the night there.

From Southampton to Berkeley

J. Service: I finally ended up at Southampton and took the Mauretania. I got a third class ticket which was actually the lowest--it wasn't the tourist third, it was real third--on the old Mauretania which had four smokestacks and was the holder of the blue ribbon across the North Atlantic.

I found quite a few other young people, American young people, aboard traveling third. They started exploring around and we found we could get up into the upper part of the ship. So, I used to go up to the upper part of the ship.

One night I was up in first class, just leaning over the rail watching the waves. They looked so much better from a first class deck than they did from a steerage porthole. [laughter] A man came up beside me and in a stern voice said, "Do you speak English?" I said, "Yes," and he said, "Well then, go downstairs where you belong." So I went downstairs.

1. John S. Service, three months old, with mother and teddy bear, Chengtu.
2. The Service Family: Jack, Dick, Roy, Grace, Bob, ca. 1922.
3. Grace Service with her oldest son Jack, 1924. Jack is 15 years old.
4. YMCA Building Bureau, Shanghai. The drafting staff.
5. Robert Roy Service and first Chinese teacher in Chengtu, 1906.
6. Jack (left) at boarding school in Shanghai, ca. 1921. Jack is 12 years old.
7. John S. Service, graduation from Oberlin College, 1931.
8. Jack winning the mile, Oberlin College, ca. 1930.

neg avail for all



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J. Service: We came into New York. A group of us stayed up all night--because we were coming in early--to see the Statue of Liberty. I had to go through immigration because we were third class. As I recall we had to shower and take some sort of physical examination. I had a terrible case of dandruff, and so the inspector told me I'd better do something about the dandruff. But, I was admitted into the country. I'm sure it wasn't Ellis Island, but it was an Ellis Island type of procedure for people in third class because most of us were immigrants.

The next day, I think, was Lindbergh's arrival, after he'd flown the Atlantic. I stayed with some people out in Yonkers named Yard who were very good friends from Chengtu. Mrs. Yard had been my mother's boon and inseparable companion for many years.

They were living in New York at that time. Mr. Yard had left the mission field. I forget now exactly why. But, they lived in Yonkers and I was staying with them. One of the daughters, the eldest daughter, and I went downtown to see the big tickertape parade for Lindy.

I stayed with them and then came across the country, visiting various relatives whom I'd never seen. My mother had given me family trees and instructions about going to Chattanooga and going to Grand Rapids, Michigan, and going here and there and visiting people. I did it all faithfully, according to instructions and spent a day or two here and there and got out here [to Berkeley] in time to start the summer session which I very quickly found I detested.

Levenson: Why did you detest it?

J. Service: I was taking trigonometry. You see, I had to get this damn trigonometry.

But I don't know--Berkeley was a big place. Summer sessions are not a very good introduction to a place like Berkeley, lots of schoolteachers and so on. But, it just seemed to me a very large, impersonal place.

I expected a little more ivy and so on, school spirit. Of course, there's nothing of that atmosphere in the summer session. No one could care less about you and who you are and what you're doing and all. So, I wrote my parents and said that I thought that I really wasn't going to like Berkeley very much and I would prefer to go to a smaller place such as Oberlin.

A Switch from U.C., Berkeley, to Oberlin College

Levenson: What put Oberlin into your head?

J. Service: I'd known lots of people from Oberlin because it had been a great breeding center of missionaries. There were a lot of people in China from Oberlin. One or two of my teachers at SAS, at Shanghai American School, had been from Oberlin. I had two classmates and very good friends at SAS who were going to Oberlin. One was Clarence Wilbur, Marty Wilbur, [C. Martin] and there was another boy that was going there. So, Oberlin just struck me as the logical place to go.

My father--whose idea always had been, as I think I mentioned before, that you treat children as adults as much as possible and encourage them to make their own decisions and do what they feel they should do--he cabled back and in effect said, "You're the one that's going to college. If you can get yourself into Oberlin, good luck!"

This was the middle of the summer. I wrote off to Oberlin. There wasn't time, of course, to write to Shanghai American School for my record because this was before the age of airplanes, and it was three weeks across the Pacific. But I did have my record at Berkeley High which was superb, all A's, except maybe one B+ for that mechanical drawing course where I had the fight with the teacher.

Being a missionary's son and coming from China I'm sure was a help--but, on the strength of my senior year record at Berkeley High, Oberlin admitted me in August. Of course, things weren't so tough in those days.

Oberlin was having a little problem recruiting men. They were getting more women than men applicants. So, I think that my sex helped me a bit. At any rate, I was admitted to Oberlin.

In the later part of the summer of 1927, as soon as summer session finished, I went down to the ranch of one of my uncles and worked on the ranch picking fruit. Marty Wilbur arrived by ship from Shanghai and he came down and worked a few days. Then, we came up and took the train, went to Oberlin.

Meets Caroline Schulz on the Train

J. Service: By coincidence on the train I met Caroline Schulz.

Levenson: Who became Caroline Service.

J. Service: Who became Caroline Service much later. [laughter]

Levenson: What do you remember about that?

J. Service: I don't remember her at all frankly.

What happened was that we were on the main transcontinental line as far as Toledo, Ohio. In Toledo the people going to Oberlin had to shift to a branch line, sort of a loop line, that went south of the main line down through various towns, Oberlin, Elyria, and then up to Cleveland. It was a very small train on this branch line that was going to go through Oberlin. There were only a few cars. In one car we found ourselves with quite a number of young people of college age.

One girl who was a very extrovert type started asking people, "Are you going to Oberlin?" It turned out most of us were. There was no other place to go to on that line. So, we got together and Caroline was one of the group. As I say, I don't recall Caroline because I remember much more this girl who was running around getting us together.

Oberlin College: "A Good YMCA Atmosphere, Friendly and Optimistic"

Levenson: How did the Middle West impress you after the sorts of freedoms you'd had in Europe and in China? The little, tiny town of Oberlin--

J. Service: Oh, I liked Oberlin. Oberlin, I had no problem there at all. It was nice. It was a town of three or four thousand, I suppose, at that time. It's gotten bigger now but not too much larger. The college was somewhat smaller but, maybe fifteen hundred altogether including the conservatory.

They had a freshman week which was great fun, at least it seemed a lot of fun to me. Everybody get acquainted and learn the college songs. Plenty of ivy and rah rah and college spirit and warmth, sort of a good YMCA atmosphere, friendly and optimistic.

Champion Long-Distance Runner: "A Wonderful Feeling of Well-Being"

J. Service: My father had never let me run competitively when I was in high school because he thought I was too young. He thought that boys should have more of their development before they try to compete in anything like running

But cross-country starts as soon as college starts in the fall. So, I went out for freshman cross-country. It didn't take very long to find out that I could run quite well. In fact, after we'd been training for several weeks, just before the real season was starting, we had an all-squad race competition. Freshmen couldn't compete in intercollegiate athletics, but on this occasion, the freshmen and the varsity people all ran together.

I forget--I came in second or third overall, which means that I was able to run with the varsity, and I beat all the other freshmen.

So, this then became really quite an inordinate part of my college life. Looking back on it afterward, I spent a lot more time and energy on track and field than anything else. It was actually a year-round activity because you had cross-country in the fall, and you had indoor track during the winter and then you had spring track in the spring. It was a series of getting in condition for each season.

I became good in the league we were in. I won the conference mile. Ohio is full of colleges, thirty some, I think. But, the athletic conference we were in was about nineteen colleges, most of them originally denominational schools: Ohio Wesleyan, Denison, Oberlin, Wooster, and so on, all church schools. At any rate, I won the conference mile, in other words the mile championship, for the three years that I was eligible to compete.

There was something else on running. Last time I put emphasis on running and peer relations, that at least it made me feel that I was as good as anyone else, shall we say. But, I think it's much more than that, much more important than that.

Partly, there is a sheer physical, sensual pleasure in running, I suppose, like dancing or almost any other sort of rhythmic exercise. Also, there's a wonderful feeling of

J. Service: well-being, of being in good physical shape. They talk about being "fit as a fiddle." It's not a good word, because you're not taut like a fiddle. It's quite different.

But also there's the whole question of whatever is required, I think, in being a distance runner. Whether you're a good distance runner because the qualities are innate or whether you develop them through the sport, I don't know. But, you know, there's something in the idea that the battle of Waterloo was won on the playing fields of Eton.

It's a solitary sport that requires a great deal of perseverance and determination. It's also a very, man-to-man type of competition. There's nothing tougher than a neck-and-neck drive down the backstretch and around the last turn and down toward the tape.

It's not merely a matter of who's the best runner or the stronger, but who's got the most determination, resolve, and guts. One guy has to break. If you've got the control and discipline, you'll be the lucky guy that doesn't.

Levenson: What I've read emphasizes the painfulness of long distance running.

J. Service: Well, painfulness only in competition. Of course, when I was doing it they hadn't developed some of the new training methods which are obviously very much more arduous.

Cross-country, which I liked best, was in the fall. It was beautiful around Oberlin. We ran through the woods, the countryside. It was a fairly popular sport and so you're running with a whole pack through the autumn foliage and all the rest of it.

What to Major in? A Switch from Engineering to Economics

J. Service: I did fairly well my first year, except with my idea of engineering. I had signed up for a very heavy math course. It had a woman instructor who, I think, was probably just starting teaching. At any rate, I don't think she was a very good teacher.

They had the honor system in Oberlin. You always sign the honor pledge at the end of the blue book, "I have received no

J. Service: help," and so on. On the first blue book that we took in this course I forgot all about the pledge, and I didn't sign it.

So, when I got my blue book back, zero. Well, it was another thing like this mechanical drawing thing business. [Allegation that Jack stole a T-square in high school] I said, "I'm very sorry, but this was the first blue book I've taken, and I just forgot all about it." Well, she finally gave me credit. Anyway, I had decided by that time I didn't like mathematics, not all that much.

This meant that I wasn't going to be an engineer. My college experience really was a sort of a floundering, groping around, not knowing what I wanted to do. After a good start in my first freshman semester, I seemed gradually to go downhill. Then in my junior year I began to get interested again and to come up. My junior year and my senior year I did quite well. But, there was no Phi Beta Kappa key like my future wife got!

Levenson: What did you major in?

J. Service: Well, this again was a funny business because after I lost interest in engineering, I didn't know what to major in. I ended up with a minimum economics major, because economics just seemed the sensible thing to do--practical.

But, I took courses like economic history of the United States. I liked history. Economic history of the United States was history, but it would count for economics. I had to take a course in accounting. I took a course in foreign trade and things like that. But, I got by with just a barebones minimum economic major.

I actually took my introductory economics in the fall of 1929, right during the crash. I don't think our professor had any conception of what really was happening on Wall Street. Not many people did, except that stock prices were going up. When the market broke, he believed that this was just another business cycle. This one happened to be worse, but we would come out of it all right. In fact, for a long time he was quite optimistic that it wasn't going to be a very serious one.

I had one professor, a quiet old fellow who I think was probably a Socialist, but he was very discreet about what his real beliefs were. He sometimes would make a quiet remark that indicated that he didn't believe the old classical economics that the head of the department taught--who was sure that the Depression was not a very serious or deep one.

Levenson: When you were taking your economics were the theories of Keynes brought in at all?

J. Service: Not at all. Well, Keynes may have been mentioned, but none of our professors were Keynesian, and certainly we learned nothing about Keynes' theories. I mean it was pretty much Adam Smith with maybe a little Marshall and Ricardo, but it was not Keynesian.

Finances: Waiting at Tables and Summer Jobs

J. Service: I managed to be reasonably self-supporting through college. My father got a special allowance from the YMCA for each child of college age. This probably just covered my tuition. Then, I had a board job waiting tables through college. I worked in the summers, various jobs, so that I was fairly self-supporting.

Levenson: What did you do in the summers?

J. Service: My father had a friend from when he was Y secretary at Purdue before he went to China. This man was now, I think, head or near the top of a power company in Fort Wayne, Indiana. So, my father wrote to him, and he said, "Yes, I can give Jack a job."

My first summer I went out there with a friend from Oberlin, one of my Shanghai friends. We were simply put to work on a construction crew that the power company had. We spent most of the summer building a power substation and doing some repair work. It was just good sweaty hard work, spade and shovel, and pouring concrete. It was instructive, my first real contact with working class Americans and working class language.

We lived at the YMCA, saved our money. You could get a meal, a three-course full meal--for 25¢ in those days. The Y was a good place to live and we could swim there.

The second summer--My friend Eddie Reischauer, whom I had known from crossing the Pacific together, was a classmate of mine. As a matter of fact, we had become housemates because his brother, named Robert Reischauer, was a senior when we were freshmen. He was in a group of men that had gone together, about eight or ten people, and simply taken over a house. There were very few dormitories, but other students lived out in town. At any rate, this group of seniors had a house, and there was a question of who was going to take it over when they left. Ed Reischauer was a freshman, as I was and Marty Wilbur. So Ed organized a group to take over the house and I was a member for the next three years.

J. Service: Anyway, the Reischauers had a friend, who used to be in the YMCA, I think, out in Japan, but was now working at the University of Michigan Student Christian Association. The association ran a summer camp, a semi-charity camp, in Michigan, fifty miles or so from Ann Arbor.

Ed got a job there his freshman year. Then, his sophomore year, he was able to get me a job there. So, I went to this summer camp after my sophomore and junior years. Not after my senior year, because after my senior year I started working at Oberlin Inn. I had two summers at this camp, which was very good.

A few days after we arrived at the camp, the truck driver decided to quit. We were about fifty miles out of Ann Arbor where we got most of our supplies. This truck driver took the camp truck into Ann Arbor and telephoned, "I'm quitting."

I just happened to be with the camp manager, this ex-Y man from Japan, when the word came in. He said, "Well, what do we do now?" I said, right away, "I can drive. Let me do it."

This was wonderful because instead of being a counselor and having to deal with a lot of tough kids from Detroit, inner city, and so on--I was the camp truck driver, which put me outside of the business of having to cope with the children and do exercises, calisthenics, swimming class, and all the rest of it. I was the man that went off every day to town and brought in supplies, brought in hay to make beds, helped run the camp pump, and brought in ice. We had to bring lake ice. This was when I had my early romance with the iceman's daughter.
[laughter]

Levenson: Oh really?

J. Service: Well, it wasn't a romance in any very serious sense, but we used to wrestle in the hay a bit. She would take me to the icehouse. It was all lake ice, you see, in Michigan. In the winter they put it in big barn-like structures with layers of ice and layers of straw, huge big blocks. So, she would take me to the icehouse, and we got quite well acquainted before the summer was over. She was a big husky gal.

Levenson: Have to be, handling that ice.

Extracurricular Activities: The Honor Court

Levenson: What other extracurricular activities--I'm not referring to what went on in the icehouse--did you enjoy?

J. Service: Not really very much at Oberlin. I was nominated for class office, but didn't actually make it. I was on class committees. I was on something called the men's senate eventually. I was president of the men's honor court. We had an honor court. After my embarrassing initial experience of forgetting to sign the honor pledge, I eventually ended up being president of the men's honor court, which was supposed to deal with infringements of the honor system.

I'm sure there was much more cheating than was ever reported. People were supposed to report it. It's like the West Point system pretty much. Not many were reported. But, if one was reported, why then, the honor court, of course, had to try to deal with it. I think we only had one or two cases that were reported to us.

One, we decided, was not a serious thing. I think one man was asked to leave school. If we gave an adverse decision, why, it was automatic. You had to be expelled. But, it wasn't a particularly active--thank goodness--not a very active job.

There was something called the Oberlin Peace Society which the president of Oberlin who was a sweet, gentle scholar named Ernest Hatch Wilkins, was interested in. This was the same time that Oxford students were having the same sort of ideas; if enough people say they won't fight, why, we won't have any more wars. So, we had occasional speakers and peace resolutions and things like that, all--it turned out, of course--unrealistic. No one could foresee Nazism in those days. This was still the twenties, late twenties, 1929 or so, '30 maybe.

I was fairly active in that. It fitted perfectly into my YMCA background. A lot of the people very active in the international peace movement--Sherwood Eddy and others--were YMCA people.

A Change in Religious Attitude

J. Service: The religious side of my life took a drastically downward turn. Oberlin was a church-founded school, but by this time it didn't have any direct or formal connection with the Congregational Church. But, they did have a requirement that you had to take a course in religion your freshman year. This was just an innocuous history of the Bible sort of thing. Then in your junior or senior year you had to take a one semester course.

I found that I was able to discharge my religion requirement by taking a course in psychology called the Psychology of Religion. Our textbook was [William] James' Varieties of Religious Experience. By the time I had gone through that, I had become, shall we say, completely agnostic. It was quite a disillusioning sort of a book. The professor who taught it was obviously a complete agnostic himself, atheist or agnostic. I'm not sure which is the right word.

So that I ended college with no feelings at all, shall we say, in religion, and a complete inability to understand my parents' --particularly my father's still strong feeling about it.

Levenson: Was this painful to you?

J. Service: To some extent, yes. Not terribly so. I mean it was sort of an enlightenment at the time, rather than discouragement. It was interesting to be able to look in an impersonal way, objective way, at religion, how it was something that almost every people had felt the need of, and that some people got support and benefit from. But, I didn't feel the need.

Levenson: Did your parents know this?

J. Service: Oh, I don't know how much they knew. I never was much of a letter writer. I think I wrote once a week, but I doubt if I ever discussed with them--I did later on, I think, tell them something about my lack of being able to feel concern about religion.

Later I did join a Unitarian Church after I retired. But this was partly, I think, a desire to associate with a group of people that I liked, that had the same sort of feeling about the world, the universe, that I did, and a sense of wanting to establish some roots when I came back to Berkeley, to affiliate with some sort of organization. The Unitarian Church, the

J. Service: Fellowship, is hardly a very religious organization. But, it does have the same sort of residue of Christian, humanistic, ethical ideas that I ended up with.

The Spirit of Oberlin: Values of a Liberal Education

Levenson: We're leading into something that I wanted to ask about, the sort of spirit Oberlin tried to convey to its students. You mentioned the two religious courses and the peace movement.

J. Service: Oberlin was devoted or consecrated to the value of a liberal education in quite a broad sense, that it was the best training for young people to have, and you should defer your professional training till after you had a liberal education. They did have at Oberlin a pre-med course for people who were going on in medicine, but that's about as close to any technical training as they came. There was a kindergarten for teacher training, but that was separate from the college at that time. And, of course, you had the musical conservatory. But even the musical conservatory was also part of this whole liberal education idea, that a liberal education included, properly, some knowledge and appreciation of music. Actually I didn't get much music out of Oberlin. But, that was my fault, not Oberlin's fault.

Levenson: Did Oberlin actively teach a service mentality?

J. Service: Oh yes, very much so. I mean it was something that was very much in tune with my own background in the YMCA. Service to mankind or service to the community was the highest thing you could do, the most honorable. It was definitely a Christian school.

Levenson: Were there any Chinese students during your stay?

J. Service: Yes, there were a few; most of them were older. The Chinese that were there, as I recall, were people who had been to college already in China and were getting what was the equivalent of a master's, or getting extra training. They had been teaching at Oberlin-in-China, something of that sort.

We had a program of sending people who had just graduated from Oberlin out to teach at this school in Shansi province that Oberlin had connections with, an American Board school. Most of the Chinese were from there. I'm not sure that there were any Chinese undergraduates. I don't recall any.

J. Service: There were people--Oberlin was quite an international school--people from a lot of different countries. Of course, in those days it was not unique, but it had been one of the first schools to admit Negroes and had been the first school that had women, coeducation, so that it was a school that had a proud tradition of being in the vanguard, progressive, and so on.

Levenson: I get the impression that you had a group of B-I-Cs [Born in China].

J. Service: Oh yes. We did tend to cluster together.

Levenson: Hang together.

J. Service: Yes. Marty Wilbur, of course, has remained a good friend. Eddie Reischauer was a B-I-J [Born in Japan]. And there was another boy from Japan that lived in the house later on. Also a fellow named Willis from Shanghai that I worked with at Fort Wayne that first year as a laborer.

There were people not only in our class but years ahead of us that were from China. There were a lot of people from China at Oberlin.

But, things like track, of course, took me out of this China group. Not many men from China happened to turn out to be good runners. [laughter]

College Dating

Levenson: What about meeting Caroline? You mentioned that you met her on the train on your way to Oberlin in 1927.

J. Service: The group on the train included a girl who was an organizer type. She had a friend from Detroit. I got to be quite good friends with this boy, and he took me home at Christmas vacation. At that time I met the organizer girl's younger sister. The next year she came to Oberlin.

So, in my sophomore year, I became very much attached to Dollie Hiatt. It was in that year I learned how to dance. I hadn't learned how to dance until that time.

It was a very serious college crush. I was, you know, very inexperienced and probably very naive, and with my missionary

J. Service: background and so on I tended to be serious about these things. I didn't have any facility at playing games or flirtation.

My mother came to the States, and visited me at Oberlin the beginning of my junior year. She was unhappy, I think, that I had gotten so deeply entangled. She convinced me that I was making a great mistake and that I should break off, that this was the only thing to do.

So in the fall of my junior year for a while I was just sort of drifting around. We all knew quite well a woman professor of English literature named Mrs. Lampson. She was really quite a character, a good teacher.

I and one of my house mates, a boy named Dudley Reed, whose father was at the University of Chicago, used to go around and call on Mrs. Lampson. She encouraged people to do this. We called on her one afternoon and Dudley in a joking way said, "Can't we do something about Jack here? He doesn't have any friend," and so on.

Mrs. Lampson said, "Well, you know, Caroline Schulz is an awfully nice girl," and had had some sort of a breakup recently. Well, I hadn't really thought about Caroline Schulz, but I knew her. She had been at the dormitory where I waited tables. She was a very attractive girl, in a vivacious way, lively way.

Some time after that, maybe--I forget--a week or ten days after that, I just happened to run into Caroline on the campus one day. There was going to be what we called an All College dance. So, I asked her if she would go with me. She looked surprised and said yes. So we started getting acquainted.

From then on things progressed very well through our junior year. But by my senior year not so well because I began to be very serious about studies and what I was going to do. I didn't know what I was going to do. Some of my professors that I knew quite well obviously took a dim view of people getting married at an early age, of college romances that got too serious.

So by the time I was to be graduated I had chilled things off. This was tough on Caroline. But, it seemed to me to be the sensible and logical thing because you can't get married--or you couldn't in those days--till you were settled and established and knew what you were going to do. Why carry on a romance that was sort of hopeless? So, I rather pushed Caroline aside the last part of my senior year.

J. Service: It wasn't until late the next year, when she came on a trip to Cleveland and visited Oberlin and I saw her after some nine months, that I decided that this was a mistake. Of course, I'd had a pretty lonely year in Oberlin too. [laughter]

A Fifth Year in History of Art

J. Service: The last semester of my senior year I took a course in art, in the history of art. It was called "History of American Architecture," I think.

The professor was a very fine lecturer, a dynamic sort of a person who had great enthusiasm. It was contagious. He was interested in things like, oh, the Greek revival. There are lots of houses in that part of Ohio, northern Ohio, that were built in the early 1800's, Greek revival style.

At any rate, I thought this was absolutely terrific. This really gets back to my architecture, gets back to my liking for art. I was quite good in art. I had taken courses in practical art which I did well at, sketching, charcoal, things like that, well enough for the teacher to have my stuff shown.

So, I thought, "Well, I'm going to come back and study history of art and make a thing out of this." So, I did for a year.

Levenson: This was a fifth year, was it?

J. Service: This was a fifth year, after I got my A.B. degree. I went back and I had a job.

My father's grant from the Y was not for graduate study. That had run out, maybe at twenty-one. But, I got a tuition fellowship from the college and a job as a night clerk in the little hotel that the college ran in the town.

Levenson: The Oberlin Inn?

J. Service: The Oberlin Inn, yes. At the Oberlin Inn job I worked from midnight till six. This paid my room and board and \$2.50 a week, I think, in cash. At any rate I had a good year, did very well.

J. Service: I did very good work academically. History of art, I found, was not a terribly demanding subject. Actually, I found the year a little disillusioning in a sense because, although I enjoyed it, the approach was very much detail. You identify a painter, for example, by the way he paints trees, the way he paints the leaves of a tree, or just some small detail. Too much of this business of cataloging and identifying. I was taking a course in medieval architecture.

The professor was going away, I think, to give a lecture. He was going to be away several days. So, he said, "Jack, will you take my lectures while I'm away?" So, I said, "Well, I'll have to do a lot of reading and studying." "Oh, no. You don't have to do a thing," he says. "My notes are all here." Of course there were slides. And it's true. I found out he had all the notes written out for each slide, and he even had the jokes and everything. So that it was really no trick at all for me to take over his course and lecture for him while he was absent, although I had not yet myself gone through that part of the course. In any case, my enthusiasm for history of art chilled somewhat by the end of the year.

I developed the ability to take several short naps during the day. I would work from midnight till six. The day clerk came on at six. I'd go right upstairs and sleep from six until eight. After lunch I would sleep for maybe two hours or two and a half hours. I coached freshmen cross-country, and then I would get to go out to the track and work with them. After dinner I would usually go to the library. When it closed at 9:40 p.m., I would rush back to the hotel and sleep from 9:45 or so until midnight. With these three short stretches I did very well. I got the habit, I mean the ability, to go to sleep almost immediately.

Levenson: That's a wonderful thing.

J. Service: Yes. So, it worked out.

Levenson: I imagine it's been very useful to you.

J. Service: Well, I haven't kept it up. [laughter]

Levenson: Does that seem like a good place to stop?

J. Service: Unless you've got something else.

Levenson: I was going to ask you about the effects of the Depression.

J. Service: Well, it was quite apparent by that time, '32, that this was no ordinary Depression, and there was no hope really of my being able to continue graduate study. I'd have to get a Ph.D. in order to do anything with the history of art, either as a curator or teacher, professor. So, I just had to think of something else.

Levenson: When I asked about the Depression I was really referring to Oberlin and what effect it had on you and your classmates.

J. Service: A lot of my classmates had a disastrous time. They had to take any kind of job they could get. A lot of them couldn't get any jobs. Some of them went years without finding anything to do. I solved the problem temporarily by this year of graduate study.

I don't remember that it affected Oberlin, the college, very much. I think the college was well endowed. Things went on pretty much in a normal way. I think later on that they may have felt pinched, but by the time I left in '31, '32, it wasn't hurting the college.

It affected my family, of course, my father, but that's a later chapter, because my father was discharged [from the YMCA].

Oh, there's something I should mention which was an effect of the Depression. In, I think, my junior year when I was still floundering about--

Levenson: That was 19--

J. Service: About 1930. I had the idea perhaps of getting a job with the Standard Oil Company in China. I think I wrote them. I may have done that through some sort of office at the college, because they usually sent recruiters around. Oberlin was one of the places the recruiters went.

But, in 1931, which was the next time they were going to come by, they wrote me a letter and said they were very sorry, but because of conditions they were not recruiting for China. So, perhaps it was due to the Depression I didn't end up selling oil for the lamps of China. [laughter]

Levenson: That sounds like a good place to stop, don't you think?

J. Service: Okay.

Three Significant Families: The Yards, the Davies, and the Arnolds

[Interview 3: April 28, 1977]

J. Service: I wanted to get married by this time. I had reestablished my feelings about Caroline. But you know, you have to have a job. So, there was this question of what to do.

My mother was back in the States. I was in Chicago with her visiting the Yards again who I had grown up with in Chengtu.

There are three families that have been woven in and out of my career. One of them is the Yard family. They, as I think I may have mentioned, were a missionary family from Chengtu. Mrs. Yard was my mother's very, very closest friend. There were four Yard girls. One was a little bit older than I was. She died, incidentally, yesterday.

Levenson: I'm sorry.

J. Service: The three Service boys were sort of in between the Yard girls.

Then, the Davies family. John Davies' parents were missionaries in Chengtu. Another family is the Arnold family. Julean, that's J-u-l-e-a-n, Julean Arnold, was a classmate of my parents at Berkeley and then went out to China and for twenty-five or thirty years was US commercial attache in China. He was very well known.

He donated his library to the university here after his death. I'd take out books on China here at the library, look inside, and find a bookplate of Julean Arnold.

He had three sons. One was a little older than I was. The second son was just about my age, then a daughter, and then a younger son. They had moved to Shanghai. They were originally in Peking. But a commercial attache in Peking was almost useless, so the office was moved to Shanghai. I had spent vacations with them during my boarding school days in Shanghai.

I stopped in Chicago and was staying with the Yards and talking with the Yard girls about what to do.

Levenson: This was in--

J. Service: This was 1932, the summer of '32. I wanted to get married; I wanted a job. Graduate study was simply out of the question, physically unfeasible. A Ph.D. would have been a long study anyway.

What Career? Why Not the Foreign Service?

J. Service: So, one of the girls--and I'm not sure whether it was Priscilla, the second one, or Elizabeth, the elder; probably Elizabeth--said, "Why don't you try the Foreign Service examinations? John Davies just took them and he passed."

I don't think I had realized that John had just taken them and passed. At any rate, I hadn't thought of the Foreign Service before. The more I thought about this suggestion, the better it seemed, the more reasonable, logical it seemed. Why not? If John Davies could pass the examination, why couldn't I?

I was with my parents. We came out to California, to southern California, and there we met the Arnolds who were also Californians. Harrison, my own age, also had taken the Foreign Service exam the same time John did, but he didn't pass. He had gone to a cram school in Washington.

He was very enthusiastic. He was going to take it a second time, that fall, the fall of '32. He was very enthusiastic and encouraged me, but he said, "You can't possibly pass it the first time. The thing to do is to apply for it, take it this year, but just for practice. Spend this year studying and preparing for it, and then hit it the second time"--which would be '33.

I didn't like this idea very much, but a few days later we were driving from southern California up here to Berkeley. About midnight we went through Fresno. I happened to see a Western Union. In those days Western Unions were more important and more common, and they stayed open all night in places like Fresno.

To apply for the Foreign Service exam one had to make application six weeks before the date. The date was in September some time. I suddenly realized when I saw this Western Union station that if I was going to get under the deadline, the only way would be to send a night letter.

So, I said to my father, "Why don't we stop and I'll send a night letter from this telegraph office?" I got under the wire.

J. Service: Eventually I got my designation to take the examination, which I did over here in San Francisco in the Federal Mint building, in the basement room with about twenty other people.

Levenson: What appealed to you about the Foreign Service at that point?

J. Service: We'd known consuls in China, some of them quite well, particularly after my parents moved to Chungking. Well, basically it was a job. But it seemed like an honorable, respectable, a good job, a job that would have interest and so on.

Of course, I always assumed if I was going to do it, I would go to China. This I just sort of took for granted. I felt that I had a background that would probably help me. But, I think it just seemed like an attractive, white collar, pleasant job. My father was unhappy about the idea.

Levenson: Why?

J. Service: For various reasons. I think he felt that consuls and diplomats generally were inclined to be frivolous persons, perhaps too much drinking and smoking, and too much emphasis on social life, and things like that.

Finally, when he saw I was serious about it later on, he was quite willing, except that he did emphasize his concept of a career, that you make a commitment to it. If you're going to do it, why, really do it. Don't expect to just dabble in it and try something else. His whole idea was that it could be a career job, a service job in the YMCA sense. If I went into it he hoped I would do it in that spirit.

A Drop-In Student at Berkeley, 1932

J. Service: I came to Berkeley and they didn't know quite what to do with me. I registered as a special student. You could get in apparently at Berkeley in those days without doing it six months ahead of time, because I just came and registered.

They sent me to an elderly gentleman named Barrows, General [David Prescott] Barrows, who had served at one time in the Philippines. Was he governor of the Philippines or in the cabinet of the governor?

Levenson: He was director of education.

J. Service: They thought he would be the logical person to talk to about how to prepare for the Foreign Service. But he didn't know very much.

I registered in a couple of courses. I took a course in Chinese. But, mainly I just used the library.

When you apply for designation to take the Foreign Service exam, they send you an old examination. So you have a sample. This gives you some information about it. And I had my friend Harrison who had come to Berkeley then.

I mainly just got out basic textbooks. The exam included international law, commercial law, maritime law. I got basic, simple textbooks, reviewed a lot of history and economics. I used the Morrison Library a great deal. I just holed up in the Morrison Library, as I recall, used that as my base.

I lived in a rooming house which was right where the Zellerbach Auditorium is now. Harmon Gym was just being built across the street. I roomed with another fellow whom I didn't know. We just found ourselves roommates. I paid five dollars a month.

Levenson: For a room?

J. Service: Yes. He was a student, but he worked nights as a parking attendant at a night club in San Francisco--they had night clubs even in '32--at a place called Bal Tabarin. He parked cars for people and lived on tips.

There was another boy in the attic there who was putting himself through school by selling rubbers, condoms, to the fraternity houses. It was a rare place!

I ate most of my meals at a place called White Tower which was a very cheap hamburger place on Bancroft. The main gate of the University was then Sather Gate. All that block where Sproul is is all new since then.

I waited tables some at fraternity houses. The Psi U people, my father's fraternity, found out about me and invited me around. But, obviously, we weren't made for each other.

Finally I got a job on a fairly regular basis as a night clerk at what was then the Berkeley Women's City Club, and is now the Berkeley City Club. They wanted some man there at

J. Service: night because the upper floors were for women living in residence. So, I would come around--I forget--about midnight and sleep usually for a few hours on the divan, take a swim in the pool sometimes.

The Lake Merritt Marathon

J. Service: One day in the fall, I went out to the track to see what was going on. Brutus Hamilton had just started as coach at Berkeley. This was his first season actually.

He was glad to see an experienced cross-country runner. He was a coach of distance runners himself. He'd been famous because he had coached Cunningham at Kansas, who was an Olympic miler, but not successful in the Olympics.

But, anyway, he was interested in building up some distance runners. The basis, the foundation, for distance running is cross-country. So, he was glad to have an old hand along. I ran with the squad which, as I mentioned earlier, was smaller than the squad had been at Oberlin.

The Lake Merritt marathon came along. This was promoted by the Oakland Tribune in those days. It was misnamed a marathon because it was just once around Lake Merritt, which hardly qualifies as a marathon.

I forget whether it was my idea or Hamilton's, but anyway, I entered and won it to everybody's surprise. I was an unknown, a complete outsider. It had an amusing sequel later on that we'll mention.

Levenson: Who awarded you the prize?

J. Service: Oh, I've forgotten who actually handed it to me. Of course, Senator [William] Knowland was very young in those days. He wasn't in the scene. I was given a nice, a fine, gold watch, which we lost in Yunnan, circumstances still unknown. Caroline hid it away, and it was hidden so carefully that we've never found it since. [laughter]

Levenson: You wanted to fill in a few things from last time, Jack.

J. Service: Yes. One was the summer of 1932, late summer of '32. My family went up to the Sierras, and my father and I walked from the floor of Yosemite valley over to Tuolumne Meadows in one day. This is noteworthy mainly because it was the first time that I outwalked my father. In other words it was a sort of a milestone. We did, I suppose, about forty miles.

Levenson: In one day?

J. Service: Yes. We leapfrogged two camps, you see. We passed Merced Lake hikers' camp, and then Vogelsang and then down into Tuolumne Meadows.

But, the shocker for us was that the valley at Tuolumne Meadows had changed from what we remembered of it when we were there in the twenties. So many people now were going up there that they had had to set out special campsites.

There was a place along the river where my uncles had always camped. So, we simply assumed that we were going to find them in the same place. We got there in the late afternoon, dusk coming on, having had nothing except a couple of sandwiches since early morning, and found that where they used to camp was no longer a campsite.

We charged up and down the valley trying to find them in various campsites. It got darker and darker, and we finally had to go to the Tuolumne Meadows hikers' camp. They were able to give us a cot for the night.

The next day we started out again and found them by going to the ranger station and finding out where they had been assigned.

I was twenty-three and he was fifty-three. So, it was hardly a fair contest, but nonetheless it was a turning point.

Foreign Service Examinations, Written and Oral

J. Service: The exam was in late September. As I said, I took it over in San Francisco. It was a three day examination, three long days, three hours morning, three hours afternoon. First day was all general, which was general IQ or reading knowledge. You read paragraphs of unfamiliar material--complex, technical text--and then had to answer questions about what it said. All

J. Service: this was done against time. We had a whole section of mathematical problems, but they didn't really require detailed knowledge of mathematics. It was mostly reasoning, analysis in other words.

General knowledge, you know, lists of names. Are they people, rivers? What are they? Then, of course, as I say, you've got law, economics, history, and I think language the last one.

When I came out I thought that I had done all the mathematics and checked them all. I missed one. [laughter] At least, I got my scores, so I know I missed one.

In the three hour exam, the first hour you would do, say, four or five questions. But, you always had a choice. Then the second hour, write two thirty-minute papers, answers to two questions. But, again you had a choice. Then, the final hour was one long question, from a list of topics. I almost always found within the choice something that I could handle pretty well.

I got through the exams with almost no sleep. I can do this for a time. This is really how I got through college--by cramming, not by steady work.

I would take the exams in the afternoon and then usually go to a movie show in town and then come home and work practically all night and then go back to the exams the next day.

Levenson: I have an addendum. In looking at the names of your references for the Foreign Service I saw Monroe Deutsch and one or two other well known Berkeley names.

J. Service: Monroe Deutsch was an old friend of my parents. I think he'd been in Berkeley the same time they were. But, they knew him quite well.

Levenson: Did you know him?

J. Service: On that trip through Europe when I met two teachers who were classmates of my parents, we went to Amalfi. Who should be staying at the same pension in Amalfi but Monroe Deutsch?
[laughter]

I knew some of them but I admit some of the names were put in there largely because they were friends of the family rather than my personal friends.

Levenson: You have Robert Sibley.

J. Service: Yes. Again an old friend of my parents. I had met him. I knew him slightly. He had been quite good to my younger brother Bob at Berkeley.

Levenson: D. Willard Lyon.

J. Service: D. Willard Lyon was an old worthy in the YMCA. In fact, he was the man who first started YMCA work in China in 1896, I think.

Levenson: R. R. Rowley.

J. Service: Rowley, yes. His mother-in-law had been an old friend of the Service family. She had lived with us here at Berkeley when we came on furlough in 1924-25. When my parents went east and they wanted somebody to stay in the house, Mrs. Strite, Rowley's mother, was an old friend of my father's mother and came and stayed in the house with us.

Levenson: So there wasn't really anything very significant about these names?

J. Service: No. I picked one Chinese name there. Chee Su Lowe. I wanted a Chinese name. He was a California-trained mining engineer who had gone out to China to work for the Chinese government on some mining project they had in West China and had gotten into trouble. This was around the time of the revolution.

Like Chinese often did in those days, he had trouble about his American citizenship. I forget what the argument was, but my father succeeded in getting him out, and he was always very grateful. They lived over on Chabot Road here in Berkeley at that time. They were old friends, also from UC Berkeley.

Levenson: When did you hear about the results of the exams?

J. Service: It was in December. I had continued at college, at the University [of California], after I took the exams, since I didn't know how it was going to come out.

Levenson: So here we have a list of your grades!

J. Service: There it is.

Levenson: Your average was seventy-nine.

J. Service: If you got an average of seventy, you were allowed to take the oral. I got in touch with Caroline. Her parents were just outside of Washington at an army engineer school, near Mount Vernon. She knew the man who ran a cram school in Washington. She felt that I ought to come to Washington and go to the cram school.

But it seemed to me that going to a cram school for an oral examination was a waste of time and money. I would have had to borrow the money. The oral examination--I knew something about it by that time--could be anything. They just mainly want to see you, talk to you, get an idea of you and how you react.

I got to Washington just before the examination. The examining panel in those days was very high level. There was the man who was executive head of the State Department, named Wilbur Carr; the head of personnel of the Foreign Service; there was an assistant secretary named Castle; there was a man who was in charge of the exams who had drawn up a new type of examination which they were giving then, which was very different. This was why my friend Harrison had failed because he was there the first year of the new type of examinations.

They asked me all sorts of weird questions.

Levenson: What sort of weird?

J. Service: If I were offered ten thousand dollars if I could shake Mussolini's hand within ten days, did I think I could do it and how would I go about it? So, I explained very briefly how to get to Rome the fastest way possible and then said that I would go to one of the American newspaper correspondents, and I mentioned there were several there--New York Herald Tribune or somebody--and explain the proposition to him and ask him to talk to the information minister of the Italian government whom he would have contact with and explain that I would give the money to charity if Mussolini would do this. I said I thought Mussolini would go for the story and publicity.

They said, "You wouldn't go the American embassy?" I said, "Oh, no. I wouldn't go near the American embassy." They were obviously pleased!

They asked a lot of questions--"Who do you think is an important or interesting character in current affairs?" I said, "T.V. Soong." "Why?" Well, of course, I knew that anything you gave you had to know why. You had to be able to follow it up. I said, "Because he has just balanced the Chinese

J. Service: budget," and I thought that was quite a memorable achievement. T.V. Soong comes into the story later on, of course, but he helped me pass the Foreign Service exam.

Actually, on this whole subject of the written and the oral exams, the fact that I had not known in college what I wanted to study was a great help to me. I had had a very good liberal education, a very broad one, because of the fact that I didn't have any limited or definite career motive. So I took a lot of history. I took a lot of English literature, some political science. I got a basic major in economics. I had a wonderful preparation, quite accidentally, for something like the Foreign Service, for this type of examination.

They asked me, for instance--this was January, '33--"What would be the first thing you would do if you were suddenly made dictator of the United States?" I said I would do something about restoring the price level because of deflation. I explained something about the effect of deflation on the farmer, lower prices. He was losing his land, foreclosures and so on.

They said, "How could this be accomplished?" I said, "One way would be to devalue the dollar, reduce the gold content of the dollar." I don't, of course, claim any originality, but at least a Republican administration--Hoover was still President--accepted my answers!

The man who was the grand wizard, the head of the examination board, who devised the examinations, was a history professor, former history professor, from Princeton named Joseph Green. His question was, "I see by the dossier, Mr. Service, that you've had some courses in medieval architecture. Could you please tell me something about the difference between late Romanesque and early Gothic architectural ornament?"

Well, this happened to be the section of the course that I had given the lectures on for the prof that had been away. At that point I could open up and give him a chapter of a book! So, I started in. He said, "Well, I see that you know something about the subject." [laughter] That was the end of that.

The chief of personnel had only one question. He referred to my China background. "If you are successful and are appointed to the Foreign Service, will you volunteer for service in China?" I said, "Yes."

Levenson: When they asked about your upbringing in China was there any implication at any point that they wanted to establish how "American" you were?

J. Service: I don't recall any particular questions about that. Later on, of course, this became very much of a concern.

The written exam was heavily on American history and things like that, so that they knew that at least I could pass muster on that sort of thing.

I think the exam--the questions about the Y were just exploratory--a lot of it is just pulling you out, seeing how well you express yourself, how much you know about anything you're saying. They asked me about how many secretaries the Y had in China, how extensive the work was, something about the history of the Y. I was able to answer them satisfactorily.

I had told them that I could speak some Chinese, and you'll note in these results that my language was terrible. [chuckling, shows test scores]

Levenson: What language did you take?

J. Service: I offered French. I had had a little French in Shanghai American School, but it was abominable, so I told them I knew some Chinese. They sent me around to see a Foreign Service officer up in the Division of Chinese Affairs, who turned out to be someone my parents had known and I had known slightly in Shanghai.

He was rather busy and surprised. He said, "Well, I haven't spoken any Chinese for a long time." A lot of people didn't keep up their Chinese very well. He said, "Just tell me something about yourself, where you were born, where you went to school, and what you're doing."

So, I rattled on for a while in my terrible Szechwanese. He said, "Well obviously, you know some Chinese." [laughter]

After the oral, the examiners said, "Wait in the waiting room outside, the anteroom." So, I went back there and--I forget--fifteen or twenty minutes later, somebody came to me, a clerk, and gave me a piece of paper and instructions about having a physical examination at the navy dispensary.

Well, this was a tip-off. If you were sent to get the physical, then you had passed. They didn't tell you officially until some days later. I went and passed my physical exam that afternoon at the Naval Dispensary.



DEPARTMENT OF STATE
WASHINGTON

REPORT OF RATINGS IN THE WRITTEN PART OF THE FOREIGN SERVICE

EXAMINATION HELD SEPTEMBER 26-28, 1932.

Name of Candidate: John S. Service.

Examination number: 3151.

Subjects	Averages	Relative weights	Products of averages multiplied by weights
I. General examination	89.51	4	358.04
II. General examination	96.67	1	96.67
III. General examination	78.73	2	157.46
IV. Special examination - International, maritime, and commercial law	72.05	4	288.20
V. Special examination - Economics	84.00	4	336.00
VI. Special examination - History and government	77.50	4	310.00
VII. Special examination - Modern languages	27.00	1	27.00
Total		20	1573.37
Average percentage, written test			79.00



DEPARTMENT OF STATE
WASHINGTON

JAN 24 1939

Mr. John S. Service,
Care of Colonel E. H. Schulz,
Fort Humphreys, Virginia.

Sir:

It gives me pleasure to inform you that you passed the recent Foreign Service entrance examination with a rating of 83.00 per cent, and that your name has been placed on the list of those eligible for appointment as Foreign Service officers.

A statement of your ratings appears below.

Very truly yours,

Chairman, Board of Examiners
for the Foreign Service.

Final report of ratings.

Average percentage on written test	79.00
Oral test	<u>87.00</u>
	2) <u>166.00</u>
	83.00
Average percentage	<u><u>83.00</u></u>
Modern language (Oral)	34.00

J. Service: Then, there was the question of what to do. I had asked the man who examined me in Chinese for advice. This was Janaury, '33. He said, "Look--there's going to be retrenchment in the department. Appropriations are going to be cut. There are simply going to be no appointments of any Foreign Service officers. You've undoubtedly passed the examination since you took the physical, but I can't give you a clue when you may get appointed, how soon."

I mentioned that I was thinking of going back to China anyway. My father was going then and my mother was going to follow later. He said, "Well, that would be an excellent idea. If you go to China, apply for a clerk's job, a clerkship. You'll probably get one if there is a vacancy because you will have saved the Department of State money by being already in China; and the fact that you've passed the examinations and are on the waiting list for appointment will also be in your favor."

So that's what we did. I went with my father to China.

Levenson: Supposing you had been offered a foreign service position outside of China, would you have taken it?

J. Service: Oh certainly. I'm sure I would have. Simply that--A job was critical at that time. Almost any other job probably too. I don't know.

Trainee in the American Oriental Bank, Shanghai

J. Service: My father and I had a difficult time sailing because the Bank Holiday intervened and my father couldn't get the money to pay for the steamship ticket. They weren't anxious to take checks in those days since all the banks were closed. [chuckling] But, he had a brother in Berkeley who had a jewelry store down on Shattuck Avenue, L.H. Service, and he helped out. All the old Berkeley people knew L.H. Service.

Anyway, we got on a Danish freighter and got to Shanghai.

Levenson: Were you at that point formally engaged to Caroline?

J. Service: Yes. Oh, I'm sure we were formally engaged. After I passed the examinations we had agreed. I'm not sure that I gave Caroline a ring then. I don't think I gave her a ring till later. Even then it was a ring my mother had, that my mother gave me, that I gave to Caroline. But anyway, we considered ourselves engaged.

Levenson: Then, you arrived in Shanghai in 1933.

J. Service: Shanghai was having a deflation. Things were not good in Shanghai. American firms were letting people off. My brother Bob had been to Berkeley, had dropped out--he didn't like Berkeley, was unhappy--and gone out to China. He had been fired by the company he was working with. He was working as a sales representative for a machinery manufacturer.

There was an American-owned bank in Shanghai, the American Oriental Bank, which was run by a man named Raven. My family knew Raven very well. We also knew a Hungarian who was number two in the bank. Like our architect friend, he was a man who had come out across Siberia from a Russian prison camp. He had stayed in Shanghai and gone into banking.

At any rate, the bank agreed to take me on as a trainee. The salary was \$200 a month, \$200 Mex. a month, which at that time was--well, less than \$100.

Levenson: Two hundred dollars what? What was the word you used?

J. Service: Mexican. We'd say Mex.

Levenson: Was that the currency in Shanghai?

J. Service: Yes. Well, Mexican dollars, had circulated very widely in the early days of China trade. By this time the Chinese government was putting out its own dollars. But, the word Mexican still was used. You saw Mexican dollars with Spanish, all sorts of different kinds of coins. Most of the coins were now minted in China. But, the phrase when you meant Chinese dollars was always Mex. or Mexican.

Levenson: I hadn't heard that before.

J. Service: When you meant American dollars you said gold. You never said U.S. dollars. You said gold, even after Roosevelt devalued.

At any rate, I was sort of a trainee in the bank, working with the Chinese clerks as a teller, learning how to be a bank teller.

Missionary's Son Becomes a Social Drinker

J. Service: In April, 1933, soon after my father and I got back to Shanghai, the Arnolds invited me to dinner. Harrison was there also. He had taken the exams that fall of '32, for his second time, and had failed again. He was back in Shanghai. The Arnolds were great connoisseurs of Chinese food, the whole family was wonderful, always had good food, knew the best restaurants.

The noteworthy thing about the dinner to me was that we, the family, drank. We had drinks before dinner, drinks during dinner, as I recall, drinks after dinner. But, it was my first experience really, in a polite and aboveboard social way, with alcohol.

Of course, my family had always been, like most Protestant missionaries, dead set against the evils of John Barleycorn and liquor. At Oberlin it had been absolutely verboten. I had tasted a little bit, you know, like bootleg hooch, bathtub gin.

But, to suddenly find that it was perfectly okay and normal--in fact tasted rather good--was another sort of a milestone in my life. Fortunately, I found I could drink reasonably well. This is useful socially in China because all business, all social affairs, and a lot of other affairs, are conducted at the banquet table, connected with feasts. Finger games, toasting, and drinking is an important part.

Later on I found out, much later, when I was on the Foreign Service selection board in 1949, that there are a lot of people in the Foreign Service that weren't very successful in handling it. It's sort of an occupational disease, I'm afraid.

Levenson: Alcoholism?

J. Service: Alcoholism, yes, or drinking too much.

Levenson: Did you ever commit any of the sorts of excesses that some strictly brought up people go in for when they're on their own--binges, and so on?

J. Service: No, I don't think so. In those days, Shanghai, particularly when we were there later from '37 to '41, we went out with a group of young people that drank a good deal at dinner. I've wondered at times: "How did I get home?" But apparently I never disgraced myself. I did enjoy it. However, I always found that when it was not available I could get along without, or I could quit it.

J. Service: I picked up smoking in Peking in 1936 when I was studying Chinese. We learned our characters by having them written on cards. I would study character cards usually very intensively for maybe half an hour. Then I'd need a break and I started smoking. So, I got the habit really from my study breaks in Peking. That's a habit I did get very badly and much worse relatively speaking than drinking. It was particularly troublesome during the war when cigarettes were hard to get in China. [laughter]

III APPRENTICESHIP OF A FOREIGN SERVICE OFFICER, 1933-1942

Clerkship in Yunnanfu

J. Service: Almost as soon as I got to Shanghai I went around to call on the American consul-general, Cunningham, a very elderly gentleman who had been in Shanghai a long time, and applied for a clerkship.

It wasn't too long--I think it was only about six weeks--when Cunningham asked me to come and see him and said, "Would you like a job as clerk at Yunnanfu?"--which in those days was considered the end of everything. I mean to hell-and-gone, a remote and isolated post in South West China. He said, "You don't have to say today." I rushed off and sent a telegram to Caroline.

I didn't get an answer right away, but I went back to Cunningham I think the next day and said yes, I'd take the job. Then, Caroline's cablegram came in saying, "No, don't go!" But, the die was cast. I had committed myself, so I went to Yunnanfu which is now known as Kunming. In fact, to the Chinese even in those days it was known as Kunming. It was only the foreigners who still called it Yunnanfu because that is what it had been before 1912. The old Chinese name was Yunnanfu.

Levenson: So, that was your first post. What did it pay?

J. Service: The pay was \$1800, U.S. dollars, for that day and age, a very fine job. But as soon as Roosevelt came in the Economy Act cut all federal salaries 15 percent across the board. That still didn't bother me. I had plenty to live on. But then they started devaluing the dollar. This meant that our paycheck went down as the U.S. dollar went down.

J. Service: It was particularly bad in Yunnan because it was in the French sphere of influence and a lot of prices were based on the French Indochinese piaster, which was a gold-based currency. So, we had a very substantial cut in pay.

Eventually the government got around to compensating us, not for the depreciation of the U.S. dollar, but for the "appreciation of foreign exchange." So, it meant I had eventually quite a nice lump sum payment which I promptly proceeded to deposit in the bank, the American Oriental Bank in Shanghai.

Duties

Levenson: What were your duties? First off, to whom did you report?

J. Service: When I first got there there were two officers--two vice consuls actually. The senior vice consul who was in charge was a man named [Charles] Reed. Then, there was John Davies.

Everybody in the Foreign Service was usually sent first to a Mexican or a Canadian border post for a short trial period, usually three months or so. Then, you came to Washington for Foreign Service School which was another three months, sort of indoctrination, orientation, whatever you want to call it. Then you were sent out to the field. So this was John Davies' first field post--really. He'd been in Windsor, Ontario, and then Foreign Service School.

Very soon after I got there they decided that with two men there--in other words the chief vice consul and me--there was no need for John Davies. They were cutting down everywhere. John then was transferred up to Peking as a language student. You asked who I reported to. Well, there was only one person to report to, and that was the vice consul.

The office, of course, reported to the legation--it hadn't been raised to embassy status. We always said Peking, but actually the capital of the country was Nanking. In 1928, the Nationalist Kuomintang government made Nanking the capital.

This was very unpopular with the foreigners because, well, they loved Peking and they had their establishments in Peking. They had no lovely buildings in Nanking. So, the ambassador kept most of his office--most of the chancery was in Peking. He would make occasional visits to Nanking to conduct business.

J. Service: So, we would always say that we reported to the legation in Peking. We generally reported by mail which might take two or three weeks, because the only way to get to Yunnan was a long trip through Hongkong, then down to Haiphong, then by train, the French railway, from Haiphong--which in those days was a three-day trip because they didn't run at night--up to Yunnan. You could come directly overland but it would have taken you weeks and weeks to make the trip. So the only practical way was this two-week trip around.

Levenson: When you say direct--

J. Service: Well, you'd go up the Yangtze to Chungking and then overland to Kunming, but it would take you about four weeks to do it.

Levenson: What were your duties there?

J. Service: I did everything. Files, of course. I maintained the files. I did all the filing. I did all the typing and I was not a trained typist. This was to create a lot of grief because--Reed was terribly worried about promotions and much concerned about almost everything, social position, everything else.

But he couldn't stand any erasures or any mistakes on a page. I was always having to retype things so they would go in looking perfect. I myself don't mind little things like that.
[laughter]

He had me do trade letters, commercial work. But, there really weren't any commercial opportunities in Kunming. There couldn't be because the French were not about to let any Americans do business--or anyone else except themselves, any other foreigners except themselves--do business in Yunnan. All goods had to come through French Indochina.

We would get trade inquiries--what is the market for beer, for instance, in your consular district? The only real letter to send them back was just, "There isn't any." But not my boss! He insisted that we write them a full dress discussion of the market and procedures for importing and the desirability of getting a local agent, the desirability and necessity of getting a forwarding agent in Haiphong, and all the rest of this. Every trade letter had to be a certain number of pages.

I had gotten eventually to do most of the routine consular work, registration of American citizens, issuance of passports, registration of births, marriages, this sort of thing.

J. Service: After a year I was commissioned as a vice consul with no increase in pay.

Levenson: Your first title was what?

J. Service: Just clerk, foreign service clerk. But then they commissioned me a vice consul, which meant that I could perform services like passports since I had signing authority. I could do notariats.

"Bureaucrats are Made, not Born"

J. Service: My chief was not a China service man. We had a Chinese interpreter in the office who was supposed to call attention to newsworthy things in the [Chinese] newspapers and translate them if necessary.

But, my vice consul didn't think he was doing a very good job. So he'd make poor Mr. Hwang sit down beside him, and he would point at the paper, [sternly] "Now, what is this? What's this?" You know, point at the headlines here and there and make this poor Chinese translate.

Actually, most of his political reporting was from talking to the British consul general who was an old China hand and whose Chinese was excellent. He was eccentric like a lot of British people in remote places. Homosexual and a Mohammedan to boot. He'd served in places like Kashgar.

But he was not alone in being unique or peculiar. In the French consulate, one of their members was a Buddhist.

But, anyway, Charles Reed talked mainly to the British consul general. He'd go to the club and hear the gossip at the club. The commissioner of customs and the commissioner of posts had Chinese colleagues, theoretically on the same level they were. So, they got a good deal of news because they had to know where the disturbances were. The political reporting basically was the sort of gossip Reed got from talking to other people. We had to submit a monthly political report. If anything urgent came along we would make a special report. If it was something really vital we'd send a telegram, but that was very unusual.

J. Service: I remember one night. I think we were having a Christmas party and a telegram came in--any telegram was an event. We had to leave the party, rush down to the office, open the safe and get out the code book.

The telegram was from the legation in Peking relaying a circular from the Department of State saying that the president had declared December 24th a holiday because of the weekend arrangements or something like that. But, of course, we'd passed December 24th [laughter] by the time we got the telegram. So, we went back to the party.

The political reporting was, shall we say, very low key, very unimportant.

Levenson: So, you don't feel you really got any good training in this--

J. Service: Negative training, mostly negative.

Levenson: In what sense?

J. Service: How not to do it. This was a favorite phrase of Mao Tse-tung, training by negative example.

We ought to go back to Kunming because I rejected out of hand the value of serving there. That really wasn't true, because although I wasn't getting any very useful training in political reporting, I was learning to be a bureaucrat.

This is something that should not be treated facetiously. Bureaucrats are made, not born. Nothing in my background trained me or prepared me to be a bureaucrat. It's very important. It's not all negative. If you're going to get along in a bureaucratic system, bureaucratic organization, you've got to learn what things are acceptable, what you can do, what you can't do. You've got to learn prudence and caution, how to get things done, things like that.

Actually I became, I think in most people's minds, a pretty good bureaucrat. Most of my career was spent as a bureaucrat. I've made a little summary here. Actually, out of my twenty-nine years of service--which were diminished by five and a half by firing, leaving twenty-three and a half years as actual time served in the Foreign Service--I only spent about five years in political reporting.

J. Service: This is what I'm generally known for, and this is probably why I'm sitting here talking to you. But, actually administrative and consular work, which are usually lumped together, were about fourteen years of my time. So most of my time was, shall we say, in bureaucratic pursuits.

Of course, in the Amerasia case I violated a lot of bureaucratic rules, and I acted in a very unbureaucratic way. That's one of the reasons why I got into trouble. But that's something that comes later.

Also, the business of being a clerk and learning from the ground up how things are actually done--filing, coding a telegram, all the routine operations--was something that always stood me in good stead.

I had it in Kunming. I had it for a while in Peking because after things got busy in China politically, then they needed extra help in the code room, and the language officers were called out for night code room duty.

Then in Shanghai, as we'll see later, most of my work was administrative.

Always in my later Foreign Service career I knew what the practical problems were. I knew the advantages of writing, breaking up a despatch, for instance, into various smaller despatches, because then they would be filed more easily under the appropriate topic. You write a grab bag type of despatch, why the file clerk has got a terrible problem.

Learning how to draft telegrams so that the night duty officer could get the subject right away and decide whether or not it's worth decoding in the middle of the night, and learning how to deal with subordinates. All these and more were improved by having had a basic grounding. Most Foreign Service officers come in and start as a commissioned officer. They never had the non-commissioned, grassroots, down-to-earth sort of experience. Anyway, that covers my addendum.

Incidentally, talking about bureaucracy, I was going to relate an incident in Kunming when I was learning to be a bureaucrat. Every post in those days was required to submit weekly, for the U.S. Public Health Service, what was called a quarantine report. It was supposed to report epidemics for the U.S. Public Health Service.

J. Service: Generally, most consuls were in seaports. But Kunming was five hundred miles from any water. We didn't even know the population, and there were no medical statistics. So, we simply had a form statement. We would put it on this form each week, "The population is estimated to be 150,000. There are no statistics, but typhoid, smallpox, syphilis, are prevalent, and such and such diseases are endemic, cholera and so on." When I had spare time I would type these up in advance and have them all ready. It just seemed to me completely absurd that we should do this.

So, I kept telling Mr. Reed that we should explain and object. He laughed at me and he said it was no use. But, I persisted. He said, "Well, okay. Write a despatch and send it in."

So we wrote a formal despatch to the Department of State explaining all the circumstances. We waited months and eventually a reply came back.

[paraphrasing] The Department of State has forwarded our despatch to the Treasury Department which in turn had forwarded it to the U.S. Public Health Service (which was under Treasury). They now had pleasure in transmitting the reply back through the same channels.

The Public Health Service reported they read our reports with great interest, found them of much value, and hoped that the consulate at Kunming would be instructed to continue to submit them.

Reed laughed, of course, when this came in. He said, "I told you so."

But, he also had his foible in bureaucracy because he was trying, all of the time he was there, to get Kunming declared an unhealthy post. In those days you got service credit for time and a half if you served in an unhealthy post.

Kunming was considered a healthy post simply because somebody looked at a map and said, "Well, it's on a plateau; the elevation is six thousand feet, lovely climate." So, we were a healthy post.

But, Shanghai and Hangkow--Shanghai was a modern city. You lived in a foreign concession. There was sewage, sanitation, doctors, and all the rest of it. But, Shanghai was listed as an unhealthy post.

AMERICAN CONSULATE YUNNANFU, CHINA.

GENERAL INFORMATION CONCERNING THE YUNNANFU CONSULAR DISTRICT

Area, Climate, and Topography.—The Province of Yunnan, comprising the Yunnanfu Consular District, covers an area of approximately 146,714 square miles and is situated in the southwestern-most part of China Proper between latitude 21° and 29° N. and longitude 98° and 106° E. Although a mountainous province, various conditions combine to give Yunnan a striking assembly of topographic and climatic contrasts. In the lower districts adjacent to the Indo-China and Burma frontiers, high temperatures prevail throughout the year with an abundant rainfall. Much of this area supports a tropical forest. In the southeastern region, broad stretches of elevated plains surround the principal commercial centers. The average elevation here is in excess of 6,000 feet above sea level, hence there is the salubrious climate of low-latitude highlands. At Yunnanfu there is a marked periodicity of rainfall, most of the annual precipitation coming between May and September. The topography of the western and northern regions, which is characteristic of three-fourths of the surface area of the province, is formed by wide belts of elongated peaks and broken plateaus trenched by canyons and deep river valleys. The average altitude in these parts is a little over 8,000 feet. Several large areas of Yunnan are still unsurveyed.

Population, Language, and Standard of Living.—The native population is estimated at slightly over 11,000,000, or 75 to the square mile. A little more than two-thirds are Chinese, the remainder being highland tribesmen of undetermined ethnical and linguistic affinities. The tropical districts are so isolated by mountains, rivers, and dense forests that the few who live there are mostly aborigines having little in common with the Chinese. In the west and north, the population is scattered over widely separated areas. Fertile stretches in the large river valleys support a dense agricultural population, but the majority of the inhabitants eke out a scanty subsistence from live stock raising on the grassy slopes. Because of level surface, fertile soil, and communication facilities, the southeastern table-lands are the most densely populated and have become the political and commercial center of the province. There are about 500 foreign residents in Yunnan, most of whom are French.

A Mandarin dialect is spoken by the Chinese and is the language of business. Correspondence may be conducted in French with a few firms in Yunnanfu.

The standard of living among the common people is very low. The average annual income of a family of five is \$120.00. The purchasing power per capita for foreign imports is \$2.50 per annum. The average daily wage of coolie labor is \$0.25. Foreign imports are largely confined to necessities and nearly all other considerations are secondary to price.

Chief Cities and Leading Occupations.—Yunnanfu, with a population of about 150,000, is the provincial capital and chief commercial center. The city is 6,400 feet above sea level and 534 miles by rail from the seaport of Haiphong. The treaty ports of Mengtze, Hekou, Szemao and Tengyueh are trading centers. Talifu is of commercial importance in the western region.

The chief occupation of 90% of the population is agriculture; this is intensively carried on in the river valleys and fertile plains where native irrigation systems have been developed. Farming methods are antiquated but well adapted to local conditions. Rice, poppy, beans, wheat and corn are the principal crops. Sericulture and stock raising are also important. Aside from manufacturing for local consumption, which is still in the handicraft stage, the only important industry is mining. Yunnan is rich in undeveloped mineral resources but only tin, coal, and salt are of commercial importance. In 1930 Yunnan produced 4½% of the world's output of tin ore.

Foreign Trade.—The value of the whole foreign trade of Yunnan in 1930 was approximately \$20,556,194. The principal foreign imports were cotton yarn (\$5,208,082), piece goods (\$1,264,106), kerosene (\$481,996), rice (\$472,906), dyes and pigments (\$174,732). The bulk of foreign imports are of Japanese, French, and English origin. Exports to Hong Kong and foreign countries consisted chiefly of tin in slabs (\$5,643,731), hides and skins (untanned) (\$726,874), yellow silk (\$608,462), medicines (\$62,016), pig bristles (\$60,755).

Customs Tariff.—In addition to the duties collected under the regular Chinese Customs tariff, a special local consumption tax, ranging from 2½% to 17½% ad valorem is also levied. To this may be added transit dues amounting to approximately 2½% ad valorem on goods entering Yunnan through Tonking.

Postal Tariff and Telegraphs.—Rates of the Universal Postal Union apply to all mail matter from the United States. The international parcel post and money order services may be used to advantage. Yunnanfu maintains radio-telegraphic communication with all parts of the world.

Transportation Conditions and Connections.—The majority of foreign imports enter this province through the port of Haiphong. French Indo-China, thence by rail to the distributing centers of Mengtze and Yunnanfu, where pack animals and coolie carriers are engaged to transport them over primitive caravan routes to interior points. Several American steamship companies are prepared to serve the port of Haiphong or to transship at Hong Kong under a through bill-of-lading.

Character of Packing Desirable.—Goods destined for this province should be packed to withstand repeated transshipments, rough handling and the hot, damp climate of Indo-China through which they pass. Moisture-proof containers and metal-bound cases are desirable.

Banking Facilities and Credit Terms. The Banque de l'Indochine (French), with branches at Mengtze and Yunnanfu, is the only foreign bank. It offers very limited banking facilities for direct trade with the United States. Importers usually arrange for goods to be shipped on the payment of sight drafts on the bank's New York correspondent. Telegraphic transfers and irrevocable export credits are generally unobtainable. Cash with order or substantial partial payments in advance of delivery are the usual terms imposed on local firms.

Advertising.—Modern advertising methods are practically unknown, although some progress is being made to introduce them through the medium of posters and newspapers. Posters to be effective must be intelligent to the masses, that is, they must explain themselves by the pictures they bear, and draw attention to the trade-mark or "chop." Newspaper advertising rates are not heavy. Descriptive literature of American products should be accompanied by price lists. If the product is used in Yunnan, the all important factor is how much it will cost the local importer. If the manufacturer's letter gives this information, i.e., current prices c.i.f. Haiphong or Hong Kong, the local merchant is in a better position to know at once whether business is possible.

Entering the Market.—On account of the language barrier and the unfamiliarity of Yunnanese firms with Western business practices, it is usually advisable for American exporters to deal with foreign commission houses in Hong Kong or Shanghai. Most of these firms have branch offices or representatives in the United States, with which it is frequently advantageous to communicate before endeavoring to do business with local establishments.

This office is prepared to supply lists of local firms without assuming responsibility for their integrity or financial standing. For further information address:—

THE AMERICAN CONSUL, YUNNANFU, CHINA.

Revised February, 1, 1931.

J. Service: Reed spent a good deal of his time in Kunming on a campaign to get this changed, but he was as unsuccessful as I. [laughter]

Marriage to Caroline Schulz in Haiphong, 1933

Levenson: You got married pretty soon after you were posted to Yunnanfu, didn't you?

J. Service: Well yes. Caroline came out to China with my mother. You know all this probably from her. She got sick in Shanghai. Whether or not it was really appendicitis was later cast in doubt by another doctor. But, at any rate, she had her appendix out and came up to Kunming--came to Haiphong first.

Everyone felt that it would be very difficult for a strange woman to come alone up the railway, so I should go down to meet her. But, then we couldn't possible travel up the railway alone three days together! So, we had to get married in Haiphong which turned out to be an incredibly difficult thing to do. French colony, French regulations and laws.

We were probably the first and maybe the only Americans ever to have been married in French Indochina. We had to get dispensations from the governor-general in Saigon. All sorts of special documents had to be obtained that we were entitled to get married under our own laws, of our own states. Everything had to be translated into French.

With the help of the French consul-general in Shanghai and the French consul-general in Kunming and the governor-general in Saigon it was all finally arranged. The only problem was that Caroline's ship ran into a typhoon, which meant that she was stranded off the island of Hainan for three days.

A whole series of holidays were coming, the birthday of the emperor of Annam and Armistice Day and a weekend. There were three or four days of holiday. Her ship finally came in. The mayor--it was a civil wedding--stayed in his office specially. He obviously had given instructions to customs to get her through fast.

So we rushed to his office and in five minutes it was all done--for a fee, I think, of one or two piasters. But we spent fifty times that amount in hassling and documents, because they all had to be certified as correct translations. All had to be notarized.

J. Service: We stayed that first night in the flat of the American head of the Standard Oil Company and then took the train up and had another wedding up in Kunming in the home of the YMCA secretary. There was an American missionary--named Romig--who happened to be in town because his wife was having a baby. So, he married us. A few years ago he turned up as minister of a church down in Oakland.

Soon after we were married the [American Oriental] bank went bust, because of deflation in Shanghai, which was caused by the U.S. silver purchasing program. This caused the price of silver to go up, which meant deflation in China. Prices went down as the price of silver went up.

Anyway, the bank went under--it may have gone under for other reasons too, who knows? We eventually got about 37 percent back.

You ought to stop me if I'm saying things that Caroline has said.

Levenson: No, she didn't say any of this.

J. Service: All right.

Yunnanfu Society

J. Service: I'm sure Caroline has talked about Charles Reed. We lived in a couple of rooms off on a wing of the consulate which was a semiforeign, semi-Chinese style place--which we revisited in '75 when we were in Yunnan.

Levenson: Who were the American nationals in Yunnan?

J. Service: There was an American YMCA secretary. There were, I think, two families in the Seventh Day Adventist mission. There was an American who was commissioner of customs. He was a Californian named Talbot, from Berkeley, who had known my parents.

The foreign community was very small. There was a commissioner of customs, a commissioner of posts, British consul-general, French consul-general--and then he had two staff, two officers under him. Then there were some people with the French railway. The French had a doctor there. The

J. Service: French had a hospital, as they did in Chengtu also. One of the same doctors who had been in Chengtu in my boyhood was now one of the doctors in Kunming.

About the only thing to do in Kunming was to go to dinner parties with the same people. You always knew where you were going to sit. My usual place was next to the daughter of the postal commissioner, for instance. Caroline always sat higher because women were relatively scarce. I would be always at the middle of the table.

You had picnics, Sunday picnics. That was a big thing. Then there was the Cercle Sportif de Yunnanfu, the foreign club which was dominated by the French. People went there almost every afternoon for tennis or bridge and for a few drinks.

I taught one or two Chinese students who wanted to get some help on English. But, actually we saw very few Chinese. It was a foreign life floating on the surface of China.

Levenson: Were there any journalists out there?

J. Service: No. None ever got to Kunming, as I recall, when we were there. Nor did we have very many American visitors, and almost no tourists.

There was one American tourist. He was a young chap named Fulton, who I think later on became a member of Congress. He was just out of college, bumming around the world. He had had some money apparently. So, he was just going to out-of-the-way places.

We had one party of [American] consular people from Canton who came up on an overland trip. Reed was still there, and he was going to put them up at the hotel. When these people got there and found out they were going to be put up in a hotel, why they said, "Come on, can't we stay at the consulate?" So I took them up, and Reed was furious. They had been on the road for three weeks or something like that and staying at inns. They weren't about to go to a crummy little local hotel.

We put up what few people there were, like the airplane people, the CNAC [China National Air Corporation] people. We usually put them up. But, I don't recall any newspaper people. There wasn't much reason why they should be there.

Levenson: What was your impression of the French colonial government?

J. Service: Their consular people were quite good. They learned Chinese. They had a specialized China service, very much the way we did and the British did. I thought they were quite capable. I didn't see too much of the railway people. They ran the railway fairly efficiently, a narrow gauge, a little railway.

The community was more notable for people who had come up as labor contractors when the railway was being built, some of them Greeks. They had come up as labor bosses. They would contract to build a certain section of the railway. They stayed on and went into business.

They had little import-export or general stores in Kunming --names like Miniatis and Kominatos. They were mainstays of the club. Most of them played bridge very well. They'd all come to bridge by way of whist and goodness knows what else. In those days contract was just coming in.

A British salesman came up there to try to sell some airplanes. He was trying to break the French monopoly. So, he had this plane and he offered us a ride. Ginny had just been born, and Caroline said, "We can't. It would be awful to leave Ginny behind, in case something happened to us." So, we took Ginny along.[laughter] She was only about two weeks old I think, two or three weeks old.

But, when the CNAC people were there I went out with them to the airfield. They had to do some work on the plane, and I could be helpful as an interpreter if they needed one. So, they got the plane--did whatever they were going to do. Then they said, "Come on, let's take a ride!"

So, I jumped in the plane and we flew to Kweiyan, which is the capital of Kweichow province, a neighboring province to the east. We flew there and just landed on a mud field, military field there, and then took off again and flew back. We were away a little less than two hours altogether.

That evening I told the consul what we had done. He scolded me for leaving the consular district without authority because Kweichow province was not in our consular district and regulations say that a consul should get authority before he leaves his consular district.

But we had done in that two hours what would be the equivalent of four weeks' travel, because it was two weeks each way, a minimum of two weeks each way by mule or sedan chair.

J. Service: The first trip I made to Shanghai was down by boat to Hong Kong. We stopped at Hainan Island. I always got off the boat and called on the missionaries there, Presbyterians I think.

The boat was staying there long enough so they asked me to stay overnight. The next morning at breakfast, the head of the house asked me to say grace. In a missionary home they always said grace, but I had gotten so out of the habit that I was just caught completely unawares. I managed to rally and say a few words. The young Foreign Service clerk had already slipped far from his missionary rearing.

There were crackpots. Yunnan was not a regular mission field for the older established missions. Most of the people we had were Assemblies of God or Pentacostalists or people who were drawn there because it was remote, close to Tibet.

We had some Baptists down on the Burma border that were always getting into trouble because they had made their work among some of the aboriginal people down there. The aborigines were miserably treated by the Chinese. The missionaries came in and when the aborigines found a protector, someone on their side, then they converted by the village, just en masse.

This caused all sorts of problems. There was nothing we could do about it. [chuckling] They were way down, you know, three weeks travel away down there on the Burma border. Yunnan, on the whole, was a screwball sort of place.

The Opium Trade

Levenson: What sort of trouble did these missionaries get into?

J. Service: They were always trying to protect their converts against what they considered persecution by the Chinese. Heavy taxation--opium. The Chinese wanted them to grow opium. How else were they going to get any taxes out of them? This was typical pretty much all over.

I think that the missionaries were gulled at times by their converts. No doubt their people were badly treated. Most of the aborigines were badly treated by the Chinese. The Chinese took the best land. The aborigines either were left in the valleys if they were malarial, or were pushed up on the mountains. Where the land was good the Chinese were in occupation. In taxation, in everything that concerned government, they were discriminated against.

Levenson: What about the opium trade? Did that ever come under your official eye or did you manage not to notice?

J. Service: You couldn't help but have it under your eye since the poppies were everywhere. Whole fields around the city of Kunming were a mass of poppies in the springtime. There was vacant land inside the city walls, right outside the walls of the consulate, that was planted with poppies.

Did the trade come to our notice? Certainly you couldn't avoid knowing about it. There were certain people there in town, French people, that had no visible means of support. One assumed that they were engaged in it some way or another.

Some foreigners smoked opium. The Frenchman who was the local representative for the Salt Gabelle which was the third Chinese organization run by foreigners, smoked opium.* After dinner he would generally retire and smoke.

The whole life style, the daily schedule of a city like Kunming was tied to opium smoking. People got up very late in the morning, and late in the evening they would come out in the streets to get a snack. The whole town was geared to the prevalence of opium smoking.

You saw it everywhere you went. If you traveled, the inns were full of the smell of it. Your chair bearers and so on would smoke. It was a very commonly seen thing.

We took trips on ferry boats on a lake near Kunming. I remember watching an old man, for instance, curl up on deck and then smoke, just taking advantage of the relaxation, quiet on the boat crossing the lake to smoke.

One thing I may not have stressed was the fact that Yunnan was one of the principal opium producing regions of China. It was an important cash crop. The opium was shipped out through various other warlord domains down the river to Shanghai, Hangkow, and also particularly down the West River to Canton. Of course, some of it went into Indochina, and some of it we suspected was processed into morphine and heroin.

*Others were the Maritime Customs and the Posts.

J. Service: Soldiers and opium were what Yunnan really lived on, exporting soldiers and exporting opium.

The United States government was very much interested, then as now, to stop opium traffic, narcotics traffic. So we were supposed to report on that.

I just happened to pick up recently a Bulletin of the Concerned Asian Scholars, July-September, 1976. I see there's a long article in here, a very good article as a matter of fact, on opium and the politics of gangsterism in Nationalist China, 1927-45. One of the important sources this author, Jonathan Marshall, uses are American consular reports from all over China. I find a number of reports in here that were written by Reed and Ringwalt while I was in the consulate in Kunming and which I myself typed and prepared to be sent out.

They mention in one place a figure of 130,000,000 ounces for 1933.

Levenson: From the province of Yunnan?

J. Service: The province of Yunnan.

Levenson: Doesn't that seem like an extraordinarily high figure?

J. Service: It's a tremendous figure but--I don't know. No one actually knew of course. It was a guess, but if you saw the countryside around Kunming in the springtime when it was just a mass, a sea of opium poppies, you could believe an awful lot was produced.

Levenson: How did you and your seniors arrive at these figures? This sort of statistics collection has always struck me as a tremendous problem.

J. Service: Well yes. You had ideas of the magnitude of the trade through the size of military convoys that would take it out of the province for instance.

Levenson: Military convoys?

J. Service: Oh yes.

Levenson: Whose army?

J. Service: Well, it had to be by military to give it safety. Most of it moved in very large shipments. One warlord shipping it through the territory of another warlord, by arrangement of course.

J. Service: There would be a pay-off. But you would hear, for instance, of convoys of a hundred or two hundred mules. Well, we're talking here about ounces, so you'd convert that to pounds, into mule loads. A hundred mule loads is a lot of opium.

Levenson: Of course it is.

J. Service: And so, it's actually tons, and perhaps hundreds of tons, of opium that was being produced, that one could actually get very clear evidence of.

Levenson: Who counted? Was it direct observation or did you have sources who brought you these reports?

J. Service: Sometimes scuttlebutt, rumor. Sometimes missionaries had seen them. Sometimes Chinese reported them. Occasionally something would get in the newspapers, but not very much of that sort of thing. This was generally gossip and rumor. But sometimes if you just happened to be traveling yourself you might see them on the road. We didn't do much traveling, but if a large shipment was being made it would get talked about.

Levenson: I look forward to reading that article.

J. Service: The thing that's interesting about this article, one thing to me that's interesting about this article, is that in the late 1950s, or around 1960, there was a man named K-o-e-n, I think it is, who wrote a book on the China Lobby. This was his Ph.D. dissertation, a rewrite of it, and it was being published by Macmillan. In it he made some accusations, some statements tying the Kuomintang to opium business.

After the book was published Macmillan got cold feet, withdrew the book, tried to get back all copies from libraries and people they sold it to, and simply squashed the book. I've been told, and I think it's probably true, that it was the State Department that brought pressure on Macmillan to withdraw the book.

Yet here is this article written now, much later, all based on U.S. government consular reports showing absolute, complete, and very intimate tie-up of government in China, including the Kuomintang government, with the opium business, deriving income from it.

Levenson: On a fairly institutionalized basis.

J. Service: Oh yes, sure. And yet the State Department apparently forced Macmillan or scared Macmillan into withdrawing this book. It became a collector's item, of course, until it was reprinted here recently.*

Levenson: How does the book stand up?

J. Service: Oh, it stands up very well, The part on the opium is quite peripheral. It's not at all integral to the story of the book.

Levenson: I think that's a very interesting footnote.

Did opium users function okay?

J. Service: Oh, yes. Opium in moderation is probably no worse than cigarette smoking, and cheaper in those days in Yunnan.

People would smoke usually in the evening. Then, about ten-thirty or eleven o'clock they would want some refreshment, and the streets would suddenly be quite full of people. A great many peddlers selling Chinese-type snacks would be on the street, noodles and things like this, for this post-smoking snack, like the after-theater crowd.

We knew it was just as well not to try to get hold of our number one boy along in the middle of the forenoon, or in the middle of the afternoon, because he was down in his room having a few pipes.

You would telephone people in government offices. We did have telephones, although they didn't work very well. Particularly in Chengtu when I was a boy, if you telephoned somebody or you tried to call on somebody, and they said, "He's out telephoning," it always meant that he was having opium!

Lung Yun, the Local Warlord

Levenson: What relations did you have with the provincial government? Did you have your own warlord or conflicting ones?

J. Service: There very definitely was a local warlord named Lung Yun, "Dragon Cloud," who was part aborigine, probably mixed Chinese and aborigine. But, he had gotten Yunnan very firmly in his

*Ross Y. Koen, The China Lobby in American Politics, New York, Macmillan, 1960.

J. Service: grip. Of course, he worked with the French, but I think the French were quite content to let him govern.

But they had him really under a very tight rein because it was impossible for him to import any arms, buy any arms, except from them. The foreign trade had to come through Indochina. The only outlet to the world that was usable was through Indochina.

I think that they had agreements with him on things like handling of political exiles. There were always some dissidents, Annamese dissidents who were opposed to French rule. So, I'm sure that the French, or Lung Yun for the French, kept a pretty close watch on that.

Then, there were problems like deserters from the Foreign Legion. A good part of the garrison in Indochina was Foreign Legion, and some of them would take off and run to the hills occasionally, end up in Kunming. They always got returned to the French.

But, Lung Yun ran Yunnan as a separate country in effect. There was a representative of the ministry of foreign affairs--

Levenson: The Chinese?

J. Service: Yes, the Chinese Nationalist government in Nanking. But, he had to be someone who was acceptable to the local people. In other words he was someone designated by Lung Yun and then given a commission by the foreign office.

He was the person we normally dealt with. What little business we had was with this old gentleman who was an old Mandarin holdover from the days of the [Ch'ing] empire who, I'm sure, consumed his share of opium as most people did.

Assorted Chores

Levenson: Was there something further on your notes?

J. Service: Oh well, I've got all sorts of things.

We didn't have any dealings with the central Chinese government except for this local representative. We didn't have much business anyway except for missionaries that got into trouble or had complaints, or in some cases a missionary might die.

American Consul

Kunming

October 3, 4 p.m. Following from the Department: "Two, October 2, 3 p.m. The president has approved the appointment of Service Yunnanfu as foreign service officer unclassified twenty-five hundred dollars per annum effective October 1, 1935. Shall take three separate oaths as foreign service officer unclassified, as vice consul of career and as a secretary of the diplomatic service of the United States and file bond and affidavit in accordance Consular Regulations. Service is assigned vice consul Yunnanfu.

Rent unchanged. Cost of living increased to two hundred ~~sixty~~-six dollars per annum effective October 1, 1935."

The above has been repeated to Shanghai for delivery to Service.

For the Ambassador

LOCKHART

*Please back.
Back back soon
Promotion - cost
of living allowance.
All within an hour!
Should cheer up the
windows.*

*2
3 4
5 exp's*

J. Service: I remember one missionary who died. She was a very large woman who had lived in a remote city for many years and gotten so heavy she couldn't be carried in a sedan chair. So there was no way for her to leave. She simply died there all alone. It turned out that despite her having been there for ten or twelve years she had no converts, no one to look after her. The local magistrate took charge of her possessions and sent them up to the consulate.

We didn't have a great deal of business. We were there mainly because it was so remote; there was no other way for Americans to get protection or consular services, passports, and so on, except by having a consulate there.

But, also we were there to watch the French. In earlier more actively "imperialist" days, there had been concern about what were the French up to.

After about a year, Reed was transferred, and a Chinese language officer, Arthur Ringwalt, was assigned to the consulate.

Also, after a year--I think after Caroline became pregnant --we were given a rent allowance, \$150 a year, which was ridiculous.

But anyway, we then moved out of the consulate and rented a house belonging to an Englishman, an English Methodist missionary, I think. They had a small mission hospital there, and the doctor was going on home leave.

Ringwalt was a more pleasant person to work for. I was in charge actually for a while between the two men. Then, Ringwalt did some traveling and left me in charge.

The Long March Skirts Kunming

Levenson: When the Long March skirted Yunnanfu, what advance intelligence, if any, did you have?

J. Service: Well, I'm not sure. Of course, the Chinese newspapers had something but not very much. They were strictly controlled and heavily censored. Also, we had only Kuomintang communiques which were always that the enemy is at full retreat. But, very often the enemy is in full retreat toward our rear, you know.
[laughter]

Levenson: That's a nice expression.

J. Service: I think that probably most of our information came from people in the customs and the post office, and also from missionaries, because in those days the Communists were super anti-imperialists. If they had a chance to snatch missionaries, they would hold them for ransom or sometimes try them for imperialist crimes.

Not so much the Mao group, but some of the subsidiary groups actually executed a few, held trials, executed them as imperialist agents, which they could be. If you wanted to talk about passing on information, missionaries did serve in some ways as spies. We'll come to some of that later on.

We got reports from missionaries who were having to flee because of the Communist advance, telegrams and so on. This got closer and closer and people traveling as best they could, began to arrive in Kunming. So, we knew the Communists were coming our way.

Late one night--The consuls were trying to keep in touch. I forget what time this was, but it was quite late. We got a chit from the British consul-general, I think, who was very close to the French consul-general--they were near neighbors--saying that they had decided that all women and children should leave by the morning train.

They'd made arrangements with the railway. There was one train a day, early morning. So I rounded up the few Americans there were, running around knocking on their front gates, got them up and got them off on the train.

There was an American plant explorer there, a rather famous man named Joseph Rock who did a lot of work for the Harvard Arboretum and for the National Geographic Society and the U.S. Department of Agriculture. He was living in Kunming at that time, and a bit of an old maid. He wanted us to tell him whether or not he should evacuate. We said, "Our instructions are women and children should evacuate." He asked, "Did we think it was dangerous?" Well, we didn't know. So he left on the train the day after the women and children did.

The Long March came very close to the city. Some of it did. Of course, an army of that size doesn't all trudge single file on a single road. They move through a country like a cloud of locusts, in a way.

J. Service: Villages very close to Kunming were told the day beforehand-- they had scouts out ahead--"Prepare so much rice. So many people are going to be here tomorrow. You'll be paid." The remarkable thing was that everything worked out just as the scouts had said. So many people did come the next day, rice was prepared, and they were paid.

Of course, they were robbing landlords along the way, seizing what they could in the way of silver. Apparently they did have enough money to pay. It made a tremendous impression because people were not used to being paid for anything that was provided to soldiers.

For an army like this on the move to be so well organized and to pay off made a tremendous impression. This was not in the papers. It was what you heard from talking to people, the grapevine type of news.

Obviously their intent was to make a dash for the Yangtze, which they did. They had completely sidestepped the provincial army which had marched forth to meet them in Kweichow. The Communists were so mobile, so fast in marching, that they simply marched around them.

The night of the crisis some Yunnanese troops dragged into town, dead beat from being force-marched from further west. They would have been poor defenders--Kunming could have been captured if the Communists had thought it worth the time. But they knew their lives probably depended on getting across the Yangtze. So the Communists didn't delay.

Levenson: Have you any estimate of the numbers in the Long March at this point?

J. Service: We had heard all sorts of figures. I don't think anybody knew. We heard figures from fifty thousand to a hundred thousand, probably closer to fifty thousand.

Levenson: Did you see any of it?

J. Service: No. No, we didn't try to go outside the city walls. It would have been foolhardy. We went down to the club and consoled ourselves with the Cercle Sportif! [laughter] So, no one saw any of them. They just went by like ghosts. After about a week, we called the women and children back from Indochina. I think it was a week. Caroline probably told you. She remembers those things much better than I do.

Levenson: Can you recall your own estimate of what it meant?

J. Service: Not really, no. No one really thought that these people were terribly important. Yes, they had held out in Kansu. But, I don't think anyone felt that they were a real threat to the country or likely to take over.

Everybody felt that they were semi-brigands--and some of them were semi-brigands or had been brigands. There was always a lot of unrest and dissatisfaction. Yes, they were legendary for their marching ability, for their deftness in maneuvering.

But, they had been defeated. That's why the Long March took place. They had been driven out. They had lost, I think most people felt that this was sort of a remnant, defeated remnant, that was running for shelter and safety in some far western areas.

Levenson: Were leaders' names talked about?

J. Service: Oh yes, of course, a great deal. Mao Tse-tung and Chu Teh and Chou En-lai were famous names, and they were continually being reported as having died or been killed or died of wounds. Chou En-lai died numerous deaths. All of them--Mao Tse-tung was tubercular, at death's door. These names were already legends.

Levenson: Amongst the foreign community?

J. Service: And Chinese, yes. I don't know how much among the Chinese, but I would guess quite as much.

Levenson: I would have thought more amongst the Chinese.

J. Service: Yes. My own contacts with Chinese were so limited in those days that I can't speak with assurance, as I could for instance in later days.

It was very impressive though, this organization and their treatment of the people. It made a very real impression.

Levenson: Did it linger? What was the effect of the March on the surrounding communities?

J. Service: I don't think very much because they couldn't stay very long. They undoubtedly left wherever they went, a memory. People were paid and they treated the people well. In those days they took it from the landlords and gave it to the people.

J. Service: What they couldn't carry away they said, "Come in and help yourselves." It was sort of Robin Hood.

The ideology didn't have a chance to sink in as far as Yunnan was concerned.

The Chiangs Visit Yunnanfu

Levenson: Was it soon after that that Chiang Kai-shek and his wife came to visit?

J. Service: Yes. The Kuomintang armies and Kuomintang airplanes were pursuing the Communists. This was how Chiang extended his control to some of the western provinces. Kweichow and Yunnan at this time began to come under central government control. It wasn't really effective until '37 when the Japanese war started. But, organizations like the Bank of China began to get into Yunnan.

The Chiangs came up to Yunnan, and they had a reception for the foreign community. Ringwalt, who was very absent-minded, didn't think about taking us. We found out later that the British consul had taken his cypher clerk, a man who was lower in status than I. But, Ringwalt just didn't think of it. So, we didn't meet Chiang and his lady. [laughing] Did Caroline say we did? I think she's wrong about this.

Levenson: No, Caroline remembers it that you went and she didn't.

J. Service: No, no. Neither one of us went.

Levenson: Do you remember what impression they made? Obviously, you can't speak first person on this.

J. Service: No. The big problem locally, the big question, was whether they were going to come before the opium was harvested, the poppies were harvested. If they were going to come before the opium was in, then the Chinese realized they were going to have to do some chopping, at least in the fields close to the city.

But, fortunately the crop was got in all right. Now, how this was arranged or why, I don't know. But the fact is that there were no great losses of the local crop.

Levenson: Tact, I dare say, at some level.

J. Service: The way the Chinese work things out.

The "Y" Discharges Roy Service: His Final Illness

J. Service: My father was discharged from the YMCA about this time, which was a very traumatic thing for my parents. Have you finished my mother's autobiography?

Levenson: No, I haven't.

J. Service: Well, you'll see that she's terribly embittered about it. The YMCA ran into serious trouble in the Depression. I suppose donations to things like missions and foreign works are probably the first things that a lot of people cut. American Y's had to maintain their local programs and probably cut their foreign donations first.

So the Y, I think, had a catastrophic loss of income. They were forced to reduce their foreign staff in China to a few people that they felt were essential or were good money-raisers, good public figures, this sort of thing. My father was just not that kind of person.

But he took it very hard. One thing was he felt he had made a lifetime commitment. That's what he'd been told when he joined the Y. Also he had his own support, partly from the Y here at Berkeley, although I think that had tapered off a good deal.

But he also had a friend who had been in China and who had gone back to the States and become YMCA secretary, general secretary, in Scranton, Pennsylvania, who was apparently a great admirer of my father and what he was doing. He had generated support in Scranton.

So, my father had his own support. He had enough money coming into the Y to pay his salary. So, he felt that it was very unjust that he be one of the people to be laid off.

Ginny was born in July, 1935, and in the fall the air company that was partly owned by Pan Am and partly by the Chinese government, called China National Aviation Corporation, decided to start an airline to Kunming. They already had a line up the Yangtze which got as far as Chungking and Chengtu, and now they were going to have a branch come down to Kunming. We had quite an interesting time with those people when they stayed at the consulate.

J. Service: My father had gotten a job meanwhile with the China International Famine Relief Commission. But my mother telegraphed in September that he was ill and apparently the doctors had no hope for him.

Fortunately, these air people had finished their preliminary survey and were just about to fly back to Shanghai. So I was able to make the trip before the airline was actually established, on this trial reconnaissance trip. They were going straight through, so I flew direct to Shanghai in two days.

It was actually quite exciting. It was a Ford tri-motor plane, a "tin goose" they called it. We got to Chungking, and the only field was a Chinese military field, which was quite a long ways down the river. We would have had to go up the river by launch for several hours to reach the city. So they decided it would be easier to go all the way to Hangkow.

When we reached Hangkow, it had gotten dark. The field had no lights. They had several motor cars with their headlights on. And they lit two drums of oil, waste oil, to mark the end of the runway.

The next day we went on to Shanghai. But, flying was much simpler in those days. [laughter]

My father was dying of what was probably cancer of the liver. The doctor said we could consider it cancer, but he called it cirrhosis, acute cirrhosis. He went downhill very quickly.

My second brother, Bob, the one who had come out to China after leaving college, had gotten a job in Macao with an engineering firm that was building a water works, a British contracting firm. He came up to Shanghai.

My youngest brother, Dick, had just come out from the States after graduation, so that all three of us were there.

We simply took care of my father at home, divided up the twenty-four hours. He didn't want to go to the hospital. He died the twenty-ninth of September.

He knew about his granddaughter, Ginny, being born. But, he just missed my becoming a Foreign Service officer. It was just a few days after that that I got word--I was in Shanghai--that I'd been appointed.

It was three years, roughly three years, from the time I took the exam. Normally after the exam, the eligible period is

J. Service: two years. If you're not appointed in two years they drop you off the list. But, of course, they had to extend the list during the Depression.

So, I was then appointed a Foreign Service officer and assigned to Peking. They had already asked me, if I was appointed, would I volunteer for China language? I had said yes. So, my original orders just transferred me from Kunming to Peking.

To Peking as Chinese Language Attache

J. Service: We arrived in Peking in December, 1935. I was assigned as a [Chinese] language attache. That's where we sent all our people for language study. In fact, all the foreign missions sent their people to Peking for language study. I had two years in Peking, which were a wonderful two years, an idyllic place to be with ostensibly no responsibilities except to study.

Levenson: Was this your first serious exposure to the written language?

J. Service: Yes, that's right. I had sat in on a course here at Berkeley for a while, but not long enough to really learn anything. As I said before, I had learned the numerals from comparing the English and the Chinese on the streetcars in Shanghai when I was a boy. But, I was basically illiterate in Chinese. I spoke a backwoods Szechwan dialect.

The first quarter in Peking we were sent to what was then called the North China Union Language School, which was run by a man named Pettus, mostly for missionaries, but also some business people and scholars.

It was the equivalent in those days of this sort of school in Taiwan now. But, there weren't very many scholars. [John King] Fairbank and Woody [Woodbridge] Bingham, people like that, were in Peking or had been in Peking just recently, Marty Wilbur and so on. All the China scholars went to Peking for a while, and they studied at this North China Language School.

But, the legation sent its people there only for the first quarter for an introduction. After that we studied on our own with our own teachers, following our own course, our own book.

J. Service: We had a different emphasis. The missionaries were learning to read the Bible and to preach. We were interested in Chinese official correspondence and reading newspapers and being able to translate and interpret for official interviews.

The teachers, as I say, were horrified at my accent, my dialect, and insisted that I try to forget everything I had known and start completely anew.

Levenson: Was that very difficult?

J. Service: Yes, it was. But, I think I did it fairly successfully.

Levenson: That's what I've heard!

J. Service: I tried to forget my Szechwanese and just assume I didn't know any Chinese. So, I worked "wo, ni, t'a," "I, you, he," this sort of thing.

Levenson: What did you think of the system of teaching?

J. Service: It's a very time-wasting system, I'm sure, because basically, after we finished the language school we were just on our own with two or three teachers. We would spend practically all day with a teacher across the table working on the text. But, the teacher knew no English, and at the beginning you knew very little Chinese. I think that the modern methods of using tapes and so on would be far better.

But, we had two years to do it. In the army and the navy they had three years to do it.

Levenson: Oh really.

J. Service: Yes. So, if you're willing to invest that amount of time and you've got full time to do it, why it works. We could learn Chinese.

Levenson: It sounds enormously luxurious to have a one-to-one relationship.

J. Service: Oh, yes.

My brother Dick, after my father died, had gotten a job as clerk in the consulate in Foochow. He found out at this time that he had intestinal TB [tuberculosis]. He had an operation for appendicitis in Foochow and the doctor, when he opened his abdomen, found he had intestinal TB.

J. Service: So, he came to Peking and was in the Rockefeller Hospital, the PUMC [Peking Union Medical College]. They recommended that we find a place outside the city. We went out to the Western Hills, maybe fifteen or twenty miles outside of Peking, and rented a house. Foreigners had bungalows out in the Western Hills. We lived out there for something over six months with Dick after he came out of the hospital.

I only had one teacher, and he came out by bus every day. He'd take a morning bus out to the bottom of the hill--we weren't very far up the hill. Then, he would stay there all day and go back in the afternoon. This was not as good as having two or three teachers. But, we got along all right.

Levenson: So, you had no other duties than to study Chinese?

J. Service: You had to read. You took an exam at the end of the first year and an exam at the end of the second year. You took exams on Chinese geography, foreign rights in China--extraterritoriality in other words--some Chinese history. You had to know something about China. This was not regarded as terribly important. Your main job was to learn Chinese.

But, I did a lot of reading. I can remember very definitely a milestone in my attitude or knowledge of China was coming across and reading R.H. Tawney's Land and Labour in China, a very good book, still a very good book. But, it was the first, analytical, economic-sociological approach to China that I had seen.

There was a good deal on foreign relations in China. H.B. Morse and Tyler Dermott's Americans in Eastern Asia. Then, there was a two volume compilation by a man named [Westel Woodbury] Willoughby about foreign rights in China, all sorts of things about extraterritoriality because, of course, we had to protect our rights and even to serve as consular judges at times.

Then, the history of China. In those days there wasn't very much. [Chauncey] Goodrich, and the old histories. The succession of the dynasties and Confucianism. You got a fuzzy idea about the wonders and virtues and ethical beauties of Confucianism and the examination system where even the poorest man had a chance, you know.

But, there was not much along the lines of a Marxist approach or any sort of a class analysis of China or what really went on with the peasants. You knew vaguely that there

J. Service: was an elite culture. But, no one really went down to the soil and looked. You had had agricultural people come out and write books, like a man named King, an American, who wrote a fine book, Farmers of Forty Centuries. He was lauding the virtues of the Chinese system of agriculture, how it was self-sustaining and self-supporting and so conserving of everything, like night soil. He wrote panegyrics about Chinese agriculture, but nothing about systems of land tenure or life of the peasants or anything like that.

So, to read something like Tawney's modern, social analysis of what China was all about was quite new.

Levenson: Did you come across [Max] Weber's work on China?

J. Service: No, not at that time. No, actually it was not on the list, and I don't think it even was in the library at the legation.
[laughter]

At the end of the first year we took comprehensive exams. We checked in about once every quarter at the embassy to find out how we were doing. Then, at the end of the year we took the exams. There were three students.

Levenson: Who were they?

J. Service: Three at first. Two of them--One was Ed Rice, who's out here in Tiburon, and another man named Millet. We had a lot of jokes about Rice and Millet working together. Millet is the staple food for North China and rice for South China, of course. Then the second year another man was assigned, a man named Troy Perkins, who had already been in China, and had served for a while as a consular officer.

Levenson: Was there any professional training for your job as political officers?

J. Service: Very little. I'd had some introductory political science, political theory, at Oberlin. But, it was a very sketchy course under a Hungarian named Jaszi, who was quite an interesting person who served in one of the early post-World War I governments in Hungary.

But, we really didn't have to know very much. We didn't go to anything like West Point or Annapolis. There wasn't any sort of special training academy.

J. Service: Normally in the Foreign Service you went to an orientation course in the Department. But, that was only about a six week course. They'd show you what a visa was and what a passport was and a consular invoice was. You learned a little about routine operations.

I never attended the course because I'd been a clerk for two and a half years and I went from Kunming direct to Peking. So, I never had this orientation. But, I'm sure I was much better off than the people who had to rely on that.

You asked whether I'd read any Marxist and Leninist materials. No. I don't think I read anything directly by Marx or Lenin until I got to Yen'an.

When I got to Yen'an I realized--

Levenson: In 1944.

J. Service: In 1944 I realized that I hadn't, and so I scratched around and asked the Communists, "Look, haven't you got any of these things here?" [laughter] They did. They found some very dog-eared, old copies that some of them had, some English versions of [Marx's] Communist Manifesto and things like that.

A Lotus-Eater's Paradise

Levenson: What can you remember about the foreign community there?

J. Service: Oh, it was a wonderful place. Peking was a lotus-eater's paradise in those days. The life and the homes, the old Chinese homes that people were able to rent or buy, attracted people who simply wanted a lovely place to live. There was an artist community.

There were people like Harold Acton, a British poet. There were foreigners who were teaching in the universities there. Pei Ta [Peking National University] and Tsing Hua had several foreigners on the staff. Ivor Richards, a British philosopher and linguist was there.

There were people there that just liked living in Peking. There was an American sculptress named Lucille Swan. There was Teilhard de Chardin, the Jesuit archaeologist, paleontologist, but philosopher as well.

J. Service: There was a diplomatic community. There was a missionary community. And there was a community of language students. There were the Marine guards.

For those who wanted it there was horse racing. A lot of people had polo ponies and played polo. We didn't. We stayed away from the club. Of course, we were out of town, living in the hills for a part of the time. But I was more interested in study than in going to the club.

But you couldn't avoid living a fairly busy social life. You met a few Chinese, not very many.

Levenson: I was going to ask about your Chinese contacts.

J. Service: Hu Shih was there and various other people. Chiang Monlin who later on was president of Pei Ta. Hu Shih was lecturing in Chinese philosophy. I went to Hu Shih's lectures one year, my second year, when I could understand enough.

Levenson: How did they impress you?

J. Service: Well, it was very interesting. Philosophy is not my subject unfortunately. I'm a nuts and bolts--I'm a facts and figures man, and I don't deal well with abstract concepts. But, the lectures were interesting, history of Chinese philosophy.

Levenson: Did you ever come across George Kates who wrote The Years that were Fat?

J. Service: Yes. I didn't know him very well. He was a bit of an eccentric, sort of lived by himself.

People like [Owen] Lattimore were there. [Edgar] Snow was there. There was a foreign newspaper community, a foreign writers' community. As I said, there was quite a large, active artist colony.

We took several trips. I went up to Inner Mongolia with a man in the embassy named Salisbury. A group of us--Phil Sprouse and a couple of Marine language officers--took a trip out in the hills to an old Trappist monastery which was way back about four or five days' travel back in the mountains. They had developed their own little valley, put in irrigation, sort of a Shangri-la type of place.

But a lot has been written about Peking. I think we're wasting our time talking about life in Peking!

An Informal Study Group and Edgar Snow's Report on his First Trip to Yen-an (Paoan)

J. Service. You asked me about Ed Snow as a person. I wasn't an intimate with Ed, although we knew each other in Peking from the December 9 student demonstrations. But, we weren't very close. I've said almost everything I know about Ed in a piece that I did for the China Quarterly* after his death. I don't know whether we can incorporate this or not. Ed was a wonderful person, but you really don't want me to spend a lot of time talking about him, do you? [tape off]

It's actually mentioned in the memoir here, my second year in Peking I joined a group, very informal group, that used to meet about once a month at one of the member's homes.

Generally these were people who were scholars, writers. Hu Shih was a member. Owen Lattimore was a member. There was a Swedish newspaper man--half newspaper man, half scholar--people who were in Peking for postgraduate study or graduate study.

Ed Snow was a member. We knew in the summer of '36 that he was out of town, but nobody seemed to know exactly where. Then, he came back in the fall of '36, and it just happened that that month's meeting was at my house.

So he came and told us about the trip to Yen-an. It was a very interesting, exciting evening.

Levenson: Visiting--

J. Service: Yen-an, his first trip to visit Mao Tse-tung, and the Communist army--actually not to Yen-an but Paoan, which was where they were located then. But, we always lump Paoan and Yen-an and think of it as the Yen-an period. It was at the beginning of the Yen-an period, but they hadn't yet reached and occupied Yen-an.

What was happening then, of course, was the hope for a United Front. What Ed Snow brought back was the Communist push for a United Front.

*John S. Service, "Edgar Snow, Some Personal Reminiscences," The China Quarterly, April/June, 1972, #50, pp 209-229.

Levenson: With the Kuomintang?

J. Service: With the Kuomintang. The Sian Incident hadn't yet occurred, but it took place very soon after that.* I think most of us, and even Ed Snow himself really, didn't seem to feel that the Communists had any chance of coming out on top.

There was this possibility, a rather exciting one, that the civil war might end. But that was the extent of our expectations at that time.

Ed's political views at the time, well, [chuckling] we didn't categorize people by political views, and our political concerns were generally limited to China. Ed was certainly sympathetic with the Chinese left. He'd already published a volume of translations of stories, mostly short stories, by left-wing writers in China. But, then most of the promising young writers in China were left-wing, anti-Kuomintang, Lu Hsun and so on.

We knew that he was a friend of Lu Hsun and Madame Sun Yat-sen. He was in contact with the left. He and his wife, Nym Wales, had been sort of co-conspirators with the student leaders at Yenching during the December 9 riots.

We didn't know at the time the extent of the Communist influence in those riots, but I think the Communist influence moved in very rapidly. It may not have been there as an instigator at the beginning, but certainly the Communists did move in. A lot of those leaders, of course, ended up by becoming Communists.

You ask what information we had on the Communists. Snow's description of his trip to Yen-an was really all we knew about the Communists.

Levenson: What was the focus of the study group?

J. Service: The focus really was whatever study or research people were doing. Owen Lattimore, I remember, was still writing his Inner Asian Frontiers of China. He was doing research on the history of the long conflict between the nomads and the settled farmers.

*When Chiang Kai-shek was kidnapped by the Chinese Communists, 1936.

J. Service: I remember there was a lot of discussion at one of these sessions about who first invented trousers and the significance of trousers! Of course, you couldn't really develop cavalry until you had pants. [laughing] You could have chariots. But, if you were going to ride, as the Mongols did, you had to have trousers. So, there was a lot of discussion as to just when-- The Scythians are supposed to have had trousers.

It tried to be scholarly. There were several members that usually had some topic of interest. I don't remember Hu Shih ever giving us a talk, but he used to show up occasionally.

Levenson: When you commented on Ed Snow's political views you said that people weren't categorized in those days. Now I don't know to what extent people were being categorized in the United States in the mid-thirties?

J. Service: Probably more than we were in China. I think we were much more isolated in China and naive perhaps. But by the mid-thirties certainly there was Communist influence in the writing field and labor unions in the States. But we didn't, as I recall, think much about it in China.

Levenson: I just read a review of a book about Norman Thomas and a comment that like many American political activists he despised too much intellectual baggage--political theory. Am I getting the right impression that political theory just wasn't a significant part of the intellectual life of the group you're describing in the 30's in China?

J. Service: Yes. I think it was probably felt to be irrelevant. It didn't impinge very much.

I think I mentioned earlier that in 1932, when I was a graduate student here, Norman Thomas came to Berkeley during the presidential campaign. He couldn't speak on the campus. He spoke on the steps of I[n]ternational House.

I was one of a large crowd that heard him speak. I voted Socialist in '32 and if you asked me, I probably would have said that I was a Socialist: certainly Ed Snow and his wife were Socialists. But I wouldn't have thought very much about it.

I hadn't met any Communists at this time. I didn't think of people as being Communists.

Embassies Insulated from Chinese Political Events

Levenson: What political judgments were you able to form? Or were you just so busy that--

J. Service: Actually, I think it was a sort of a vacuum. No, that isn't true. The political climate was mainly the Japanese threat. The Japanese were trying by a nibbling process, to carve off North China or at least cut it out from under direct Nanking control. They talked about "autonomy" for the North China provinces, and that would mean the withdrawal of Chiang Kai-shek's own troops and strengthening local people.

There was a flight of Japanese airplanes over Peking the day we got there. They were dropping leaflets in favor of autonomy for what was called East Hopei, where they finally did set up a separate regime, East Hopei Autonomous Region.

Then only a few days after I was in Peking, the students in the universities all demonstrated, December 9 movement [1935]. John Israel has written a book about it.

Of course, I took off. I mean I didn't go to school when something like that was going on. I was the only person really, except for people like the Snows and Jimmy White who was the AP [Associated Press] man--the newspaper people were out--but I was the only American official as far as I know that was in the streets while these demonstrations were going on. I went back to the office and told them about it.

Levenson: Was that apathy typical of the diplomatic corps?

J. Service: Very much. They'd got enough to do at the office, and they stayed at the office.

At any rate I had a wonderful time following the students all day. That afternoon, they were beaten up very badly by the gendarmes, sprayed with water hoses, and driven into alleys where the police could beat them up. The police had belts with heavy buckles and they used those. I'm sure they learned a lot of these things from the French police. Don't they call them gendarmes?

Levenson: Yes.

J. Service: Then at the end of '36--just after a year--there was the Sian Incident when the Generalissimo was kidnapped in Sian. Of course, this was a tremendous affair.

J. Service: I remember seeing Chinese like Chiang Monlin weep when the Generalissimo was released, when the word came that he was safe and coming back. The Chinese felt--people of that kind who were, you know, Kuomintang people--felt very emotional about it.

I had a shortwave radio which really we got for my brother, because when he was sick out in the Western Hills he was in bed most of the time. I was fiddling with it during the Sian affair, and suddenly I realized I was hearing Sian, Sian calling, an English voice. It was Agnes Smedley who happened to be in Sian. She was broadcasting the news.

So, I went down to the embassy the next day and told them about news being broadcast from Sian, and they were absolutely staggered. [laughing]

Levenson: Did they not have anybody monitoring?

J. Service: No. Things were very simple in those days. People didn't think of these things. The idea that there were news broadcasts in English that they could pick up from Sian was something that no one had ever thought of.

Levenson: Was anything done to change the situation?

J. Service: I think that they picked up--After all the navy had a big radio station there. All of our communications were by navy radio. So, I assume from then on--when they got the time and wave length from me--that they started listening.

Levenson: You assume, but you're not sure.

J. Service: No, I don't know.

Levenson: That's an extraordinary story.

J. Service: I just went in and told them, Agnes Smedley's in Sian, and she's telling us all about it. Chou En-lai was there, of course, negotiating the whole settlement and the release.

Levenson: What did Agnes Smedley have to say if you recall?

J. Service: Oh, I don't recall. It was just a news bulletin. I don't remember very much of what she said, but that the Generalissimo was safe and things like that, because people on the outside weren't sure. I think she was just giving an account of negotiations going on and the terms of the Young Marshal, Chang Hsueh-liang. She was talking from the point of view of

1. Caroline Service, Peking, ca. 1936.
2. John S. Service, Western Hills, Peking, ca. 1936.
3. John S. Service en route to present his credentials to Chiang Kai-shek, May 26, 1941.
4. Jack and Caroline Service in front of American Club, Shanghai, 1939.
5. Chungking, 1941. The full staff of the American Embassy: 5 career officers, 4 clerks. Back row, from left: Ruess, Service, Vincent, ?, Hart; front row: Craig, Small, Ambassador Gauss, Macdonald.
6. American Consulate, Yunnanfu (Kunming), July 4, 1934. Warlord Lung Yun, center front. John S. Service, 3rd row, far right.
7. A Masonic group, Shanghai, 1941. John S. Service, back row, right.


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
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J. Service: Chang Hsueh-liang rather than from the point of view of the Communists. But, I think she mentioned the fact that Chou En-lai was there, as I recall. Well, that's enough of that.

Levenson: Okay.

Red Star Over China

Levenson: When was Snow's book, Red Star Over China, published?

J. Service: [gets up to get book] Actually, Gollancz brought it out in '37. Here's the first English edition, but third printing unfortunately.

We saw it first in the British edition in China. It was late '37, as I recall. Practically everyone read it in China.

By the time Snow wrote the book, things had changed because the Sian Incident had taken place. He had to do a lot of frantic, last minute revision. The war against the Japanese had started. The United Front was in existence. It looked in those early, optimistic days of the United Front that there might be real peace in China and that the civil war really was over.

Levenson: This is 1937.

J. Service: Nineteen thirty-seven, early '38. A Chinese edition came out in '38. The Chinese translated it immediately. It was a sensational best seller, of course, in China. No attempts to suppress it. This was published in Shanghai, and it was in Shanghai that I saw it on sale. I can't tell you for sure what the situation was inland.

But, I think in the very early months of the war the United Front was really quite effective. [telephone interruption. New York Times correspondent checking on Philip Sprouse's obituary]

Levenson: You commented before I turned the tape back on that the pictures in the Chinese edition of Red Star Over China were very much more interesting than the ones in the English, Gollancz edition. How do you account for that?

J. Service: I really don't know. Ed's wife, Nym Wales, went up to Yanan just after he did. When he came out she went in. A lot of the photographs in the English edition are actually by Nym Wales.

J. Service: I would guess maybe that she--she was not one for a back seat--may have wanted some of her pictures in. They're very stereotyped pictures of dance troupes and things like that. Whereas, the others were probably selected by the Chinese from a stack of photographs that Ed had. He took a lot of pictures.

Incidentally, Ed gave all the proceeds of the Chinese edition to the Chinese Red Cross. He didn't get a dime out of it. There were also pirated editions that were put out. But, this is the authorized edition.

Levenson: I see notations on the Chinese edition. Did you read most of it in Chinese?

J. Service: Yes, I read it once long ago. It's a good job.

Levenson: It's a historical document now.

J. Service: Okay?

Levenson: Okay.

The Marco Polo Incident: Jack in Hospital with Scarlet Fever

J. Service: The war started when we were in Peking, in the summer of '37. Caroline's father and mother came out to visit her. Her father had retired. His last post with the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers had been in San Francisco. They came out and stayed with us for a while.

Then, they decided to go off to a beach resort, Peitaiho. My mother was also down there with my brother Dick. On the third of July--they were going to leave after the fourth--I had a terrible sore throat. I went to the embassy guard. They had a navy doctor there, a couple of them.

The doctor was amazed at my throat. He called the other doctor over to look at it. "Isn't this a beauty?" So, they told me to go home and gargle with salt water. I said, "We've got a small baby. How about that?" He said, "Sure, you better stay away from the baby. Don't get too close to the baby. Mustn't give the baby your sore throat."

The next day I went to the Fourth of July reception at the embassy--all Americans were invited, of course, to the embassy on the Fourth of July--and talked to everybody, but I felt miserable.

J. Service: The next day--the fifth--I had quite a fever. So a doctor finally came to my house, and he said, "You know what you've got?" I said, "No." He said, "You've got scarlet fever."

They sent me immediately to the PUMC isolation ward, which was full of children. It was mostly diphtheria, and they had tubes in their windpipes. Chinese don't go to hospitals until they're in extremis normally. I think I was the only adult in this ward for a while with all these little kids with diphtheria.

Anyway, the family had already gone off to the beach before they knew I had scarlet fever and had to go to the hospital.

Then, the seventh, which was two days after I went in, I could hear the firing at Loukouchiaio from my hospital bed. You know, ten miles or so outside of Peking, eight or ten miles, was Marco Polo bridge. I could actually hear the war starting in the night and then heavy fighting in the days after that.

Germany had just developed the first sulfa drug, sulfanilomide.

Levenson: Yes.

J. Service: The PUMC had just gotten some; and they were trying it out. I was one of the first people that they used it on, and it was absolutely dramatic, the effect. Within twenty-four hours all my fever had gone and I felt quite normal, felt fine.

But, they didn't know what to do about the normal quarantine, so they made me stay the full--I think it was three weeks that I stayed in isolation. It was quite a long period. But, eventually I got in a room by myself. There was an American dietician who tried to make me gain weight because she thought I was awfully thin. So, she was stuffing me.

They told me that I could not put my feet on the floor. It was part of this isolation. But, I found I could get all around the room by hopping from one piece of furniture to another. [laughter] From the bedside table to a chiffonier to something else, I could get all around the room without ever putting my feet on the floor.

Levenson: Why weren't you allowed to put your feet on the floor?

J. Service: I don't know, but the rules were that I wasn't supposed to put my feet on the floor. The nurses came in and found me once perched on top of the dresser.

Levenson: Sounds like a Thurber cartoon. [laughter]

J. Service: The nurses were all missionary-trained nurses, practically all.

Levenson: Chinese?

J. Service: Chinese nurses, yes. Several of them tried very hard to find out whether or not I was right with Christ. I finally complained about it and said I thought it was unfair to take advantage of a man in this situation. The head nurse said that she would speak to them, so I was not bothered after that. [tape off]

Levenson: So, then the Japanese had taken over Peking. Is that correct?

J. Service: The Japanese took over Peking and I think Caroline came back with her parents from the beach when they were able to travel.

But some time after the occupation--I'm not quite sure why--it was decided that everyone should move into the Legation Quarter, where there were foreign guards. It was an enclave.

So the family moved in and stayed with some of our friends in the embassy. Everybody doubled up, sort of like in the siege of the legations--if you've ever read about that--in the Boxer time.

I was not allowed to go in because of my recent scarlet fever. I stayed in our house which was in one of the PUMC compounds, trying to find out what was happening in the city. I apparently stimulated a few rifle shots. So I gave up exploring.

After a few days, it was decided to evacuate people who could leave. So, Caroline and her family then left and went to Japan.

Edgar Snow Smuggles Teng Ying-ch'ao out of Peking

J. Service: About this time I took her trunk down to my mother. Trains were just beginning to run. I think I was on the first train after a long break. Ed Snow was on the train, I remember, and he had an amah with him.

I was quite surprised that he had an amah, and he seemed rather solicitous. I said something to him, and he said, "Can't tell you now." It turned out that this was Chou En-lai's wife, Teng Ying-ch'ao, whom I met next in Yen-an in 1944. He was smuggling her out of town. She'd been having treatment in a hospital in Peking, I think for TB.

Anyway, the train trip to Tientsin, which normally takes about two hours, took us over twelve hours, because we were always being sidetracked for Japanese troop trains coming south.

I was escorting a couple of American women tourists who had been stranded in Peking. I delivered them to Tientsin and went on to Chinwangtao. This was where my mother was catching a boat south. Because of the delays, I got there--with her trunk--just as the gangplank was being raised.

Mother got to Shanghai precisely as the hostilities were starting there, and was caught on the Bund on August 13 when the bomb was dropped by the Palace Hotel that killed Bob Reischauer and hundreds of other people.

Levenson: Were you physically afraid at this point in China?

Service: I've never thought much about it. Perhaps a part of being an optimist is that one tends not to be very fearful. But things like war, gunfire, and bombing haven't usually bothered me very much. At least, as my mother would have said, I haven't been "frightened out of my wits."

When we came down in the houseboat from Chengtu in 1920, when I was going to school, we had to go past a place on the river bank where there were bandits. We expected the bandits to try to stop us. The baggage in the bottom of the boat was moved over to the side toward the shore, so my mother and the baby could get down behind the trunks.

When we came to the place on the river, sure enough, they started firing with rifles. The boatmen all jumped off the boat, on the far side and held on to the oars. Mr. Helde and

J. Service: I went out on the front deck to row the boat and to persuade the boatmen to get up. I remember watching the bullets hitting the water around us.

But, in the excitement of things like that you're not really afraid. I'd heard much fighting going on, as I mentioned before. In coming down the Yangtze--in '21 I think--there was a big battle in Ichang during the night when some of Wu Pei-fu's troops came up and tried to attack the city. Our steamer was sort of in between. I heard the firing, but I don't remember being terribly afraid. I stayed in bed.

You don't necessarily want to walk into it. But, if you hear it you know you're not going to feel it. [laughter]

[Interview 4: May 3, 1977]

The Foreign Press Corps

J. Service: You asked about the caliber of the foreign press corps. Actually, Shanghai was probably more the center of news. Peking was a bit of a backwater. The capital was Nanking, which is accessible and easily covered from Shanghai.

Most of the regular foreign press in China was chiefly interested in developments that affected foreigners, business, the principal political developments, wars, and things like that. They generally had a rather scoffing attitude about Chinese warlord affairs. You know, the Chinese armies always carried umbrellas, and they didn't fight when it rained. "Silver bullets" were what really won the wars, or were the major weapons. It was a sort of a looking down the nose, a slightly sneering attitude.

There wasn't very much real concern with what was going on in China. There were exceptions, of course. Ed Snow was probably the best exception.

When the Sino-Japanese War started they picked up people to be stringers who happened to be in Peking. A young fellow named Haldore Hanson was teaching in a YMCA school there in Peking. He started working for A[ssociated] P[ress], I think.

J. Service: There were a number of people in China, young Americans. After all these were Depression days, and people were footloose. Some of them had come to China just to try to make a living as well as they could. A lot of these people started working as journalists.

There was a Reuters man in Peking named Oliver who was quite good, but then there were others that just went to the embassy for the handout and talked to a few Chinese.

I think even that people like the New York Times depended mainly on the handout material, contact with the embassy, the superficial news. Generally they had one or two Chinese friends or Chinese contacts who they hoped could give them the inside story politically of what was going on. But, it wasn't particularly analytical reporting.

Levenson: With the exception of Ed Snow, would you say that there were any China specialists who really knew the language and had a detailed knowledge of the Chinese political scene who were working as reporters for the American press?

J. Service: Not who really knew Chinese. There were people like Hallet Abend, for instance, who had been for many years with the New York Times. But these people were Treaty Port people, reporting from Shanghai and they didn't really know Chinese. They might have had Chinese informants, but basically their reporting was Treaty Port and foreign interests oriented.

Levenson: I think we'll go on with this later when we move to Chungking.

J. Service: Good. [interruption: workman to fix window]

We were talking about censorship in the Chinese press. During the suppression campaign against the Communists, prior to the formation of the United Front, there was very little news published about the Communists. It was very heavily censored. The Chinese government news was always, "The Communists are near defeat and are retreating." After the United Front began to break down, you again heard very little about what the Communists were doing.

You asked me a question about circulation of Ed Snow's book. My guess is that that was probably not heavily suppressed at the peak period of the United Front. But, I'm just not sure how much it circulated outside of sanctuaries like Shanghai. In the International Concession of Shanghai, of course, Kuomintang censorship couldn't apply.

J. Service: Certainly the Communists were never given a good press in China or by foreign correspondents. But, I think there was a period when they were not completely cut out of the news, as they were before and after the United Front.

Passes Second Year Chinese: Shanghai, a Disappointing Posting

Levenson: Let's return to chronology now.

J. Service: Yes. We had Caroline being evacuated from China in, I think, September [1937]. She went and stayed in Japan for a while, and then the State Department decided that things were not going to be good for returning to China. So she was authorized to come to the United States. We had two small children. She came to the States and stayed with her parents.

Meanwhile, I stayed on in Peking. I kept the house, a Peking Union Medical College house, in what was called the south compound.

There was an American newspaperman that I mentioned earlier, Haldore Hanson, who had been taken on as a stringer, I think by AP. He'd followed the Japanese army south from Peking on bicycle and had gotten himself into Paoting, which was a city about seventy-five miles south of Peking, and then was found there by the Japanese.

They gave him a very hard time for a while, kept him under detention, and then finally let him out. They were suspicious of what he was doing, of course. Anyway, he was, I think, rather shaken up and he needed a place to stay. He came and stayed with me and shared the house.

He did a good book on the war*, but he was one of the people jumped on by [Senator Joseph] McCarthy because of his writings at this period. Some of them were published by Amerasia magazine.

*"Humane Endeavor;" The Story of the China War, New York, Toronto, Farrar and Rinehart, Inc., 1939.

J. Service: The language exams were supposed to be given in late December. My two other fellow students, Millet and Rice, asked for a little extra time which was granted. Goodness knows, there had been interruptions to our studies. We were having to do night code room duty. So, we got a slight extension. We took the exams and I passed, and then got word that I was assigned to Shanghai, which was a terrible disappointment to me.

Levenson: What did you hope for?

J. Service: I hoped for a smaller post and one where I would have a chance to do political reporting and to use my Chinese. We had two years of required language study. Then there was a third year optional exam, which you didn't get time off for. You simply prepared yourself for your third exam at whatever post you were at.

I wanted very much to do that. Very few people in those years had been taking the third year exam. But, since I had a good start it seemed to me a shame not to do it.

I figured Shanghai would be a difficult place, and it turned out to be exactly as I expected, a very difficult place to prepare for the third year exam, for various reasons.

Levenson: Why?

J. Service: For one thing, it's not a Mandarin speaking area. But I met a peculiar situation in the administration of the post. The executive officer, a man named [Richard] Butrick, was very anti-China language service.

This was quite common. There was, I think I mentioned before, some tension between China service and non-China service people. He gave orders that I was not, for instance, to have any access to the Chinese correspondence coming to the office. I had hoped to be able to either supervise the translation-- We had a Chinese interpreter, but we always had an officer that checked the translations.

He would not allow me to have any contact with the Chinese correspondence and felt that I was supposed to devote full time to my duties in the office and made it as difficult as possible for me to study for my third year exam. [laughing]

Levenson: What a terrible waste!

J. Service: He was a very peculiar man. He's famous in the Foreign Service, as I say. Dick Butrick, all sorts of nicknames have been applied to him--"black bastard" probably the most common. He was very darkhaired.

He apparently believed that most China people became effete snobs or went native.

At any rate, I was disappointed going to Shanghai, but of course there was nothing to do except to go.

Levenson: Did you enjoy it when you got there?

J. Service: Well, yes, a very, very busy life. Caroline came back to China after I'd been there a few months. We had a hassle when I got there. This is again, as we were speaking of, "the science of bureaucracy."

When I arrived, I was not met at the boat, which was rather typical of this man who was executive officer. Anyway, I presented myself to the consulate as soon as possible, and he said, "You'll have quarters in the bachelors' quarters." There was an apartment for bachelors above the office in a big office building in downtown Shanghai. "You'll be up there since your family's not with you."

I was entitled to quarters. There was allowance for quarters. "I am a married officer," I said. "My family--" He said, "Your family is not with you. You'll be up there."

Soon my household effects arrived from Peking. So, I applied for a quarters allowance "to store my effects," and I made sure it got on [Clarence] Gauss' desk who was consul-general. Gauss was sharp enough to know there was some background to this.

He called me and said, "What the hell is going on here?" And I explained the situation and he said, "I'll take care of that." I had very little trouble with our executive officer after that. I got a nice apartment and moved in.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

April 15, 1937.


To: John S. Service

From: The Division of Far Eastern Affairs

The Division of Far Eastern Affairs offers hearty
congratulations upon your recent promotion in the Foreign
Service.

M. M. Hamilton
~~*Edward J. ...*~~
J. W. Ballantine
W. D. ...
Arthur Vincent
J. T. ...
John H. Spencer
~~*...*~~

Dinner honoring Clarence Edward Gauss on his appointment as First Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary to the Commonwealth of Australia at the Columbia Country Club, Shanghai, March 30, 1940.



WHANGPOO CHIN-CHINS

THE DINNER

SALTED NUTS	GREEN OLIVES	PICKLES
	FRUIT COCKTAIL	
	CREAM OF TOMATO SOUP	
	FRIED MANDARIN — TARTAR SAUCE	
	ROAST STUFFED TURKEY — CRANBERRY SAUCE	
	POTATO CROQUETTES	
	GREEN PEAS IN BUTTER	
	STRING BEANS	
	GARDEN LETTUCE — 1000 ISLAND DRESSING	
	ICE CREAM — CHOCOLATE SAUCE	
	HOT ROLLS	
CHEESE		COFFEE



• COLUMBIA COUNTRY CLUB •

Comments on the Social and Political Backgrounds of Foreign Service Officers in the 1930s

Levenson: You said that you voted Socialist in '32. I think we more or less talked about how you stood politically. I don't know what the Foreign Service rulings were on political affiliations for active members of the Foreign Service?

J. Service: There were no rules. There were absolutely no rules, as far as I know. How you voted was supposed to be your own business. There wasn't any loyalty, security program, of course, at this time. I doubt if there were any Communists in the Foreign Service. But there was no effort to find out really if there were. The great majority of the people in the Foreign Service were probably good, rock-ribbed Republicans. Basically they came from very conservative backgrounds, usually from families with some money, social position, Eastern establishment.

Probably the Foreign Service in China, the China branch of the Foreign Service, was by and large more liberal than the Foreign Service as a whole. We weren't from this same sort of background. Most of us were either China-born or mid-western, this and that. There were one or two, of course, from the Ivy League schools. But, most of us were not. The group I was with were children of the Depression to some extent.

Levenson: Just for the record, did you know any members of the Chinese Communist party before Pearl Harbor?

J. Service: Well, Pearl Harbor's hardly the right date to use here. I didn't know any before Chungking. I got to Chungking about the beginning of May, 1941. Almost immediately, as soon as I got to Chungking, I met them because I was introduced to them by a man in the embassy who had been keeping contact with them for the embassy for political reporting purposes.

Levenson: Would you still have described yourself as a Socialist--

J. Service: Oh no.

Levenson: --in the mid-thirties?

J. Service: Actually, after the New Deal came in--after Roosevelt came in and the New Deal--most of us considered that Roosevelt was carrying out many of the things that Norman Thomas had been talking about in his speech in Berkeley in '32. So, we all became, I think, good supporters of Roosevelt and the New Deal.

J. Service: While I always felt that there were a lot of things about Socialism that we should try to work towards, I never considered myself an active member of the Socialist party or an active Socialist. I figured that Roosevelt was moving us in that direction at a reasonable pace, an evolutionary way.

Jack's Estimation of the Chinese Political Scene

J. Service: In the United Front period, which was '37, '38, perhaps the end of '38, most of us felt that the Communist party was willing to accept the leadership of the Kuomintang, work in the United Front; that the Kuomintang itself had liberalized itself and was able to take in or accept other views. None of us--I keep saying "none of us," which is bad; I should speak for myself--I don't think I thought that the Communists were an important threat to the Kuomintang or an imminent rival.

Levenson: I feel that this question is anachronistic, but again I'd like to ask it, because after World War II, world leadership of Communism seemed for a while firmly rooted in Russia, with the possible exception of Yugoslavia and Tito. But, now in the seventies we see that Communism is not monolithic and is polycentric. When did the possibilities of polycentric Communism with China as one of the centers seem an alternative worth considering to you?

J. Service: Oh, I think not until after we'd been in Yen'an for quite a long time and had gotten to know a good deal more about the situation up there, and the Chinese Communists' relations with the Soviet Union, or rather the tenseness and delicacy of their relations with the Soviet Union, and until we had seen the example of Tito.

I think that this was something that came at the end, when we thought that the Chinese Communists were not necessarily Russian Communists and were really quite likely to pursue their own nationalistic way. But, this came late on.

Levenson: Just to wrap up this section--We keep making glancing mentions of the Kuomintang. How much really did you know about Chiang Kai-shek and other leading Kuomintang figures at this time, again, '36, '37, '38?

J. Service: Very little. Actually, most of the political reporting in those days was not, as I've already said, particularly penetrating or analytical.

J. Service: We generally tended to accept Chiang as being what he seemed to be, a leader of China. I don't think most people really gave very much thought as to how he managed to maintain his leadership and control. Internal groups within the Kuomintang, the factions, were not particularly well understood.

This is digressing, but when I came back on leave in early '43, I was in the Department, and they sent me around to talk to an old Foreign Service officer named [Clarence] Spiker who had been consul in Chungking with my parents in 1924. He was the consul in Chungking when my father was almost blinded by the shot through the glass door.

Spiker, as a China service man, had spent all of his career in China. He was in the Department, an old man. He was too old now to send to the field. So, they had him in what was then a research branch in the State Department doing intelligence research.

He had read some of our reports. Apparently he'd asked to see me because he was very perplexed by references in our reports from Chungking that I'd written in '42, '43, about different factions and groups and cliques in the Kuomintang. He didn't know anything at all about them.

So, I had this odd experience of sitting and talking to this man whom I'd known as a boy, when he was consul in Chungking, and telling him almost in A-B-C terms about the Political Science group, the CC clique, the Whampoa clique, all of the congerie of competing factions and groups within the Kuomintang which Chiang was able to manipulate, and how he was able to keep control by setting one against the other.

This poor old guy who spent all his life in China just seemed to be amazed. He didn't know any of this, hadn't really apparently been concerned about it. So, I would say that State Department knowledge of China was fairly superficial.

Levenson: Would there have been others better informed in the State Department?

J. Service: Oh yes. I picked a rather extreme example.

There were people like Willys Peck who had been counselor of embassy in Chungking before John Carter Vincent, who certainly knew something about these things, understood some of them. But, there wasn't a great deal of reporting on them. [tape off]

Consular Duties, Shanghai: Jack of all Trades

J. Service: Actually, my posting to Shanghai turned out to be a very interesting, and in many ways, a very valuable assignment. I was used as a relief officer. It was one of the largest offices we had in the world at that time and the largest consulate. There were about twelve officers, I think, which in those days was a big office.

We didn't have "home leave" in those days, but in remote countries, far countries like China, we were ordered home on consultation. It was the only way they could get you home at government expense. When anyone was on home leave or away from the office, then I would move into his chair.

So, I spent three and a half years--I was there almost three and a half years--in a constant rotation from one job to another, usually three or four months in one job.

You know, we were young. Caroline liked the social life in Shanghai which was very busy. We joined the Columbia Country Club. I didn't play golf, but I used to play tennis out there. We had a social life within the consulate. Then, we had a lot of other friends in Shanghai. I had my family's friends.

We knew a few Chinese, but they were all highly foreignized Chinese that mixed in the foreign community. It was a busy life, much too many parties. I was not very keen on it, and for a while I managed to quit going to parties entirely to get ready for my third year language exam.

Press Survey

J. Service: The first job I was given--I had just arrived--they were way behind in writing a survey of the press. The office was required to write a press summary of the English language press. This had been assigned to an officer who was in charge of the shipping section.

This was the beginning of '38. I got there just after New Year. The man in the shipping section apparently didn't know how to go about writing this sort of report.

Gauss, who was the consul-general, called me in and asked me to do it. It was just a problem of getting the clippings organized. You had an outline of things to cover. And unlike the shipping man, I could give the job full time. Gauss liked my report and I got a very nice note commending me.

J. Service: Incidentally, while I was in Shanghai the legislation was passed that consolidated the agriculture Foreign Service and the commerce Foreign Service with the State Department's Foreign Service. They used to have their separate--up to that time had had separate attaches abroad. A commercial attache was responsible only to the Department of Commerce.

I was always the man that was called in when some special job needed to be done, task force and so on. So, I was the person who had to carry out all the routine of the amalgamation of the offices, inventorying their furniture and transferring it to our inventory.

Visa Section, I

J. Service: I was assigned soon after arrival to the visa section, which was a normal thing for the low man on the totem pole. I worked under the man named [John B.] Sawyer who was a classmate of my mother and father's at UC, and had looked out for me when I was a boarder at the American school.

He had never passed the Foreign Service examination. He was what was called a non-career vice-consul. But, he was the great authority on Chinese visas. He wrote the manual on issuing Chinese visas, which were a very, very special thing in those days.

We had exclusion laws. Chinese could only come to the United States under certain conditions, as a student or as a merchant trader under Section Six of such and such a treaty. A Section Six trader, we called them.

Anyway, one day soon after I got to the desk a White Russian woman came along, a young White Russian woman, and asked to speak to me.

She told me this heart-rending story about how her father had been an American engineer in the Soviet Union, been caught there by the revolution--there were American engineers in the Soviet Union, mining engineers and so on--and that she lost all her papers. Her father had died when they were trying to escape the Soviet Union. She had come to Shanghai with her mother, but since her father was American, she had a claim to American citizenship, and wanted a visa to the United States.

J. Service: I wrote a long memorandum about this. The other men in the visa section said nothing at all until I presented my memorandum. It turned out that she was a case that had been doing this for years and years with every new person she saw in the visa section!

Political Office: "How to be a Successful Political Reporter"

J. Service: I did every job in the consulate except sitting in the consul-general's chair--accounts, shipping, invoices. I had at least two spells in what was called the political section.

This, I think, was where I really had my first lessons in political reporting. There were two people in the political section, a man named Ed Stanton--who was a very fine officer and later ended up as ambassador to Thailand--and then quite a brilliant man named Monroe B. Hall who was a Japan language officer. But, he was stationed in China because the Chinese-Japanese war had started, and we were having a great many problems with the Japanese army occupying American properties wherever they advanced in China, molesting American missions, and a lot of protection cases, we called them.

Form is sometimes more important than content. You're not going to be a successful reporter unless your reports are read. So there is some sense in saying that the first thing is to learn to write well. People get typed. They get a reputation as being good or bad, easy to read, interesting, and so on.

Hall particularly was a good writer. He used to kid me unmercifully about what I submitted. "Terrible, tear it up. Do it over again. You're using too many words. Boil it down. Be concise."

Gauss himself was a master of concise, succinct drafting. He did all of his own, sat down to the typewriter. He had been a court reporter before he came in the Foreign Service. He was an excellent typist, and he almost never had to retype. He'd just sit down at the typewriter and be able to do it all. His drafting of telegrams was a model of very brief, concise writing.

So, in Shanghai I at least had a good training in drafting, writing. Most of the work I did was, as I say, protection cases, writing notes to the Japanese. I worked out a sort of progression of letters, the first-second-third-fourth, like dunning letters. [laughter]

J. Service: "For example, "We wrote you on such and such a date about the occupation of this mission chapel. Nothing's happened." The second letter would be tougher.

I finally got so mean in writing these, these final stages, that the Japanese consulate—we had to send them to the Japanese consulate-general, and they transmitted them to the military--sent a delegate to come around to the consulate and ask us to please not use such rough language because they didn't dare [chuckling] give them to the military.

Levenson: Did you get the properties back?

J. Service: Oh, generally yes--eventually. The Japanese weren't seizing and holding them, but the military had absolutely no respect for foreign properties. This was partly intentional, part of the way their attitude was. In the Panay case, for instance, the officers on the spot certainly knew that it was an American gunboat. It had big American flags painted all over the top of it.

But there were a lot of wild-eyed, hot-headed, anti-foreign junior officers, I'm sure, that didn't care. We had proclamations and signs, all sorts of things. But in military operations, who cares?

Then also, of course, the missions opened their premises to the refugees. So, all sorts of people came in, and from the viewpoint of the Japanese, they felt they had a right to go in at least to search for Chinese soldiers. Probably there were Chinese soldiers in some cases, not in their uniforms. The Japanese usually raped the women. But, wartime--it's pretty hard to protect property in circumstances like that.

Third Year Language Exams: Stratagems for Study

J. Service: One thing in Shanghai I've already alluded to was this effort to work for my third year exam. The chief interpreter was an old friend of mine. He'd been in Peking, and been transferred to Shanghai because they had a lot of work. I worked out a system where I had an hour lesson early in the morning with a young Chinese woman whom I also had met in Peking. Her family had moved to Shanghai. She came for an hour's class early in the morning before I left the house for the office.

J. Service: The senior Chinese clerks in the consulate had lunch brought in from a Chinese restaurant nearby. We were very close to Foochow Road, which is a street in Shanghai which is where all the best restaurants are. They had a contract with one of these restaurants to bring in food in containers, hot food.

There was a room where the chauffeurs and so on sat around--where they had a big round table, you know, a collapsible table, which could be set up. That was always set up and food would come in promptly at twelve o'clock. I went down and ate with the Chinese clerks.

Chinese eat very fast. We'd eat in about twelve minutes, and then I would have a lesson with the interpreter for the rest of the lunch hour. This was a bit unusual, and probably seemed strange to my colleagues. I'm sure it had never been done before.

Levenson: Was it frowned on?

J. Service: I was never told I couldn't do it. I'm not sure that Butrick knew about it.

But anyway, I had the hour in the morning, I had lunch with the clerks, and then I had an hour's class during the noon hour. Then, in slightly over a year--we had a home leave in there--I took my exam.

A funny thing happened. I wrote to the embassy in Peking and told them I planned to take the exam. The customary thing was to send you a sample of the questions that had been asked in earlier exams.

Between the time that I asked to take the exam, and the time I took the exam, there had been a change of officers in Peking. When I got my exam questions for the exam I thought [chuckling] that they seemed familiar. They sent me the same exam I'd already been sent as a sample. Unfortunately, I had assumed that I wouldn't be asked the same questions, so I hadn't concentrated on them. [laughter]

Discovery of Lax Accounting and Lax Security in the Consulate

J. Service: I think this having lunch with the Chinese staff was probably a good thing in many ways, beside the linguistic one. I was assigned, at one point, to be in charge of the accounting section.

J. Service: I did all the accounts. We kept the register of fees. The immigration visa was ten dollars—one dollar for the application, nine dollars for the visa itself.

The man in the visa section, the clerk, had to come over to our section to sign in the book. There had to be a record of fees, and the record of fees for the whole consulate was kept in our section. He would come over and make an entry, describe the service, what the fee was. He would get what we called a service number which then would be applied to the document.

A Chinese clerk that was working for me in the accounts section said to me one day that he thought it very odd that so many "no fee" services were being performed by the visa section. I said, "Next time one comes, let me know about if it you think maybe it's peculiar."

Soon he came in my office and said, "Come look." We went and there was a no fee service that had just been put in by a Chinese clerk in the visa section. What the clerk did was to fill out this little slip for the service, and then he handed it to the American officer for initial. The American officer normally never read the slip. He just put his initial on it.

I went over and spoke to the officer who had signed the slip. I said, "Did you just sign a slip for a no fee service?" He said, "No." He recalled it was a visa.

We went immediately to the clerk's desk and asked him to stand aside. We looked in his desk, searched his desk, and there we found a whole lot of nine dollar fee stamps that were bogus. A nine dollar fee stamp was gray, and he had simply gone out and had some photographic ones made, gray. It was quite easy.

What he had been doing, for goodness knows how long, was putting in this slip for a no fee service for a nine dollar one, when the service was really nine dollars. Then, he pocketed the nine dollars and took one of his fake stamps and put it on the visa.

So, we had the goods on him. We asked him to come along and went right up to the consul-general's office--it was not Gauss by this time; it was another man named Lockhart--explained the situation and called the police.

But, Lockhart would not prosecute. He thought it would be too embarrassing. However in this whole affair we then found out that the Japanese were paying some of our employees,

J. Service: messengers--for wastepaper, for picking up whatever they could and taking it out. But nothing was done about that either.

We had Chinese messengers going in and out of the file room. They could pick up things. They picked up things like office directories, Department of State directories. We tried to tighten up a little but, there wasn't any real security system then.

We don't know that they got anything important, but of course we had to fire a few people. The man who was working for the Japanese was a relative of one of the very senior Chinese employees, so that was a very nasty business.

But at any rate, this possibly wouldn't have happened if it hadn't been for the fact that I had established, shall we say, good relations with the Chinese staff.

Levenson: Did it cause trouble when you had the firings of Chinese employees?

J. Service: No, not really.

Levenson: I meant disturb your rapport?

J. Service: Oh, not that I recall. We had the goods on this man. He lost face completely on it. Everybody around saw what the situation was, so that there wasn't anything bad there.

There were some hard feelings about the messenger that we had to fire, but that was the loss of face by his uncle or whoever it was that recommended him. I didn't feel badly about it. In fact, I think I felt somewhat self-righteously angry.

Home Leave, 1938: A Class VIII Officer

J. Service: We had home leave in October, I think it was, of '38. This was the first time I'd been back to the States for over five years since I left in early '33. We got a car, picked up a car in Detroit, drove to Washington, and back across the continent, which we subsequently always did on every home leave. We always crossed the continent at least once by car.

I've crossed the continent--I don't know; I've tried to count--something like twenty times.

J. Service: Being in the [State] Department was interesting. It was my first real appearance in the Department since I'd been a Foreign Service officer, since I took my exams in January, '33. In those days you had to go calling in the Department.

You left a card on the secretary of state and on the under-secretary. You called on the chief of personnel. Generally you had to talk with everybody at that level, have a short talk.

You, of course, talked to the people in the Far Eastern section, Stanley Hornbeck and the other old worthies of the Department.

Levenson: How did they impress you?

J. Service: Well, I was rather awed, shall we say. I felt somewhat differently later on after I'd come back from Chungking. But, after all, I couldn't claim any great expertise in those days. I'd studied language, but as a language student you were sort of removed from the actual, what was going on. In Shanghai, as I say, I'd been general relief man.

So, I sat and listened respectfully, I think, when I talked to the chief of personnel. He said, "You're doing okay, Service. Don't be worried."

Actually, I was doing quite well because, having passed my third year exam, I was promoted to class VIII. You have three unclassified grades. You start as unclassified C, then unclassified B and unclassified A.

It put me in class VIII four years from the time I was commissioned. That was well ahead of most of my contemporaries--in those days it was generally taking about seven years to reach class VIII.

Levenson: Class IX is the last class, isn't it?

J. Service: They don't call it class IX. They just call it unclassified. Eight is the lowest numbered grade.

Levenson: Right. So that was accelerated promotion.

Shanghai, May 1, 1941.

Dear Jack:

I am sorry I did not find a better way to express my appreciation of your help in V.S.*As a last resort I am sending you a box of chocolates.

You have helped us four times in the past four years, but this last time was the best. Never in all my government experience have I known anyone to turn in a better performance.

I am glad you are to be in the Embassy. When we holler for help, we will have the satisfaction of knowing that there is someone there who knows whether we are bluffing or not.

I realize full well that I am on my last lap and that my stride does not have the spring that it once had, but whether I am in China or in California, I shall remember with pleasure our association together and shall follow your career with the greatest interest.

My very best wishes always!

Sincerely yours,

John B. Sawyer

(Approved by the Department
January 10 1924)

MEMORANDUM

CAN CONSULAR SERVICE

SHANGHAI

Date

Mar. 3

* Visa Section

Referred tofor

Dear Sir,

Your report
on editorials
for January
is very well done.
I am much pleased.

Visa Section II: The Trap Snapped Shut in Europe

J. Service: By 1940, it began to be obvious that things were headed for trouble in the Far East, particularly after the European war really came to life in April, 1940. As soon as France fell, Japan moved into the northern part of Indochina.

This was a sort of a weather vane of what was going to happen. Japan was going to move in and take over the colonies, Dutch East Indies, French, British, and so on, the Far East if she could.

This really is what changed American policy. It wasn't so much sympathy for China as it was our concern about Europe, what we began to think of more and more by this time as our allies. The Lend-Lease Act was beginning to start.

In late 1940--I think we had already given notice in July of the cancellation of the commercial treaty with Japan--the State Department decided to order families back to the States. They couldn't expect other Americans to do anything unless they set the example of ordering their own back.

So our families were all told. An American ship was brought into Shanghai, one of the Matson liners, to evacuate them. Caroline and the children and my mother and my brother Dick's wife were all on that same ship, the Monterey, in November, 1940, which I'm sure Caroline has told you about.

Then, I became a bachelor, which was--Oh, I didn't carouse as much maybe as some, but there was a fair amount of night life.

By this time the Jews in Europe had no other place to go really except China. They could only get out for a while through Italy. From Vienna they could go to Italy. Italy didn't come into the war until after France fell or about the time that France fell.

Levenson: Nineteen forty.

J. Service: Yes. Up to that time Jews could get out through Italy. Where could they go? Shanghai was one of the few places. So, I forget, twenty or thirty thousand came to Shanghai.

They had all registered for American visas in consulates in Europe, in Paris, or Warsaw, or Vienna, or wherever it was. But, the waiting list [for an American visa] was years and years

J. Service: long. They asked to have their case transferred to Shanghai. But, when the case came in, all we could say was, "five years wait" or something like that.

But then when Italy came in, when the war really started--and France was occupied by Germany--then the Department informed us in Shanghai tht we had to start considering these cases, because people who were caught in Europe could no longer have any hope of getting out. Therefore, the Jews that were out of Europe in Shanghai had a right to have their cases considered.

This was a great surprise and shock to Shanghai because our little old visa section under Mr. Sawyer had perhaps handled two cases a day or something like that. Suddenly we had thousands of cases that we had to deal with.

So, I was told to organize a task force to go into the visa section, to set up a special unit in the visa section, and try to handle these cases, which we did. We got in touch with other offices to find out how big offices handled their load, got some hints on how to do it, how to set up an interview schedule--one every fifteen minutes--and how to manage files and records on a wholesale basis.

Unfortunately the American immigration law still contained a check rein in it because of the provision that you couldn't issue a visa to anyone who was "liable to become a public charge." Even though he might be qualified, even though his number had come up, if the consular officer considered that he was liable to become a public charge, you couldn't give him a visa.

This was a hangover from the Depression. We still had a lot of unemployed in the States. American labor unions were powerful.

The consul was always under a kind of sword of Damocles. Because even when he issued a visa, this wasn't necessarily final. The immigration officer, the immigration service at the port of entry, had the final say. Immigration could still turn someone back, even though the unfortunate person had received a visa in the field, in China.

This made you quite cautious in applying this "liable to become a public charge." But we did issue a lot of visas. As you probably know, Max Knight here in Berkeley, who worked for the UC Press for many years, was one that I gave a visa to. I remember him very well.

J. Service: But, you got an awful lot of pressure of various kinds, emotional pressure and some offers, shall we say, of money and other inducements to get people out. A lot of them were--[breaks down] What I'm trying to say is somebody who'd been in a concentration camp and obviously had the scars of a concentration camp, you might not be able to give a visa to because he didn't speak any English, had no close relatives in the United States, had no trade.

People like a doctor couldn't get any assurance--They couldn't get a license to practice in the United States under many state laws. People who had all sorts of professional training would have to stay in the United States for a long time to pass licensing examinations that were obviously aimed against foreigners and people like this. So there it was--a bad business.

Levenson: I'm sorry to upset you, Jack. I've heard you criticized, or rather not you personally but the consular service--

J. Service: Oh, of course. Oh, of course.

Levenson: --in Shanghai, criticized in your own house here by a guest.

J. Service: No.

Levenson: Just for the record, I'd like to know what were the stringencies that were imposed on you from Washington. You've told me about the immigration service stringency. But, as I recall, the quotas were tiny at that point.

J. Service: Yes, the quotas were fairly small, but that wasn't the basic problem, the size of the quota. Besides, at this time, the war was on, the Polish quota, who could come out on it? The people in Poland couldn't come out. Bona fide Poles weren't immigrating.

The quota is determined by where you're born. If you're a Jew and you're born in Austria or in Poland, you come under those countries' quotas.

The whole quota system was set up on a very arbitrary, biased basis to favor the northern European countries at this time, so that countries like Poland and Russia had quite large quotas.

After the war started and people couldn't leave these countries it wasn't the size of the quota that was so much limiting as much, I think, as this business of having to decide well, is this poor man going to be able to make a living in the States?

J. Service: Of course, a lot of them could, because they would be taken care of by the community or organizations helping refugees. In places like New York there were whole colonies of refugees, and a man didn't need to learn English or know English to be able to get a job in a German butchery in the Queens.

But, we felt under a good deal of pressure on it, certainly. I would say that we tried to apply the law as leniently as we could, as we felt that we could get away with, at least as long as I was running the visa special unit.

But, some of these people were pathetic. They'd been in concentration camps, as I say. But, people like Max Knight-- Max Knight had gotten himself a job. He was teaching English in Shanghai and writing for the English newspaper in Shanghai. Obviously a person like this, good God, give him a visa quick.

I've got a letter that was written by Mr. Sawyer which was very nice. You want to shut it off? We got a minute? I'll go down and dig it out if I can.

Levenson: Fine.

J. Service: The visa work ran until the time that I was transferred. What happened was that since my family had left I was living alone in an apartment. Really I'd had enough of Shanghai and enough of this continuous rotation.

I must say I didn't really relish the high pressure--high pressure in every way--visa work.

Comments on Gauss and His Tight Ship at the Shanghai Consulate

Levenson: Do you have any other comments on Clarence Gauss and the sort of character he built in the consulate at Shanghai?

J. Service: He was always thought of as being crusty and cold, sort of hard-bitten, gimlet-eyed. He was very demanding, very hard-working. He had no real interest except his work as far as I could see.

He had a wife and a son, but they were not in China. He and his wife usually lived apart, or did in those years. He ran a very tight ship in the office, expected everyone else to work hard and up to high standards.

J. Service: The only thing that most of us could criticize about him was that he put up with Butrick. But, Butrick was a hard-working guy himself. No one could call him lazy.

Actually, my relations with Gauss became very close, particularly at Chungking, not so much at Shanghai which was a big office. But, in Chungking I lived in a small house with him and Vincent. He had almost a sort of a father relationship to me.

Levenson: What about the rest of the staff? Were any of the others people who subsequently became called "The China Hands?"

J. Service: There were several. Edmund Clubb came to Shanghai later on. He was, of course, considerably senior to me.

There was another China man there named Smith, but he was not much of a China scholar and he worked in the commercial section.

"Service Transferred Chungking Soonest"

J. Service: Early in '41--I forget just how I did it--I got myself transferred to Chungking. I think what I did was to write to the ambassador in Chungking, Nelson Johnson, whom I had known from Peking; he'd been ambassador in Peking--and said that I'd welcome an assignment to Chungking, which was then the temporary capital of China.

In those days, it was not a particularly desirable post, and anybody that volunteered got it. Very quickly, soon thereafter there was a telegram came to the department, "Service transferred Chungking soonest." So, I left and went to Chungking.

in this
April 7 Please return
Shanghai To me.
1941
Mother

Dear Caroline and Mother

I had a letter in the works before the last boat left. But something happened and I never did find the thing. It probably got attached to some visa dossier and will show up in the files years from now to puzzle someone.

I think the main thing that I wrote was that I had received a letter from Drumright - in the Embassy at Chungking. When I wrote Drum a letter of introduction for Bob Barnett a few weeks ago, I mentioned that I would like Chungking for an assignment. His letter was to tell me that he had mentioned my suggestion to Johnson (Nelson T) and that Johnson had sat write down a~~w~~ritten a personal letter to Hornbeck strongly suggesting the assignment of Service to Chungking. Drum said that Johnson had let him read the letter. It is probable that nothing will come of this - there are rumors that the Department is trying to avoid making any transfers now. But it is possible - perhaps a little more so if Johnson's letter arrives in Washington while Gauss is there - so I am telling you. But don't mention it to anyone until it has become a fact. As you know I would be very pleased.

Things go on here about the same with me. "Social" life seems to be tapering off but I'm getting into a routine which keeps me busy - too busy for any ~~productive~~ reading or study except my two nights of Chinese a week.

Saturday afternoons I've gotten into the habit of playing bridge at the Club. A sharky affair with Al Shumaker the No. 1 shark. He looks enough like one ordinarily but you should him hot in a bridge game. Nonetheless he is very pleasant at it. Others in the game are usually a Chinese Dr. Liu, Mortimer of the Chinese-American, a movie man named Goltz, a German (or Swiss) named Neumann (not my old friend Achie) and one or two others. Believe it or not I am still more plus than minus. Saturday night a bit of roistering with some of the office. But this Saturday, Dave Berger had a poker game. My luck was lousy and I lost gradually all evening. Table stakes. I'd win a little, then lose more. Until the very last hand which was draw poker. I went in with three aces. We doubled the ante and nearly everybody stayed in. It turned out that I had three Aces, Harold Pease had three Queens and somebody else (I think John Carter Vincent) had three tens. I made over \$100 on that one hand and ended the long evening up \$11.

The last few Sunday's I've been having barbecue dinner

2

out at the Columbia Country Club with bridge afterward. Mainly Brownie's promotion. There have been various other members - Mary Tandy, Tommy Pond, and one week Freddie Hinke from the Tientsin Consulate was on his way home. And about 1 night a week, Bill Hines, and Brownie and I manage to get together. Fourth man is now Chaplain Trump of the 4th Marines.

Tuesday and Friday the Chinese class - Allman, Mansfield Freeman, George Green, and myself - meet at my house and listen and argue over a glass of beer. Mansfield is a great old arguer. George practically never opens his mouth.

Tonight I've been reading essays for the annual contest at the American School. I found out recently to my horror that I'm on three committees of the Junior Chamber. Barr has been trying to rope me into plans for a men's discussion group at Community Church (but I have successfully avoided being one of the speakers at the opening meeting) and I haven't missed a Masonic meeting since you left.

As for work, I sort of went on strike about the first of April when we counted up and found that we had had 207 new cases register last month. Although we are turning them out at the unprecedented rate of over 350 a month (more than Tokyo says that 3 offices in Japan together can manage) the net gain of less than 150 - against our waiting list of 2700 seems discouraging. One feels as though it wasn't much use. I think I told you about Lockhart's finally getting up courage to ask for more help when he saw a five page message sent by Tokyo telling about the terrible time they are having (with a problem less than one/tenth the size of ours) and asking for 2 FSO's and 4 American clerks.

Anyway, instead of working till 7:00 or 7:30 every night the way I have been doing for 2 months, I quit now at 5:15 or 5:30 and go to the Y for (you guessed it) running. There is a good bunch out this year - all the old regulars and a new fellow who ran at Pomono (Cohen) and a boy named Lionel Stagg from USC. The last two, especially Stagg, are comparatively hot stuff and Service will be a fill-in in the relay this year. However, I'm feeling pretty good - if not as far as running ability goes, at least in physical condition - surprising good considering the bum life I have been leading.

Mother, did you see Dick when he went thru? I judged not. The next few months will be tough for him but I hope that he buckles down and really sweats. This will be a good time to show the determination that Helen looks as though she had - though to handle a Service she will have to exercise it tactfully. ☺ - *Maybe it's not the Service but the Boggs in*
Much love
Jack

IV CHUNGKING POSTING, 1941

[Interview 5: September 12, 1977]

Background to Jack's Appointment to Chungking

Levenson: I'm glad to be back here after the summer, Jack. When we left off last time, you said that you had applied for posting from Shanghai to Chungking. But, in rereading E.J. Kahn's China Hands, he says that your transfer was recommended by [Everett F.] Drumright, "oddly."* What do you think he meant by that?

J. Service: Well I can't really speak for Jack Kahn, but when he wrote his book he decided to talk to someone beyond the circle of China hands who were fired. I don't know who suggested it or how he happened to choose Drumright. He knew that Drumright disagreed rather basically, particularly later on, with those of us who were fired.

I think that when Kahn mentioned my coming to Chungking--and this is all my hypothesis--Drumright said that yes, he was in Chungking when Service's letter to Ambassador Nelson T. Johnson arrived. I can well assume that Johnson would have asked around, particularly Drumright, if he knew Service, what do you think of him, what should he (Johnson) recommend?

Drumright probably knew me as an active younger officer. The service in China was very small. Gossip and rumor went around. Everybody had an idea of other people's capabilities, how they stood, how good they were. Certainly Drumright knew that I was the only person since he himself had done it to

*E.J. Kahn, Jr. The China Hands: America's Foreign Service Officers and What Befell Them, Penguin Books, 1976, p.67.

J. Service: have taken a third year Chinese exam. I would guess that my reputation was fairly good as a very young officer. He probably said to Johnson, "Why sure, Service is a good, hard worker."

So Drumright could say to Kahn that he recommended me. My transfer was on the basis of my having written and asked for a transfer. I think that Kahn, not really knowing the situation at the time, thinks this was odd. But it wasn't really odd.

At this time, in 1941, early '41, there was no [American] debate going on in China about China policy. There was no real disagreement among people serving the government about our attitude toward the Chiang Kai-shek regime. We were pretty much all of one mind. So there really wasn't anything very odd about it. Later on, as we look back on it--Drumright having served as ambassador to Taiwan and fought many battles for the Taiwan government--now it looks odd that Drumright should have been the guy that said, "Well, yes, you better get this guy."

Night Flight, Hong Kong to Chungking

Levenson: How did you travel from Shanghai to Chungking?

J. Service: In Spring, 1941, there was still a daily flight run by the China National Aviation Corporation, which was jointly owned by the Chinese government and Pan American. Pan American supplied the know how, operations, and so on. Crews were Pan Am. The flight left Hong Kong-- Haven't I described this to you?--

Levenson: No.

J. Service: Very late at night at an undetermined hour--You never knew what time you were going to leave. You were simply told to come to the airport at midnight or 1 a.m. Then somewhere around two or three in the morning they would take off from the old Kai Tak airport there in Hong Kong and circle above Hong Kong, or actually go out to sea a ways. Then when they got enough elevation--those were DC-3's in those days; the DC-2 was just going out and the DC-3 was just coming in--when they had enough elevation then they would go off across occupied China. They had to head across Hong Kong, head across Canton, and so on, Kwangtung, Kwangsi, and on up to Chungking.

They would fly across at night. This was before effective radar and night fighting, so there wasn't much the Japanese could do about them. Then they would arrive in Chungking soon after daybreak.

Levenson: Before the bombers.

J. Service: Before the bombers. I flew up on the same plane with the Luces. We arrived on a misty morning just barely after dawn. Clouds were around.

It was pretty hairy because the airport was down beside the river, high hills on both sides. The pilot knew it well. He got down through and we came in.

You were very, very strictly limited on weight. I was very much annoyed because I knew when I went to Chungking that I was going to have to attend a presentation of credentials by our new ambassador. By that time Gauss had been appointed. The Chinese insisted on all the rigmarole. They had to do it properly. In the American system we've got no diplomatic uniforms. If you go to a presentation of credentials you've got to wear a white tie.

Levenson: Tails?

J. Service: Tails. [laughter] So I had to take my tail coat, et cetera to Chungking with me because I couldn't expect to borrow anyone else's. I was thin as a rail in those days. I weighed about a hundred and thirty pounds. I had to take my white tie outfit, taking up valuable luggage. I was allowed forty pounds, something like that.

Then Drumright, who was in Chungking, knew I was coming, and he wrote to me in Shanghai and asked me to bring his flat silver. For some strange reason he wanted flat silver! So I had all of his flat silver in a briefcase which practically weighed me down. Anyway, I got by with the heavy briefcase partly because I was a foreigner.

There was a large Chinese passenger who was being weighed just ahead of me. He just ballooned out all around, sort of like a tent. The clerk in charge of weighing in says, "This won't do. What have you got on? Let's see." So he started to take off layer after layer after layer. He had all sorts of things inside. [laughter] The whole crowd at the airport, all of us who were waiting to be weighed in, got great enjoyment out of this poor fellow's embarrassment.

Ambassadorial Styles: Nelson T. Johnson and Clarence E. Gauss

Levenson: Then when you came to the embassy you served under two different ambassadors. Would you comment on their different styles?

J. Service: I came in just on the tag end of Nelson T. Johnson. He was transferred to Australia. Clarence Gauss, who had been my boss in Shanghai when I first went to Shanghai in '38 was sent to Chungking.

Johnson was very easygoing. We referred to him as a sort of Taoist. "Do nothing and there is nothing that will not be done." [repeats saying in Chinese] He was fairly inactive and passive. At that time we were neutral in the Chinese war. Roosevelt had tried in his quarantine speech in '38 to get the United States to do something. That had been strongly rejected by public opinion. I think the general attitude in Washington was that we should try to not get involved and stay out of the line of fire.

The American embassy, for instance, under Johnson had set up offices on the south bank across the city from Chungking in an area which had been largely taken over by foreign business people. So it was regarded as a semi-foreign area, not normally a target by the Japanese. All the other embassies were in the city of Chungking.

The embassy had no motor car. We were isolated, and he was quite content to let a very active and very able naval attache named McHugh maintain close contacts with Mme. Chiang, the Generalissimo, important people. Quite abnormal in most embassies to abdicate the important contacts, the important political reporting, to a service attache.

Levenson: Why not a foreign service officer?

J. Service: Well, here was this guy. He was in the navy. He had a car. The navy had a sampan to get across the river. Crossing the river was a problem. He was a very active, aggressive person who had been in China a long time, knew these people, was adept at developing his contacts.

The embassy under Johnson was rather content to take life easy. Johnson regarded Chungking as a temporary office and made no attempt to build up the embassy. He was just, I say, a Taoist, to repeat myself. [laughter] He was a raconteur who took life quite easily, liked to socialize and talk. He

J. Service: played the guitar. He was a rotund, rather jolly person who liked to sit around and talk, had a great fund of anecdotes and stories.

Gauss was the complete opposite. He was a tough, hardboiled guy, no small talk, no interest in socializing, very touchy and sensitive about prerogatives and about the embassy exercising its proper role in things like political reporting.

He brought in new staff. The old staff was due to go out anyway. They'd been there a long time with Johnson. They'd followed him up from Nanking to Hangkow and finally to Chungking. So they were all due for a transfer.

Before Gauss came he tried to solve the transportation problem by getting a motor car from the Department. Later on that's why I was sent to Rangoon, because the Department took so long to get the motor car that it was on the high seas at the time of Pearl Harbor. It had been promised early in the year [1941], but they had to wait for the next fiscal year before they had funds, and then they had to get bids and so on, all this sort of thing, a real bureaucratic fairy tale.

Johnson himself never did any official political reporting or drafting of telegrams. Gauss did a great deal of that. He just sat down at a typewriter and would bang out a dispatch.

Levenson: What was the norm at that point for an ambassador?

J. Service: There aren't really any norms. I think that Johnson was nearer the norm than Gauss in many ways. Johnson was a very close and old personal friend of Stanley Hornbeck who was an old character in the State Department, had dominated the Far Eastern branch of the State Department many, many years and was a close friend of [Cordell] Hull.

Johnson did all of his work in personal letters to Hornbeck. He just scorned writing official despatches which were going to be read by a lot of people in the Department. It was all personal letters to Hornbeck who, of course, had the ear of [Cordell] Hull, the secretary of state.

Gauss had no real, close, personal contacts in Washington. He sat down and wrote official despatches or expected his staff to. So, we had a very much tighter organization under Gauss. It was very soon made known to the naval attaché that the embassy was going to do the important political reporting. It expected to develop contacts with the top people, Chiang's family, and so on.

J. Service: Gauss was interested in a much more active role in getting his staff out in the country and doing much more reporting. There had been very little traveling by anybody in the embassy under Johnson. Gauss got the Chinese--fairly soon--to agree to let us send people out to various cities as observers, not setting up formal offices but so we could get some feel of what was going on in the country. We were isolated.

Gauss got to Chungking at the end of May, 1941. When France fell [June, 1940], Japan had moved into Indochina. When Japan moved into Indochina and began to threaten Indonesia, the United States became really concerned. Our whole attitude toward helping China began to become much more positive.

The Flying Tigers business was all being set up in the summer of '41, sub rosa. This was a mercenary force originally. But there was an airplane factory that was going to be set up on the border between Burma and China. American experts were being sent out to help advise the Chinese in improving the Burma Road, building it better, paving it, getting more traffic over it, organizing the traffic which was deplorably disorganized.

Gauss' Ceremonial Swearing In

J. Service: I've got a picture of my going to the swearing in. Because of the occasion I was riding a [sedan] chair. I managed to borrow a hat. I found someone in the British embassy who had a silk hat.



Levenson: You look like Fred Astaire in Topper!

J. Service: But this hat was much too large and I had to stuff paper inside it, so that it would stay on my head for a while at any rate.



Levenson: What was the ceremony like?

J. Service: Well, all presentations of credentials are pretty cut and dried. The chief of protocol comes to your embassy to meet the new ambassador and escort him to the foreign office or to the presidential residence. The chief of government then was an old man named Lin Sen. That's right. It wasn't the Generalissimo. Lin Sen was the sort of head of government, chief of state, but he was a complete nonentity. It was just a figurehead position.

- J. Service: Then the president, or whoever, stands in the reception room and the ambassador and his staff are brought in and you bow once at the door and then you advance halfway and you bow again. Then you come up close and bow the third time. Then you hand him your credentials, your commission. Then one of your staff--in this case it was Drumright--reads a message. Then the head of state has his message read and then you withdraw the same way. Then you go in another room and there's a reception, a little more informal. The ambassador then introduces all of his staff. The military attaches are all in dress uniform. We're all in these silly white ties.
- Levenson: There's a curious anomaly to think that this is going on in 1941, while China was falling apart!
- J. Service: Yes. That's right. That's right. And Chungking absolutely isolated and barricaded and beleaguered.
- Levenson: Was the message delivered in English?
- J. Service: Originally it was in English, but Drumright read a Chinese translation. Each country usually insists that its own communication--the authoritative copy is the one that's in its own language, but they furnish a translation. The Chinese wrote in Chinese, but usually--not always--sent along an English translation. We wrote to the Chinese in English and sent along a Chinese translation.
- Levenson: Was it in any way fun or informative? Or was it a purely formal occasion?
- J. Service: Oh, I think the fun was afterwards when we got back to the embassy.
- Levenson: In what sense?
- J. Service: We had a few drinks. [laughter] There wasn't any fun involved in the ceremony itself. It's a drag, very, very formal. You're representing a state. You're representing your country. Then it all becomes very formalized.



Farewell dinner for Ambassador Nelson T. Johnson
at Generalissimo and Mme. Chiang Kai-shek's



Personal card: China-Burma-India Theater

First Meeting with Generalissimo and Madame Chiang

Levenson: When did you actually meet the Chiangs?

J. Service: I got to Chungking just before Nelson Johnson left. In a sense this was an advantage to me because there was a whole round of official entertainment to say farewell to Johnson. Chinese liked Johnson. He was very pleasant and genial, said all the nice things, patted them on the back. He had a wonderful speech which he always gave in various formulations, various variations, about the three great documents: the Sermon on the Mount, the Gettysburg Address, and Sun Yat-sen's Three Principles, San Min Chu I. This was typical of the kind of speech that he'd give. There was always, "What a wonderful, great man Sun Yat-sen was," and how he was one of the world's great leaders.

At any rate, soon after I got there the Generalissimo gave a farewell dinner for Johnson and I was included simply because I was on the staff of the embassy. Officers were all included. That was when Madame Chiang heard my name and Jack Kahn says that she said, "Oh, we hope you'll be of service to China." She didn't seem to remember that she'd known my mother. My mother was at the wedding reception when the Chiangs were married in Shanghai. But the name didn't apparently ring any bell with her.

Levenson: Can you recall your initial impressions of them?

J. Service: It's very hard, you know, to go back and peel off all the layers.

Levenson: I know it's hard, but it's interesting.

J. Service: The Generalissimo--and I think that this would be my original impression--was very tense and very taut, no relaxation, very stiff. She was obviously very charming, in a rather heavily made up way, very heavily made up for a Chinese, and I thought somewhat artificial. But, these have been the impressions that have been heightened by subsequent memory.

I remember I was annoyed at the time about this "Hope you'll be of service to China." This sort of rubbed me the wrong way at the time. But I didn't have any real chance to talk to them. When you're junior man on the embassy staff you're very much in the back.

J. Service: H.H. Kung for instance, who married Madame Chiang's older sister [Ai-ling]--he was minister of finance at the time--he gave a luncheon to say farewell to Johnson out at a summer house that he had some miles away from Chungking at some hot springs which was a very good place to get away from the bombing.

That meeting was much more pleasant in a way because H.H. Kung was an Oberlin graduate, had been a benefactor of Oberlin, and always apparently was able to find jobs in China for Chinese Oberlin graduates. Anyway, he knew I was from Oberlin and we had some talk. He seemed like a very pleasant, nice, old guy, sort of a granddaddy type.

Levenson: That impression, I imagine, changed as the war proceeded.

J. Service: Yes. I don't think that there was so much entertainment when Gauss arrived. I don't recall the mention of a round of parties for Gauss. There must have been some, but I don't have any particular recollection on that.

What I remember more clearly is after Pearl Harbor, after we got into the war, that there were then a series of meetings and dinners, to get all the Allies together. The Russians were always included then, and the British, and ourselves. And several public meetings where we'd all get on a platform--I would be in a chair right behind Gauss, sort of whispering into his ear a translation of what was going on.

Right next to me was Federenko, who later on was at the UN for many years. He became the Soviet representative at the UN. Federenko was whispering the same sort of thing, in Russian of course, into his ambassador's ear. And over here was an Englishman named--I think Derek Bryan--who was doing the same thing for his ambassador. We were all keeping our ambassadors informed, telling them what was being said, what was happening.

Only Nine Staff Members in the American Embassy

J. Service: The work of the embassy started snowballing after Pearl Harbor. I got a little picture here which shows the embassy staff in the summer of 1941. You can see that it's tiny.

Levenson: Nine.

J. Service: We had no women.

Levenson: That was something I was going to ask you about.

J. Service: There were no women permitted. That was true for the Americans. British and other people had them, but we had no wives, no women allowed. So that four men out of the nine were clerks. Between those four they had to take care of all the coding and decoding, filing, and typing of anything that was confidential, most of it was classified. Then there's the ambassador and four officers.

This, of course, by present day standards is tiny. It's just incredible. The smallest country now has an embassy twice or three times this size. But this was in China, in Chungking. We had the ambassador, the counselor, John Carter Vincent. We had a second secretary named John Macdonald who was the economics man. He knew no Chinese, never served in China. So, all he could do was to take the handouts.

I was third secretary and a Chinese-speaking officer. Vincent was a Chinese-speaking officer, but his language was weak because he'd been out of China for most of his service. He'd been in Switzerland, at the League of Nations, for a long time. Then there was a very young foreign service officer named Boise Hart who was not a China man. B-o-i-s-e, I guess.

Levenson: How did this staff compare, for instance, with that of the British or the French?

J. Service: Oh, we were more or less comparable. Things were all much simpler in those days. Yes, I don't think the British had a much larger staff than we did, although it may have been fancier. The ambassador was a very able man named Clark Kerr, who later on became Lord Inverchapel and was ambassador in Moscow--had a private secretary. That sort of thing. They may have had a slightly larger staff than we did, but it wasn't tremendous. But they did have some wives working and they had some girls in the embassy.

The Soviet embassy I think was considerably larger, but the Soviets always had a big staff because they brought their own cooks and chauffeurs and so on. They didn't use Chinese servants the way we did. They had language people. They had quite a big establishment.

Levenson: You commented that Johnson had his own people and that Gauss gradually brought in his people. Was this the usual practice for an ambassador to have a certain degree of control over postings and who he had in his embassy?

J. Service: In those days it didn't go down very far. I'm not sure it does now. An ambassador usually had the privilege of asking for the top people. The counselor for instance, the number two man, was usually somebody whom the ambassador felt he could work with. The ambassador could ask for other people.

One of the first things that Gauss did when he got to Chungking was to tell me that he had not asked for me. He didn't want me to be under any misapprehension that he had asked for me, since I had been assigned there almost the same time that he was assigned there. I told him, of course, that I realized that, because I had asked to be assigned there before I knew he was going to be assigned! [laughter]

Levenson: What was the implication of that, that he didn't want you to be under an obligation?

J. Service: No, no. He didn't want me to feel that I could expect any special preferential treatment. He was absolutely just straight as a die, you know, on anything like that, no favoritism.

Jack as "Chief of Chancery" or General Handyman

J. Service: Eventually I got to know people in Chungking and to get around more. And then Boise Hart arrived. He took over the consular chores, and I moved more into political reporting, although even that was part-time. It wasn't a full time job. We were always very much tied to the office, tied to the desk.

Levenson: That's interesting. How many hours did you have to spend at the office?

J. Service: Oh, we spent a full eight hours usually and very often more. We were busy and getting more and more busy. We had to help out in the code room and things like that. The code room staff was very inadequate. Traffic built up. We all had to give a hand at doing telegrams, and this might mean at night sometimes.

Levenson: What were your assignments in Chungking?

J. Service: It's hard to recount-- It was such a small staff, of course, you had to do a lot of things. When I first arrived I think I was just made general handyman. They call you chief of chancery. It's a misnomer, the title, because it just means you're chief clerk, a minor administrative officer, taking care of all the

J. Service: chores that need to be done. Nowadays they've built up administrative officer into a glorious, big job. But in those days, before the administrative sciences had been developed, apparently we got along with very little administration!

When Drumright left--I think some time in the fall, or maybe even before that--I was put in charge of what did they call it? I was made a sort of a Chinese secretary in charge of checking translations and correspondence to and from the foreign office. We had the Chinese translator but someone was supposed to look over it, make sure that everything was all right.

The translator, when he had some time, translated articles from the press or articles that we asked him to do. But I soon found that nothing really was done in any immediate way to check the press. It took the translator a long time. He did laborious, word by word translations. He only did things that he was asked to do generally. He couldn't do very much.

There were about eight newspapers, seven or eight papers, in Chungking. Every political grouping or faction, clique, would have its paper. I don't want to get into a lot of Chinese names here. I started looking at the editorials. We got the papers usually quite early in the morning. I would skim the editorials of all the papers and then write a paragraph or so, just the gist of each editorial.

Later on, of course, all this thing was highly developed. After the war started, the Office of War Information got organized, and they had a whole corps of people doing this, Chinese translators doing it. But for a while it just would take up a couple hours of my morning, just skim the editorials and then try to capture the gist of it in a little capsule.

Madame Chiang's Unique American Visa Issued by Jack

J. Service: I also did consular work, visas and so on. You were asking if there were differences between Gauss and Johnson. Soon after I got there, I was doing these sorts of consular chores--the embassy still had to do things like passports and visas--the Foreign Office sent over the passport of Mme. Chiang. Mme. Chiang apparently made a practice of keeping an American visa in her passport so she could leave on short notice.

J. Service: They sent a little note saying that they had sent the passport over many times, and it seemed to be much easier if we could just issue a permanent visa. Well, there's no such thing as a permanent visa, wasn't then. Visas are limited, for a certain period.

So, I took the thing up to Johnson and he said, "Oh, go ahead. [laughter] Just leave out any expiry date. Just give her a visa and don't mention an expiration date." So, I gave Mme. Chiang a unique State Department visa!

Of course, with Gauss this would never have worked. Gauss had written a manual on notarial procedures that was the "Bible" all through the Foreign Service. He would have insisted on the regulations and the law.

Embassy Relations with American Army and Navy Intelligence

Levenson: So Gauss built up a professional office as quickly as he could. Another thing that you said that interested me is that he told off the navy in no uncertain terms. What sort of liaison did he have at that time with information that the army and the navy were getting?

J. Service: Oh, I think quite good. I don't think there was any complaint. Under Johnson, of course, he was reporting [navy] information and giving credit. He would say, "McHugh has seen Mme. Chiang and reports the following," and then send it in. I don't think that McHugh was holding out particularly. The military attache was Meyer, who had taken the place of Stilwell, who by this time had left China as attache. I don't think that there was any problem with the army either.

McHugh got into hot water later on when he began to try to play politics a little bit. He sort of joined the anti-Stilwell faction, and this eventually got him in the wringer.

Most of Meyer's contacts were not political contacts so much as military contacts. He watched what was happening militarily in the Sino-Japanese war and gave us copies of his reports.

Chungking: A Precipitous City Divided by the Fast-flowing Yangtze River

J. Service: The American embassy was, as I said, situated very unsuitably and inconveniently on the south bank across the Yangtze. Crossing the Yangtze at night was sometimes a chancy and perilous business. Some nights you just couldn't do it. If the water was flooding the boats wouldn't cross. You had to cross by a little sampan with people rowing, and you'd get swept way down the river and then you'd hang on and pull yourselves up on the boats on the other side.

Levenson: How wide is the Yangtze there? It's a confluence, isn't it, of two rivers?

J. Service: Yes, two rivers. Oh, I suppose maybe half a mile wide. It doesn't get much wider when it floods because the banks are very steep. The Yangtze flowed down through these very steep shores. The city of Chungking is built on a high rock, like a ship almost, between these two rivers, and anyplace you go is up. In those days you had a long, long line of steps. People used to say that there were 365 steps at the landing where we normally went. I think that's slightly exaggerated, but in any case it would differ a good deal depending on the stage of the water because the difference between high water and low water level was a hundred feet. So obviously at low water you had a lot more steps to go up.

A lot of people found the steps difficult. Gauss usually had to get a sedan chair to go up. There were no wheel vehicles until you got up onto the top, the plateau at the top. Then you'd have some rickshaws and buses. But there was only one place in Chungking where a motor car could get down to the river. That was where they had a ferry across for trucks and so on.

Along the cliff side as the water went down people built bamboo houses, huts, and when the water came up in the springtime they all had to be torn down. This happened every year. Houses would move down as the water went down and be dismantled when the river came up the next spring.

The commercial airport was an island in the river, a glorified sandbar. But then every summer that was flooded. So then they had to use another airport much further away from town, the military field. But the river was very swift, and when it was rising in flood, it could be quite dangerous.

J. Service: They had launches, steam ferries, that operated during the day-time, but they quit in very early evening. After that, a sampan, a small rowboat was the only way of getting across.

Levenson: Were these rowed by men or women?

J. Service: Men. You're thinking of South China where it's women. But in Szechwan it's a man's job. They row by standing up, facing forward, not our way of sitting down, backward.

Levenson: I've never been able to figure out how that works!

Domestic Arrangements.

Levenson: Where and how did you live in Chungking?

J. Service: The embassy rented a bungalow that belonged to Standard Oil.

In normal times, Standard Oil was a fairly large company in Chungking because it was the distributing center for Szechwan and areas west. So kerosene was shipped there in bulk, and put into five gallon cans to be shipped out by other means from Chungking.

Since fairly early in the war the river had been blocked. It was barricaded just above Ichang to keep the Japanese from being able to come up the Yangtze, so that nothing could come in and Standard Oil was doing no business. They had one man there, sort of a caretaker. But several of their houses were available and they had a bungalow up in the hills, in what was called the Second Range, the south bank of Chungking. The embassy rented that bungalow, and they also had a house down fairly near the river. That was the house that was right next to the ambassador and the counselor.

When I arrived the man that I was replacing had lived up in the hill bungalow and I went up there. I didn't mind. It was a half hour or forty minutes from the office, but I normally did it by foot. Some people did it by chair. It was more arduous, I thought, by chair than by foot.

But the ambassador and the counselor and the counselor's private secretary lived in the Standard Oil house down fairly near the river, near the office.

J. Service: We rented a building from a Chinese landlord, which I think was put up in a hurry, for the office, which became very inadequate. Other people rented houses. The rest of the staff lived in a couple of houses that were owned by a widow of an American doctor who had left the mission and gone into business. He started a private hospital in Chungking, a drugstore, and so on. They built several houses which they rented. But we were all there on the south bank.

In the fall of '41 I was asked to come down from my hill house and move in with the ambassador and the counselor, Gauss and Vincent. So I did that. I lived there until I left Chungking in late '42.

Levenson: Did you have a Chinese staff, a cook, amah, and so on?

J. Service: Yes. Some of the staff had been brought in by Johnson and other people, from Nanking, Hangkow.

Levenson: Who ran the house?

J. Service: That was one of my chores really. I was the junior man, and so it was my job to do the accounts and pay the cook, and do things like that, watch out that we weren't squeezed too much and so on.

Coffee was a tremendous problem. These crazy, perverse things that happen in times of scarcity-- Coffee became a sort of a fad in Chungking, which was completely cut off from the world. Coffee houses sprang up all over town. The in thing to do was to have coffee. Where did they get their coffee? They got their coffee, of course, largely from foreign establishments like ours.

We had an agreement with the cook that if we got forty-five cups of coffee out of each pound of coffee, that was okay. We sort of kept a check. [laughter] How long the coffee lasted. Of course, what they did was to dry the grounds. Grounds were all dried and sold to the coffee houses, maybe sweetened a little bit with some fresh coffee. But mostly it was grounds that you got when you went to town. They boiled them to death!

You had to be very careful because things got terribly scarce, terribly expensive. Light bulbs would disappear. You couldn't leave a light bulb out on the porch, for instance, things like that. You had to bring it in at night. You got along fairly well without imported stuff.

J. Service: The navy had a gunboat there. I think around the time of Pearl Harbor, or maybe even before Pearl Harbor, it was decided to pull the crew of the gunboat out. It couldn't do anything. It couldn't go anyplace. So, they sold a lot of their supplies to the embassy staff.

As I mentioned the naval attache had a car, and the navy had a truck which went on a regular supply run, first to Indochina, when the road was open from Indochina, to Chungking, and then from the Burma Road later on. So they would bring in some supplies. But after the gunboat stopped operating, the truck was discontinued, and we were really cut off.

Levenson: Did you eat Western style or Chinese?

J. Service: Completely Western.

Levenson: Really? Was this Gauss' preference?

J. Service: Yes. He had no interest in Chinese food.

One thing that we got from the gunboat was a case of tabasco sauce, and Gauss liked tabasco sauce. We had soup at lunch, we had soup at dinner, and always had tabasco sauce. I had learned that eggs with tabasco sauce are very good, so I had tabasco sauce three meals a day. I had eggs for breakfast. [laughter]

But this was normal. Most foreigners were quite nationalistic in that they insisted that the cook prepare foreign style food, bread and so on.

Levenson: Were there other residents in that house?

J. Service: It was a rather small house and it was just the three of us, Gauss, Vincent and myself. The bungalow up on the hill I always shared with someone else.

Japanese Bombing Rituals

J. Service: The summer of '41 was the last heavy season of bombing. The Japanese did most of their bombings in the summer in Chungking for some reason. We had very heavy, sometimes almost continuous bombing in the summer of '41, whenever the weather was good.

J. Service: It was all quite ritualized. If the weather was good the Japanese from Hangkow would send up a reconnaissance plane to check the weather in Chungking. You could hear it buzzing about. Then you would know that in about two hours or three hours, various alerts would start going off.

The Chinese had a wonderful system of air raid warnings. A lot of credit is given to the Chinese for this. But it was organized by [Claire Lee] Chennault. Chennault then worked for the Chinese. This was before the Flying Tigers, the Fourteenth Air Force.

It was made easier by the fact that the Japanese operated only from one particular locality, Hangkow. They built their base in Hangkow. The Chinese had watchers apparently almost beside the field, right in Hangkow. So they knew when the Japanese were getting ready for a raid, they could tell when they took off, and all the rest of it. The watchers could tell when they got to two hundred kilometers, a hundred kilometers, fifty kilometers from Chungking. By that time you heard them and everybody went underground.

Levenson: You had air raid shelters.

J. Service: Oh yes. We had one for the embassy. Every one was instructed, required, you might say, to prepare shelters. Chungking is on soft sandstone, quite easy to dig into.

We normally used to stay outside of the shelter until we could see the planes and see where they were coming from. In the city, because of so many people, police required you to go underground, but we would stand outside and watch the planes. If the planes weren't coming over us then we would normally not go in. Even that was not without some danger because Chinese did have anti-aircraft and you had shrapnel falling around.

The first day I was there-- I came up on a plane with Mrs. Luce, Henry Luce and Mrs. [Claire Boothe] Luce. They came over and called at the embassy and there was an air raid. I was standing about three feet from Mrs. Luce on the edge of a terrace looking out toward the city, a whizzing sound, and a piece of shrapnel fell right between us on the ground, a small piece about as big as your finger.

Levenson: How did she react to it?

J. Service: She reacted very well. She was very calm. I made the mistake, foolishly and ignorantly, of trying to pick it up too soon, before it got cold. Shrapnel gets very, very hot.

J. Service: But anyway we would watch, and then if the planes were in a threatening position we'd go in the shelter. If you had a shelter then you were required to let the neighborhood people in. There were a lot of poor people, ordinary people who couldn't build shelters. So if you had a shelter you had to have open house.

One day we went into the shelter and I noticed a woman holding a child who was obviously quite sick. So I asked her what was wrong with the child. The mother gestured: "Something wrong with his throat." It was mumps. So at an appropriate time after that I got sick. We had a navy doctor there from the gunboat. The navy doctor says, "You've got a fine case of mumps. Get yourself up the hill." I was living up on top of the hill at that time. "Get yourself up the hill and ride a chair." That was the only time, I think, I rode a chair up the hill. "Stay in bed. Don't get up. Don't walk around."

So I went up. I got the Chinese to get me some of these mats--they use them in South China a lot--to sleep on because it was much cooler than sleeping on a mattress and sheets. I unrolled the mat and I spent my two weeks up there. The doctor never came to see me.

Levenson: Were you very sick?

J. Service: Not really. We had some night air raids. So all of this made staying in bed not exactly comfortable.

But the embassy [staff] used to come up to the hill, to the cottage on the hill when they had day-long alerts. They would come up and they could work up there. The whole staff pretty much would move up--the coolies carried a few typewriters. We worked up there several times when we had these prolonged alerts. The Japanese would send over a few planes every two or three hours to keep the whole city immobilized. Food couldn't come in from the countryside. People would be kept in the shelters.

Levenson: What about fires?

J. Service: Oh terrible fires, terrible fires.

Levenson: Did they have a reasonable firefighting system?

J. Service: Well, very poor, very primitive. For one thing there was no water. The river was two hundred feet below, so it was very hard to get very much water. Very often the bombs would destroy whatever water supply there was, the mains and pipes. They had no real adequate water supply.

J. Service: So that it very often was a matter of trying to stop the spread of a fire by tearing down, making firebreaks. You couldn't do much about putting out the fires. By the time the war was over Chungking had all been rebuilt several times. Most of it was just bamboo and sort of wattle. You know, they split bamboo and would weave it into a mat and then plaster mud on it and then outside a thin coat of lime plaster, white plaster. These things could burn down very quickly, but then they could be put up very quickly.

Levenson: What about communication? Was there an operating telephone system?

J. Service: Yes but very, very poor. We could telephone to the city, but that again was subject to trouble when air raids came. But there was a telephone. It was almost like, not as bad as Chengtu in my youth, but you sent messages around. We had a coolie or two that spent his time carrying notes. It was sometimes more reliable and sometimes just as fast to send a message by courier.

We didn't try to do much business with the foreign office, for instance, by telephone. Yes, setting up appointments, something like that, with the ambassador, you could do that by phone. But if you wanted to do any business you didn't sit down and do it by telephone. You went over and saw the man.

Levenson: How good were Chungking's radio links with Japanese-occupied China?

J. Service: They had small radios. I'm sure they had to move them around. In a place like Hangkow close to the Japanese they probably had small, portable things. You could work them with a bicycle [pedaling], you know. Well, that was one way they often did things. In a city like Hangkow they may have gotten house current. It was relayed, I'm sure, to some other point and then further on.

Levenson: But when you talk about sending telegrams, did you have reliable wire and/or radio service?

J. Service: We used the navy, you see. The navy had a gunboat there and one purpose of the gunboat was for the radio. We worked through the Philippines. I'm not sure that we used the Chinese commercial telegraph at all. I don't recall ever using it at that time. I think everything went through our navy. When the gunboat was pulled out we still kept the navy radio staff. They stayed on and set up their station on land.

Jack's Evolution as Political Officer and Communist Specialist

- Levenson: How did you become the embassy's "specialist" on the Chinese Communists? I put that in quotation marks. Again, Jack Kahn says that Gauss assigned you to find out all you could about the Communists, and Joseph Esherick* quotes you as saying that it was a simple career decision, that you weren't an economist and you weren't this and you weren't that, but you could make it as a Communist specialist.
- J. Service: Well, people are, you know, speaking at different times and for different forums. Or is it fora?
- Levenson: [laughing] I don't think so.
- J. Service: What Kahn is doing is quoting in effect from Gauss' testimony when he was testifying before my Loyalty Security Board in the State Department in 1950. Gauss is trying to explain, of course, that I was only carrying out orders. He's gilding the lily a little bit and so on. Certainly, I was assigned political reporting and part of the political reporting I was assigned was reporting on the Communists, maintaining contact with them. So, he's correct, as you say, that he sent me over there to find out all I could about them, I suppose.

Esherick's statement is aimed at a refutation of the general assumption that I reported on the Communists because of a political interest in the Communists. This was a very common attitude. If you reported on something it must be because you're interested in that yourself. In other words you're under suspicion simply because of having reported on it.

I was saying that certainly I was interested in political reporting--the gravy, you know; this was the way to fame and fortune, but it's also the interesting part for most people in Foreign Service work--and that I had been very much impressed by talking to old hands like Clubb, [Edmund O.] Clubb who had advised me, advised any young man, to make a specialty of something, get to be known as being an authority on some particular subject, some topic.

*Ed. Joseph W. Esherick, Lost Chance in China: The World War II Despatches of John S. Service, New York, Random House, 1974, p. 169.

J. Service: After I got to Chungking it was quite obvious--to me at any rate--that the big problem in the future, the political issue, was going to be the Kuomintang-Communist thing.

Levenson: You say that as though it were self-evident. But from my reading in that period it doesn't seem to have been evident to many people who regarded the Kuomintang, both in China and in the West, as the government and that the Communists were done for.

J. Service: Well, yes. I can't say that this was immediately apparent. It became apparent over a period of time. But almost as soon as I got to Chungking, or my very first few weeks there I think, Drumright was having a meeting at dinner with Chou En-lai and some of the people on Chou En-lai's staff, and he took me along.

He knew that he was leaving. I was coming in. This was sort of turning over his contacts, introducing me and so on. This was a very proper, thoughtful thing to do. But it was recognition and we all recognized at that time that the Communists were an important factor.

There were very few China language officers in the embassy at that time, so I think it was just taken for granted that the Communist contact would be maintained, and that I would be the one to maintain it.

New Fourth Army Incident and the Eighth Route Army: Factions Within the Communist Party

J. Service: The New Fourth Army incident had just recently taken place in January that year [1941]. The British ambassador Clark Kerr, made some very strong statements on it. We kept our mouths shut. We said nothing at all. Johnson was ambassador and we just saw no evil, heard no evil, and so on.

Levenson: Would you put the New Fourth Army incident in context?

J. Service: At the beginning of the war--

Levenson: Excuse me. What do you mean? Everybody has a different date for the beginning of the war.

J. Service: We're talking about the Sino-Japanese war. At the beginning of the Sino-Japanese war in '37 it had been understood or perhaps agreed on, but at least implicitly understood, that

J. Service: the Chinese Communist forces, who at that time were based in north Shensi around Yen-an, would be allowed to operate in North China behind the Japanese lines, which they did very successfully. Very quickly they expanded their control in the North China provinces.

But at the same time there were still some remnants, old "Red" guerrillas, in the south Yangtze areas, Kansu where the Communists had operated from 1928 until 1934 when they were driven out. But they'd had a republic in Kansu, and they had left behind a lot of people who were indoctrinated, who had been in their army, who were fighters, and who had maintained a shadowy glimmer of a guerrilla struggle.

Ch'en Yi for instance, who later on became foreign minister, remained in that area. One of Mao's brothers had stayed but was caught and killed.

But during the early honeymoon period of the war--late '37, early '38, and particularly when the capital was in Hangkow--the proposal was made: "Everything to fight the Japanese." Therefore we've got these people down here. They're old, experienced people, guerrilla people. The Kuomintang agreed to allow another Communist force to be formed which was called the New Fourth Army. The Fourth Army had been very famous in the 1926-27 Northern Expedition. So they took the name "New Fourth Army."

This became extremely successful, operating in the areas south and then eventually north of the Yangtze, the lower Yangtze valley. It became so successful the Kuomintang became very disturbed. Relations from '39 got very bad anyway. So the central government ordered the New Fourth Army to discontinue any operation south of the Yangtze and move all its operation north of the Yangtze.

What really happened and why is still a matter of debate. The Communists promised they would do so. They agreed in principle they would move. Most of their forces did go up north, but they had a very large headquarters contingent with wounded and various people like that, staff, civilian cadres, which were still south. Instead of moving in early January, instead of moving north, they started to move southeast, I think it was, anyway not toward the Yangtze.

They had some excuse that they couldn't cross the Yangtze where the Kuomintang wanted them to because of the Japanese presence. They had to take a roundabout route. But the Kuomintang apparently was ready, and they jumped on them and wiped them out.

J. Service: Ten thousand or so people were practically obliterated. They captured the commander of the New Fourth Army and kept him prisoner through the war. He was killed at the end of the war.

There was a great outcry. As I say, Clark Kerr the British ambassador issued very strong critical statements of the action.

Levenson: To the Kuomintang, to Chiang?

J. Service: To Chiang and to the press. It was given to the press. The Kuomintang officially dissolved the New Fourth Army, said that it would no longer recognize any New Fourth Army.

The Chinese Communists, of course, protested bitterly. Both sides put out big stories to the press. As I say the whole incident is still a mystery to some extent, because there was also internal friction within the Communist party. We know much more about these things now than we did then. We knew nothing then, generally speaking.

But some of the leaders of the New Fourth Army were apparently very close to Wang Ming and the Russian-trained faction, the Twenty-eighth Bolshevik faction within the Communist party. They were not Mao Tse-tung men. The Eighth Route Army people generally were hostile to them.

Levenson: The Eighth Route?

J. Service: The Eighth Route Army which were the people based in Yen-an.

All this goes back to my point that at some point in here it seemed to me that this was going to be a critical issue. As I began to get more Chinese friends, newspaper friends, they began to tell me this. This perhaps was the summer of '42. So that it seemed to me that I should concentrate on Communist politics.

In that sense you could say, as Esherick does, that this specialization was a career decision. It was not a decision based on my own political sympathies particularly. It was looking for something that was going to be the main--the ball game.

Japanese and American Negotiations, 1941: The American Embassy in Chungking Was Not Informed

J. Service: In the summer of '41, things in Washington were warming up between the United States versus Japan. Our War and Navy Departments at that time said that they weren't ready and they had to have delay. They didn't want to have hostilities if they could avoid it. So in Washington there began to be this long negotiation with the Japanese to try to reach some sort of a modus vivendi, it was called.

We in Chungking were kept completely in the dark about this. It was partly the disorganized way that the State Department very often operated. But also it was regarded as a very tightly held secret business, although the Chinese in Washington found out about it. Hu Shih was the ambassador but T.V. Soong, who was very aggressive, very pushing, and also developed excellent contacts in Washington, was there.

Gauss got called in several times by the Chinese foreign minister, named Quo T'ai-ch'i. Quo was a wonderful old man—I think he'd been ambassador in London as a matter of fact, and educated at Oxford. Quo asked Gauss what was happening in Washington. "Are you getting ready to sell us down the river? Our ambassador has been told by your secretary of state that it's necessary to have these discussions with the Japanese. What are you discussing?" Gauss was completely uninformed, and completely at a loss.

The reason I'm mentioning it is that he always used to take me along. My job was not to participate in the talks, but simply to listen and write the memorandum of conversation when we got home. Gauss almost never changed the memoranda that I wrote. Of course, I would try to get the conversation organized a little bit better. I wasn't trying to make a verbatim thing, but it had to be something that could be the basis of a telegram or despatch.

You asked once about training for political reporting. This was one aspect of reporting. You've got to be able to hear; you've got to be able to listen. So, all through this summer of '41, I was writing the memoranda of conversation at three or four of these meetings.

Last time I was telling you about accompanying the ambassador with his meetings with the foreign minister and my function being to prepare the memoranda of conversation. I'm not sure that I made it clear that I did not take notes. You don't take notes when you're sitting there having an interview with the foreign minister. It had to be pure memory.

J. Service: It was like the old boy scout game of watching, going past a shop window or being shown a certain number of things and then having to see how much you could remember. It taught you to fasten on to key facts, dates, numbers. Anything specific, you'd try to fix in your mind.

Later on in New Zealand, to skip way ahead, my ambassador there used to do the same sort of thing. But he would go and talk to the prime minister without me being present and then he would come back to the office. He lived way out in the country: He wanted to get home. He would say, "I said this and Peter Fraser would say this and I said this and Peter said that. Now send a telegram." I would be expected to send a telegram.

But an important part of political reporting is just the ability to listen and to report correctly.

Levenson: Do you now have any explanation that makes sense to you of why State kept your ambassador in ignorance of these negotiations with the Japanese?

J. Service: No, not really. The Chinese picked up some stuff, obviously, that they were not expected to pick up. I mean I'm sure they had some leaks available. But State did tell the Chinese ambassador something. I think that they may not have trusted the radio, the codes. We were reading the Japanese codes at this time--beginning to. They may not have trusted our codes. We were getting new codes. We knew our codes were not very good.

There was always a fear that Chungking was a bit like a sieve. Of course, this was the thing brought out later at Yalta, that there could be no secrets in Chungking. There was some justification that Chungking was probably more of a sieve even than Washington.

But also these negotiations were being carried on by [Joseph Clark] Grew and by [Joseph William] Ballantine, the Japan oriented people. Hornbeck was in it. I think that they just didn't think that the ambassador to China needed to be informed. We were discussing this with the Japanese. I think that they really never thought about where this left Gauss, you see, in Chungking.

Gauss had no friends in the State Department as I say. Nobody in the Department really felt any great warmth or sympathy toward him. He was a cold man in many ways. There

J. Service: wasn't this sort of tie with Hornbeck, for instance, that Johnson had had. If Johnson had been there, there might have been something in a private communication, something like that.

Levenson: I haven't seen that commented on anywhere in the literature, and it seems, as you talk about it, fairly important in terms of later developments, that our ambassador did not have a good relationship with State or with the executive.

J. Service: Oh yes. Yes, this is important, always important.

Levenson: Has that been commented on? You know the literature much better than I do.

J. Service: I don't recall any comment on this particular episode. In my monograph* discussing a later period in 1944-45, I mention that the State Department had no real in with the White House.

People have commented generally on Roosevelt's distrust of the Foreign Service, but in this particular case I don't think it was Roosevelt. I think it was just that Grew and those people didn't feel under any compulsion to keep Gauss informed. They could justify that on the basis that, "Well after all, we're telling the Chinese." But they weren't telling the Chinese enough to satisfy the Chinese. Otherwise the Chinese wouldn't have gotten Gauss on the carpet so fiercely.

Levenson: So fiercely, what do you mean?

J. Service: Well, the foreign minister was very agitated, very alarmed! "What is going on? What are you people doing? What are you going to do to us?"

Levenson: Legitimately, I would say.

J. Service: Oh certainly. Chiang Kai-shek made some statement as I recall. But the foreign minister made no bones of the fact that he was talking for the Generalissimo. The Chinese were extremely alarmed.

*John S. Service, The Amerasia Papers: Some Problems in the History of US-China Relations, Berkeley, China Research Monographs, University of California, 1971.

Pearl Harbor: Great Chinese Celebrations

Levenson: What was the impact of the news of Pearl Harbor on Chungking?

J. Service: Well, there was a great Chinese celebration. It was VJ Day as far as the Chinese were concerned, fireworks all over the city, a big celebration. The Chinese were beside themselves with excitement and pleasure because to them this meant assurance of victory. The war was over, and literally almost, as far as active participation in the war went. They sat back after that and didn't do much.

The impact on us was quite different. In the first place we decided we had to do something immediately about increasing coverage. We had to have somebody on duty in the evenings, things like that. We'd never had night duty officers. So immediately we started having someone on duty twenty-four hours in the office. I drew the first night. I spent all of my first night, that first night, decoding a long message that was delayed, telling us what to do in case of a sudden outbreak of hostilities, destroying codes, burning this and that. This had been delayed in transit through the Philippines and it went on for pages.

Jack's Dash to Rangoon for the Embassy Mercury

J. Service: One thing that we realized in the embassy very quickly was that the motor car, which Gauss had gotten the State Department to promise us, was still on the high seas and would never reach us because from where we sat we realized, just took it for granted, that Hong Kong and Burma were going to fall very quickly. Hong Kong, of course, was attacked immediately. There was no hope of them holding out. The Japanese moved immediately into Thailand and began to move toward Burma and towards Singapore.

So we scouted around and found that the British American Tobacco Company had a new car, landed in Rangoon, which they were willing to sell because everybody in Burma also realized that they were in a bag. They had to be prepared to get out. So the car in Burma was a drag on the market. Anyway, we bought the car from the British American Tobacco Company.

I was very eager and the ambassador agreed to let me go down to drive it up. But he thought that it might be a good idea to have two people, partly for intelligence reasons, I

J. Service: suppose. The military attache wanted to send a young officer along, so he went with me. The Texaco Oil Company also managed to get a car in Rangoon. So the three of us went down by air, oh, just before Christmas in '41, stopped in Kuming.

The Chinese National Aviation Company was just starting this route from China down to Burma. They foresaw the end of the Hong Kong link. We spent the night at the border, Lashio, and then had to rent a car the next day and get down to the railhead and then took the train, came down into Rangoon.

When we were coming into Rangoon it was Christmas morning, which also happened to be a Sunday as I recall. The fields were just full of people, miles out of town, all these people out in the country. We couldn't understand what it was all about. Why should the Burmese all be going out and having a picnic in the countryside?

We got into the railway station. It was almost deserted. There were no porters, no crew. Vegetables and so on were piled up on the platform. We finally found somebody and asked. They said, "Oh, we were bombed yesterday by the Japanese." The Japanese had made their first very heavy bombing of the Rangoon docks.

The population--Burmese and Indian were the majority--just evacuated, just left. They had no interest in the war. The Indians, of course, were trying to get back to India. A lot of them did, overland. The Burmese just went off to the villages. We went into a quiet, empty city.

The hotel had no staff. We went in and we finally found an assistant manager--it was the Strand Hotel in Rangoon--and said, "Can we stay here?" He said, "Well, go upstairs, find a room. You can have it." So we picked out what we thought was the best room, not too near the top, not too near the bottom, no outside windows, interior light well, that sort of thing.

We were just unpacking when the air raid alarm went off in the building right next door to us. So, we went downstairs and found the air raid shelter was a ballroom on the ground floor with mattresses up against the windows. We stayed in the hotel. We had to stay there. They couldn't throw us out. Eventually there were only a few of us that stayed. Sort of a hardcore--a Greek shipowner, a one-armed Frenchman who was trying to recruit for De Gaulle's Free French, some sort of a lady singer, uncertain age, Greek or something like that. I don't know whether she was European. Anyway, we were a very odd group, but we all got to be very chummy.

J. Service: There was an Austrian Jewish refugee who was a chef. There was a Swiss who was assistant manager. I don't know who the manager was. I never saw him. He wasn't around. There was Captain Cahill and myself, Americans, and these few other people, the one-armed Frenchman. We lived in a little group in the hotel.

The internal phones worked in the hotel. We got a call in our room one night. "Can you come down and help out in an emergency?" The hotel had been called up by British command. "We got a Sunderland flying boat full of VIP's coming through. "You've got to put them up. We got no place to take care of them."

It was all Australian brass from Tobruk. The siege of Tobruk had just been raised, and they were trying desperately to get these people--this was most of the high command of the Australian army--they were trying to get them back to Australia because the Japanese were coming down the Solomons. Australia was almost bare of troops.

I'd waited tables in college and washed dishes and so on. We went down and peeled potatoes and helped get ready and then I said, "We'll wait on tables." We set up a private dining room, and we waited on all these officers.

By the end of the meal, they began to get suspicious about these two Yanks. I had said something about "Captain" to Cahill. So they said, "What's going on?" We had quite an evening after that. They drank up most of the case of whiskey which we bought to take up to Chungking!

I ran into one of these guys years later when I was in New Zealand. The Australians felt that their military heroes should be rewarded and given nice jobs. So, he was sent to New Zealand as a trade commissioner. [laughter] Australian trade commissioner. We looked at each other for a long time. Then finally I asked him if perhaps he had passed through Rangoon. He looked at me and said, [lowering voice] "My God, that's it. I've got you now, mate!" [laughter]

Rangoon to Chungking Via the Burma Road, January 1942

J. Service: We picked up the car, a Mercury, which at that time was nothing much except a fancy Ford. Unfortunately, New Year's Eve, my friend the army officer went out on a bit of a party and backed up,

J. Service: didn't realize one of the back doors was open. So that door was badly sprung and didn't work very well. From then on, it was better to leave it closed. [laughter] There was no hope of getting it fixed in Rangoon of course.

Gauss smoked twelve cigars a day, which meant a box of twenty-five lasted him two days. When I went down he said, "Get me all the cigars you can." Of course, the stores were closed in Rangoon. Rangoon really was a dead city. Then things opened up a little bit. We got into stores. I finally bought three thousand cigars.

We had to buy spare tires. We had to buy extra springs for spare parts, loaded them all up on top of the car, inside the car. Then we drove up the Burma Road. It was a long trip, more than two weeks, three weeks, as I recall, from Rangoon to Chungking.

Levenson: How did you get enough gasoline?

J. Service: Before we left Chungking we had to make arrangements with the Chinese National Resources Commission. So we had orders from them to supply us. In all the main cities there'd be a National Resources Commission depot and we'd get gasoline. We had extra cans, of course, to carry spare fuel. No gas stations along the road.

The road was chaotic. Incredible mismanagement and lack of management. Every Chinese government organization that had an interest in transportation maintained its own trucks, own transportation services, no unity or unification. Military, civilian, all sorts of different organizations. There was no policing of the road.

The road was continually being tinkered with. It was in atrocious condition. It was built by poor farmers, minority hill people that had never seen a road! They didn't know what it was all for. They had supervisors but there was no machinery or anything like that. It was carved out of the hillside. Many places were subject to slides. You had to cross the Salween and the Mekong Rivers.

Levenson: How high do you go on the road?

J. Service: You go up to about eight thousand, but then you run into these tremendous canyons you see. [cutting down with his hand] At some of them they had bridges. Sometimes you had to cross by ferry. The Chinese drivers, a lot of them were inexperienced, inept. They tried to save gasoline, so they would coast.

J. Service: You had terrific, hairpin zigzags, guys trying to coast down to save gasoline. They were issued an allotment of gasoline for the trip. So anything they could save, they could sell at the black market. At that time gasoline, you know, was the equivalent of \$5 U.S. a gallon on the market.

The trucks were terrifically overloaded. The Chinese themselves officially would overload the truck, but then the driver would take extra illicit cargo and a lot of illicit passengers, "yellow fish" and so on.

Levenson: Yellow fish?

J. Service: Yellow fish was what the Chinese called them. So that the trucks were subject to atrocious road, to brutal overloading, and to just horrendous mis-driving. Some were wrecked. It was a tough road.

Levenson: What was the surface allegedly?

J. Service: The surface was just gravel, earthbound macadam. You put in big rocks and then you put a layer of smaller rocks and then you put in fine rocks that have been--

Levenson: Tarred?

J. Service: --beaten up, no tar. There was no tar except they were just starting to put blacktop on some of it down near the Burma border. There were a few miles down near the Burma border that were black-topped, but the rest of it when it rained--and it rained a great deal--was terrible because a lot of this earth was clay. It would get very slippery and slick. Then, of course, trucks pounding over it kept breaking it up.

Levenson: How did the trip go?

J. Service: Without any great incident.

Levenson: Bombing? Refugees?

J. Service: No. Lots of people on the road. There weren't many refugees. As I say, most of the Burmese simply had left Rangoon.

We went up north of Rangoon to a place called Tounggoo where the Flying Tigers had set their base. We spent a night there and went up to Maymyo, which is a hill station in the hills north of Mandalay where the British were training their people for jungle warfare.

J. Service: It was pathetic to see these poor guys from the banks and the British trading companies who'd spent their life sitting at a desk, now suddenly trying to learn how to be a commando. I don't know how many of these guys came out alive, but they were no match for the Japanese of course, when it came to jungle warfare.

I don't know. It was all sort of dreamlike because no one really thought that the Japanese could be stopped. The Flying Tigers people were shooting down some, but had no way of getting spare parts. They were pretty much cut off. They were only fifty planes or something like that.

The poor British had outdated, old planes. They were no match for the Japanese. The Zeros just massacred them. Our people with the P-40's and Chennault's tactics did pretty well against the Zeros.

We spent the night at Maymyo. They'd hoped that they were going to be able to get parts, but the way things were going, the losses and the attrition, they didn't see much hope. These guys, yes, they were being very gung-ho and stiff upper lip and "stop in the afternoon for tea" at this hill station. But one felt a little uneasy about them.

Anyway, we got up the road okay without any serious mishap, and made it back to Chungking. Gauss said, "Did you get the cigars?" I said, "Yes, three thousand." And he said, "You'll look better when you get that beard off." [laughter]

V TRAMPING AROUND NORTH CHINA, 1942

Building Chinese Contacts

Levenson: You told me that when you first arrived in Chungking, Drumright introduced you to his contacts. How did you go about building on these Communist contacts and making a variety of Chinese friends? I was surprised to read that you belonged to Rotary in Chungking and founded a Masonic group there.*

J. Service: I didn't actually found it. No, that's a misnomer. There was quite an active Masonic group in China, almost all Western trained, educated in America primarily, businessmen, government people, and so on, who apparently liked the whole idea very much. It fitted in with their whole idea of clique, group, faction, secret societies and so on, but it was Western you see.

My father had been a Mason in Shanghai in a lodge where he was one of the very few foreigners. I eventually joined another Masonic network. All Masonic lodges are under a particular Grand Lodge. The lodge my father belonged to was under the Grand Lodge of Massachusetts for some strange reason. Some Americans who were Masons in China long, long ago--decades back in the last century--wanted to start a lodge and they found they could affiliate with the Grand Lodge of the state of Massachusetts.

But later on most of these Chinese who started lodges affiliated with the Grand Lodge of the Philippines which was of course mostly American started.

*Kahn, op. cit., p. 68.

J. Service: You can't start a new lodge unless you get a charter. By the time of Pearl Harbor the Philippine Grand Lodge was closed up. This was one of the first things the Japanese did. So, there was no way for the Masons in Chungking to start a new lodge. They couldn't get a charter since the Grand Lodge was out of business.

So we had an informal group of Masons, who were Masons from various lodges in Shanghai, who met occasionally in Chungking. It was something that for a while was sort of fun. Later on I got too busy and drifted away from it.

Rotary was again mostly all Chinese. There were very few foreign businessmen in there. But it was a way of getting to know a lot of people.

I knew already or got to know the foreign newspaper people. There were some Chinese newspaper people that dealt with the foreigners a good deal, administrative information people. The Reuters man was Chinese. Of course, there were all the missionaries. A lot of them had known my parents. My parents lived in Chungking until '24.

Jack's Travels Begin: Irrigation Works in Szechwan

J. Service: One thing leads to another, but I think it was through one of these missionary contacts that I got invited on a trip in the spring of 1942. The provincial government people were very much put in the shade by the national government people. When the national government moved into Szechwan, the Szechwan provincial people had to take a back seat.

There was a very active provincial commissioner of construction or public works man--the Chinese always used reconstruction, but the Chinese phrase really means construction. His department had built several dams and irrigation works in central Szechwan, to try to improve production. Some of these were being opened up. He wanted to get a little bit of notice, a little bit of publicity, a little face.

But also we had some relief funds that we were distributing, not large. We had allotted funds for rebuilding after some of the bombings in Chungking, things like that. Actually one of the fine stairways going up to the city from the river bank had been built with these relief funds.

J. Service: I think that this provincial commissioner of reconstruction may have had some idea of getting into American funds, making contact with an American dispenser of funds. An embassy person along would add luster to the group he was planning.

He was a very good friend of an old missionary named Rape, R-a-p-e. One of his sons went to college in the States, and he changed the name to Rappe, R-a-p-p-e. But I think he went to Rappe and asked Rappe if he knew any American in the embassy that would like to join the visit to these irrigation works. Gauss agreed, the embassy agreed, so I tootled off for about a ten day trip. They had a special bus. There were several newspaper people and assorted worthies. Rappe was along and I was there from the embassy.

There was a very pleasant correspondent from the Chinese Central News Agency, official government news agency. He and I became extremely close friends. There were a couple of other newspaper correspondents along too. It was a very genial and sort of a jolly trip. Rappe was a person who had a lot of fun and good humor in him and spoke perfect Szechwanese, absolutely Szechwanese. Most of our party were not Szechwanese, because most of the government people were from down river. The Central newsman was from Manchuria actually.

Buildup of U.S. Agencies in Chungking

[Interview 6: September 21, 1977]

J. Service: During this period [1942] there was a buildup in Chungking of new U.S. agencies. Also, there was a parallel buildup in Washington of research organizations, research analysis intelligence, that just hadn't existed before. The State Department set up some sort of a research unit which I don't think they'd had before.

Very early an office was set up called COI--coordinator of information. Then the Army and the Navy--and OSS--set up their R&A branches. They were beginning to ask for information.

Eventually it got very confused because people in China felt they were too busy to be spending all their time sending in information. They were busy with current affairs. Eventually Washington created a "Joint Intelligence Collection Agency" which sent representatives to China to try to make sure that they got stuff.

J. Service: In Washington there was competition for information and some people did not want to share their information with other people. But we'll hear more of this later on.

The coordinator of information was a predecessor of OSS. Their mandate was to collect publications and documents. It was under General [William J.] Donovan. The first man they sent out was a man named David Rowe, R-o-w-e. The coordinator of information was set up, like a lot of these very early agencies, directly under the White House. They didn't know quite where to put it in Washington. So, it was directly under the White House.

Rowe came out and got cards printed up in Chinese that he was the China representative of the pai kung, the "White House." This finished him as far as the American embassy, American ambassador, was concerned, because it appeared that he outranked the ambassador, you see! [laughter] David Rowe didn't last very long.

A similar development was American relief. There had been some American relief work before Pearl Harbor, not on a very large scale. But soon after Pearl Harbor and the war started, United China Relief, which had [Henry] Luce as one of its very important angels, started up.

One day in the embassy there I remember we had a visitor, a short, round fellow, quite cheerful, bustling, busy little type of fellow from New York named Albert Kohlberg.

Levenson: Uh-oh.

J. Service: He was working for something called the American Bureau for Medical Aid to China, which was trying to get supplies for the China Red Cross. He had come to China to see what was happening to supplies they were sending. He'd been down to Kweiyang, the capital of Kweichow province in the south, which was a big supply depot for the Chinese. He found great quantities of their supplies just sitting in warehouses instead of getting out to the troops. He was very unhappy about it. He also found some information that there was leakage of these drugs and supplies to the black market.

So, Kohlberg in those days was very unhappy about what was happening in China and very friendly to the American embassy and quite pleasant to me in contrast to what happened many years later, of course.

Jack Tapped to Write State Department Report on Psychological Warfare and Morale in China

J. Service: One example of this early increase in demands from Washington was an instruction we got from the Department. Some time in the spring of '42, a very elaborate questionnaire, wanting information on morale, psychological warfare, and propaganda agencies in China. This was very perplexing. It was very un-State Department.

I found out later what happened was that a young professor at Johns Hopkins University-- Everyone in the academic field who had any sort of background on China was recruited into these various agencies. He was a young political science professor and thought that he might as well be a psychological warfare expert as anything else. After all, there weren't any psychological warfare experts in America!

He got a job in the War Department and had to start casting about for information. So, he thought immediately of having the embassy send in a long, elaborate report. I got tapped to do it. Any rate, it involved me in a lot of going around Chungking, talking to people, trying to pull together a lot of information. The Chinese were as disorganized as we were. The party was doing many things; the government was doing things; the army would do things in the propaganda and morale building fields.

Levenson: Did that stimulate your interest in what is now called content analysis, lead you to start looking at wall posters and so on?

J. Service: Well, it certainly stirred my interest in wall posters and their content. I hadn't ever heard the term "content analysis," I think, till I came to Berkeley as a retired officer and went to the political science department. If you mentioned content analysis, I wouldn't have known what you meant. But yes, it started an interest in that sort of thing.

Levenson: What sources did you find most useful?

J. Service: It was just a matter really of talking to everyone that you could think of that knew something about the field. I talked to a good many Chinese, but a lot of them weren't terribly helpful. My newspaper people, both foreign and Chinese, were helpful, people like Mac [F. MacCracken] Fisher.

There were several people there who had been in China a good many years working for the news services. The Associated Press and the UP had people that were quite well established

J. Service: in China, had been there a long time, and had a long contact with the Chinese Ministry of Information, that sort of thing. They were helpful. I talked to Chinese in these various departments.

There wasn't very much published stuff. But, it was a matter of pulling together the data. You can't be too precise sometimes. You have to convey a general understanding of what things are like.

Levenson: I find I'm a little unclear as to whom psychological warfare would be directed in the Chinese situation. It's clear enough in Europe.

J. Service: There wasn't very much. They'd tried to use some of their prisoners. They tried to prepare some propaganda material. There were attempts early in the war to drop leaflets on Taiwan. They didn't have any planes that could reach Japan, and there really wasn't much directed at the Japanese. This was one of the things that you found out.

One thing that interested me was this professor--who later on I got to know--why he was so interested in Chinese psychological warfare. Theoretically he was interested in psych warfare against the Japanese. I suppose his rationale was that he had to find out what the Chinese were doing in psychological warfare against the Japanese, but most of the questionnaire was about propaganda directed toward Chinese. Of course, he was a Chinese scholar and all this was useful material for him in his professional business. Is that all?

Levenson: I think so. The only place I can see for psychological warfare would be in Japanese occupied areas of China.

J. Service: I finally finished the report in July. It was a long thing. I got a good commendation on it. It gave me an interest in this subject, which later on led to other reports which are in Esherick's book.

Chungking: A Kuomintang Cocoon

Levenson: You said that you were in a cocoon. How restrictive were the KMT [Kuomintang] provisions on travel?

J. Service: You couldn't travel anyplace without some sort of permission. This was not very easy to get particularly if you were traveling toward war areas or in the war areas.

J. Service: The newspapers were heavily censored, and it was very hard to get out-of-town papers from other cities. It would take a long time to get them. But by-and-large they didn't have very much news in them. Certainly any war news was heavily censored. The Chinese Ministry of Information and a Central News Agency put out a lot of material in English. It was obviously what they wanted out, what they were willing to have out. It didn't present any gloomy side of things.

There was a lot of gossiping and talking around. Your contacts with Chinese generally were limited to social contacts, dinners. That's not always the best time to talk. Chinese don't have the habit of cocktail parties, so that if you go it's usually to a formal, sit-down dinner. As I say, we were fairly well cut off from that because of our location. We went to some things in the city at night but not very often. We tried to avoid them.

We saw our opposite numbers in the other embassies and if anybody got any news it got around. Everyone was sort of reporting the same thing. You see the same thing with Peking today. I'm sure the embassies are all talking to each other and everyone is reporting pretty much the same thing.

Relations With Germans and Italians

Levenson: What were your relations with Germans and Italians in Chungking?

J. Service: We were neutral when I first got to Chungking. Our relations with the Germans and Italians were fairly friendly. There were so few people they could be friendly with [laughter] they were perhaps more friendly with us.

The Germans had two men and it was very interesting. One was a man who had been interned, I think, in England during the First World War, and I think actually studied at either Oxford or Cambridge. He could pass for an Englishman. Career diplomat with many years in the diplomatic service. The other fellow was a younger, obviously Nazi type.

The night of June 22, 1941, they were coming over to one of the houses where some of our people lived for a bridge game. I was also invited. They arrived and the "Englishman" was absolutely distraught. He said, "This is the end. Hitler's made the incredible error of starting war on two fronts, attacking the Soviet Union."

J. Service: I never found out what happened to the other one because very soon after that the Germans recognized the Wang Ching-wei government in Nanking. So our German friends had to leave. At the same time the Italians also recognized the Wang Ching-wei government and left. From Yunnan they went into Thailand, I think, and were in Thailand for some time.

The Italian, oddly enough, came out of it all very well. He stayed loyal to Mussolini and Mussolini's government. But later on he had a very good job at the United Nations. Italians are very, very much split up about the treatment that some of the pro-Fascist and Fascist diplomats got. Apparently they were not very much discriminated against, shall we say, in the postwar period.

A Turning Point: Genesis of Jack as Outside Man: Journey to Kansu

J. Service: When I got rid of the psychological warfare report, a chance had come to make this trip to the northwest provinces. I left on that in July--I'm not sure just when--ostensibly to attend a China Society of Engineers conference in Lanchow province, in Kansu. But, also the party was going up to Tsinghai province and to the oil wells up in the Kansu Corridor, a newly developed oil field.

I was with a party of about twenty government engineers working for some of the government departments, mainly the Ministry of Resources, some engineering professors in Chinese universities. There were three Chinese newspaper people and myself. I was the only foreigner.

We had a bus assigned to us as far as Lanchow. After that we traveled by truck. But, it was a very, very pleasant experience, and in a sense it's probably a turning point, a watershed.

Levenson: . In what sense?

J. Service: In a sense that I didn't realize of course at the time, but from this time on I was to be very much a sort of a traveling man, an outdoors, or outside man, instead of an inside or office man. This led into my becoming pretty much an independent operator, independent reporter, partly because I was traveling, but this led to various other things.

J. Service: A friend of mine, Han Ming was his name, was apparently very close to the Minister of Economics, Wang Weng-hao. The ministry was really resources and development, more than economics in our sense.

I think Han Ming suggested that I be included. Wang Weng-hao, with the idea of getting someone from the embassy involved, approved. The embassy was delighted--a very fine chance.

Growth of Chinese Friendships: Filling a Long Felt Need

J. Service: I was thirty-two when we started, thirty-three soon after we were on the road. The newspaper people were about my age. Some of these professors were a little bit older, but it was a fairly young group. We got to be very congenial. We got to know each other very well. My allowance was fifteen kilos, and I stuck to it. Everyone else was on the same basis. In the nights when we'd stop at an inn, why we'd all sleep lined up on the k'ang [brick sleeping platform heated by flue from kitchen stove] like sardines in a can more or less.

For the first time I was being completely accepted as a friend by Chinese on a very intimate basis. I think that this was something that probably I had, in an unconscious way, missed a great deal in my youth. My parents were devoted to China, were obviously very much interested in China and Chinese culture. My mother's poems and so on, which you haven't seen, indicate something of this attachment for China. But because of the question of sanitation, hygiene, and the fact that we lived on an entirely different plane, I really had no close contact with Chinese.

I've mentioned before I grew up having no Chinese playmates. I knew no Chinese. Then in my experience as an adult in China I had not really known any Chinese, on a very intimate basis, who were really Chinese. In Yunnanfu we got drawn into that small, compact foreign community. We met a few Chinese who were officials, but on a very sort of arm's length, official basis. We had a few returned students that had studied in America, who were teaching or something. But this was not any close association.

In Peking we met our teachers. My language teachers were men of an older generation--long gowns, old fashioned! One of them had taken the examinations in the old imperial days. They were very much scholars of the old type. We met a few university people like Hu Shih or Dr. Chiang Monlin. Then we met a few officials.

J. Service: The Chinese young people we met in Peking were attached to the foreign community and trying to be "foreign." The same in Shanghai. The only Chinese one met in Shanghai were Western educated--either abroad or in foreign-run schools in China. They were aping the foreigners, going to the night clubs in Shanghai, the Western social life.

It wasn't really until I got into this milieu, this full time immersion on a long trip that I was completely on a par and accepted by Chinese, sharing their intimacies and their own ideas. These were down-river people--almost all the government people were from the down-river provinces--who were exploring new country. They were as excited about this trip as anybody could be. It was all new country to them.

Levenson: When you say down-river, you mean Peking, Nanking?

J. Service: Yes, all the coastal provinces. Han Ming actually was from Manchuria, but most of the rest of them were from along the Yangtze. One of them was from Hangkow for instance. But, they were from Treaty Ports and Shanghai and Peking.

It was tremendously exciting to them to be making this trip from Chengtu up to Lanchow and up to the northwest. China has got a two-thousand-year history, and these were people who were educated, college graduates, some of them engineers--there were several Western educated--but they'd never seen--They'd read all about these things, you see. To go along and realize that this town here, that little walled city, was a famous place mentioned in the Romance of the Three Kingdoms! We saw the towns where all sorts of things happened in Chinese history.

We crossed over from the valley of the Kialing into the valley of the Han River, the headwaters of the Han. The Han River comes down at Hangkow. But, there's a narrow gorge and you could see the square holes in the cliff where a famous general during the Three Kingdoms [A.D. 221-265] period had built a road by driving posts into the cliff side and then laying planks along it.

The whole history of the country we went through was very exciting to these people. Along the road, the trees had been planted by Tso Tsung-t'ang's army when he went up in the 1860's or 70's to repacify Sinkiang and put down Mohammedan rebellion.

The cliffs along the way in China, particularly along a famous road like this, have inscriptions of characters. The temples have got tablets--they were built by such and such a person.

J. Service: These were young Chinese who were modern in every sense, but not aping the West. They were nationalistic. They were for the war against Japan, of course. It was a very stimulating and exciting experience for them as well as for me.

Levenson: What was their political orientation?

J. Service: Oh well, they were all critical of the Kuomintang. The intellectuals were almost unanimously critical of the Kuomintang. You had a variation among these people, of course, as to how outspoken they would be and how much they felt the Kuomintang should be blamed. Some people felt, well, you know, after all, there's a war on and there are a lot of difficulties. There were some people who would be government apologists.

But no one tried to cover up the facts. The facts were just so plain. We saw recruits on the road. We saw Szechwan recruits being marched over the mountains to Shensi province--you had to get your recruit away from his native province so he couldn't run away so easily--dying beside the road, starvation. There were all sorts of things. No one made any attempt to apologize or ignore the shortcomings.

There were differences of opinion. Some of them just weren't much interested in politics. The newspaper people, of course, were very politically interested and politically aware.

We had one American Chinese on the trip. Quite a few Chinese-Americans went back to China during the war for what they saw as their patriotic duty to help the fatherland. He was teaching in a university near Chungking.

He was very amusing because he was very much alarmed, as I had been once, about sanitation. He had to be assured everything was boiled and so on. They laughed and made a lot of fun of him. I was called the Chinese American. He was the American Chinese. [laughter] Well, anyway.

Values of Missionary Contacts

J. Service: Along the way, of course, I made a point, every chance I had, every town we stopped at, of going to see the missionary. If there was a missionary in town--I could find out very easily--and having usually a chat with them. I didn't try to stay with them. I stayed with my own gang.

J. Service: Missionaries, of course, were glad to see anybody. They were isolated much more than normal. Travel was difficult. A lot of them had not been able to take home leaves on schedule because of the war. They were all anxious for news, anxious to talk to somebody from the outside. In a way, I was from the metropolis, coming from Chungking. And, they all knew who I was or knew my family, knew my parents.

I would simply pick their brains as much as I could, as much as was decent and they were willing, on strictly local conditions. I didn't try to get them onto what might be embarrassing political subjects, what they thought of the government. There was a lot you could ask just on purely local matters, which they were very often thoroughly informed about, through their own church members.

Levenson: We talked about this a long time ago. I think you said at first you found these people, many of whom were politically quite unaware, that their mission in life was a missionary one, and they were not politically interested, and that bit by bit you sharpened your techniques of asking questions.

J. Service: Oh yes. Yes. I'd forgotten we had this on the record.

Levenson: No, we didn't. This was several years ago.

J. Service: Yes, it's quite true. As time went on I certainly became a little more effective perhaps, a little more delicate perhaps, about it. Also, I learned more questions to ask, things that they would know.

They very often had quite thorough details about the taxation picture. Various Kuomintang officials made private estimates that between a third and a fourth of what was actually collected from the people reached the government. These people knew from their own church members a lot of what went on, bribes, entertainment, efforts made to get your land classified in lower categories so your tax rate would be lower.

And conscription. They had had experience with their own people. When I got in a place like Sian where they had large schools, they knew a good deal about secret police activity against the students, political repression, thought reform camps, or schools.

But I didn't usually ask people what they thought about the government. I just asked what was happening locally, what did they know about this and that. What was the current price of a recruit? Was land being abandoned? How about refugees?

J. Service: I also had ready access to the YMCA people through my father's contacts. In those days, the YMCA was almost completely run by Chinese. The secretaries were Chinese. There were a very few foreigners who served on the national committee in Shanghai.

Then another group that was active in the northwest and practically all over China was the Friends Ambulance Unit. These were conscientious objectors, first from the U.K. and later they had some Americans. They couldn't drive ambulances in China because Chinese just don't let any foreigners get near the battle. There are no roads anyway usually for the ambulance.

So, what they did was to transport relief supplies from abroad on highways in China. They had depots in various places. They were another group that I got tied into.

Levenson: I imagine they had fairly good intelligence because they traveled.

J. Service: Oh yes. They traveled, sure, and they were bright. Michael Sullivan down here at Stanford was one of them, you know. Rhoads Murphey was one of them, who's now at Michigan. There were all sorts of young chaps. There was a fellow Mel Kennedy who teaches at Bryn Mawr.

The INDUSCO Network

J. Service: Then I also stopped in a place, Shuangshihpu, south of Sian, across the Ch'ingling Mountains in southern Shensi where the [Chinese] Industrial Cooperatives, INDUSCO, had a base. Rewi Alley made his headquarters there, and was running a school. I'd never known Rewi before, but I knew Ed Snow who was a very close friend. Rewi at first was standoffish but later on we became very good friends.

Through people like Rewi Alley and through getting acquainted with the INDUSCO people I sort of clued into a whole other network.

Levenson: Could you expand a little on Rewi Alley's role. I know he still lives in China.

J. Service: Rewi went to China about 1926 from New Zealand and got a job as a factory inspector with the Municipal Council in Shanghai.

J. Service: When the Sino-Japanese war started in '37 a great number of refugees from the coast moved inland with the government. Rewi, the Ed Snows, and several other friends got the idea that industrial, producers' cooperatives could give work to these people, and help the war effort.

At first the Chinese government was quite helpful and friendly and advanced loans and credit. But, as the United Front weakened in China and the political repression became greater, they became more and more suspicious of the co-op people. They were liberal, they were toward the left, and they were devoted people who were willing to work for almost nothing.

Anybody that was willing to work for starvation wages obviously was suspect in the corrupt atmosphere of the Kuomintang. No "normal" person could be willing to work for nothing. He had to be sort of a Communist. So, toward the end of the war, they ran into a lot of political trouble, a lot of their people were arrested.

How "Gung Ho" Came Into the Language

J. Service: Incidentally "gung ho" which has come into the American language, was a sort of slogan, as a short form for the industrial cooperatives. It was the Chung Kuo (China) Kung-yeh (industrial) Ho-tso-she (cooperative societies). In the Chinese way of making acronyms you took the "Kung" from the industrial and a "ho" from ho-tso-she. So, you got the word Kungho which became the industrial cooperative slogan. One could say it meant "work together."

Then an American Marine officer, Evans Carlson, came out to China, or was in China, and got a chance to travel up to Yen-an in the early days--in '38 I think, and again in '39--and he was much impressed with the cooperatives and became a great promoter. He adopted this slang "Kungho" which then he used as a sort of war cry for his raiders when he was the leader of the raider regiment that was in the South Pacific during the war. That's how it came into the American language!

Chinese Engineers' Conference, Lanchow: Jack Drives the Truck to Sining

J. Service: At the engineers' conference I was the object of much curiosity, being the only foreigner there.

Levenson: What would people want to know about you?

J. Service: Oh, "Good God, who is he?" It was very surprising to Chinese to see someone who spoke Chinese as well as I did and who was simply willing or able to live completely Chinese. I'd be eating with my friends in a restaurant. People would come in the restaurant and just stand and stare at me, they were so surprised.

But anyway, the conference was over and we went off first on a trip to Tsinghai province, which is more or less due west of Lanchow.

They had some heavy rains. The road was through loess country, which is wind deposited dust--very fine dust. The hills are just made of this. It's a deposit hundreds of feet deep. It was very hard to get rock in that country. You could find some in the river beds, but they hadn't put much rock on the road, so the road was very badly washed out.

The driver decided the bus couldn't make it. We had a truck that had been used on the Burma Road. It was an International five-ton truck, considered a big truck in China. We'd had an awful time with washouts and uncertainty whether we'd get through or not.

The truck driver said he had a recurrence of malaria which he'd contracted on the Burma Road. He may well have been sick. So, we were stranded on this highway, no towns. I said I could drive. Some of the engineers had studied abroad. They could tell you all about automotive engines. But no Chinese in those days, except a trained chauffeur-driver, could drive a car.

They said, "Oh, you can't drive this truck. It's a very big truck. It's difficult." It had five speeds forward and a dual ratio, so you had another five speeds. I said, "Never mind. I used to drive a truck during summer vacations in college." I'd been watching the truck driver, so I knew pretty well what to do.

J. Service: So at any rate, I drove the truck from then on, to everybody's amusement. Just outside the gates of Sining, the capital of Tsinghai, [laughing] the truck driver decided that he was well enough to drive into town.

On the Old Silk Road

J. Service: From Sining we took a trip down to a very large and famous lamasery--which was a seat as I recall of the second ranking lama, the Panchen Lama, called Kumbum, very large and magnificent. Some of the main buildings had gold roofs, gilded roofs. We had a day there. An interesting experience.

Then while the engineers spent a couple of days in Sining, I hired a cart--north China cart, a Mongolian horse and so on--and went west to a town called Hwangyuan. There was a missionary family out there in Hwangyuan. I couldn't get as far as the Lake Koko Nor--which means clear, or blue, lake. Anyway, I spent a day with these missionaries and came back.

We drove back almost all the way to Lanchow, and then we took the trip north on the old main road, the Kansu Corridor, which was again a very fascinating trip. The country is like the Southwest. It could be like Arizona or New Mexico perhaps. You're paralleling a range of very high mountains, with snow even in the summer. The rivers come down from the mountains and then just disappear into the Gobi Desert.

This is the famous "Silk Road" the old road up to Sinkiang. It dates back to the Han dynasty or before. Wherever it crosses the streams or rivers there's a little town, a garrison town in the old days.

What remains of the Great Wall is to your right out toward the Gobi, to protect the oases and the towns from the nomads, from the people coming in from the desert. There's not much left of the Great Wall now. It's packed earth. But there are still ruined watch towers. You can poke around in the ruins and find arrowheads and porcelain shards and things like that.

The cities, the towns, were half abandoned. They were important towns when they had military garrisons there. But now they were dilapidated, almost ghost towns.

The Only Functioning Chinese Oil Field

J. Service: The [Chinese] government at that time was planning to ask the United States government to fly in an oil refinery. It would have to be broken down into small segments, and flown from India to Tibet, up to the Kansu Corridor.

Levenson: Over the Hump?

J. Service: Not over the Hump. Well it might have come in over the Hump, but they expected to take it in a much more direct line north from India instead of east from India. The Hump from India was east into Yunnan.

Levenson: Right.

J. Service: The transport problem required a refinery that could be broken down into small pieces; it would also require a lot of high-quality steels that were scarce under war conditions.

We got up to the oil fields. They were very cautious about security there. They took away my Leica camera. They took us around the wells, the oil fields. They had a very primitive, small refinery.

They didn't produce lubricating oils. They just distilled out the primary products, kerosene and some gasoline, a very low octane gasoline. It was a very simple distillation process.

I counted paces between the wells. I could produce a pretty good map when I finished, you know, without having a camera. It was on an alluvial fan. You see many of them in Death Valley or in the West, where a stream comes out of high mountains and then there's a very gradually sloping fan or apron of rocks and boulders.

Our party, twenty or so people, were put in a schoolhouse. They'd built a schoolhouse at the lower end of the settlement. The wells were at the top. They had no place to put the oil, so they had just scooped out shallow reservoirs and put the earth around the downhill side. American farmers do it with a bulldozer to make ponds. They were very simple holding basins for oil.

They had brought in a lot of workers, just common laborers. Of course, they had engineers, but they needed a lot of common labor. Wood was very scarce. There were no trees except way

J. Service: high up in the mountains, hard to get at. So, most of the workmen had just dug themselves huts in the ground, dug into the ground, and then got willows and so on and made a roof over it.

Fire!

J. Service: One of the nights we were there--we hadn't been there very long--second or third night, there was a downpour of rain, just an absolute downpour of rain, sort of a cloud burst. In the evening we were all back in our quarters. Suddenly, there was a great alarm, shouting, noise.

We all went out of the door, and we could see a fire, a big fire going on. I was anxious to see more! Just back of our place was a hill. We were right at the foot of a hill. I was better clothed in some ways than most of the other people. Anyway, I rushed up the hill and could see the oil fire blazing up.

As I was watching it--a tremendous uproar-- An oil fire is a very, you know--I think I'm overusing "exciting"--scary sort of thing. But, watching it I realized--I did a sort of a double take. There was a ditch. A drainage ditch had been dug along the foot of the hill, where the fan came against the steep hill. This ditch emptied right at the playground in the middle of which our school was standing. The ditch just ended there. It hadn't been continued down. I suddenly realized that this fire was coming down the ditch. Then I realized that it was going to reach our playground which was already covered with water.

So, I charged down into the building, the one room school-house, and shouted, "Save your lives! Save your lives! Get out!" We had bunks there, board bunks. My sleeping roll was spread out. I just threw my clothes into this, bundled it up in my arms and rushed out! Everybody thought I was crazy. But, they quickly decided to do the same thing. Some of them had to run through flames to get out. By the time the last few got out, the fire had reached our playground. The place just went up like a matchbox.

Levenson: You saved the lives of the gang?

J. Service: We all got out. My own problem was that I only had two pair of shoes, and I forgot that my heavy pair of shoes [laughing] were on the floor under this bunk. So, from then on I had only one pair of shoes. My spare pair of shoes was incinerated.

J. Service: But at any rate, we got up on the hill and huddled there in the rain, clutching our few possessions, our sleeping rolls and so on. Things calmed down. The fire burned itself out.

What had happened was that the retaining walls around the lower side of one of the oil pools just gave way. The oil then started running downhill, and into the lowest places which were the homes of the workers, who were sitting huddled around their little cooking fires, in the center of their earth hut or yurt. That caught the oil on fire.

The oil wells didn't burn up. They were up higher. It didn't get up to them. Most of the town itself, the main buildings, were not burned because an alluvial fan is higher in the center. So, the oil flowed off to the side and hit the ditch. The buildings and the refinery were mostly in the center and they weren't hit. There weren't many buildings burned except the one where we were staying, which of course was very embarrassing. We spent the rest of the night on wet blankets in one of the office buildings. Well anyway, that's enough of that.

Jack Recommends Against Flying in a Refinery

Levenson: How did they get their products out?

J. Service: It had to be taken out by truck. But, it was a very long haul. This was one of the reasons why I recommended against our putting a lot of money into this business of flying in a refinery, because --I forget the exact mileage--but from there to Chungking was something like twelve hundred miles by road, atrocious roads, worse than the Burma Road if possible. So that a truck had to carry enough gasoline for the round trip, and there wasn't much capacity left over. And Chungking was still a long ways from the fighting zones. Most of the fighting then was done in Kwangsi, and in the southwest. So that it wasn't a very practical proposition.

The oil drums in China were old, and a drum gets old quickly because every trip means continual jolting. It leaks more and more, so you were always troubled by leaking oil drums. We would have had to fly in drums. The Chinese didn't have enough steel. They couldn't make the drums. It was just not a very feasible proposition.

J. Service: From the oil wells the Chinese agreed to let the party (I was not the initiator--the engineers and the other Chinese asked and I was pleased)--go on further up the corridor to Tunhuang. These are the famous old T'ang dynasty cave temples up at the extreme end of the corridor.

This was a very pleasant trip. We went to the town of Tunhuang. Then the temples are about, oh, ten or fifteen miles out from the town. But this is desert country and terribly, terribly hot. The town of Tunhuang--you've probably seen pictures of Sinkiang--the streets in the summertime are covered with rushes, with arbors above to give you some shade.

We had to leave our truck in Tunhuang. It's sandy desert. Then just at sunset we took off and went in the evening, by moonlight, across this desert to the cliff with the caves. We arrived about eleven or twelve o'clock. Beautiful--that was almost dreamlike.

Levenson: Was that limestone?

J. Service: No, it's actually a fine buff-colored sandstone. The carvings are well preserved but most are inside so somewhat protected. And it is the murals that are best. [musing] Well anyway, that's all very fine and very exciting.

Levenson: Did you take your typewriter with you?

J. Service: No, no. That's one trouble. I did very little reporting on this whole trip. I hadn't gotten the great urge to report. But, I couldn't take a typewriter. I was limited. I was absorbing and listening and talking, but the only reports that really came out of this were when I got back to Chungking--and I'll talk about that later--a report on the oil wells, because that was a report that was wanted, and a report on the Honan famine which we'll come to.

Jack's Message to Chungking Does Not Get Through: Private Code Breaks Down

J. Service: There was one interesting experience, though, on this trip. We were in the Kansu Corridor, well up the corridor and in one of the towns. We found out that Mme. Chiang and a bunch of--I think maybe T.V. Soong--but anyway an important official party was flying through, going to Sinkiang.

J. Service: What had happened was that the governor of Sinkiang, Sheng Shih-ts'ai, was a Manchurian who had gotten--I don't know how, anyway, it doesn't matter now--but he had gotten from Manchuria to Sinkiang, apparently with Russian help or connivance, and had taken over Sinkiang and had ruled it very much under the Russian thumb. He was very pro-Russian, allowed Russians to come in and develop and so on.

For a long time Sinkiang had been really a closed province that had no relation to, no connection with the national government. Foreigners could not travel there. The few people that did try were imprisoned and so on. A very tough regime and very much of a closed preserve.

Anyway, I heard through my Chinese companions that this plane was flying through with the party up to Sinkiang. After the Russian-German war started, Sheng apparently thought that the Russians were going down the drain, as a lot of other people did, and also they could no longer give him supplies and support, or were not willing to.

Hence he decided to turn over, become loyal and friendly to the Chungking regime. This was a party that was going up to do the preliminary negotiations. Well, I was quite excited about this because I didn't know whether the people in Chungking would know about this or not. I thought that this would be something that might have been secret even from foreign embassies in Chungking.

I had a code that I had worked out with the code room staff in Chungking, a private code I could carry in my head. So, I charged off to the telegraph office, [laughing] sent off a telegram to the embassy saying that Mme. Chiang and various other people were going through in this plane to Sinkiang.

They never coded the telegram because-- Well, the cipher ran words together, you see, so that my Chinese names, being run together, looked like gibberish to the code clerk. If they had gotten someone who could read the Chinese and have separated the Chinese names, unscrambled them, they would have been able to make sense out of it. Anyway, they never got the message. But, they knew about it. It was not as secret in Chungking as I had expected.

Levenson: Why wasn't the code clerk competent enough to sort out names like Chiang and Soong?

J. Service: I forget now what the names were, but Chinese names are polysyllabic. If you take a name like Chu Chao-liang, which was probably one of the names, and you write it all together, it can look very confusing.

J. Service: If I had Mme. Chiang or something like that--I probably did--she would recognize that, but the Chu Shiao-liang or these other names he just thought I'd gotten the thing all scrambled.

Levenson: What did the embassy expect you to do on this trip?

J. Service: It was simply a chance for observation in an interesting and unvisited part of the country.

We drove back to Lanchow. We stayed for some time. Most of the engineers left. I think the newspaper people stayed on for a while and then they left. I stayed on. I'm not quite sure why I stayed on, but I had decided by this time to go from Lanchow to Sian, the capital of Shensi province, by bus.

Wendell Willkie's One-World Trip: Jack Welcomes Him to China

J. Service: Anyway, I was in Lanchow when word came that [Wendell] Willkie was coming through, Willkie on his great one-world journey. He had visited the Soviet Union and was coming from the Soviet Union down into China. His plane would stop over-night in Lanchow.

So, I thought, "Well I'm here, I'll certainly be expected by the embassy to welcome him to China." The local Chinese were quite excited and I was called in to help with the translations, prepare the slogans. They had banners across the streets, and they wanted them in English of course. So I helped to make sure the English was correct. The Y secretary, because he knew English, had been called in by the provincial government people. I helped him out.

I went out to the airport to meet Willkie and welcomed him to China--he looked a bit confused and startled--I welcomed him to China on behalf of the embassy and then looked over his shoulder and saw the naval attache who had flown to Sinkiang to meet him in Urumchi! The embassy, of course, had not told me anything about this. So, I was looking sort of foolish. [laughter]

J. Service: There was a big dinner given by the governor of Kansu province for Willkie that night and I was not included, an obvious snub which perplexed the Chinese in Lanchow. It was Hollington Tong's doing.

Then Hollington Tong was the Chinese minister of information which in Kuomintang China was a party job, not a government job. He had also gone to Urumchi. Hollington Tong was the Generalissimo's favorite interpreter.

The usual Chinese strategy was to try to isolate these visitors from as much local American contact as possible. This was a standard practice, but Tong used the excuse that Willkie had said that he preferred not to spend all his time with American officials. Anyway he got me taken off the guest list.

This was pretty typical of Chinese tactics with the Luces, and important newspaper people, and foreign visitors, to try to smother them with hospitality and to try to limit as much as possible their chances of talking to local Americans. I talked to some of the people with Willkie, but I didn't have much chance to talk to Willkie. He wasn't much interested anyway.

Bus Trip to Sian: The Kuomintang's Permeable Blockade

J. Service: The bus trip to Sian was interesting because it was through the blockade zone. At that time there was a very heavy Kuomintang military blockade of the Communist border region area where Yen'an was located. One of the reasons I wanted to take the trip was that we passed through this area.

Levenson: Was the blockade efficiently run?

J. Service: Oh no, not really. There was a good deal of going back and forth. There were refugees on the road at this time. There was a major famine going on in Honan, and people were coming west from Honan into Shensi. Even up this far north you saw refugees on the road going west.

I asked some of the missionaries about what they knew about conditions. They didn't know anything very much, except that there were more people going in to the Communist areas than coming out. So the presumption was that things were pretty good if people were going in. The missionaries had no contact, but they said there was trade back and forth, some smuggling and so on going on.

J. Service: There was one interesting episode about this bus ride. Lanchow was very much a secret police town. Surveillance of all foreigners was very noticeable, very obnoxious. I had had a tail when I was in Lanchow that I got to know quite well. When I got to my bus in Lanchow to go to Sian it turned out that he was on the bus, but he was under detention, wearing manacles. He'd been arrested [laughing] for something. He was extremely embarrassed about this. He was in some trouble of some sort, being taken down to headquarters in Sian apparently.

Levenson: What was the surveillance? What were they looking for?

J. Service: Just tailing you, watching.

Levenson: Contacts?

J. Service: I'm sure that letters and mail and baggage were searched--I didn't really mind. But I was doing no reporting and had no documents or files. I assumed that I would be searched.

One day on the bus, we saw people beside the road searching and looking beside the road. We stopped to find out what was going on. They were passengers who had been on a bus the day before that had been robbed. This was a heavily militarized zone, but the bus had been robbed. They were merchants and had thrown some of their money out of the bus into the weeds. They were trying to see if they could find their valuables!

I got to Sian and it again was a heavily secret police place. I stayed in a China Travel Service hostel, talked to a lot of the missionaries. They had had a lot of experience there--because they had large schools, middle schools--with secret police surveillance of their students, midnight or early morning raids into the dormitories, taking off students.

By this time I had heard a good deal about the famine in Honan province, which was the next province to the east. So, I decided to go there. But, while I was waiting to take my trip, Willkie arrived in Sian. He had been down in Chungking. Then, he wanted to see a war zone.

The favorite place to take people to see the war at that time was near Sian where the Yellow River makes a bend at Tungkuan and the Japanese were on the north bank and the Chinese were on the south bank. They exchanged sporadic artillery fire.

It was a simple and convenient place to take somebody. With binoculars you could look and see Japanese on the other side of the Yellow River.

J. Service: Again there was a big parade for Willkie, and I was out on the street all morning with the crowds watching the preparations and listening to people complaining about how they had been ordered out and mustered by the paochia organization.

I was treated better in Sian, and was included in the guest list for the dinner that was given by the local government for Willkie.

Chinese Interpreters Distort Willkie's Speeches

J. Service: Willkie gave a speech. We Americans never had, we never used our own interpreters. So, Hollington Tong did the interpreting. It was interesting to see the distortion of what Willkie was saying.

Willkie was trying to talk about [raises voice to paraphrase Willkie], "He'd looked into the eyes of the common man of China and he realized what Chinese aspirations were, what the common man of China wanted." All this was changed in Hollington Tong's translation into Chinese. All the talk about the common man became only China. It was on an entirely different level. My Chinese YMCA friends and others asked afterwards whether or not I had noticed what had been done.

Levenson: Was there any way of getting around this?

J. Service: We should have done what the Russians did. The Russians would never use a Chinese interpreter. The Russians always had their own. We never trained any interpreters. My Chinese wasn't really good enough to do it. I can interpret conversations but a speech where you've got to have it right at the tip of your tongue, simultaneous speech, is very tough. But, we should have had people who could do it. For somebody like Willkie we should have had an interpreter. When Gauss gave a talk we should have had one of our own people there, but we've always complacently used Chinese.

Nixon did the same thing. Nixon and Kissinger, they didn't want to use State Department interpreters. Kissinger and Nixon would not allow them to play any role except when Rogers* talked. But, when Nixon and Kissinger had their talks with the Chinese, they used a Chinese interpreter.

*William Pierce Rogers. Secretary of State 1969-1973.

Levenson: Why?

J. Service: Because they didn't want the State Department to know what they were saying. They didn't trust the State Department.

A Catholic Bishop's Links with Tai Li and Secret Police

J. Service: Loyang was an interesting chance to talk to missionaries, particularly a Catholic bishop, Bishop Megan, who was very outspoken about human and government causes for the famine, the mistreatment of the peasants.

But, at the same time it was interesting that he was using his parish priests, Chinese and foreign, scattered through the occupied areas as an informational intelligence network, for Tai Li. He was cooperating very closely with Tai Li.

Levenson: I wanted to ask a little-- You used the term "secret police" and you introduced the name Tai Li. I've seen in various places the term "Gestapo" applied to the Kuomintang secret police. How valid, in your opinion, are the connotations of "Gestapo" to what was going on in China at this time under Tai Li and the Kuomintang?

J. Service: There were some parallels but probably not very close. There were several secret police organizations in China. The party had one which was under the "C-C Clique," the Ch'en brothers, Ch'en Li-fu and Ch'en Kuo-fu. Then Tai Li was independent, more or less directly under the Generalissimo. I'm not sure whether he was technically under the military or not, but he operated directly under the Generalissimo.

He imported a lot of German specialists, technicians, and so on, for training. This was one reason why the term "Gestapo" has been used. Some of these Germans stayed on long after relations between the governments were broken. We would still meet some of these German advisers to Tai Li walking in the hills in Chungking.

Levenson: When you say advisers, what sorts of people were they?

J. Service: They were teaching police methods, that sort of thing. We'll come into this later on, but Tai Li, after the German connection was ended, started the American connection.

J. Service: Very often there were other secret police. The military had their own police organization. The gendarmerie had its own investigative or police unit. There was a lot of overlap and competition between these various groups.

Their primary concern was Communists and Communism. In places like Shanghai they ostensibly were working against the puppets, the people like Wang Ching-wei who went over to the Japanese. But, by and large, eventually they pretty much hooked up with the puppets, because the common enemy of both of the puppets and the Chungking people were the Communists. A lot of the secret police organizations were--maybe compromised is not the right word--but anyway they were working fairly closely with the puppet people.

They had prisons of various kinds--political prisons. They had, I mentioned earlier, some thought reform institutions. When foreigners talked about concentration camps in China--which we did; we used the term concentration camp--it was generally in reference to this sort of thing.

Prisoners were generally students, people they thought were left wing. As I said, people who were working for the industrial co-ops would get put in these places. Generally you were required to read proper material, study the San Min Chu I, Sun Yat-sen's Three Principles, read Chiang Kai-shek's book, China's Destiny, write self-criticism, your own psychological history. If you acknowledged that your thoughts had been wrong and you were going to reform, generally you were let out. If you were stubborn, you might stay.

Some people were undoubtedly tortured, and we'll hear more about that. But, these places weren't at all of the scope of the concentration camps, Buchenwald or anything like that. And the purpose was not extermination.

Famine in Honan

Levenson: I interrupted you. You were talking about Loyang.

J. Service: I don't know that there is much to say about Loyang, except that I saw something of the famine. I didn't get out into the worst areas. In the next year after this, the Japanese came down from the north and just walked through. The people turned against the Chinese armies that had been impoverishing them, starving them to

J. Service: death. The famine was partly because of the crop failure, but also because of the tremendous impositions of hundreds of thousands of Chinese soldiers. Anyway, I wrote a long report about it, which Esherick has got. So, we don't need to go into it now.*

Food and Lodging on the Road

Levenson: You talk about famine and you talk about living Chinese style. What sort of food did you get in these inns along the way?

J. Service: Wonderful! There was no rationing in China. It was purely a matter of having money. Even in the famine areas if you had the money, you could live pretty well. Of course, small inns don't serve cordon bleu food. It's simple food. Very often in north China, in small villages or towns on the road, the meal might be dried garlic and mant'ou, steamed bread, which is very nice.

The people up in the Kansu Corridor are mostly Mohammedans and will not touch pork. They wouldn't let us open cans that we had with us or use their cooking pots. But, the food was very good--beef and mutton and round flat crusty loaves of bread baked in large brick ovens.

The north China people eat steamed bread, different kinds of wheat and kaoliang millet, and so on. We didn't get rice except in the large towns. But noodles, in a place like Sian, wonderful noodles. Mien, Chinese mien, of all different kinds.

We ate at the street peddlers' stalls a lot of the time. Especially breakfast, eggs, things like that you could get on the street. We may not have eaten the fanciest food, but it was always good.

Levenson: Were your Chinese companions willing to eat off the stalls?

J. Service: Yes, except for a few. Some were fussy about it. The "American-Chinese" was squeamish.

Accommodations were simplified by the fact that in the early years of the Sino-Japanese war the Russians had sent a lot of supplies to China down this route by truck, and the Chinese had set up hostels along the road in all the main towns. Each of

*Esherick, op. cit., pp. 9-19.

J. Service: these old garrison military post towns had a temple, generally a temple to a god of war or some local deity. The Chinese had used these old temples. They'd fixed them up, repaired them, whitewashed them, and turned them into hostels. They had a kitchen and some staff.

So, our group stayed in these hostels all the way up and down Kansu. We slept every night in front of the gods, [laughter] the Buddhist hell, and so on. But, they were very pleasant and comfortable hostels, and they helped to make it an interesting and pleasant excursion.

The hostels hadn't been used for years because '39 was probably the last time that supplies had come down. But, the Chinese, whether from bureaucratic inertia or whether they still hoped that maybe they'd get more supplies from the Russians--had kept the places up, and they dusted them out and swept them out and got them ready for our party. That's it.

Ordered Home for Consultation

J. Service: I got a telegram from Sian telling me to return! By this time it was October. So, I started south from Sian. At a place called Paochi, which was the end of the railway line at that time--it's just a little bit south of Sian--the INDUSCO had quite a large establishment. They got me a ride with a Chinese official. He was traveling inspector for the ministry of social affairs or something like that. He had a sedan, which was a very rare thing. So, I came south with him to Chengtu and then eventually by bus to Chungking. I arrived back in Chungking in early November.

Just about that time the embassy had gotten a telegram from the Department: "Why haven't you reported anything about the famine in Honan?" News reports had gotten out that there was an important famine in Honan. So fortunately Gauss' ire at my being away so long--I'd been away since late July and this was now early November, and I'd just been "tramping around north China" in his view--fortunately his ire was ameliorated because I was able to sit right down and write a long and exhaustive report on the famine. I also wrote a report about the oil wells. I had been in China by this time for four years. It may have been that or my travels--I don't know. Anyway, I was ordered back to the Department for consultation.

J. Service: In those days there was no provision for paying travel for home leave; but a man could be ordered to the Department for consultation and then permitted to take some holiday in the States. So, I was ordered to the Department for consultation, and I left Chungking in early December, 1942.

VI CONSULTATIONS IN WASHINGTON: 1943

[Interview 7: September 26, 1977]

Chungking to Miami in Seven Days

Levenson: Last time we'd finished talking about your first big trip around Kansu, Tsinghai, Shensi, Honan, and so on, and then you were called home.

J. Service: For consultation, which was a way of giving me a chance to have some vacation. I left in December, 1942. I flew to India, to Calcutta, where things were quite disorganized.

Later on Air Transport Command became very much of a big, airline-like operation. But then things were quite informal.

From Calcutta to Karachi they arranged for me to travel on a British Sunderland flying boat. So we crossed all of India in a flying boat. Rather amusing. We took off in the Hooghly River in Calcutta and put down on what they call a tank, a reservoir, some place in the middle of India, and then on to the Indus River at Karachi. From Karachi on it was all by DC-3, which was a big plane in those days. They look very small nowadays, of course.

We crossed the Arabian Sea, stopped at a landing strip that had been built on the beach in South Arabia. They had a tent beside the field, I remember, for a cafeteria, eating place, very much of a makeshift arrangement.

Arab--I suppose you could call them Bedouin--warriors would come out of the dunes riding horseback with their beautiful swords or scimitars, and look at the airplanes, I remember.

And on to Aden. Then we went across the widest part of Africa, from Khartoum by way of a line of new fields and hostels that had been put up hurriedly by Pan American, through El Fashar, Fort Lamy, Maidugeri, you know, and finally to Nigeria.

J. Service: Then from Accra we got in a B-24 bomber, which was carrying strategic cargo. It was carrying large boxes of mica from India. I got in early enough to appropriate the tail gunner's seat. So I crossed the Atlantic in the tail gunner's lookout spot.

Just before we took off I remember a sergeant coming and yelling at a group of us in the plane, "Keep a sharp lookout. Plane went down yesterday. If you see anything floating in the water, let the crew know."

We stopped at Ascension Island in the middle of the Atlantic, and then on to Brazil and eventually up through Trinidad and Miami.

Levenson: How long did it take?

J. Service: Oh I forget. About a week, something like that. You didn't fly much at night except across the Atlantic. They flew at night over the Atlantic for navigation. But, the rest of the time was flying by day, and these little planes only did about a hundred and fifty miles an hour or something like that.

And one stopped over. I remember in Khartoum we slept up on the roofs of some building that had been taken over as a hostel, very nice and dry. No mosquitoes in Khartoum that I recall.

I'd been flying on a fairly high priority. Everything had to have priority, of course, to get on a plane. My orders said that I could proceed to my home in California for leave before going to Washington for consultation. When I reached Miami, I lost my air priority, because my orders said to go to California on leave.

So, I had to travel by train, and that was very, very difficult during the war. I stood up in a day coach to the northern part of Florida and then I managed to get a seat. By the time I got to New Orleans I was able to get a berth, so I finally slept for part of the way across.

I met Caroline down at my mother's in Claremont, and came up to Berkeley for Christmas. Saw the children. Young Bob who hadn't seen me for two years—he was five at this time—insisted, of course, he remembered me. Maybe he did; anyway, it was very pleasant.

The First Foreign Service Reporter from Chungking to Washington Since Pearl Harbor

J. Service: Then in mid-January, [1943] I guess it was, I went to Washington for my consultation. This was very different from my previous experience in the Department. I'd been there before in 1938. Remember?

Levenson: Yes.

J. Service: At that time one went around and left cards personally on the secretary, on the undersecretary. You had to call personally, go out to the homes of the head of FE [Far Eastern section], things like that.

Now, of course, there was a war on. Things were very different. You didn't have to do all this calling, and you didn't leave a card on the secretary.

It turned out that I was the first man to reach Washington from Chungking since Pearl Harbor--certainly the first man who'd done any political reporting. All the research analysis units and all the various agencies were eager for news of China, particularly first hand.

So, I started in. I was even asked to say a few words at a staff meeting of FE, which of course was something not expected of me in '38.

Briefs Lauchlin Currie, the White House "Man on China"

J. Service: I was asked to call on Lauchlin Currie, one of President Roosevelt's several special assistants, each one of them assigned to certain fields. One of Currie's fields was China. He was the White House man on China, you might say.

He'd been out in China early in '41, just before I got there, and he'd been back there a second time in the summer of '42, just after I'd started my trip to the northwest. So I'd never actually met Currie. But, he knew Vincent. I assume, from what I knew later on, that they were in correspondence with each other. Anyway, Vincent had told me to look up Currie.

J. Service: I was asked to go and see various other people, Colonel Donovan, head of OSS, and so on. But, the Currie interview, Currie meeting, was probably the most important.

Levenson: How would you assess his competence for the position he held?

J. Service: I think he was a very able man. He was a professional economist, who had come into the government by that route. He was obviously a man capable of assimilating a great deal of information. He had been, I think, very favorably impressed with China when he first arrived. He'd known T.V. Soong in Washington. Then later on, in China, as he knew more about China, his views had changed.

Of course, I didn't know all this when I first met him. He wanted to get my impressions and drew me out. So I started to tell him my reactions to my trip to the northwest. As I had seen a good deal of the grassroots in China, I felt rather pessimistic about the Kuomintang and about our attachment to the Kuomintang, our unquestioning support of it. I expected that the situation in China was eventually going to blow up.

He was much interested in this and indicated that he generally agreed with my views. He also let me get the impression that "the man across the street" shared his thinking. This meant the White House--Roosevelt--as Currie's offices were in the old State, War, Navy Building, at the corner of 17th and Pennsylvania. It's just to the west of the White House.

Roosevelt did know Ed Snow quite well, and he also was a friend of Evans Carlson, a Marine colonel who had been out to China and had written books about the Eighth Route Army.

Currie Urges Service to Help Build "Backfire" to Counter Mme. Chiang's Propaganda Furor

J. Service: Currie referred to the fact that Mme. Chiang was in Washington creating a terrific furor--furor of propaganda favorable to the Kuomintang--and said that it was a real problem and something had to be done to "build a backfire"--the phrase he used--against this publicity. She was appealing over the head of the president by going directly to Congress, stirring up a lot of sympathy for aid to China, really attacking the whole strategy of the war, which was Germany first and the Far East second. This strategy was something that a lot of the Republicans, Luce and the China group, never accepted.

J. Service: I remember [chuckling] in the Department at that period somebody on the White House staff called over and wanted to be instructed on how to pronounce the name Chiang. I gave him a telephone lesson on how to say Chiang.

Arranges Meeting With Drew Pearson and Other Journalists

J. Service: Currie wanted me to talk to Drew Pearson particularly. His office arranged a meeting. There was a little bar in the basement of the Hay-Adams Hotel. The Hay-Adams was just across Lafayette Square from the White House. I'm not sure whether it's still standing or not, but it was one of the nice old Washington hotels. I was supposed to look at the back of the bar, a very dark cocktail lounge, in the basement of the Hay-Adams at a certain time. I went there and sure enough Drew Pearson was there. We had a nice long talk.

I saw him several times later on. Of course, I saw a lot of other newspaper people too during this period. But one had to be a little bit careful of being known as a friend of Drew's. He rarely telephoned me. And he would never talk over the telephone.

Levenson: What were your personal impressions of him as an investigative journalist?

J. Service: [chuckling] Drew was of course a hell of a good newspaperman. He had an interest in China. He'd been out in China, as a lot of newspaper people had. He'd known Hurley and had a grudge against Hurley. Of course, Hurley wasn't an issue at this time in '43, but became one later on. He'd had a grudge against Hurley ever since Hurley was minister of war I think.

He had an enormous capacity for carrying a whole lot of various stories and information in his head. I suppose anybody in that kind of work does. He was not terribly fussy or meticulous about details. Almost anything that you gave to Drew would somehow get a little bit changed or garbled. It never came out exactly the way it went in.

But, of course, he became a tremendously important journalistic force because a lot of people fed him information. People that knew of scandal or corruption or misdoings, a lot of them would get the word to Drew. So, he did pick up an awful lot of dirt. I think he was probably the most influential newsman in America during that period.

Levenson: Did you like him?

J. Service: Oh personally yes, extremely pleasant.

But that was only one thing. Currie wanted me to talk to other people, spread the word that things in China were not the rosy picture that the press was spreading. He said that he would try to make arrangements and encourage journalists to go to China, because China was such a minor field that not many first rate news people were going out there. He was trying to encourage people such as Eric Sevareid and Raymond Clapper to visit China. If they came out, I was to feel that it would be helpful if I would give them the true picture, because one problem, as I mentioned before, was that the Kuomintang always tried to smother these people, keep them away from American contacts.

Currie Requests Letters from the Field, Out of Channels

J. Service: Also, he wanted me to write him letters from the field. Well, he hoped that I would keep him briefed on things of special interest. What he was particularly anxious for was that if I wrote a report or knew of a report that would be especially interesting to him, to alert him to its existence. A great difficulty for him was that, working in the White House, he had no reporting staff. He had no field agents or anything like that. He felt that the State Department and other agencies weren't really keeping him informed.

The old business, the bureaucratic run-around, "Well, we'll give you anything; you just ask for it." [laughter] But if you don't know what exists, you can't ask for it. So, what he wanted me to do was to let him know so that he could ask for things.

Levenson: Was there anything improper in this?

J. Service: Well, this was out of channels, shall we say. It was sort of an unusual thing. It surprised me. I didn't mention it to the people in FE at the State Department. I may have mentioned it to Larry Salisbury. I'm not sure. But, I mentioned it as soon as I got back to Chungking, to Vincent. Vincent was my chief, in the sense that he was number two in the embassy.

J. Service: Vincent didn't seem to be surprised. He said, "Well, this is the way the White House operates. After all, it is the White House, the office of the president. You follow your own judgment; my suggestion would be that if this is the way they want to operate, you might as well go along."

As a matter of fact, I never felt very comfortable. I never wrote very many letters. Later on, when I joined Stilwell's staff and was working under John Davies, I found that John had some contacts established. He already had his communications with people like Currie and with [Harry] Hopkins and various other people including influential senators. So that as long as I was working with John, I usually left this to him.

I didn't do very much after John was removed and I was back in China. In the Hurley days I wrote a few letters, but never very many.

Levenson: One of my reasons for asking at this point about your estimate of Currie's general position and ability is that I'm trying to establish the level of information on China that was reaching Roosevelt and what priority he gave it.

J. Service: Currie had other responsibilities, I'm sure, besides simply China. He was involved in Lend-Lease, and I think most of these assistants had changing responsibilities. But one of his standing assignments was China.

I would guess, but I really have no way of knowing, that in the overall world picture China ranked relatively low. Sometimes it was more important and a hotter issue than at other times. It was certainly an important issue at the particular moment when I was there because of Mme. Chiang's arrival.

Report on Kuomintang-Communist Situation: Service as Prophet of China's Civil War

J. Service: The only man I knew well in the Department was a man named Larry Salisbury who had been second secretary in Peking when I was a language student and with whom I had traveled to Inner Mongolia in the summer of '36. Salisbury wasn't directly in China affairs. He was handling special affairs. It was sort of an overall sweep. He was much interested in the fact that I had taken this long trip and also that I had impressions and observations that hadn't been reported. So, he urged me to sit down and write sort of a summary report. This became my memorandum of January 23, 1944.

July 27, 1944

There has come to my attention recently a dispatch from Chungking entitled "The Situation in China" with which there is enclosed a memorandum prepared by an officer of the Embassy under the title "The Situation in China and Suggestions Regarding American Policy."

The Embassy calls attention to the memorandum, states that "while in some respects it may be hypercritical and while we are not prepared to support it without qualification, we consider that it is a very able and thoughtful analysis and we believe that it will be of interest to officers of the Department concerned with the political and military situation in the Far East to read the first 9 pages in their entirety as they delineate concisely the background of the present critical developments generally along lines of the Embassy's concept of what has been happening in free China and why."

The memorandum under reference covers 19 pages of foolscap, single space. The first 9 pages, to which the Ambassador calls attention, consist for the most part of an indictment of the Kuomintang and Chiang Kai-shek. In outline, it lays down propositions as follows: "The situation in China is rapidly becoming critical. The Japanese strategy in China, which has been as much political as military, has so far been eminently successful. The position of the Kuomintang and the Generalissimo is weaker than it has been for the past ten years. The Kuomintang is not only proving itself incapable of averting a debacle by its own initiative: on the contrary, its policies are policies precipitating the crisis. On the internal political front the desire of the Kuomintang leaders to perpetuate their own power overrides all other considerations. On the economic front the Kuomintang is showing itself inept and selfishly short-sighted by progressive estrangement of its allies. On the military front the Kuomintang appears to have decided to let America win the war and to have withdrawn for all practical purposes from active participation. These apparently suicidal policies of the Kuomintang have their roots in the composition and nature of the Party. The present policies of the Kuomintang seem certain of failure: if that failure results in a collapse of China it will have consequences disastrous both to our immediate military plans and our long-term interests in the Far East."

[Page 2]

There comes next the proposition: "There are, however, active and constructive forces in China opposed to the present trends of the Kuomintang leadership which, if given a chance, might avert the threatened collapse." This is followed by two pages (10-11) in elaboration of that proposition. Therein there is underscored the proposition: "Democratic reform is the crux of all important Chinese problems, military, economic, and political."

Part II of this memorandum (pages 11-19) consists of suggestions regarding American policy. In outline, it proceeds: "In the light of this developing crisis what should be the American attitude toward

China? The Kuomintang and Chiang are acutely conscious of their dependence on us and will be forced to appeal for our support. The Kuomintang's dependence can give us great influence. There are three general alternatives open to us. Our choice between these alternatives must be determined by our objectives in China. We should adopt the third alternative--a coordinated and positive policy. This positive policy should be political. The implementation of this political policy, though difficult in some respects, is practical and can be carried out by many means. There must be effective coordination of the policies and actions of all American Government agencies concerned in these dealings with China. Since all measures open to us should not be applied simultaneously, there should be careful selection and timing. Specific measures which might be adopted in the carrying out of this positive policy include the following. Most of these measures can be applied progressively. The program suggested contains little that is not already being done in an uncoordinated and only partially effective manner. The program constitutes only very modified and indirect intervention in Chinese affairs."

/Page 3/

/Note: The material quoted in the two paragraphs above consist of sentences, verbatim and in sequence, which constitute the sub-heading and, in a few instances, underscored parts of the text of the memorandum.

Comment:

Seldom if ever have I ever seen any document prepared by a responsible officer of the Department or of the Foreign Service, of no matter what age or length of experience, expressive of such complete self-assurance on the part of its author that he knew the facts, all of the facts, and that he could prescribe and was prescribing the remedy, the one and only remedy, for a bad situation and could indicate and was indicating the way, the only way, to lead from bad to good. In many contexts I have seen and have heard and have read about things wrong with China. Never before, not even in Rodney Gilbert's book entitled What's Wrong With China, have I encountered so sweeping a charge that almost everything--except a certain amount of liberal sentiment in some quarters--is wrong with China. Never before, however, have I heard or read it laid down flatly that "Democratic reform is the crux of all important Chinese problems, military, economic and political."

I have heard before, but not from trained and responsible officials, a suggestion that it might be well for the United States to forget certain outstanding features of its policy regarding China, such as the policy of the "Open Door"; but never before have I heard it suggested by an official that among three general alternatives open to us one is that we might "give up China as hopeless and wash our hands of it altogether." I have heard before many proposals and plans conceived and expounded by authors for the improvement of our policy regarding and our relations with China; but never have I seen one so elaborately compounded of prescriptions regarding what we should desist from or refrain from doing and prescriptions of what /Page 4/ we should do, in detail, and with sequence of timing, which indicated

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so completely the lack on the part of its author of understanding of the difference between that which may be ideally desirable and that which is politically practicable.

Upon finishing perusal for the second time of the memorandum above under reference, I turned to refresh my knowledge of its author.

/See Register, Service, John S.7

J. Service: I don't think I need to go into detail about this because it's been published many times.* It emphasized the probability of eventual civil war. I didn't come out and say, "The Communists are going to win," but I said that civil war would be a disaster for the peace, stability, development of China, and that the Communists might be extremely difficult to defeat. I urged that we should try to find out something about the Communists by sending people up there, sending officers up there.

John Davies was coming to the same conclusion at about the same time. Even Drumright who was then in China, made a similar suggestion. But somehow my memorandum upset the established powers a great deal, mainly Hornbeck, who had been in the Department for a long, long time, and was long away from any sort of direct contact with China. He was called adviser to the secretary of state. He didn't have any direct administrative role.

The head of FE, the Far Eastern section, was a man named Max Hamilton. Max had also been in China for a short while as a foreign service officer, but also back in the 20's, I think early 20's. He had resigned from the Foreign Service to take an administrative job. In those days you couldn't stay in the Department for any real length of time if you were in the Foreign Service. If you wanted to take a state department job, then you resigned from the Foreign Service, which Hamilton had done. But he was completely dominated by Hornbeck, who was a very overbearing, dictatorial type of person.

The head of China Affairs was a man named George Atcheson, who had been in China more recently but not during the war. He'd been in China most recently during '37-'38 period.

My memo, as I say, caused a lot of waves. Hornbeck's first reactions were apparently vitriolic. He wrote on the margins "ridiculous," "preposterous," "scandalous," and various other characterizations.

I was then asked to rewrite the memorandum, in a less personal way, using embassy despatches where possible. The embassy had said some of the same things in less dramatic or direct ways.

Meanwhile, the Department sent off a telegram to the embassy without telling me.

*Esherick, op. cit., pp. 170-176.

Levenson: The embassy in Chungking?

J. Service: Yes. They sent off a telegram to the embassy in Chungking--without mentioning my name--and grossly distorting my conclusions. [laughter] You can see it here on page 199 in U.S. Foreign Relations [China 1943].

They say, "A report has reached us,"--not mentioning me, making a mystery--"presumably based on statements made by Edgar Snow and Chou En-lai." Well I had not seen Edgar Snow for several years. He'd been in Chungking briefly in 1941 at the time of the New Fourth Army incident, and he had broken that story by getting out of China, sending his reports from Hong Kong, I think. But anyway, he'd been persona non grata. So, I hadn't seen Ed Snow for several years. And Chou En-lai, well, of course, I'd been traveling in the northwest for four months. I had seen Chou En-lai very briefly in Chungking, but my report came not at all from Chou En-lai. "To the effect that--" and so on and so on. Then, as I say, they distort my conclusions and ask for the embassy's comments without mentioning who the embassy was supposed to be commenting on.

The embassy came back and quite rightly wouldn't buy, wouldn't go all the way for the rather distorted questions. But, they did say that, "Liquidation of the Communists by the present Kuomintang leadership is a question of when rather than whether" (which, of course, was pretty strong substantiation of what I said), and that most people assumed that there would be a civil war, probably not during the war against Japan. I hadn't said there would be civil war before the end of the war [with Japan] at all. I talked about after.

FE asked me to rewrite my memo again, which I did. I spent most of the month writing and rewriting this silly memo, based on the Chungking reply. Then Bob Smyth, who was a Foreign Service officer assigned in FE, tacked on a conclusion. I finally refused to sign the thing. I got very annoyed, partly because of the rewriting of my memo by someone else. They finally said, "Well, we'll put both your names on it, Smyth and Service." I think I finally signed it after there had been some toning down and also having his name on it.

But Hamilton made some remark to Ringwalt, who was in the Department then getting ready to go to China I think. Ringwalt had mentioned my memorandum or my suggestion. Anyway, Hamilton said something to the effect: "Pay no attention to Service. Don't take him too seriously. He's young and immature." Ringwalt got some amusement, I think, in telling me about this. I was all ready to go and storm Hamilton's office, but was finally dissuaded from making a fool of myself. [laughter]

J. Service: Hamilton's attitude was very odd. It was such a contrast to Currie, who said, "Look, we've got a problem and we've got to do something about it,"--I had lunch with Hamilton, and certainly in the beginning our relations were quite friendly. He was commenting, sort of in a despairing way, about the distorted American impressions of China, how someday there was going to be a rude awakening and this was going to be very bad when Americans found out things weren't as rosy as they'd thought.

I said, "Well, after all, we've got some responsibilities. There's censorship in China. It's very hard for the true story to get out," and that we should be doing something. I argued that we should be taking an active role in informing the American public. We owed it to the public and we had to counter Chinese censorship by helping American newspaper people get the news.

[lowering voice and paraphrasing Hamilton] "Oh, we could never do that, could never do that. It would be very embarrassing and very difficult. If it became known that we were taking an active role in news, it would be very embarrassing."

His whole attitude was a dithering, milquetoasty sort of business.

Levenson: This situation was not unique to China. There have been plenty of other places where there's been censorship.

J. Service: Oh yes.

Levenson: Were there precedents for Foreign Service officers informing the American news corps?

J. Service: Oh, I'm sure there had been. Sure! In 1931 in the Manchurian Incident--my trials bring out--the Foreign Service people in Manchuria and in China generally made sure that the newspaper people got the true story.

Hamilton was an unusually cautious, conservative type of person, I think. And perhaps he was prescient enough to expect that I was likely to be indiscreet or controversial. I don't know.

A lot of Foreign Service people were not used to the idea of American government being in news. The O[office of] W[ar] I[nformation] had just been set up. The government had never had anything like this before. You know, a lot of people in the State Department are still not very enthusiastic about this role of government. They would much prefer to stick to the traditional

J. Service: role of diplomacy rather than get ourselves involved in public information, propaganda, cultural affairs, and so on. Particularly propaganda, that's usually the bad word that's used.

There was another comment, I remember, by a fellow Foreign Service officer who survived what came later. He read my report, said it was very interesting, and it would be a terrific assignment, this business of going to Yen-an. I suggested sending some Foreign Service officers to Yen-an to observe. But, he wasn't sure that he would want the job because--He said, "Oh, the KMT government would be awfully down on that person." [laughing] It might not be a very good idea."

Levenson: Who was that?

J. Service: I think I'd better not mention the name. [laughter]

Levenson: What sort of security was put on this document?

J. Service: Oh, I'm not sure what the security was. The classification was probably confidential, because everything was at least confidential. There was practically nothing written that wasn't classified in some way or another.

Levenson: What sort of circulation did it have?

J. Service: I think I showed the thing around to various people I talked to, but then I was talking to people like Donovan and OSS people, Currie. After all, I gave Currie a copy. It was passed around quite widely. The State Department was concerned. What they were really concerned about was the fact that I was talking to other people. This was why they went to these absurd lengths to try to rebut it, because, of course, they knew that I was talking to Currie, and they knew that OSS was interested. I was being called to go to all sorts of debriefing sessions at OSS and the army MIS [Military Intelligence Section], and Navy ONI [Office of Naval Intelligence].

When they got their reply from Chungking, you see--here, this is on page 205*--they circularized to all the head offices of the Department their message to Chungking and Chungking's reply without sending them my memo.

*Foreign Relations, 1943, China.

J. Service: So, this was all sent in, and then Hornbeck put out a memo in reply to mine which is very amusing. This is Hornbeck. It's a memorandum by the adviser on political relations. The State Department historian's footnote, you see, says, "is commenting on memorandum by John S. Service, dated January 23."

I think it's worth reading a little bit of it here.

"We should I think maintain an attitude of intelligent skepticism with regard to reports emphasizing the strength of the (quote) Communist (end quote) forces in China and expressing apprehensiveness that civil war in China may be imminent." Of course, I didn't say in my thing it was imminent. That was circulated to try to offset my memo.

I was talking recently to an English historian, Christopher Thorne, who has written a book coming out very soon now on the relations between the Allies during World War II.* He's done a lot of research in British cabinet archives and British Foreign Office archives. He was telling me that in the summer of 1943--it was six months or so after this--that Hornbeck asked to go to London to consult with the British to make sure we were together on our Far Eastern policy. He raised their eyebrows in London, Foreign Office eyebrows, by his insistence that the so-called Communists were of no importance and no concern at all and that Chiang Kai-shek, if the need should ever arise, would have no difficulty whatever in coping with the problem.

Levenson: Was Christopher Thorne's belief that the British were much better informed?

J. Service: Yes. This did not accord [laughing] with their views. [laughter] As I said, Clark Kerr, the British ambassador in Chungking, was the man who was most alarmed about the New Fourth Army incident.

The British had a man named Michael Lindsay living in Yen'an who had been there since Pearl Harbor. There were other people, people named Band who'd come through from Peking, and so on. Anyway the British apparently were willing to be a little bit more realistic than Hornbeck.

*Christopher G. Thorne, Allies of a Kind: the United States, Britain and the War Against Japan, 1941-1945, London: Hamilton, 1978.

Levenson: I asked earlier if you'd taken notes on your trip?

J. Service: Oh, no. I didn't have any notes. I didn't keep any diary. I was just sort of reporting off the top of my head. Yes, it's been one of my drawbacks really that I never could be systematic enough to take notes. Later on I took some notes at various times. But, on this trip I didn't try to take any.

Comments on Developing Relations Between the State Department and U.S. Intelligence Agencies

Levenson: You've raised a question indirectly that was on our formal agenda which concerns the relationship between the various intelligence agencies that were developing. You said that you were raising eyebrows by being debriefed by these people. But, when you use a term like "debrief" it implies, at least to me, that there is official recognition that this is part of your duties.

J. Service: Oh yes. There was no question about that. An office was set up to inform all concerned agencies about arrivals of people who could be debriefed. Generally speaking, there was an intent to cooperate. After all, we were all fighting the war. So, word was circulated that I was there and available for debriefing.

But, I think what bothered my State Department superiors was not so much my talking to the lower level analyst groups as the fact that I was being talked to by people like Currie in the White House and by Donovan of OSS and so on. I'm not sure whether they knew it, but I was asked to talk to or taken to see various senators. I talked to Senator [Claude Denson] Pepper. There were a number of people that in one way or another I saw. Michael Straight, who was then the owner-publisher of the New Republic, talked to me.

I soon got beyond the normal--proportions isn't quite the right word--of a third secretary in the field. Anyway, it upset the State Department.

A New Feel for the Need for Information from China and a New Engagement in the Influencing of American Policy

J. Service: After consultation, and a bit more leave in California, I went back to China: a whole bunch of us took off to China in early April [1943] I think. They were building up the staff in China.

J. Service: People had been repatriated from internment by the Japanese. So, a whole group of us went.

I think that there had been a change in my own situation. Partly because I'd been in Washington, I'd seen the end users of the reports. I'd been complimented a good deal on the reporting from Chungking, including being complimented by Alger Hiss, I remember, who was working then for Hornbeck! I'd gotten a new feel, which I hadn't before, of the need and demand and interest in information from China. I had become engaged by having my own judgment and maturity, shall we say, questioned.

Levenson: Engaged in what sense?

J. Service: I'd become personally engaged in the sense of being much more involved in trying to make sure that what I thought was the correct picture got back to the States and more interested in American policy.

The whole incident there was a sort of a foreshadowing of what eventually was the final denouement. You can change Hornbeck for Hurley, and you might change Drew Pearson and the press for [Philip] Jaffe. But, the basic issues, our concern, our conviction, our certainty, that civil war in China would be disastrous was there right from the very beginning and that American policy should be to try to avoid a civil war. We should not get involved in supporting one side, which already in '43 I thought might well be the losing side, although we weren't so certain then as we were later on.

We were still at this time thinking that the Kuomintang could be saved and that our efforts should be toward trying to get the Kuomintang to reform. At this point we didn't know much about the Communists and we hadn't gotten to the point--which we eventually reached--of expecting the Communists to win.

At any rate, what happened later on seems to be pretty much foreshadowed in this incident in 1943.

Levenson: Did you run into troubles at all with the embassy in Chungking as you wrote more and more?

J. Service: No. I think engaged is not the right word. I mean up to that point I had certainly done a very conscientious job. I reported when I was supposed to report. I saw something that I thought was worth reporting and reported on it. But, I didn't have the zeal that I eventually developed. While I wrote a tremendous volume of stuff I was generally, shall we say, an outside

J. Service: observer. I obviously wasn't aloof later on. But I think that the embassy never tried to discourage me or disagree with me. In fact, Vincent saw things very much as I saw them.

Interestingly enough, almost as soon as we got back to Chungking, Vincent was transferred back to the Department. He became head of China Affairs. Hamilton was sent off to the Soviet Union. Acheson then became deputy chief of mission, number two in Chungking.

In the Department during the January hassle Acheson had tried to argue against my thesis by recalling that the Communists were willing, in 1937, to take orders from the national government. It's true that in the early part of the war, the honeymoon period of the United Front, that they had worked together fairly closely. By the time Acheson had been in Chungking a short while, he saw the situation much as everyone else did.

I don't think there was ever any putting the clamp on me or clamping down on me from the embassy.

VII POLITICAL REPORTING: TRANSFER TO STILWELL'S STAFF

Posted to One-Man Observation Post in Lanchow

J. Service: Very soon after I got back to Chungking, we were opening up listening posts or one-man observation posts at various places. They weren't formally called consulates. The Chinese government didn't want us to call them consulates. We weren't expected to perform normal consular functions and duties. Lanchow was one of the posts. I'm not quite sure why I was picked to go. They had more people to fill in in Chungking. Four or five officers went out the same time I did.

I'd been in Lanchow the summer before, so I knew something of the background and the people; I was very happy to go.

One big problem was how to get there. The China Tea Corporation ran trucks up the road to Lanchow to send tea. There was no tea grown in north China. This was a government monopoly. The government set up a lot of monopolies, trading companies, during the war. Tea was one of them. An H.H. Kung enterprise. The China Tea Corporation agreed to allow me to ride in one of their trucks.

Carries Two Hundred Thousand Chinese Dollars for an OSS Caper

J. Service: A couple of days before I was to take off, an American navy officer, Commodore Miles, who was always known as "Mary" Miles, got in touch with George Atcheson--never contacted me directly--and said that they wanted me to take some money up to Lanchow.

He just dumped on George Atcheson a suitcase with two hundred thousand Chinese dollars--officially this was ten thousand U.S. dollars at the official rate of exchange. Two hundred thousand

J. Service: dollars in five and ten dollar notes is quite a pile of money! Would I please take this up to Lanchow because the OSS had an expedition coming through Tibet from India through Lhasa, and they were going to end up in Lanchow? They were going to need some money to pay off the caravan.

[laughing] So, Atcheson said okay. And I said, "George, this is the craziest goddamn thing." I'm traveling on a truck just by myself. There was absolutely no guard, no security. People are held up along the roads. Banditry is endemic everywhere. I mentioned before seeing people who had been robbed the day before trying to find their valuables they'd thrown off the bus.

Furthermore, there were perfectly normal channels for transmitting funds. He could do it through a bank. He could do it through the post office. China was an operating country, and transmission of funds was a very feasible business. But, it was absolutely typical of this strange person and the weird ways that he operated. Everything had to be secret. Therefore you didn't want to transmit funds in the normal way.

It's like the Watergate business, laundering funds, and so on. People in Lanchow knew that this expedition was going to arrive. They weren't going to come from nowhere. But, Miles just wanted to operate that way, and so I was stuck with this two hundred thousand in cash.

So, what to do? I was taking some things along, a few minimum groceries. Coffee was worth its weight in gold if you could give anybody a little coffee. I was going to take some presents of tea because tea in the northwest of China is very much more expensive, very prized, and so on, good gifts. I had a few staples and stores I was going to take. I expected to stay in Lanchow for a year or two.

So, I went down and bought a lot more tea from the China Tea Corporation and took the tea out of the boxes, filled the boxes with bank notes, and then mixed them in with my groceries and other stuff in a couple of wooden boxes. When we got ready to go, why they were just thrown in the back of the truck, you see, and then I forgot them, paid no more attention to them.

Before I left Chungking I had talked to Atcheson, who was then number two as I said, about the possibility of trying to get into the Communist areas. He said, "By all means, if you have a chance, do it."

J. Service: Tolstoy, who was the name of the OSS man--he was grandson or something of the novelist, had been in the Russian cavalry as a young man and then left Russia and came to the States. This was what made him, I suppose, a prime candidate to send through Tibet, because you had to ride horseback. He was a very nice chap.

Anyway, I met Tolstoy in Lanchow and delivered the money, and he stayed on for a while. He was also very much interested in my idea of trying to get into the Communist areas. We thought we might be able to do it by going down the Yellow River. From Lanchow you can go down the river by inflated skin rafts. They use cow hides, blow them up, and make rafts out of them. You can go down to the city of Ningsia. From there we thought we might be able to get into the Communist areas from the north. There were some Kuomintang troops there, but they weren't very strong and there's a lot of open country.

The news we had was that these Kuomintang troops in the north were really sort of co-existing on a rather cozy basis with the Communists. So, we thought we might be able to do it. But, the Chinese in Lanchow were much too much on the alert for anything like this. [chuckle] They weren't about to let us go down to Ningsia.

Levenson: Was there any value, significant value, from the OSS expedition through Tibet?

J. Service: None whatever that I know of. It was irrelevant, peripheral to the war. There were various rumors that had started that the Japanese had gotten into Tibet, into Lhasa, and that Japanese agents were active there. There was apparently one Japanese Buddhist who had been in Lhasa for a good many years. But, they didn't really prove that he was a secret agent or that he was very effective or that he subverted the Tibetans. So I don't think the operation accomplished anything. Maybe it accomplished a negative result in proving there wasn't anything to worry about, no Japanese subversion. The Japanese weren't about to take over Tibet.

Truck Breaks Down: Two Days on the Grand Trunk Road Listening to Coolies

J. Service: Several days out of Chungking the truck had trouble, broke down--the trucks were all old and tied together with string and bits of wire--and we spent a couple of days beside the road.

J. Service: The road had curved. We broke down just beyond a curve. At the curve, fortunately, there was a little refreshment place run by an old peasant woman. She made noodles mostly and things like that, just very simple fare, and tea.

Most of the traffic was not truck but two wheel carts pulled by men or sometimes by animals. But this was Szechwan, so it was mostly human pullers rather than animal pullers. Other trucks went by. There were not many on this road north of Chengtu. But, the trucks would go by. I said to the driver, "Why don't you stop them?"

"Oh no. There's no use stopping them. We'll wait for another China Tea Corporation truck to come along, because all the drivers from the China Tea Corporation are from Ningpo." In other words, [laughter] it's the old regional kinsmen business. "When a tea corporation truck comes along we won't need to stop him. He'll just stop anyway and whatever he has we can use, and he won't leave until we get fixed up." Eventually some of his cohorts came along, his colleagues and friends, and they managed to get the truck rolling.

I spent almost two days in this little shack beside the road. It was quite an interesting experience because I would just sit in the back and coolies pulling these carts would come in and have a cup of tea or a bowl of noodles or something, meet others going up or down the road, talk.

Levenson: What did you pick up?

J. Service: Oh! All sorts of things! What was interesting to them. What are the conditions down the road? Where are the troops grabbing coolies, because if they needed transport, they just grabbed people, hauled them off the streets. Conscription problems-- They discussed all the things that would be of interest to them, sometimes crops, but mostly conscription and impositions by the soldiers. They talked about riots and disturbances which we hadn't heard of in various cities, where there'd been civil rebellion or resistance to some of these things.

Occasionally I would reveal that I understood Chinese and then join the conversation. But it was a very instructive two days. I was rather sorry that we had to get back on the road, although the truck drivers themselves were interesting.

The Truck Driver Network

J. Service: The year before I'd been living with a bunch of intellectuals--engineers and newspapermen. This time I was traveling and living and sleeping with truck drivers, because wherever we stopped there would be lots of other truck drivers. They always got together.

I insisted on treating the party the first night out. After that, I was accepted and always joined them at meals and things like that.

We stopped for several days in the next main town while the truck was worked on.

In most of these towns you can't park your trucks in town because the streets are too narrow. The towns were built long before motor roads, of course. Generally outside the town there'd be a stretch along the road where people would park and the drivers would squat there on their heels and chat and talk. So I went out to the edge of town where all the truck drivers were.

I finally found some drivers going to Lanchow and willing to take me for a consideration. I changed trucks and got to Lanchow by a different truck, which was a subject of a lot of concern to the local police later in Lanchow. I was staying with some missionaries. They would have been in trouble if I had not reported. So I reported right away.

But, the secret police were terribly concerned about how I'd gotten there without their knowing it, you see. [laughing] I did not give away the particular truck that brought me. I don't know whether they ever found out or not.

Reporting in Lanchow: A Heavy Secret Police Atmosphere

J. Service: During this trip, when I had really nothing much to do--I wasn't with a group of people I could talk to and chat; we weren't looking for recollections of places mentioned in the Three Kingdoms and so on--I started noting the wall slogans. In this case I did take notes. But this was not apt to alarm the people I was with. I think if I had been taking a lot of notes on my earlier trip, people might have wondered what I was doing.

J. Service: I spent, oh I suppose, about two months there in Lanchow and did a good deal of reporting on various things. There was a heavy secret police atmosphere, and surveillance of foreigners. There was a lot of rural unrest, peasant revolts against conditions.

This, I think, was the time [Walter] Lowdermilk* and I met. Lowdermilk was up there on a trip, as an expert for the U.S. Department of State, one of these cultural experts that we were sending out. But the Chinese really weren't interested in culture.

Lowdermilk was one expert and there was another man who was an artificial insemination expert. This was fairly new at that time, artificial insemination. He was pretty disappointed when he got to China to find out that there was no possibility of doing anything. They had no facilities, no equipment. They just weren't geared up for anything like this. The Chinese simply wanted the latest thing in artificial insemination. So, he made a trip up [laughing] to the northwest and looked at some of their livestock and went home. That was about all that was accomplished, I think.

Levenson: I remember you had suggested that more cultural experts should be sent out. But I don't think you meant people in artificial insemination?

J. Service: Oh, oh, no, no, no, no, no, no. The kind of culture that we were talking about was, what, big "C" culture. Real culture. [laughter] Not artificial insemination.

Levenson: What did the foreign population of Lanchow consist of, and what were they doing?

J. Service: There was a Russian consul there. The Russians had, I think, a regular consulate there. He was very much under surveillance. Of course the Russians do this to people in their own country, but he complained bitterly about it. He was an extremely friendly, nice guy. I got quite well acquainted with him.

The police were very annoyed at the way I arrived. Then, they were also annoyed with me for staying in the missionary place. There was a travel service hostel, and they kept saying, "We have a fine hostel here. Why don't you come and stay at the

*See Walter J. Lowdermilk, Soil, Forest, and Water Conservation: China, Israel, Africa, United States, Vol. 2, pp. 380-407, Regional Oral History Office, The Bancroft Library, University of California at Berkeley.

J. Service: hostel? You'd be very comfortable." This was so transparent, that it was very hard to avoid laughing. [laughter] I didn't move into the hostel. At the mission I had a room and a typewriter. I had a certain amount of privacy.

Levenson: What did you feel you accomplished up there in those two months?

J. Service: Oh, I did a lot of reporting. Reporting is accomplishing. [laughter] I got a couple of commendations on these reports. If you got commended, in those days, that was really quite a thing. There weren't many commendations passed out for reporting.

Did I help the war along? I don't know. I was asked to report on all sorts of things--movement of gold, trade with Sinkiang, all sorts of subjects that you're asked questions about, that somebody in Washington wants to know about.

I did a thing about trade between occupied and free China--tremendous trade. I remember later on, the next time I was at the Department, being commended on this by Herbert Feis. He wanted to see me. He was economic adviser in the State Department, and this was something that Herbert Feis was interested in. All this became amusing later on, ironic in a way, because the great drawback in Feis's book The China Tangle was that he was such a close friend and so much influenced by Hornbeck. Feis gives his own view of things, or Hornbeck's view of things, and one of them is that these terrible young men are making life so difficult.

Levenson: Did you have any particular difficulties that are worth commenting on in finding materials for your economic reports?

J. Service: For most of these reports, you couldn't find any hard and fast, solid data. The treasury wanted to know something about movements of gold. As I recall, I talked to a couple of bankers in Lanchow. They were in a position to know roughly, but they themselves didn't have any precise information because a lot of gold moves secretly. It's not handled through official channels.

Trade with the occupied areas, you saw the evidence all around you, the goods in the market, the stores. Then, you talked to people. How does this come across? Where does it come across? You pick up a lot of hearsay, second hand, but it was pretty well known, the main avenues for it coming in and which armies took the squeeze. Tang En-po was the man who was supposed to be making a lot of money out of it there in Honan province.

- J. Service: A lot of this is hearsay. Your reporting is only as good as your sources and your observation. But, generally speaking, if you have a very broad circle of people you can talk to, the broader the better, your information is good.
- Levenson: That leads me really into my next question which was whether you ran into resistances. You were living with missionaries, or in the mission compound. Did this put you in wrong with some people? Were your bankers willing to talk? You were American in a Chinese situation.
- J. Service: Generally speaking I got no resistance at all. If you had resistance it was apt to be from a government official, if he thought that you were looking for information which might be critical of the way things were being run or show him in a bad light. But I generally avoided going through government channels. This was one of the things that annoyed the Chinese the most, I think.

Later on when I went to Chengtu--I'll mention it later--to make an investigation there, very often I could completely avoid having to do the usual thing of going to the appropriate government agency or government bureau and asking a bureaucrat what's happening.

Assigned to General Joseph Stilwell's Staff, August, 1943

- J. Service: I was assigned to Stilwell's staff in August, 1943. The assignment was something which I was very happy about, pleased. I had tried, and I think most of us tried one way or another, to get into uniform. I had talked about it in the Department when I was there in '43 and had been told very definitely, absolutely not, because the State Department was not willing to release any of its people. They couldn't recruit, and they just couldn't afford to lose people because the Department actually had more responsibilities. So they were not willing to let anyone take leave or quit to join the army.

I had talked to Stilwell once early on in Chungking about the possibility. He laughed and said, "Well, I'd like to have you, Service, but I could just see what Gauss' reaction would be," [laughter] which was quite true.

Gauss was very annoyed about my being assigned, not entirely on account of me because there were a couple of us assigned at the same time. But it was done by the Department

J. Service: without consulting Gauss. The first he knew about it was a telegram saying that I was assigned to the army. He was annoyed, the way it was done, and of course he was annoyed at losing officers which he felt were needed by the embassy.

Levenson: Why was it done in your opinion?

J. Service: Partly I think it was simply the State Department's anxiety to cooperate with the army. It was a request that was put through the highest channels. It came through Secretary of War Stimson to the secretary of state and put in very flattering terms that they wanted cooperation.

Vincent was the man in the Department who handled it. I think Vincent saw that it could be useful. Davies had already been assigned to the army, and Davies was in sort of a freewheeling position which was producing useful reports. There was quite a bad situation in Chungking. Bad maybe is too strong a word. There simply wasn't very good liaison between the army headquarters and the embassy. Gauss and Stilwell were alike in some ways. They were both rather prickly and each took the attitude, "Well, if he wants to talk to me, I'm available. Let him come over." This sort of thing.

It's always a bit of a question in a foreign country whether the ambassador has first rank or the army. I don't think these people were particularly concerned about that. Stilwell's attitude was, "Well, I'm just awful busy." So, there wasn't much liaison or contact between the two. Davies knew that I had good relations with Gauss and thought that I could be useful being a link.

There was a rationale in the case of all the people that were brought over, but I don't think we need to go into all that.

Levenson: Well, why not?

J. Service: Really?

Levenson: Yes, sure.

J. Service: It's sort of out of my field. Emmerson was a Japan language officer. We were getting ready to fight the Japanese in Burma. Davies thought it would be good to have a Japan man for propaganda, psych. warfare and so on, interrogation of prisoners. The army was not very well prepared for it, certainly not in China.

J. Service: Ludden was a man who was a frustrated soldier and would prefer to have been in the army. I think Davies originally thought that he would be a good man to maintain contact with the forces down in Burma, the army, fighting front.

Davies himself was spending more and more of his time back in India where there were a lot of political problems to worry about. Congress [party] and [Mahatma] Gandhi were opposing the war, famine was coming on.

Then, one of Davies' ideas from about this time was this idea which I had brought up, and Davies also had brought up, of trying to establish contacts with the Communist areas to find out what was happening in north China. Davies apparently always thought that I would be a good man for that.

His original plan was a very fancy one of getting Roosevelt's son, James I think it was, to head up the group. I was to sort of lead him by the hand. But that didn't work out.

Levenson: Was the CBI, the China-Burma-India command, established at this point?

J. Service: Oh yes. CBI had been set up--well, I forget--in February or March, 1942. Now we're already in August, '43.

There was a fairly large headquarters, Forward Echelon Headquarters, in Chungking which was where I was assigned. The Chungking headquarters actually didn't quite know what to do with me. This had all been worked out, as I say, at very high levels. The people actually on the ground weren't very clear about what I was to do, whether to give me an office and have me in an office job, or what.

For a while I was fairly busy counseling a number of agencies like OSS and Board of Economic Warfare which later on became Foreign Economic Administration. We set up a sort of a psych-war committee there in Chungking, on an inter-agency basis. Actually we spent most of our time talking about American attitudes and propaganda vis-a-vis the Kuomintang [laughing] more than we did about the Japanese. In other words what we should do to try to promote the cause and the spread of ideas of democracy in China. Anyway, that didn't last very long.

This was not a full time job. I was much more interested in doing what came naturally for me--reporting. I did some of that, started that, and kept it up.

Becomes "Road Expert"

J. Service: The head of G-2 at that time was Stilwell's son, Joe. He wasn't particularly interested in political things. He was much more the narrowly military intelligence type, combat intelligence, nuts-and-bolts type of intelligence. I don't think he was much concerned about Chinese politics.

He found out one day that I'd been over the Burma Road. He was quite excited about this because they were trying to get information, and everybody in headquarters had arrived in China since the Burma Road closed. No one there had been over it. "You drove over the Burma Road?!" So he had me write down everything I could remember about the road, its condition, bridges, ferries, terrain, cover, everything that could be useful as one type of intelligence, [laughter] just very primitive type of intelligence. So, I did the Burma Road, as much as I could dredge out of my memory.

Then he found out I'd been to the northwest. So I did the same for all the roads in the northwest I'd covered, Szechwan to Lanchow and Sian. I became a sort of road expert.

A Road Reporting Tour Through Kweichow, Yunnan, and Kwangsi

J. Service: Then he decided that for contingent, future planning possibilities, they wanted to find out all they could about all the roads in the southern part of China leading into Indochina. Up until the fall of France most of the goods imported into China had gone in through Haiphong, then on up the railway or by these roads. There were several roads built into China from Indochina. This was after Hong Kong fell, of course.

After the fall of France, the Japanese moved into the northern part of Indochina. All these roads were stopped, and the Chinese had actually destroyed the roads in areas close to the border. Further back, most of the roads had simply been abandoned.

So G-2 dreamed up this idea of having a reconnaissance. They sent an army engineer officer and I was to escort him. We had two jeeps. An overseas Chinese from Singapore was assigned to us as a mechanic and interpreter, but he was absolutely no use as an interpreter. We never used him. [laughter] I don't think he knew Cantonese. His Chinese was Fukienese or something like that.

J. Service: But anyway, we never got into areas where he seemed to be of any use. Almost always--and even in Kwangsi--I could use my Mandarin. My ears are flexible enough so that I could absorb, understand, most any variety of Chinese as long as it's a form of Mandarin.

This is a long story that we don't need to go into in any detail, because it's just another Gee-whiz, boys! great excitement stuff.

Levenson: One thing I'd like to ask is-- Maps were always an enormous problem in the Pacific area I know. What was the reliability or availability of maps from any source for these areas?

J. Service: Very poor. We didn't have any good maps. Even the air force didn't. We had general maps, but they didn't show things like roads. Of course, we had to get Chinese permission. From each province we would get the maps. There were little maps, extremely primitive and sketchy. They didn't show very much in detail.

We each had a jeep. They fixed up trailers, and we carried two drums of gas. The trailer had an iron box built on it, to enclose it in other words so there was some security.

We spent two months traveling around on these mostly forsaken, empty, abandoned roads. Sometimes the grass had grown up higher than the jeep. We had to push through it. Bridges sometimes were gone. We got across by getting local sampans, sometimes by putting boards across two sampans and then running the jeep out onto the boards and maneuvering the sampans, tied together, across the river.

We did southern Yunnan, Kweichow, and Kwangsi [gesturing], in other words all the arc around the northern borders of Indochina. We went right up to the border. In several places we could see the Japanese posts on the other side.

Levenson: Did they bother you ever?

J. Service: No they didn't. We were foreigners. The whole frontier was completely inactive, and the Chinese weren't about to let it be otherwise. They weren't anxious to stir up anything.

Generally, we traveled alone, but in Kwangsi at one place, we were escorted by some young Kwangsi army officers.

J. Service: This was the most interesting part of the trip, as far as I was concerned, to talk with the Kwangsi people. Later on I wrote a report about Chiang Kai-shek's treatment of the Kwangsi clique. I'ts partly from my experience.

I think that the trip was valuable to me; I was seeing a whole, other, big new section of the country. I'd done the northwest, and this was seeing the southwest. If there was no town, we stayed in a farmer's home, in villages. We'd simply find the head man and say, "Here we are. Can you help us?" We had papers identifying us.

Levenson: How were you received?

J. Service: Friendly. [pause] Well, let's not get into that.

Some Adventures

Levenson: What were you going to say?

J. Service: No, no.

Levenson: Go ahead.

J. Service: I was going to tell the story about having my gun stolen, but that's not particularly important.

Levenson: You were armed then?

J. Service: Oh yes. We carried a carbine each and a Colt forty-five, for bandits and so on. We were under orders not to put up the side curtains on the jeeps, because the idea was that if enemy planes came over, the side curtains would make it harder to get out and we might not hear them.

The jeep tires were these big-tooth tires, and all the roads were earth-bound macadam. It was drizzling and raining most of the time, in Kweichow province particularly. The tires churned up a fine mud spray, and we used to pick it off behind our ears. We'd get all muddy behind the ears, [laughing] simply covered with mud! We had army coverall things. Wet and cold, it was just absolutely miserable.

J. Service: My trailer slipped off the road going around one curve, which had a reverse banking on it. I could feel it going. It's just like a crack of the whip. It just swung around and started to swing off the road and then began to pull me backward. I was cramping my wheels. Finally, I got pulled off the road except that my front wheel caught a tree and hung up there with my trailer hanging off down the bank at the rear and my front wheel locked on this tree.

I jumped out and fired my pistol three times, which was supposed to be the distress signal, but the other jeep was too far ahead, and he didn't hear. So, I was sitting there and pretty soon--there wasn't much traffic on this road--pretty soon a sedan came along which was very unusual.

I was waving my arms and who should be in the sedan but a party of Chinese and American doctors who were on some sort of inspection trip, and the doctor was Dr. Claude Forkner who'd been my brother's physician when he was in the PUMC in 1933 with tuberculosis! [chuckle] Forkner, as a war job, had come out to China to help one of their relief organizations.

Anyway, they gave the word to my companions in the next town. So, they came back and we got about twenty farmers and eventually pulled the trailer up and pulled me up.

The next town was Mao Tai, which is quite famous. It was also New Year's Eve. We celebrated New Year's Eve with these other doctors in Mao Tai which is the home of a famous Chinese brew, you know.

Levenson: Did you have training in your firearms?

J. Service: I'd had a little bit. I knew how to pull the trigger! The only time I really fired the thing was when we were in a place called Nanning in Kwangsi province. There was a small satellite, emergency field there that was used by the Fourteenth Air Force. We stayed there overnight. In the early morning a couple of Japanese fighters came in and dive-bombed the field and some of the buildings there. Our air raid precautions were simply to run off to a hillside nearby covered with grave mounds. We lay down between the grave mounds and peppered away with our carbines and anything else [laughing] we had at these planes. But, we didn't do any damage.

Levenson: When did you have your gun stolen?

J. Service: The other car got stuck in the mud. The road conditions were awful. The other jeep was stuck in the mud, so I stopped. We had metal holders for the carbines right beside the driver's seat. Our guns were always there. While I was trying to help the other guy get out, a bunch of conscripts came by, a couple of hundred men under armed escort.

Just after they'd gone by I noticed that my gun holder was empty. So, I ran down the road as fast as I could and got to the head of the column and told the officer what had happened, that my gun had been stolen.

At first he wasn't very much concerned. "How do you know we did it?" I said, "It was there just before you came, and now it's not there, so it's got to be somebody in this group." So he made all the men squat. No gun appeared. Theoretically, squatting should have revealed the gun. He said, "Obviously, we don't have it."

So, I said, "Well, it's very important." We were near some large town in Kweichow, and I told him where we would be staying there, and if he got any information or found out anything to let me know. He could contact me where we would be.

Darned if the next morning they didn't call up and say they had my gun. The local headquarters called up. It turned out one of the officers had taken it. They didn't make the officers squat.

Levenson: I'm surprised you got it back!

J. Service: There was one shot missing. So I mentioned the fact that the shot was missing. They said--whether or not to be believed--that that took care of the guy that stole it. I think I'd take that with a considerable grain of salt. [laughter] I think somebody shot it just to see what it was like.

Trips to India and Sian

J. Service: There were various other trips I made. Soon after I joined Stilwell's staff, John Davies took me on a tour of the theater. We went down to India and met people in the headquarters there and then up into Assam which was the Indian end of the "Hump Jump." We saw the early work--they were just beginning the Stilwell road and building and enlarging the Assam bases where planes took off for China over the Hump.

Levenson: How were Allied relations? Were problems occurring with the British at that point?

J. Service: Well, relations were good, I think. The Americans were in a hell of a hurry, and they just felt that the British didn't work as hard as they would like them to. There was always a lot of griping about slow pace of things in India. The Americans finally took over the operation of the railway from Calcutta. Stuff would come into Calcutta by sea and then had to be hauled way up the river, Brahmaputra River, up to Assam. There was a rail line and a barge line for hauling stuff up the river to Assam.

The British had really a tough situation. The Congress party was against the war. The only party in India that was favoring the war was the Communist party.

Levenson: Was there strong American anti-colonial feeling that created friction with the British?

J. Service: I would say by and large that the average American attitude was anti-colonial, yes, although it wasn't terribly pro-Indian either, because the Indians were not, you know, the most lovable people. They were querulous. I think that there was criticism of the Indians for not being willing to get in and fight.

When it came to the training camps that were set up for the Chinese at Ramgarh, British cooperation was very good. I don't think there were any complaints there. They simply put at our disposal some of their own camps. This sort of cooperation was very satisfactory.

I made another trip in the spring of '44 up to Sian in Shensi province, which was the headquarters of the Kuomintang forces blockading the Communist area. Hu Chung-nan's headquarters. The Communist representatives in Chungking were very alarmed because they were convinced that the Kuomintang was going to try to make some sort of a preemptive strike on the Yen-an base area.

I don't know what their evidence was, but it's very noticeable for instance in this book that's been written by Vladimirov, the Russian Comintern representative in Yen-an, that they were alarmed. The Chinese Communists wanted us to show some concern. The headquarters approved my going up to Sian.

This was one trip where I did not avoid Chinese officials. I interviewed them and talked to them in Sian and inquired about troop movements and the political situation. It was quite

J. Service: obvious that the headquarters was concerned that there not be another New Fourth Route Army incident or anything like that.

Levenson: How were you received?

J. Service: Politely, correctly. [chuckling] There was no real welcome.

Levenson: Did you feel you made an impact?

J. Service: Oh, yes. I certainly registered headquarters' concern. They knew who I was, of course. I was traveling under official orders.

"Doing What Came Naturally": Full Time Political Reporter
for G-2

J. Service: I got back to Chungking in February of '44, I guess. By this time I think it was quite obvious that what I was best fit for, and certainly what I most wanted to do, was to be a political reporter. As I said earlier, doing what comes naturally.

Also, there had been a new chief of G-2, [Joseph Kingsley Dickey] who was a Japan language man, and more sophisticated in some ways than young Stilwell. Perhaps because he didn't have a China background was more interested, or recognized the need for political background. I don't know.

Anyway, he was quite content to let me make my own job. We worked out a good system, quite satisfactory for me. He and I would have a conference very early every morning, eight or eight thirty. I had a small office in one of the headquarters buildings, with a typewriter. I'd usually go to my office and do some writing and then just take off. The rest of the day I was completely my own man.

I had been living up to this time in military quarters, barracks really, which wasn't very satisfactory, sharing a room with at least one other officer, with no real place where I could entertain or bring Chinese. It was very difficult to bring Chinese to the mess.

My very good friend Sol [Solomon] Adler, who was the U.S. Treasury Attache and also the American member of the Stabilization Board, lived in downtown Chungking. The army headquarters was quite a bit out from the center of town in a new area that had

J. Service: grown up during the war. Adler lived in a foreign-style three-story house owned by H.H. Kung, who was the head of the Bank of China and also the head Chinese member of the Stabilization Board.

The ground floor apartment was given to the British member. The second floor was Adler's. In the third floor was a man named Chi [Ch'ao-ting], who was the Chinese member. He was an adviser to Kung, and the man that did the technical work on the board, and functioned as a secretary.

Adler had two bedrooms on his floor. He said, "Come on down and stay with me," which was perfect. So I did that. From then on I would usually have breakfast at Adler's and then lunch and dinner every day with whoever I was with. I might make appointments or look up people.

A Wide Range of Contacts

J. Service: My contacts were numerous and various. People talk now about how you never got into the homes of Chinese in the old days. Chinese don't live in a way that they can entertain foreigners very well. Certainly in China in those days they were living in a very, very crowded, ramshackle way.

But I was continually in these people's rooms, their lodgings, just as they came to me. We got on a basis of very intimate equality, so that I could drop around and see them and we'd spend evenings talking where they lived. We usually went out for meals because even for Chinese [chuckle], it's easier to go out and get a snack--perhaps even at a noodle stand--than eat at home. And they weren't set up for entertaining. Most of my meals were in restaurants. Occasionally I would have supper with Adler, but very seldom.

I mentioned last time moving in with Sol Adler, and I think we ought to say something more about that, because I had become by this time very close friends with Adler. He had come out to Chungking for the Treasury Department in the summer of 1941. So he'd been a long time in Chungking.

A brilliant person, he'd worked for a long time in the government, in the treasury, was a very close associate of Harry Dexter White. A brilliant economist, an international

J. Service: chess master, a terrific bridge player. Just a very, very keen, sharp mind who was as interested in Chinese politics as I was and in what was happening in China and how it would affect us.

He knew no Chinese, but all his associates were Chinese. He was an economist in the treasury working with Dr. Kung and with the Ministry of Finance and with the government economists and the top government bankers in China, so that he tapped an entirely different layer from what I was reaching. We compared notes and worked together very closely, so that my moving to a room in his apartment on the second floor was more than just a convenience. It facilitated our own collaboration, which really is the right word to use, on a lot of the reporting that I did.

Things like my comments on, oh, the Generalissimo's book, China's Destiny, a lot of it came indirectly from Adler, from his contacts, and particularly from his friend and very close associate Chi Ch'ao-ting, who was a Ph.D. in economics from Columbia University and whose book Key Economic Areas in Chinese History, I think was one of the best known books in Chinese economic history at that time.

Then the Generalissimo came out with semi-secret publication. It was not published in China, but it was a textbook for all the party schools on Chinese economic theory. This actually was translated by Chi and then Sol wrote a long comment on it, economic analysis of it, and I gave it to the embassy, to Davies. Chi's translation was the origin of the eventual English publication.

Levenson: Did the Generalissimo write it himself?

J. Service: No. Chungking was convinced, and I think it was fairly well accepted, that the person who wrote it was a man named T'ao Hsi-sheng, who was a sort of a secretary, a member of the Generalissimo's inner secretariat. He was an extreme conservative, right-wing, traditionalist Chinese scholar.

There were a whole lot of foreigners in Chungking working one way or another in intelligence or intelligence related work. This was the period that I first met John [King] Fairbank. He came to Chungking with what was called the COI [coordinator of information], which then became, or was part of OSS. John was running their office and did a great deal of work collecting printed materials on China.

J. Service: Fairbank had spent four years in Peking while he was working for his Ph.D. and had done some teaching at Tsing Hua University. As a result of that and because of his own interests and Harvard work and so on, he had a very, very extensive acquaintance among Chinese university circles.

I saw the people in the embassy, like Sprouse, of course. Most of the embassy contacts were government officials, particularly foreign office but other government--the ministry of economics and so on. We all did a lot of comparing of notes.

There was a man in the headquarters named Linebarger, who had been the psychological warfare guy that had asked for the original long compendium on morale and propaganda agencies. He eventually was sent to Chungking as a captain attached to G-2. Because of his father's connections with Sun Yat-sen and because of his own predilections, he had a direct contact with people like T'ao Hsi-sheng and Tai Chi-t'ao, and most of the conservative groups of the KMT.

There were other OWI people like Fisher, Stuart and others, who had been in China a long time.

Also there was a very active press contingent, the permanent group. I'm not thinking of the visitors who came in for a week and left. I talked to them of course. People like Severeid came at that time, and Raymond Clapper. Various people. You remember, this was one of the things that Currie wanted me to do. He undoubtedly told these people to look me up. Perhaps they would have anyway. I don't know.

The residents were people like Gunther Stein, Brooks Atkinson, Richard Watts, who was there for the Herald Tribune. Brooks Atkinson was the long-time drama critic of the Times. He was there for the New York Times. He didn't want to write drama criticism during the war. He asked for a war job, and they sent him to Chungking. It was a coincidence that Richard Watts, also a drama critic, was the Herald Tribune man in Chungking.

Teddy White, and with him was Anna Lee Jacoby. Harold Isaacs was there later on for Newsweek. These people were interested in exactly the same sort of thing I was interested in. They were able to talk to a lot of people I couldn't see.

Levenson: Why couldn't you?

J. Service: Because I was not given prominent status in headquarters as political representative or adviser. In other words, I wasn't given big face. If I had been treated that way, as Davies was much more in India, then it would have been more possible for me to ask to see T.V. Soong or someone like that, the head of the government. John could go and talk to Nehru, or he could talk to the governor-general.

I preferred it this way. I much preferred to operate the way I did, than to have been put at a desk in a big office. It really didn't hamper me a great deal. Having good relations with the press, they often let me know before they were having an important interview.

Levenson: So, you could feed in your questions.

J. Service: "I'm going to see so and so. What do you think?" Then, I would read their notes afterward. In many cases I read their despatches and could read what was censored. I was on a basis of friendly cooperation with some of these correspondents. They were tapping, you see, still a different stratum, than I was tapping.

We were all living and breathing the politics of Chungking. We shared both ways. If I knew something, if I had some rumor I was trying to check out, I shared with them. None of this material was about American policy, what the American government was going to do, military plans. It was all about what was happening in front of our eyes in China, so that although all these things were classified, we got out of the habit of thinking of them as classified, or at least I did.

Levenson: We know subsequently that many of these people to whom you've referred have taken very different positions on American-China policy. I'm talking about people who are now, to put it in seventies' terms, pro-Taiwan or pro-PRC [People's Republic of China]. Was there any evidence of splits at that time or any personal friction?

J. Service: No, not really. We were beginning to get a difference of attitude toward the Communists. At this time—I'm talking about before I actually went to Yen-an—most of us didn't know much about it. No one knew much about what really was happening up there.

Isaacs, I think, always from the very beginning was critical of the Communists. He himself had had a political background in China. He'd been there as a young man editing a magazine which was regarded as being Trotskyite. He asked Trotsky to

J. Service: write the foreward to his book on China. He regarded Mao Tse-tung, I think wrongly--his anger should have been at Wang Ming and the twenty-eight Bolsheviks--but he regarded him as a tool of Stalin. He was very anti-Stalin.

There were some people working for the Chinese, people like "Mo" [Maurice] Votaw, who was working as an editor for the Chinese Ministry of Information, which as I mentioned before was a party ministry. Mo was restrained in his criticism, shall we say. He didn't try to pretend everything in China was hunky-dory. There were some differences, but by and large we all were talking about what's happening here, and we all saw it pretty much the same way.

Later on, when the Kuomintang started putting out prejudicial information, they made a good deal out of my contacts with some of the press, particularly Teddy White. They even claimed that I used to use his room in the press hostel for assignments with Chou En-lai's lady press secretary, a woman named Kung Peng.

This, of course, was absurd to anybody who knew the layout of the press hostel, because the press hostel purposely was laid out to facilitate surveillance. It was like a two-story motel, built around two sides of a square. The third side of the square was a dining room, and then at the entrance you all had to go through one gate.

The entrance was where your surveillant sat, the policeman. The doors of all the rooms opened out onto balconies, verandas, so that he could sit there and watch whoever went into any door. So the idea that I would pick this place for assignments is somewhat laughable. But, we'll come back to this subject.

Kung Peng was famous in Chungking. She was a graduate of an American missionary school and Yenching University, had been active in the student movement there in 1935, and went over to the Communist side. Her first husband was killed fighting in the guerrilla areas. Her second husband was a man I knew quite well, who had escaped from Hong Kong after Pearl Harbor and was one of the editors of the Communist paper in Chungking.

He became ill, had an operation, and I found out that she was very distraught because the hospital needed blood and they couldn't get it. Chinese, at that time, weren't used to the idea of giving blood. They somehow think it's their life essence, and they just don't like the idea of having people take it away.

So I went down to the hospital to give blood. My veins are very hard to find apparently. I'm very thin, the doctors were not in practice, I'm sure, and the needles were very old.

J. Service: Anyway, they had to probe around so long and make so many futile attempts [chuckling] that I finally passed out cold as a flounder, which alarmed everybody, except me of course. But at any rate, this example encouraged Chinese comrades, and he got a good supply of blood after that. Also, I was able to get him plasma from our army doctor up at headquarters, plasma and antibiotics which they needed desperately. He's the man who later became foreign minister.

Levenson: His name?

J. Service: Ch'iao Kuan-hua. He was a foreign minister until, unfortunately, he got mixed up with the Gang of Four. His wife had died some years ago. He remarried and his new wife, who was a vice-minister of foreign affairs, apparently was quite close to Chiang Ch'ing.

People often assume, you know, that intelligence is a matter of paying money and so on. I think it's clear that the type of work I was doing was not at all with paid informants. It was all friendly, people who had the same interests that I did.

The Chinese newspapermen who were the primary people that I talked to, and the Communists were all interested in what was going on, all interested in talking shop, exchanging ideas, pumping each other. Mostly it was friendship. Of course, some people talked to me because of my position. Obviously, my position was an advantage. People knew I worked for headquarters. Some people wanted to influence me, wanted to get their ideas through to headquarters. People like Feng Yu-hsiang and some government people tried to talk to me at various times, convince me of their views or change my views.

But basically, it was simply a matter of common interest. When we went out I very often paid for meals, but that was not exactly bribery. Most of these people were working for a pittance themselves. When I left Chungking I gave away everything I had practically--this was normal, pretty much--gave away clothes, pens, watches, anything like that. But it was not as payment for information received. They would resent that if it was ever suggested that I was bribing them.

Informal Liaison with the American Embassy: Files Kept at Army Headquarters

J. Service: When I started working for the army it was understood, and I think agreed, that I would give copies of everything I wrote to the embassy and send a copy of it to John Davies, who was the senior of the political adviser group. He'd come out with Stilwell when Stilwell first came to China in '42.

Levenson: He was then headquartered in Delhi?

J. Service: He spent most of the time in Delhi. He occasionally made trips to Chungking, but after I was in Chungking, he came much less frequently because there wasn't perhaps the need. Of course a copy went to headquarters, and then I kept a copy.

These were all typed by myself on a small portable type-writer. I kept all the files-- What files there were were all at headquarters in my little office there. I never kept anything down at Adler's. I might have a notebook which I usually kept with things that were going on, that sort of thing. But, I didn't keep any reports, any typing, or anything like that down at Adler's.

Davies had by this time been with Stilwell for quite a while. He'd made trips with Stilwell back to the States. He went with Stilwell to the Cairo conference. So he had met a good many of the people in Washington, Hopkins--Currie, of course, he'd known well. He'd acted as a guide for Currie, I think, on both Currie's trips to China.

John had met several senators, and like Currie's approach to me, all these people were anxious to develop contacts, develop their own sources of information. So John was encouraged to keep them informed, to keep in contact. I think Stilwell himself realized John was extremely valuable, a press agent for him in a sense, an advocate for Stilwell's point of view.

The CBI theater had differences and problems. I've already alluded to some with the British, particularly in Burma and the Burma campaign in '42 and so on, when there was some friction with the British. We had, of course, plenty of disagreements with Chinese, and we were being attacked, shall we say, by Chennault, with Chinese connivance, with the Fourteenth Air Force point of view.

Circulation of Reports

J. Service: John did high level informational work of a sort from New Delhi. Copies of reports that I sent to him, if he thought them of interest, were retyped and then sent on to Washington. A lot of them got to Currie. Some of them went to other people.

Headquarters would send some things in, but not very much. I don't think headquarters was terribly interested. They were much more interested in what they were doing rather than sending

J. Service: stuff to Washington. That's why JICA [Joint Intelligence Collection Agency] was set up partly. They would send some things in.

Generally I didn't know what headquarters or Davies or the embassy sent to Washington. When stuff did get to Washington, if it was of interest to the receiving office, they might make copies. They would duplicate it. I've got several copies, for instance, of a memorandum that I wrote with the collaboration of Adler for Wallace's visit, the June 20 thing. This obviously was greatly welcomed and, shall we say, found of interest in Washington. So, apparently copies were made, typed copies, and we can see differences in the different versions.

Classification of Documents

Levenson: I know that you've made this point a number of times in a number of forums. But, were these papers automatically classified?

J. Service: Oh yes, of course. Everything was classified. It's hard to really explain why they were quote, "classified." They classified them because we were criticizing Chinese officials. Therefore, it was not something you wanted your Chinese officials to see. It was something that should be only used in background.

A document had to be classified to get prompt handling. Even if it got in the pouch, which would be unlikely for unclassified, when it reached the destination, why, no one was really going to pay much attention to it if it was unclassified. There were all sorts of these subjective reasons for classification.

When I was having my hearings in Washington we were able to have temporary use of copies of many of my reports. We found cases where even though I'd put a low classification on them, the receiving agency had changed the classification. I would put what I thought was a reasonable classification, generally confidential or something like that. But then the agency that transmitted it might put a different classification on it, higher. They might make it secret. I didn't know that, you see.

There was over-classification, particularly since a lot of this stuff had only timely value. What happened yesterday is of no great importance two or three days later if it's already become public in speeches and so on.

J. Service: I was on very good terms with a lot of people, so they would talk to me. Perhaps their confidence should be protected, Mme. Sun [Yat-sen] and so on. That should be protected. I would be informed sometimes that something was going to happen, but when it had happened it was no longer confidential.

The Democratic League, for instance, was going to put out some sort of a manifesto. This was a group of modern democratic parties. I was regarded as friendly and sympathetic. This was one way of getting people to confide in you, but in my case it was genuine and quite sincere. I didn't have to put on much of an act.

So, their man in Chungking was brought to me to ask me to check the translation, to see if I could improve the translation they were going to put out in English. They wanted to get maximum publicity. I made some note of this, I'm sure, some report, of the fact that this was coming out. But, of course, after it came out it was hardly confidential.

What was confidential was the fact that the person who brought this Democratic League representative to me was my very close, good friend, Chen Chia-k'ang, who was Chou En-lai's secretary. That was a matter of some political interest that they were working that closely with the Communists, that a man from Chou En-lai's office would have brought him around to me for improving the translation.

[Interview 8: October 3, 1977]

J. Service: When I left Yenan in 1944, the Communists knew I was going back to Washington, and so Yeh Chien-ying, the chief of staff, presented me just before I left with this wonderful great big map--about three by five feet I think it was--of all the north China guerrilla areas, beautifully done.

I noted he had no classification on it, and I said specifically to him, "Well now, General Yeh, is there any classification on this?"

"No classification at all! The Japanese know where we are."

So, I took it to Washington. Of course, I was asked in my usual process of debriefings to go over to military, to G-2 in the Pentagon. Everywhere I went I had the map. I rolled out the map. "Oh, very interesting. Can we borrow the map?"

I said, "Well, don't keep it very long because after all I need this." [chuckling] So, they promised, I think, to return it to me the next day. They were going to reproduce it.

J. Service: The next day when I got back it was all plastered with "confidential." I protested.

"Well," they said, "we've got to classify it because it shows where friendly troops are." It showed Kuomintang areas. But, this was a map of north China on a scale of perhaps one in two or three million. It was no good for artillery fire or anything like that. It was just general approximations, ten miles or twenty miles, something like that. "But, it shows our Allied troops, so we have to classify it."

I was thus barred officially, legally, from using that map any more in my briefings and talks around Washington.

Levenson: In your presentations and debriefings to government people.

J. Service: It was okay in classified groups and meetings. But I used it anyway, and to the press. Officially I was violating the regulations.

But, exactly the same map was published in a book written by Harrison Forman who was one of the correspondents in China at the time. He was given the same map, and it's a full-page spread in Harrison Forman's book, which was published not too long after this in 1945.*

Levenson: Once something is published, as in Forman's book, what sort of legal penalties can lie against somebody for using that? Even if the document that you yourself carried to Washington has been classified, doesn't it then enter the public domain?

J. Service: Yes, I would say logically, but you know, they would argue that after all reproduction of this map in a book of one page is very different from having the original hand drawn three by five foot original. This wouldn't necessarily get you off the hook if they wanted to make a point of it.

A very important point, of course, in all my hearings, was the confidentiality of the information that I gave as background to the press and to Jaffe particularly. The Loyalty Review Board said, "After all, some of this is only six weeks old. It's pretty hot stuff." It wasn't pretty hot stuff.

*Harrison Forman, Report from Red China, New York, Holland Company, 1945.

Val

J. Service: As one might expect, with most of my friends and associates being Chinese, I fell in love at this point with a Chinese woman. No particular apologies. It was not surprising perhaps. She was attractive. There were no American, and almost no Caucasian women in Chungking. I did it in a wholehearted way, probably unwisely. I told the ambassador about it. Sol was willing to let her move in, and so she simply moved in, lived at Adler's with me for several months. I wrote to Caroline and asked for a divorce, which she did not want to agree to.

This was a period when I got a tremendous amount of work done. I was in a kind of exhilaration, I think, partly with being in love but partly just the excitement of friends and events. I met literary and theater people through her. We used to be invited together. It was well known that we were friends. I was warned from both sides that she probably was a dangerous person, which to my mind meant that she probably wasn't, since each side thought she was probably working for the other side.

Levenson: When you talk about sides, who do you mean?

J. Service: Kuomintang and Communist.

Levenson: What was Gauss' reaction?

J. Service: Gauss' reaction was, "Well, don't be a damn fool." You don't need to talk about marrying the woman, in other words, was his attitude. "Why give up your marriage and probably your career?" --because it would have meant probably giving up my career in the Foreign Service. I couldn't say that he approved but at least he said, "Don't be public about it." [machine off]

Levenson: You mentioned to me when the tape recorder was off that she was a prominent actress.

J. Service: Yes, well, she was I would say fairly prominent. She was one of the three or four top actresses in Chungking. Through her I met an awful lot of people that I otherwise probably wouldn't have met, theatrical world, playwrights and so on. She was quite well known and I actually was invited to some of the high Kuomintang officials' homes with her.

It was an affair that did not affect the State Department, but it became involved in my affairs later on in other quarters of the State Department. Do we want to discuss that now?

- Levenson: We could talk about that either now or later.
- J. Service: It seems to me it's so out of chronology now that it would be confusing to do it now.
- Levenson: Yes. It obviously helped your work in a number of directions. Did it impair your work, say, in relation to your missionary contacts?
- J. Service: This is hard to know. I don't think so, because my missionary contacts in Chungking were not at all important. Missionary contacts were generally on the road, out of Chungking. When I say everybody knew about it, I doubt if the missionaries-- [laughing] The missionaries, they may not have known about it, since we moved in somewhat different circles normally.

Chungking Duties

- J. Service: I spoke of seeing the chief of G-2 every day. I saw the chief of staff fairly often. The army gave me other jobs to do. I may have given the impression last time, that I spent all my time running around loose in Chungking.

I was asked to report on certain topics that the army may have been interested in. One was the incident up in Sinkiang on the border there, which I wrote a number of reports about. We can make footnotes to them.*

I was often asked by G-2 to comment on other intelligence reports [chuckling] they received, particularly from the military attache. The military attache was very prone to accept at face value stuff that was fed to him by the Chinese, so that I occasionally had to prick those balloons.

I did some commenting on reports by people at OWI and so on.

- Levenson: What were the relations between the various American intelligence services in Chungking?

*Esherick, op. cit., pp. 121-129.

J. Service: G-2 tried to do some coordination. But, really there wasn't very much. As I mentioned before, they finally had to set up a special agency and send out a man from Washington to run it. It was called the Joint Intelligence Collection Agency, JICA. But he didn't have any great rank and he didn't have any power. It was simply persuasion.

Political reporting is one form of intelligence, but we think of it as political reporting rather than intelligence in the covert sense. People who worked for the Office of War Information would send in reports on conditions they observed in their traveling in the eastern part of China.

Graham Peck for instance was a remarkable guy who was spending most of his time in Kweilin. He was an artist, a writer. He'd done several excellent books on China. He got very close to Chinese, much the same way I did. But he was more limited by being in a particular environment. Kweilin was a center of intellectuals, many of them escapees from Hong Kong, anti-Kuomintang artists, and some of the people who were in the various dissident groups, some of them Democratic League, some of them Kwangsi military clique and so on.

He expected too much of the political significance of these people. We're all, you know, victims more or less of the people we know. Your reporting is as good as your contacts, as I said before. I was fortunate in a sense in being in a more metropolitan place, but also in being able to tap various different groups.

Ranked as Colonel

J. Service: This traveling for the army used to raise some questions. At first the army was very casual. They would just say go off and do this or that. Then I found I had to have a little more identification, because the question came, "Mr. Service, what and who the hell are you?"

Boarding planes, they'd start with the highest ranking officer, colonel and then major, captain, lieutenant, sergeant, then private first class, then privates, and then Mr. Service at the end. [laughter]

At any rate, I had army orders, which I didn't always want to pull out. But, I got an identification. Let me show it to you here. Do you want to turn the machine off?

FORWARD ECHELON
HEADQUARTERS U.S. ARMY FORCES
CHINA, BURMA AND INDIA


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19 July 1944

C E R T I F I C A T E

The bearer, JOHN S. SERVICE, whose signature and photograph appear below, is hereby certified to be a Second Secretary of Embassy and Consul of the United States of America, assigned to the American Embassy at Chungking and detailed to the staff of the Commanding General, United States Army Forces in China, Burma and India, and as such staff officer, in event of capture by the enemy is entitled to be treated as a prisoner of war, and that he will be given the same treatment, afforded the same privileges as an Officer in the Army of the United States of the grade of COLONEL, and receive compensation at the same rate as a COLONEL in the army of the detaining power.

By command of Lieutenant General STILWELL:


(Signature)


EDWIN M. CAHILL
Lt. Col., A.G.D.
Asst. Adjutant General



Levenson: Sure. [tape off]

I think we should have this in the manuscript, rank of colonel.

J. Service: Well actually, I wasn't terribly satisfied with that, but--
[laughter]

Levenson: How old were you then?

J. Service: Nineteen forty-four, I was thirty-five, not quite. I was still thirty-four at that time.

The question of garb eventually came up. At first they didn't care what we wore. This was typical of the theater. It was not very much on spit and polish, as you can imagine. Stilwell scorned such stuff. But, finally they decided that we should wear GI clothing. There was a patch that you wear on your shoulder [gesturing on left shoulder], triangular patch, showing that you're a civilian attached to the armed forces, and we wore that, just ordinary GI clothes. So, the pictures that were taken of me in Yen-an, for instance, always show me wearing that army uniform, but it had no insignia.

The B-29 Bases in Chengtu

J. Service: During this period I made several trips for headquarters. One was to Chengtu. There were rumors of anti-American feeling there because of the huge bases that were being built for the B-29's. We hadn't yet got far enough in the Pacific to try them out against Japan from Pacific airfields. We hadn't taken Saipan and Tinian yet.

Somebody dreamed up the idea that we'd build bases in west China, from which we could reach Manchuria and the southern tip of Japan, Kyushu and so on. It was done, of course, without any thought of the economic cost, or the problems and disturbance it would cause in China. It was pushed ahead as things were then when the top decided on it.

Large areas of most fertile farm land, rice paddies in the center of the rich Chengtu plain, were taken over for these huge bases. Hundreds of thousands of people were dislocated. Hundreds of thousands of people had to be mobilized to build them.

J. Service: There were some incidents there. I was sent up by Stilwell to try to find out what it was all about. This was what I was alluding to a while ago, that it was something that I was able to do almost completely without contacting the [Chinese] official sources, because, of course, they would have their own story.

I talked to some local Chinese YMCA people, and through them met some local Szechwanese people, business people, newspaper people, and so on.

I actually went out to see one of the bases, talked to some of the farmers. I wrote a series of reports on it, and I mentioned a number of things that could be done. One problem was that Chengtu had been bombed very heavily early in the war because it had been a base for some of the Russian planes, that the Russians gave, early, 1937, '38. There had been an aviation school set up there, and the Japanese came and bombed it quite heavily. So the populace, very practically and from long experience, were sure that big bomber bases would provoke Japanese retaliation.

One thing I reported that could be done would be to send some Fourteenth Air Force planes up there, detach them temporarily. This was one of the things that Stilwell headquarters fixed on. So they instructed Chennault to send some fighters to Chengtu.

Chennault found out that I was responsible, and this was apparently one of his real big complaints about me, was that I--[quickly and emphatically] "Amateurs that know nothing at all about it making these recommendations!" He deals with this, I think, in his book.*

[Vice-President Henry] Wallace was coming to China. I think Adler suggested that it would be good to do a briefing paper for him. I worked on a long report which has been published very extensively, a June 20th memo I think, which was really for Wallace. I'm not sure that Wallace read it, but the State Department got it and it got very wide circulation in the department. +

*Claire Lee Chennault, Way of a Fighter: The Memoirs of Claire Lee Chennault, ed. Robert Hotz, New York, G. P. Putnam Sons, 1949.

+Esherick, op. cit., pp. 138-157.

VIII THE DIXIE MISSION: YENAN, 1944

Permission Granted for an American Military Mission to
Communist Headquarters

J. Service: All this time we had been working on the question of getting permission to go to Yen-an. I don't think we want to go into a history of all that. [Colonel David] Barrett* has written some of it and a lot of other people have written books on the Dixie Mission. It can be dug out.

When Wallace was coming we thought that this would be a good time to try to make one more try. We drafted a message referring to various earlier messages. The White House had earlier sent a request, which the Chinese had agreed to. They would let us go to north China, any areas under Kuomintang control. Of course this was not what we wanted.

Anyway, we drafted a message to the War Department for [General George] Marshall summing up all this and suggesting that Wallace's visit would be a good time for a push. We got a message back which, as I recall, simply said that the White House had agreed that our message could be given to Chiang Kai-shek as being from the White House. In other words, all we had to do was to change the head and tail, you see, and say that this was from the White House.

We were elated at this, but it turned out that that morning --Wallace was already in town--that very morning Chiang Kai-shek had agreed. Apparently he decided that this was something he was going to be hit with. So, he'd agreed without being pushed on it.

*David D. Barrett, Dixie Mission: the United States Army Observer Group in Yen-an, 1944, Center for Chinese Studies, University of California, Berkeley, 1970.

J. Service: Well at any rate, this was a message which had to be delivered and we wanted to discuss details, so I was summoned with the chief of staff, who was General [Benjamin Greeley] Ferris, up to the embassy where Wallace was having lunch. We discussed tactics for the afternoon meeting. We arrived out at the Generalissimo's and said that this message had come in, and although it wasn't necessary we wanted him to know that the president thought this very important. But, all this is in Foreign Relations.

Levenson: What was your impression of Wallace?

J. Service: I was quite impressed. In a small group like this, he was very quick on the uptake, very intelligent, quite well informed. He was very good on absorbing all the details and deciding what was the best way. He would say this, we would say this, and so on. He carried it off very well. I mean he functioned beautifully. He had some fuzzy and wild ideas, and I couldn't support him in his run for the president. But when it came to an administrative sort of thing, he was awfully good.

Levenson: How did Chiang Kai-shek respond?

J. Service: Like a stick of wood, impassive. They were very surprised when we walked in. Madame showed her surprise at seeing me there. I was there with Ferris, you see. They had expected Wallace. He was due to come out for that afternoon meeting, and Vincent was traveling with him and Lattimore. We were two extra people that they hadn't expected.

She walked into the room. Hollington Tong whom I mentioned before, was there to interpret. She was a bit surprised, and then we explained why we were there. After we'd finished this, Ferris and I withdrew. We weren't there for the last part of the talk.

Levenson: Was she at this point hostile to you, do you think?

J. Service: Oh yes. By this time they had already decided that I was not a friend. I'd been interpreter when Ferris had to deliver the first messages about putting Stilwell in command of Chinese troops. I had been an interpreter on two sessions, where it was supposed to be "Eyes Alone," which meant that we asked the other people to withdraw. I think the Chiangs by this time had a [chuckling] pretty good idea that I was one of the pushers on this business--I made no particular bones of it--getting up there to Yen-an. That was an unfriendly act as far as they were concerned.

Levenson: Do you want to comment at all on those "Eyes Alone" meetings, or do you feel that's been covered adequately?

J. Service: There's masses of it in the hearings I think.

I don't think there's much need to talk about Yen-an or plans for Yen-an. I had earlier on had a talk with Stilwell and suggested that the logical man to go was Barrett, and Stilwell agreed.

When we got permission then we immediately canvassed the various operating agencies in the theater to see if they wanted to be represented--the Twentieth Bomber Command, the people in Chengtu, the B-29's, the Fourteenth Air Force, the OSS of course. Then there were various OSS groups that were put under Fourteenth Air Force, air ground rescue service, and photo, something like photo--and specialists that the Fourteenth Air Force didn't have that OSS was able to supply.

Fourteenth Air Force would not officially send anybody to join our group, because Chennault was playing the Chiang Kai-shek game. He wasn't going to do anything that would complicate his relations with Chiang Kai-shek.

Impressions of Yen-an: Confidence, Friendliness, and Efficiency

J. Service: We finally got up to Yen-an on July 22, 1944, and that's all written up in Barrett's book. I don't see the point in going into it very much.

Levenson: Well, only to the extent of what you thought and felt. After all, it was a turning point in so many ways.

J. Service: Yes, but I've reported on it so fully. You know, you've got my monograph and testimony at great length. I just hate to get too redundant. My impressions of Yen-an are all written down in my reports.

Part of the thing that dazzled us--dazzled us is too strong a word--was the difference in attitude in Yen-an. Chungking was simply waiting for the end of the war to come. Most of the people were from down river, and they were waiting so they could go back to their homes and their families in Shanghai or Nanking.

Here up in Yen-an--they had nothing, and they were poor as anything, off in the boondocks--the whole atmosphere was just full of confidence and enthusiasm. They were absolutely sure

J. Service: that they were winning. As the Communists always say, the situation is excellent. Talk about your YMCA sort of spirit of optimism and so on, this was it to the nth degree. Everything is positive, everything is good, we're going to win, we are on the winning road.

We hadn't expected this. They obviously expected, as we got to talk to them more, expected to be very important in the post-war era, expected to share power, at least, with the Kuomintang. They were quite confident that, "The Kuomintang can never whip us, can never take away these territories."

Their whole attitude was a very different one. It was very much like my own feelings that I had found, new feelings, with my Chinese friends, of acceptance, of hospitality, of not being guarded, of not holding people off. Their liaison officers came and sat and joined our mess. People would drop in to see you. It was all very informal, as I say, like a sort of a Christian summer conference atmosphere. People were living fairly close together.

Mao Tse-tung might drop by for a chat in the evening, or Chu Teh, or we could go over and see them almost at any time or on very short notice. They had some telephones, very poor ones. But, you could call over to the headquarters and say, "Can I come on over?" "Sure." If you came, it might be a "Stay for lunch" sort of thing. It was all a very congenial, friendly, frank sort of an atmosphere. Of course, there were things they didn't tell us, but we didn't know what they were. [laughter]

Levenson: You used the word, "dazzled" and then somewhat backed off from it.

J. Service: Yes.

Levenson: There have been a couple of types of criticism made of you. One was that you went "native." The other that you were seduced or converted or what have you by the Chinese Communists.

J. Service: Yes. Well, we tried very hard, I think, to avoid that. We didn't draw our conclusions immediately. We tried to wait a time until people had traveled in the areas and gotten out and seen what the guerrillas were doing and what things were like.

But the confidence that we ran into, the difference in the morale, esprit, this was something that hit us right away. The way things got done. If you asked for things, yes, they said they'd do it, and it was done, promptly, in fact, efficiently. In Chungking nothing was efficient. Nothing seemed to work and everything took a long time.

J. Service: If we wanted to talk to Japanese prisoners, "Oh yes, we've got a lot of them down the road. You're welcome." In Chungking it was the hardest thing in the world to get ahold of any real Japanese prisoners. But, almost anything-- "Newspapers, yes, we can get them for you." Pretty soon we started getting newspapers from Peking and other occupied cities in a very surprisingly short time.

All sorts of things. For instance, they had been publishing a paper all through the war up in Yen-an, a party paper; I asked Chou En-lai whether I could possibly get a set of back copies. "Certainly!" A couple of days later bales of papers arrived: he sent them up. Almost anything-- They were very outgoing-- cooperative.

We had a very elaborate briefing when we first got there. We told them: "We're not in a position to negotiate. We're not in a position to promise. We're here to observe. We want to find out all we can about you, what you've been doing, what the war has been like, what you think of it." So, they arranged a very extensive series of briefings.

Chinese don't seem to mind any length of talk or briefings. Each day we'd have another Communist leader come and spend the whole day more or less briefing us. Sometimes it was two days. Chu Teh, Yeh Chien-ying, all the top military people, P'eng Teh-huai, Lin Piao, and then people from the various areas. A lot of them were already in Yen-an.

They were talking about having their seventh party congress, apparently waiting for the opportune time. A lot of people had come in from outlying places. It might take them a month or two months to get there. So, they were already in Yen-an waiting. A lot of these people gave us briefings. I took heavy notes on all this. Then I was interviewing people, going talking to people.

Mao said at one of the very early meetings, "I suppose you want to see me," you know, with a smile on his face. I said, "Why yes, certainly I do." But, he said, "I want to see you also, but I think maybe it's better if we wait till we get acquainted a bit, you see more about us, know more about us, and then our talk will be more useful."

Just a month later I got word, "Could I see the chairman the next day at two thirty" or something. I think it was two o'clock. I said, "Of course, I can." The talk was one that lasted from two till ten at night.

J. Service: I had notes on all these things, but when I came back from Japan in '50 for the McCarthy hearings, why--Caroline, I think, had always felt that these notebooks were bad things to have around --she threw them all overboard.

Levenson: What, all your notes from the Yen-an period? [pause] Good place to stop?

J. Service: Yes, I suppose. It's twelve o'clock.

Chungking-Yenan Contrasts

[Interview 9: October 3, 1977]

J. Service: I thought we'd now go back to Yen-an where we were last time. You asked me something about attitudes, impressions of Yen-an. I think that one thing that you have to remember, of course, is we went to Yen-an--and I'm speaking particularly of myself--from the background of Chungking.

I'd been in Chungking a long time, maybe too long. Maybe I'd lost my perspective a little bit. Chungking was discouraging, a gloomy place to be. People were waiting for the end of the war, or they were trying to do as little as possible in prosecuting the war. There was rampant inflation with all the suffering and dissatisfaction, complaining, that that caused. Rampant inflation with nothing really being done to check it. There was no rationing, things like that. Wealthy people did not get conscripted. Young people stayed in universities all through the war, because university students were not subject to military service.

You had all sorts of things like this. The attitude of the Chinese officials, generally, that you met was rather resentful. They had a feeling that you were critical of them. There was beginning to be criticism of China at this time in the American press. So they were rather on guard, rather prickly. They felt that we weren't giving them very much, we weren't doing what we should for China. So most of our official relations in Chungking were uncomfortable, uneasy.

A Diversion: Tai Li's Bunch of Ringers

J. Service: They were particularly suspicious of me. The fact that one could speak Chinese, read Chinese, was something that made them suspicious. When Tai Li made his agreement with the navy, with SACO--Sino-American Cooperation Organization under "Mary" Miles --one of the stipulations was there would be no people who knew Chinese. They didn't want anybody who spoke Chinese.

Levenson: Why was this agreed to?

J. Service: Simply because it was an incredibly absurd, foolish enterprise. There isn't any logical reason why such a thing should be agreed upon, except that it was just a crazy setup from the very beginning. There is no logical explanation.

One man got in by mistake. I hate to get diverted here, but this was a fellow named Banks Holcombe who was a Japan language officer. The navy sent him to Japan. He was a Marine officer. He studied Japanese.

"Mary" Miles' outfit started trying to do some codebreaking. So they needed somebody who knew Japanese.

The wheels ground around, and they turned up this guy who was a Japan language officer. He was sent off to join "Mary" Miles' cryptographic outfit.

It turned out that Banks Holcombe had grown up in China, because his father was a Marine general, General Holcombe, who was sent out to command a Marine contingent in 1927, when we expected trouble in China.

So, Banks had gone to school in Peking and knew Chinese very well. At any rate, one big function of the "Mary" Miles outfit was to train guerrillas. You'd bring in a bunch of guerrillas and give them the course, teach them demolition, various other hot shot stuff.

Then, at graduation "Mary" Miles himself would present each one with a graduation kit, meaning a carbine, a 45 pistol, various things like this, a bunch of goodies, and some plastic explosives. They went forth, presumably, as well-equipped guerrillas.

Because Banks had been in China, Chinese all didn't look alike to him. He got acquainted with Chinese and would talk to them. He was at one of these graduation exercises, and he realized that there were a couple of people there that he knew.

J. Service: So, he went up and spoke to these guys afterward. "Didn't I see you here last course?" The man laughed in an embarrassed way and admitted the truth. What Tai Li was doing was to use a bunch of ringers. He was just running them through the course. [laughter] They got better and better each time presumably.

They got Banks Holcombe out of there. He was shipped out immediately.

Levenson: What, Tai Li reported--

J. Service: Oh yes. Yes. The Chinese caught on to the fact that he was a little too smart. So, he was moved up and out.

High Levels of Information and Conversation in Yen'an

J. Service: Well, that got me diverted. Anyway, I was talking about the Kuomintang attitudes. We got to Yen'an and, of course, we were welcomed. They had been isolated, blockaded. They had already gotten some press people up there just before we got there.

Just going there was a form of American recognition, and this was tremendously important and very welcome. We were treated with open arms and red carpet treatment. The fact that Barrett could speak Chinese and I could speak Chinese, the fact that we had, I think, six people in our group who had spent time in China, who knew some Chinese, which was a very high proportion--

Levenson: Out of what, fourteen?

J. Service: Out of sixteen I think it was. There were quite a bunch of us that had been in China teaching, or had grown up in China.

So that there was immediately a very warm, cordial atmosphere. They were interested in what was happening in the outside world. They'd been completely isolated. They wanted to talk to us. They asked us all sorts of questions.

Levenson: This was one of the questions on an agenda I haven't given to you. How much did they know about the progress of the war, and how good was their way of evaluating the information they got, because their frame of reference must have been so antiquated by then?

J. Service: They were quite well informed actually as far as the news reports went, because they listened to radio news, they got newspapers from free China, and they got newspapers from occupied China. They got Japanese publications. They had very little in the way of foreign publications. They were very eager to get anything that we could get them. We got Time and Life and things like that, that were very late of course by the time we got them. But this sort of stuff they were very happy to get.

They tended to follow the Russian line, although they didn't completely on the war because they'd been attacked themselves. In other words, they didn't buy the "phony war" line completely in the '39 to '41 period. They paid lip service to it: it was an imperialistic war. But, they were anxious for the war to reach China. [laughter]

I would say that under the circumstances they were quite realistic. In some ways they had a fairly good understanding of the United States. They realized the effect of the political campaign coming on in the fall of '44, that this was not a time for Roosevelt to make commitments. They said, "We realize this. We'll wait till after the campaign is over." After the campaign was over they wrote to Roosevelt and congratulated him. Roosevelt wrote back. It was quite a cordial letter.

They were astounded at Truman's nomination, but then so were we all. I mean we were dumbfounded when it came over the news that the Democratic convention had nominated Truman as vice-president.

We were having dinner that night with the leaders over at the army headquarters. There were two tables, as I recall, at least two tables. Generally, I was regarded as the civilian leader and Barrett as the military leader. I was generally put at the table or place of honor with Mao Tse-tung, and Chu Teh gave Barrett the honors.

I could sense that Mao was very impatient to get through with all the folderol about getting into our places and getting seated. So, as soon as we sat down he came out with it. [loudly] "Who is this Too-lu-mun? Who is Too-lu-mun?" Who is this man Truman? [laughter] Most of the dinner was devoted then to trying to explain how it was possible that someone completely unknown, or almost completely unknown, no great record of war or political service, could suddenly be chosen vice-president.

Wallace, of course, had been vice-president. Wallace had made a trip to China. Everyone assumed Wallace would be renamed. Chinese were worried that Wallace's visit to China had been what did him in, because it was during his visit that we got permission to go up to Yen-an.

J. Service: They were concerned, what this meant, you know, about attitudes toward China, attitudes toward the Soviet Union. They could imagine all sorts of things into it, because they didn't have any comprehension of the domestic political situation in the United States.

Well, we didn't know too much about it either. So we were sort of helpless. It was an amusing incident. Obviously Mao had given a hard time to Chou En-lai, because they were quite relieved when they found we were about as confused as they were. [laughter]

This is sort of typical of the intellectual atmosphere. Most of them were intellectuals. Some were military men, but even most of the military men had had an intellectual period in their lives. Ch'en Yi, for instance, whom I got to know very well--did I mention before--always referred to me sort of jokingly as his teacher's son, because he attended the YMCA school in Chengtu.

But they were not tied up with government administration because government and party were quite separate. There was a local government for the border areas. The party was quite separate. Of course, some people overlapped. But people like Mao and so on had no role in the local government.

You had a scattered group--sixteen or so--of these border areas behind the Japanese lines, far away, communications very poor. They had to be there on their own. A lot of these leaders had been called in to Yen-an in expectation of a party congress, which wasn't actually held until spring of '45. But, they were expecting it and waiting for the appropriate time. So, there were a lot of people in Yen-an without very much to do. They were just sitting there waiting, people like Ch'en Yi from the New Fourth Army and a man from Shantung.

They were quite happy and delighted to sit and talk for hours and hours and hours. But, even people like Mao Tse-tung -- As I said, my first interview with him was an eight hour interview with dinner. "Of course, you'll stay for supper" sort of thing, pot luck. Pot luck turned out to be just Mao and Chiang Ch'ing and the interpreter.

Dances, Fun, and Games in Yenan

J. Service: I had forgotten completely about Chiang Ch'ing until later on when my reports became available. My notes were destroyed as I mentioned before. But, it wasn't until many years later that these reports were published in Foreign Relations. I was able to see that Chiang Ch'ing had been there.

Levenson: Any recollection now of her presence or her personality?

J. Service: She was pleasant. I remember more her dancing. We had these dances every Saturday night, which was a sort of a--[pauses, then laughs] I don't know what's the right word-- They were fun. Miserable conditions. Most of them were outdoors--it was the summer time and fall--on packed earth, under some pear trees, a pear orchard. A pickup orchestra would play one fox trot (an alleged fox trot), one waltz, and then one yang-ko, a local folk song. It was like a conga, sort of one, two, three, oomp; one, two, three, oomp sort of a thing. It wasn't only the dances, but there was a sort of a lightheartedness about the place. I mentioned before the confidence, the morale, esprit.

We had been given some games by special services in Chung-king, including a game of monopoly. Some of the Chinese who were attached to the liaison offices saw us playing monopoly. The next thing we knew they had gone away and manufactured a game of monopoly, but all based on Shanghai real estate! [laughter] These were all down-river people. It was Nanking Road and the Bund and the Park Hotel and Cathay and all the rest of the hotels. It was all based on Shanghai. [laughter] They just thought it was absolutely hilarious! Monopoly, by the way, is banned in the Soviet Union.

We had an accident with our plane when we landed, because the landing strip had been built over a graveyard and one wheel of the plane fell into a shallow grave. They decided to improve and extend the airfield. Everyone was contributing a day of labor, so I suggested to Barrett that we do the same since it was being built for our benefit. Barrett agreed.

We went out, but it turned out to be counterproductive in a sense because no one--there were several thousand people out there working--but none of them had ever seen any white men ever doing any work. So, everyone had to stop working and watch us! [laughter]

J. Service: We played baseball. Barrett was insistent on having baseball, some exercise, some organized recreation. Usually in the afternoon before supper he liked to have a baseball game. There was enough to just get up two teams. I was a very poor baseball player. I never learned in my youth, so I couldn't catch a fly properly. I was always put out in right field, which was out among some apple trees, so that there wasn't much hope of catching any flies anyway. I could only chase them.

There was the Japanese Peoples' Emancipation League. They didn't call them prisoners after they joined the emancipation league, which was being run by Okano, the leader of the Japanese Communist party, who now is called Nosako but used the name Okano at that time. Anyway, they put on an evening benefit for us.

Everybody put on benefits. We had all sorts of theatricals and musical shows. At one of the early ones, we were much embarrassed. It was just after our arrival. After their music, they said, "Now our American friends should sing." We didn't have any choir or chorus. We did some quick consultation and found that there were a few people who could do barber shop quartet or college glee club type singing.

The only song that they knew was "You Are My Sunshine." So, they sang "You Are My Sunshine." The next question was, "Translate! Translate!" Pretty silly when you tried to translate! [laughter] Might not be so bad, for the Cultural Revolution though, because "You Are My Sunshine" could apply to Mao Tse-tung, of course, in the Cultural Revolution.

Going back to the baseball game, we eventually had a baseball game with these Japanese prisoners, which was very amusingly written up by an OWI man, Adie Suesdorf, many years later, in the New Yorker magazine. I expect it was the only baseball game during the war between Americans and Japanese prisoners.

I mentioned we had a long series of briefings by all the military people and top leaders. After that I pretty much was on my own. I went to the briefings, of course. But, after that I went around talking to various people, meeting various people, making my own schedule.

Mao himself was very apt to say on some subject, "You want to talk about economic policy. Well, the man for you to see is Po Ku. Go talk to Po Ku." Or, I wanted to talk about party and party work in the occupied areas. "Well, the man to see on that is Liu Shao-ch'i." So, arrangement was made for me to go

J. Service: to talk to Liu Shao-ch'i. As far as I know, I'm the only American that ever really had any lengthy talk with him. None of the newspaper people saw Liu Shao-ch'i at that time.

But, I talked to lots of people. I went to Lu Hsun Academy. I talked to some of the young intellectuals from Kuomintang China who had come into the Communist area and had been sent out to work in the villages. It's just exactly the same thing that's being done now. The thing was when these people came and wanted to volunteer, "Well, you've got to go out in the villages and stay for a year or two and prove that you can live with the villagers, work with the villagers, sort of prove yourself." These people were pretty starry-eyed about it, a lot of them.

There was a nurse that I met at the dances who had been on the Long March. She was a very pleasant peasant girl really. She was a nurse at the international hospital. She seemed almost eagerly friendly and we used to go for walks occasionally. But, it had to stop there. Apart from a perhaps unusual personal caution, Barrett had set the rule, and we all agreed, that there should be no American-Chinese Communist "relations."

Levenson: You were going to tell me more about the nurse whom you met.

J. Service: The friendly, cheerful nurse in Yen-an who'd been on the Long March. There weren't very many women on the Long March.

Levenson: Briefly, the Long March—most people reading this will know—but that was--

J. Service: I assume they will. It was the long trek from the Communist areas in southeast China, mainly Kansu province, all through southwest and west China, finally up to Shensi province. The main group that Mao and Chou En-lai were with started in October, 1934, and they finished up in Shensi province in October, '35. So, it was just about a year.

The nurse hadn't been in on most of the fighting. Most of the stories were all about the derring-do and the great exploits and crossing the rivers and things like that. But, one thing that she was still annoyed about was the discrimination against women when it came to the question of bathing, which was terribly important. They had no clothes except what was on their backs. They got very dirty and lousy and so on.

J. Service: Chinese have no feeling about male nudity, but they're very prudish when it comes to female nudity. So, when they came to rivers and streams, why there was no problem. The men could just strip and bathe. But, because they didn't want to offend the lao pai hsing, the country people, the women weren't allowed to strip down and take baths. It was very difficult for them, and she still resented the difficulty of bathing along this Long March ten years later.

She also talked about the fact that they couldn't do very much for the wounded. If they had wounded, seriously wounded, more seriously wounded than able to walk, they simply had to leave them behind. They tried to find some peasants who would take them in.

But, it was apparently a sad business because the Kuomintang troops were following them all the time, chasing them, and if these people were found by the Kuomintang they would be killed. The expectation was they'd be killed. It was just a continual process of having to abandon their seriously wounded people. That's about all of that.

Levenson: We read now of people going to China and resenting the fact that the sort of personal intimacy that develops—and I'm not talking about sexual intimacy—that develops normally between people who spend some time together is not now possible. You know the sorts of books to which I'm referring. Was it possible then?

J. Service: Oh, absolutely possible, completely possible. In fact this was it. We were experiencing it. I mentioned this in Chungking with my own group of close friends, and it was certainly true in Yen-an.

I think that there were some things that they would have been discreet about. Ch'en Chia-k'ang whose name I mentioned a couple times—he was a secretary for Chou En-lai—was quite frank even about many of the party affairs, Wang Ming and the background of the rectification movement which was sort of tapering off when we got to Yen-an. We were really close friends, just as I would be close friends with an American. There were very few subjects that we couldn't discuss.

This was one of the reasons why we enjoyed Yen-an because we were able to make very close friends. Koji Ariyoshi, a Japanese Nisei who was with us, became very close friends with some people quite high up in the party.

1. Yen-an, pagoda above caves. Airstrip to the left.
2. John S. Service taking notes during Yen-an briefing.
3. Helping to repair airstrip damaged by heavy American planes.
4. Left to right: Major E. T. Cowan, John S. Service, Mao Tse-tung, Yeh Chien-ying, Yen-an, 1944.
5. Left to right: Chou En-lai, Mao Tse-tung, and U.S. Ambassador Patrick J. Hurley. In Chungking for talks with Chiang Kai-shek, August 29, 1945.

neg avail for all



1.



2.



3.



J. Service: I'm sure that others also found close contacts. It was an informal atmosphere and everything was possible at the time we were there. Later on things changed of course. It became obvious that we were not going to go ahead and give them anything, that Hurley was going to be rigid and insist on everything being done through Chiang Kai-shek and so on.

The man that was sent to replace Barrett was a military attache whose reports, I mentioned, I used to have to deflate because he was willing to believe everything the Kuomintang said. He was an incredible choice to send up there.

And then after him Wedemeyer got a man who was a Russian expert because, "By God, we needed someone who knew the Communists." The only thing we knew was that he'd served in the Soviet Union. He predicted that the Soviet Russians weren't going to last--I may be exaggerating--more than ten days or something like that. I mean he was one of the extreme pessimists who said that the Russians can't possibly stop the Germans. So, he had to be taken out of the Soviet Union. He was sitting around in Washington and Wedemeyer wanted a Communist expert, so they sent him out to Yenan.

Levenson: Why was a man like that appointed? Did it represent a relegation of China to a third-class position in terms of American policy?

J. Service: By the time Yeaton was appointed--he was the Soviet expert--I think that the idea had really taken hold that they needed to get in a whole new crop. In other words, the idea became very fashionable that everyone who had served in China had preconceived ideas, had prejudices, and what was needed was a whole new crew.

In the McCarthy period the theme was: "Where there's smoke, there must be fire." During the Hurley period it was: "Anybody who has served in China already has preconceived ideas." You had to get fresh minds, fresh attitudes.

I think Wedemeyer was quite willing to buy this. I think by this time he was tired of squabbling. So, "Let's get in somebody who's a Communist expert." Everyone assumed--Hurley and I'm sure Wedemeyer too and even apparently Roosevelt--that the Chinese Communists after all would do what the Russians told them to do.

Evaluation of the Dixie Mission Team

Levenson: Perhaps this is a good point to ask you your evaluation of the rest of the original Dixie Mission team. You had Barrett as leader, and he wrote his own monograph. Does what he wrote jibe with what you recall his impressions to have been at the time, 1944? Did subsequent policy, subsequent historical developments, alter his views?

J. Service: I didn't read his reports at the time, but--

Levenson: You must have talked.

J. Service: I talked to him. He apologizes in his book, sort of apologizes for having been swept off his feet and not having realized the evils of Communism, this sort of thing. He protests a little too much and I think unnecessarily. But, certainly the fact that he does apologize indicates that he was supporting something different at the time, doesn't it?

The group on the whole was a good group. As I said, we had quite a number of people with some background in China. I think the people, the signal people, meteorological people, weather reporting people, air ground rescue, all these people were very competent.

The order of battle man was competent but inclined to go on his own. He tried to operate a bit independently of Barrett, and he had to be pulled in a couple of times. OSS had some people, demolition people, who were competent. The doctor was an excellent man, who had grown up in India. His parents were missionaries. He was a superb person. Ludden was there from the Twentieth Bomber Command.

The Twentieth Bomber Command sent up a colonel, a target man, and he didn't know anything about China at all. Considering that the observer mission was an army operation, it was, I thought, very good.

Most of the people were genuinely interested. We had good people. For instance, Ariyoshi who came up to work with the Japanese prisoners, psych warfare business and propaganda, was very good.

There was a certain amount of milling around and some people didn't know what to do and weren't very much engaged. A couple of them got into the habit of sitting around and

J. Service: drinking. One man's marriage had just broken up. He obviously was not happy, but I don't think that we ought to dwell on that sort of thing.

Levenson: No.

J. Service: Going back to the nurse, a very nice person, but one could not know whether there might also have been some sort of official connection. I mean she may have been working for whatever secret police the Communists had. I don't know. That's that.

American Journalists and Other Foreigners in Yenan

J. Service: When we got to Yenan, there was a contingent of press people already there.

The Chinese gave permission in the spring of 1944 for the press to go up—they insisted they would have to stay for an extended period, for at least six weeks or two months, something like that.

People like Teddy White and Brooks Atkinson couldn't take the time. So, they got stringers to go. [Israel] Epstein went up for the New York Times I think. Gunther Stein, who was writing for the Guardian and I think for the Monitor, did go. Votaw went. He got some commissions from various papers. The minister of information wanted him in. Harrison Forman was a sort of a free lance, and he went.

When we got there these people had already been up there for six weeks at least. They had interviewed all the top people. They had collected a lot of information. They made all of this available to me immediately. As soon as I got there I had reams of material that had been collected by these people and that I was free to use. A lot of my early reports were just transmitting interviews with Gunther Stein and so on.

This is the sort of collaboration with the press I talked about earlier. When they first got word they could go, Gunther talked to me about what sort of things we were interested in, what I would recommend. So, I had a long conversation with Gunther. He was German originally, a German Jewish refugee. He was very methodical and very complete.

J. Service: After I'd been in Yen-an for a while Ch'en Chia-k'ang, my friend, at some point said to me what a pest this guy Stein was. [laughter] They never could satisfy him. They never could get all the information he wanted. So, I broke down laughing. He said, "What are you laughing about?" So, I explained to him that I had connived with Stein, with Gunther. [laughter]

His book is the best on Yen-an--far more complete though not as exciting as Forman's book.

We began to get rescued [American] pilots that were brought in. Some of them had come down near Peking, way up in the north-east corner, and been brought down through the guerrilla areas all the way across north China.

We began to send out our own people on field trips.

I had already while in Chungking talked to various foreigners who had come through the Communist areas, people who'd gotten out of Peking, and some out of Shanghai even. People like the Bands and a man named Martel Hall. I had talked to them in Chungking at great length.

There were foreigners in Yen-an who had worked there for a long time. There was George Hatem, Ma Hai-teh. There was an Austrian doctor Hans Muller, a refugee who had gone to China and then moved up there.

There was Michael Lindsay (Lord Lindsay now), an instructor at Yenching University who just went out to the Western Hills at the time of Pearl Harbor and got in contact with guerrillas. You can see the Western Hills from Peking. He'd worked with the Communists, first in one of the areas closer to Peking and then at Yen-an for a long time.

So, there was a group of people, certainly sympathetic to the Communists, but nonetheless people we could talk to very frankly and fully. So that we had a good many sources of information besides just being fed the line.

One day I was talking to Chou En-lai. He pulled out a slip of paper and said, "Do you know this person?" Written on it was: Ferry Shafer.

I said, "Why yes, I know Ferry Shafer very well..

He laughed. He said, "Well, we have him. He's down in the lu-kuan, an inn for caravans in one of the suburbs of town, and he heard you were here and said he knew you."

J. Service: Shafer was a Hungarian, and thus considered a friendly alien in Japanese-occupied Shanghai. He was not interned in other words. On some excuse he had gotten as far as Taiyuan, which is up in Shansi province, traveling on Japanese-held railways. Then, in Taiyuan he had managed to skip out of town and get with the guerrillas. Of course, they were suspicious of him. He was an enemy alien as far as they were concerned.

He had close contacts with KMT people. He allowed a KMT radio to be set up in his house for a while in Shanghai. Why he decided to go up to the Communist area I don't know. They had him under what amounted to house arrest.

Chou told me where he was. I went around to see Ferry. He and a man named Sandor had been prisoners in the Austro-Hungarian army in World War I. After being taken prisoners by the Russians, the revolution came. The camps were opened. They just took off. The easiest way to go was east, so they worked themselves all the way across Siberia--there were lots of prisoners that did this--and finally got to China.

Ferry had training as an architect, draftsman, and engineer. He had gone up to Chungking to survey the highway from Chungking to Chengtu, and Sandor had gone up to open a branch for the American Oriental Bank in Shanghai. They'd been in Chungking when my parents were there and had become very close friends of my parents. Then later when I worked in Shanghai as an architect's draftsman in the YMCA building bureau, Ferry had been my tutor.

Anyway, I told Chou En-lai that I thought he was okay. The next time a plane came to Yen-an, we gave him a ride down to Chungking.

Later on I got down to Chungking myself and got in touch with him and found out that he was selling all his reminiscences to the Catholics. Catholics were paying. He had no money, so he [chuckling] had become a sort of an informer for the Catholics. I got him some money and told him to get the hell out of there and get to the States, which he did. [laughter]

Daily Life: No Inflation Woes

J. Service: One thing that struck you in Yen-an was that inflation had been taken care of because taxes and salaries and almost anything else were in kind. Everybody was paid in barley or millet. Yen-an was not heavily populated. There was lots of free land

J. Service: around, so everybody started gardens. Most everybody had some sort of a victory garden. It was not crowded. By contrast, in a city like Chungking there was not a blade of grass or a tree.

The army for instance, took over an abandoned area. There had been depopulation in this area, famine, earthquake, civil war, bandits, and so on. The area had been quite substantially depopulated and there was plenty of vacant land.

This brigade, which was the garrison for the Yen-an area, then developed it, planted fields, and was self-supporting practically.

This was true of almost everybody. They were at least partially self-supporting. Even Mao himself had his own garden.

Levenson: What were the domestic arrangements? Who did the cooking?

J. Service: In Yen-an they set up a mess hall. They provided the food. It was simple food.

I think we policed our own quarters. I don't recall anybody doing that. Whether they swept out for us or not I don't know.

Levenson: Did the Chinese eat communally?

J. Service: Most of the people did. There were several different living complexes, and I think most people ate in a sort of dining hall. But, as I recall, when I would go and see somebody like Chou En-lai, he had a choice. Of course, Chou was one of the top leaders. He could have food brought up to his cave from the joint mess hall which was down below in a building. Or sometimes we went down and ate down there.

It was like a cafeteria. You just went down and filled up a table. Then they would bring the dishes—three or four dishes—quite simple food, plenty of it. Up in north China it was mostly a lot of noodles and steamed bread (mantou) and that sort of stuff.

They gave the observer group semi-foreign food, as I recall. Also we brought along some things of our own. We had our own coffee and sugar (because they had very little sugar—sugar was very scarce) and powdered milk.

Barrett mentions in his book we wanted to pay for the food, and they didn't want us to. I don't know whether that continued all the way through, but in the early days we were treated as their guests.

Levenson: How did they manage about non-indigenous supplies like gasoline for example?

J. Service: They had no cars, or practically none. They had one truck and an old ambulance that had been sent to them. There was an old oil well that had been put down by Standard Oil, New York, about 1916. There were some oil seepages in the northern part of Shensi province. The oil company decided it wasn't worth developing, and so they had just gone away and left it. They got a little bit from this, a few barrels a day.

One of these military attache reports that I had to puncture was an elaborate story that was put out by the KMT that the Communists had made an agreement with the Japanese to supply some enormous quantity of gasoline from the oil wells in north Shensi. It was preposterous, because to transport the quantities that they were talking about you'd need roads, you'd need an enormous number of trucks, and you'd need a whole distribution system. You'd need some way of getting the stuff across the Yellow River, because the Japanese were on one side and the oil wells on the other side.

I said, "These things don't exist but you can check by sending an airplane. It's easy enough to find out. These quantities of oil could not be gotten out of the wells, refined, and transported without a big network."

They got along with very little imported stuff. That's why sugar, for instance, was very scarce, why rice was hard to get. They raised some rice at this new development that the army had done. But by and large, rice was scarce.

Cloth was a great problem. They'd had a self-sufficiency campaign to meet the effects of blockade.

Fortunately, they had salt. When they were in Kansu, one of the problems that really whipped them was that they had no salt.

But they produced salt and the Kuomintang areas this time needed salt. So this gave them some smuggling wherewithal, shall we say.

There was some trade with the Japanese-occupied areas. They didn't apologize for it. But there were no luxury goods. What struck you in the Kuomintang areas was that luxury goods could come in. Anything could come in. There was no restriction. But you had no luxuries on the markets in Yenan.

J. Service: There were some cigarettes that were bought, towels, combs, and mirrors, things like that you would get. I don't think they could make something like an enamel cup, for instance. They could beat something out of tin, but even tin was probably in short supply.

Anything else?

Prisoners of War

Levenson: Yes. The Japanese prisoners, how sophisticated do you think their interrogation was?

J. Service: I don't think I ought to spend much time on this sort of thing because it was not a subject I went into very much, and it's been written up pretty well elsewhere.

They were very anxious to take prisoners for propaganda reasons. There was, as far as we could find out, no brutality at all. They had some Japanese Communists with them, Nosako and another man. Most of them were peasants, not very highly educated, common soldiers. They were treated well. They were even allowed to go back if they wanted to, after a certain time. But very few of them went back because they were afraid what would happen to them if they went back.

They were used to make propaganda, write propaganda material. It was an interesting sort of experience, but it required a lot of time, a lot of expenditure of effort. On the whole, they didn't take a great many prisoners. They had--I forget--two hundred and some in and around Yen-an, which was a lot more than the Kuomintang apparently had taken all during the war. As I mentioned before [chuckling] we found it very hard to find any live ones at all.

There was constant indoctrination of their troops, to take prisoners, not to kill them. This was one of their propaganda things. "We will not harm you. We will not kill you. You will be well treated."

They did the same thing with the Kuomintang. This was an old tactic they'd used in the civil war against the Kuomintang. It was very successful in winning over a lot of the Kuomintang units that were fighting against them. "Don't fight us, join us. If you don't want to join us, here's some money and you

J. Service: can go back home." So it was nothing new. It was one that they had tried out. It was a little different situation, against a foreign enemy instead of a civil war.

Stilwell Recalled

J. Service: We were fairly cut off in Yen-an ourselves. We got old magazines, and we could hear the radio news, bulletins, if our man had time to take it down, which wasn't always. We had a little putt-putt engine, a tiny little gasoline powered generator.

We knew about Hurley's coming. The Chinese Communists wrote Hurley a letter inviting him to come up since we'd been told he was to solve the problems of China, or at least his own publicity gave that impression. They invited him up. We got no answer, and the Chinese got quite impatient after he'd been in Chungking for about a month and they hadn't heard from him.

Then on the tenth, I think it was, of October, the ninth or tenth, the plane came in. Planes came in sometimes once a week, sometimes every two weeks, whenever the plane was available. The plane came in and brought a man named Colonel [E.J.] McNally, who had been a language officer in Peking when we were in Peking. Later on I'd seen him in Chungking. He'd been transferred with the language students to Chengtu.

McNally had been assigned to Hurley as an aide, military aide, and he came up to Yen-an to see old friends, see Dave and so on. It became quite a popular thing to do. When there was a plane, and there was any space on it, if someone had enough strings to pull, he could get himself a ride up to Yen-an. The plane usually stayed over the night and went back the next day. So we got a lot of these visitors. Eventually we got newspaper people coming up. Brooks Atkinson, Teddy White, and all these people eventually did get to Yen-an for short visits.

McNally came up. We said, "What's the news? What's going on?" He told us, to our amazement, that the real argument, the only thing they were talking about in Chungking, was not about how to get Stilwell his Chinese command, but whether or not Stilwell's job could be saved. The Kuomintang were trying to get him fired.

J. Service: We had a big venting of feelings [chuckle] and I wrote that famous memorandum of October 10 that caused so much hullabaloo later on.* But, I wasn't saying anything that hadn't been said by many other people, by Stilwell, by Davies, and by other people. In other words, that Chiang Kai-shek is not China, and we should not limit ourselves to talking to Chiang Kai-shek.

At any rate, Stilwell was recalled about a week after that. Davies decided to come up to Yen-an. He hadn't been in Yen-an up to this point. It was his idea that I go back to the United States with Stilwell--simultaneously but not on the same plane. John felt that since I had been up in Yen-an and since there would undoubtedly be talks about China policy, what to do about China, that it would be useful to have me in Washington. Davies assumed that Stilwell's going back would provoke some policy discussions.

Actually, it was a mistaken idea. The decision had been made and by the time Stilwell got to the States, his mouth was sealed. He couldn't say a thing. He wasn't allowed to talk. So, the policy issues were pretty much fixed. Wedemeyer had been put in command. The theater had been split. But Davies couldn't foresee this.

Service Sent to Washington

J. Service: Anyway, Davies got me orders. I jumped out of Yen-an very quickly. One night with Davies, and I left on the plane the next morning with my big map, rushed through Chungking, one night in Chungking. I had number one priority. [sticks thumb up]

Gauss told me about his having suggested, and then been encouraged and approved by the Department, to suggest a War Cabinet, which was a form of coalition government. This really is all described much more in my Amerasia Papers monograph.

Then he told me that he was going to resign. He expected to actually send in the resignation just after the election. After every presidential election each serving ambassador sends in a pro forma resignation. He wanted me to tell the Department

*Esherick, op. cit., pp. 161-166.

J. Service: that his was not intended to be pro forma, that he really meant that he wanted out. He'd had enough. I was to tell this to the highest person I had a chance to talk to in the Department.

Then I called Hurley, and Hurley said he wanted very much to talk to me. That again is mentioned other places. It was not much of a conversation because Hurley simply held forth and kept saying that he was going to get the Communists arms, he knew what they wanted, he knew all about them, and so on.

Levenson: What was your impression of him at that time?

J. Service: A blowhard. A man that you can't talk to, that can't, wouldn't listen, and won't talk to a man who's been on the spot and knows something. [loudly, paraphrasing Hurley] "All you people seem to think I'm an ignoramus, that I've never had any experience. [with mock bombast] I've done a lot of negotiating. I've brought parties together. I did this in Mexico." He solved the Sinclair Oil claims against the Mexican government after expropriation. "I'm not a child," he said, shouting loudly.

I found that Brooks Atkinson was on the same plane. Just before Stilwell left he had called in a few correspondents that he knew particularly well and had confidence in, Teddy White and Brooks Atkinson, a guy named Daryl Berrigan who died later on in Thailand, years afterwards. He let them read the telegram log book with the messages to and from Washington leading up to his recall.

Brooks decided that the only way to get the story out would be to come to the States. So he got orders and got priority, but not as high as mine. We were flying across North Africa and were stuck in Algiers. Brooks pulled out his story and asked me to take it on to the States, which I did.

I landed in New York (we flew the Azores to New York that time). It was late at night. I went around to the New York Times and asked to see the chief foreign news editor who was on duty. I told him what I had, and said that he had to get it cleared which, of course, he agreed with.

It was Brooks' big exposé on the Stilwell recall. It was quite a blast. They held it up until Brooks got to the country. He got to the country about two days later, and then they let it be released. They published it as he wrote it, and it caused a terrific sensation.

J. Service: It was the first real story on the Stilwell recall, and hit the idea of appeasing a corrupt regime. It was written from the Stilwell point of view.

Kuomintang Reaction: Stilwell's Advisers Blamed for Bad Publicity

J. Service: The Chinese were, I think, startled. Of course, Time magazine came out with its own version later on. It took them a little time, but they got [Walter] Judd on it and he contributed largely.

Actually, Teddy White had asked me to talk to Luce. So, Luce invited me up to New York,. I had lunch with Luce at some club there on Fifth Avenue, I guess it was, or Madison. I made no effect on Luce at all. He went ahead and published what the Chinese said and what Judd said.

The interesting thing as far as my own future is that the Times story made such a repercussion--other people picked it up--that the Chinese, I think, were in a quandary about what to do. American reaction to an American general being recalled to appease a foreign dictator was rather bad.

The decision was made to blame it on his advisers. Almost simultaneously all over the world, wherever there was a Chinese embassy or bureau of the Central News Agency, or press officer, the same story popped out that Stilwell was a fine person, the Generalissimo had the highest regard for him, he'd tried to give him China's highest decoration--which Stilwell refused--before he left, but that Stilwell had been misled by these young pro-Communist advisers, Davies and Service. This popped up everywhere.

This has become a sort of a litmus test. Any writer that uses this, you know exactly where it came from. This man Brian Crozier, who's just written a silly book (1976) on Chiang Kai-shek, he buys this hook, line, and sinker. [Dr. Anthony] Kubek buys it hook, line, and sinker. Archbishop Paul Yu-pin who was in the States at about this time--later on he became a cardinal--he had a whole series of interviews about how I'd gone three times to Stilwell and forced Stilwell to do this and that.

Of course, to anyone who knew Stilwell, it's laughable. Stilwell was a man of very strong mind, and he'd been in China since I was a kid. The idea that Stilwell, who I only saw three or four times altogether, was being led around by the nose by these young advisers, is for the birds.

J. Service: But anyway, this was the Kuomintang solution of the Stilwell problem, was that it was these young advisers misinforming Stilwell.

Levenson: So, you were already named around the world, what, early in '45?

J. Service: Actually, this was early November, 1944.

When I was arrested in June, '45, I found out, I heard from some people that--this was wife gossip--that some wife of a Chinese embassy official had said--this was two months before I was arrested--"Well, Service is going to be in very serious trouble." The Chinese were looking for easier targets than Stilwell [laughter] to get mad about.

Political Reporting, Intelligence, and Policy Formation: A Summation

Levenson: You were going to speak about intelligence, reporting.

J. Service: Political reporting is what the State Department people like to call it. It's, of course, a form of intelligence. I'm always, probably, in most people's minds, thought of as being a political reporter, although really these four years from '41 to '45 were the only time when I was doing it full time. The rest of my career has been mostly administrative and various other things.

I think political reporting is much like being a newspaper correspondent. The first requirement is to know what is news. A lot of people don't recognize news. They don't have a sense for news. They're not interested. You're got to not only be interested but have enough of a grasp of the whole picture so that you know how things fit in, what belongs, what may be relevant, what's pertinent, what's important.

You've got to be able to develop contacts, useful contacts, broad contacts. Your intelligence is as good as your contacts usually, so that if you're limited in your contacts and sources, your news is going to be limited. Your people have to be in positions where they really know what's going on, know information. The more strategically located, of course, the better. The broader your contacts the better.

You've also got to be able to get them to talk to you. This can be for various reasons. It can be purely on a friendship basis. It can be on a give-and-take, cooperative basis, as your

J. Service: relations often are with newspaper people, as I mentioned. It can be because they think you're sympathetic to their cause or because they want you to get certain information. They may be trying to plant news or to influence you. Or you may be in a position, as I was in Chungking, working for the army, where people were interested in talking to me.

You've got to be able, of course, to listen. By that I mean not impose your own views. So many people have their own views so strongly that whatever they hear gets sieved through their own views, and only a distortion comes out. You've got to be able to listen, as I say, and you've got to be able to observe. Not everything comes through the ear. Some things come through what you see, very often.

Then finally, you've just simply got to be able to report it accurately, promptly. A lot of people sit on information, don't get it in. You've got to be able to write it in a way that gets attention. There have been a lot of people in the State Department that I've known that are famous for their inability to write or to write well--turgid, obscure, long-winded.

Usually to be a good reporter you've got to be willing to draw some conclusions. The guy that's reading your stuff at the other end, he's got a pile of stuff and he not only wants you to highlight what you want to say, give him a summary at the beginning, this sort of thing, but he also wants to be able to draw the conclusions from your own report. That's about it.

Obviously, this sort of thing that I'm talking about can't always be done effectively by the usual diplomatic officer. He's got family responsibilities. He's tied up in diplomatic routine, diplomatic entertaining, office routine, tied to an office. He isn't free to get out and develop these contacts. Also his contacts, because he's in the diplomatic establishment, are apt to be establishment contacts and other diplomats.

In some countries where there is a real democracy, like England for instance, you can have contacts with the opposition and it's perfectly all right. The less freedom there is in a country, the more autocratic, dictatorial, the government is, or perhaps the more revolutionary the country is, the more you're limited if you're limited to the establishment. It's harder to get to what's really going on if you talk to just the people at the top, which is unfortunately what most political reporters in the Foreign Service do.

J. Service: My situation was just the reverse of all these things. I had no family. I worked myself into a position where I wasn't tied to an office, had no routine, and I was able to develop contacts in the opposition within the Kuomintang and within the Communist party. So, I was able to exploit the situation to great advantage, which I think points to the desirability of the government having intelligence sources outside the diplomatic service.

A lot of the Foreign Service people, my old colleagues, tend to argue, "After all, we can do a perfectly good job of intelligence, it should be left to the diplomatic service." But, it can't be. It's obvious. There are situations when the Foreign Service officer, no matter how many cocktail parties he goes to, just can't do the kind of political reporting that I was able to do in China, or that very often is needed. As I say, the more unstable the country, the more revolutionary the situation, perhaps the more you need reporting outside the ordinary diplomatic framework.

Levenson: So, what would be your solution?

J. Service: I think you have to have some sort of an intelligence service. But there again you still have another dilemma in a sense of getting too involved in the country. Here probably the answer is that your intelligence has got to be somewhat divorced from policy. And again it points to the idea of a separate intelligence service which is not involved in policy.

I was certainly a better intelligence officer in China than I was a policy person. It just happens, I think, that history has proved that my policy recommendations were generally right. But by the time I left, I had become very much involved in China in what was going on there, and in the policy options for America, so that it had probably compromised my impartiality.

It's difficult because part of your success as an intelligence officer almost necessitates involvement. If you're going to get close to people, you've got to have some sympathy for them, sympathy with them at least. But, if you get too close then you compromise your usefulness as a reporter, or you may compromise it, not necessarily. If you're an accurate reporter you may not.

Levenson: Were your reports read in the State Department and the Pentagon, as those of an advocate or, using current terms, a lobbyist for the Communists?

J. Service: Eventually I was by some people. Not all people. The State Department, FE, did not. I think some of the people in some of the other agencies eventually came to regard me as an advocate.

A very good friend of mine, Marty Wilbur, who remained very pro-Kuomintang, I think even in those days spoke to me, expressed a feeling that I was becoming too much of an advocate. This was not everyone's attitude. But it's a danger.

CHAPTER IX PRELUDE: THE AMERASIA CASE

[Interview 9: October 10, 1977]

Washington, Home Leave, and a Surprise Reassignment to Chungking

J. Service: In 1942, I was the first political officer back from China after Pearl Harbor. This time, in '44, I was the first person back to Washington who'd been in Yen-an. So it was the same thing, only double in spades.

I was in much more demand for these debriefing sessions. I had, of course, far more to say. I'd observed far more. It was a frantic business of running around and talking to Currie and more talks with people like [Drew] Pearson, other newspaper people, a lot of them sent to me by the Department. IPR [Institute of Pacific Relations] session again, a much larger one, a crowded one of course.

I was called to Hopkins' office, had about forty minutes with Hopkins, in a little tiny office in the White House, barely enough room on the floor for me to stretch out this map.* He said, as I cite in the [Amerasia] monograph, at the end that, "Well, very interesting, and probably what you say is mostly true," or "Most of what you say is true." "But, after all, they call themselves Communists. Besides, the only Chinese that Americans know is Chiang Kai-shek." That was the end of the conversation.

I tried feebly to do as I had done with Hamilton on an earlier talk, to say something about taking a positive role, informing the public, and so on. I said that when word gets out what the Communists are really like, the attitude toward them is going to change. But, Hopkins wasn't really very much interested. Very close to H.H. Kung apparently--

*Showing the extent of Communist controlled areas of China.

See Appendix I for a chronology of events, April 1941-March 1950.

Levenson: How did you feel about our China policy at this point?

J. Service: I was discouraged, but it seemed so completely absurd that I don't think I really took it in. You know, "This can't be," was my reaction.

He asked me about Hurley as ambassador, and I said it would be a disaster. He said, "Why?" I said, "He's in the Kuomintang pocket, working against Stilwell." But Hurley was appointed.

I saw Stilwell over at the Pentagon. He was sitting in the next office to "Hap" Arnold, five stars. Joe was four stars.

I gave him my October 10 memo which I'd never had a chance to get to him before.* He said something about hoping that my having worked for him wasn't going to have any harmful effects on me. There weren't any consultations about China policy. All those hopes were finished.

The Department's plan was to send me to Moscow. Somebody had decided that it would be a good idea to have someone in Moscow that knew something about China. I was to be the first "China" man sent there. Davies was going to stay in China. Wedemeyer liked Davies and they were getting along fine.

I came back out here [California] for Christmas, and just before New Year's, there was a phone call from John Carter [Vincent]. "Davies has gotten in a row with Hurley. We've got to get him out. Will you go back? Do you want to go back?" I said, "Sure."

Levenson: Were you glad to?

J. Service: Oh, of course. Sure, what the hell. After all, there was a war on; we all wanted to do something. It's hard nowadays to remember how patriotic we felt--but perhaps there was also some personal interest.

I asked about Wedemeyer's attitude. He said, "Wedemeyer has asked for you. Wedemeyer wants you. We're going to ask that you be allowed to continue contact with the Communists. This is our main reason in agreeing to your going back."

It was a matter of great haste. I took off New Year's Eve, as I recall, or very near New Year's Eve, went back to Washington. In those days it was a long hop across the country.

*Esherick, op. cit., pp. 161-166.

J. Service: When I got to the Department, the chief of personnel, chief of Foreign Service personnel, wanted to talk to me. [tape off] The chief of Foreign Service personnel asked me to see him. Briefly, he said that he had very serious doubts about sending me back to Chungking, that he'd been told that it would very likely--[tape off]--have bad effects on the family. In other words, he knew about the family situation. I said to him that he didn't need to worry, that we had reached a resolution on that, which would solve that problem. I was not going to go ahead with the divorce, was going to stay with the family, and so that he didn't need to feel the Department was in effect breaking up a marriage.

I said the real problem in Chungking, as far as I could see it, was Hurley, his attitude toward the Foreign Service, and particularly the circumstances that forced John Davies' recall in a hurry.

He said he understood that and knew about it, that I would be working, of course, not under Hurley but under the army, and that the State Department understood the situation and would be in effect behind me. I forget if that's exactly the words he used.

So, off to China I went. Got a telegram I think in New Delhi from my brother Dick and from Dave Barrett. I think they said, "Don't go to Chungking, but if you feel you've got to, stop in Kunming."

I stayed in New Delhi with the man who was head of the American diplomatic mission--we didn't have an embassy; it was called an American commission or something like that--a man named George Merrell who'd been in Peking years before. There I met General Donovan who was head of the OSS, who was flying to Chungking, had his own plane. He was going to Chungking, so he said, "Fly with me," which I naturally did not turn down.

In Kunming my brother and Dave Barrett said, "You're committing suicide. Don't go. Hurley will have your scalp." "Well," I said, "one can't refuse. You can't not go after having accepted the assignment."

So I went. We got off the plane in Chungking. Tai Li had turned out to meet Donovan. [chuckling] The look on Tai Li's face, when I walked out of the plane beside Donovan, helped to make the whole occasion a little more happy.

Well, I think that's probably a pretty good place to quit.

Hurley and Wedemeyer Replace Gauss and Stilwell

Levenson: There's a new American cast now.

J. Service: Yes. The [CBI] theater had been broken. Wedemeyer had taken over the China theater from Stilwell. Gauss had left and Hurley was now ambassador.

Levenson: How much did this represent a relegation of China to a second class position in terms of American priorities?

J. Service: Partly you've got to remember that Hurley was sent out to do a specific job. He was sent out to negotiate the placing of Stilwell in command of Chinese troops. I don't think that anybody in Washington expected it to be more than that.

But then that ended in a fiasco. Gauss resigned in anger and disgust, and Hurley was on the spot. The Chinese wrote a letter to Roosevelt--it's in my monograph--asking that Hurley be nominated. This would occur to me to be a very poor reason for making a man ambassador!

I can only assume that in Washington they thought, "What the hell. China is a headache and is not very important." (I think by that time it was regarded as not very important.) "He seems to get along with Chiang, and we've had nothing except trouble and friction with Chiang. So, why not name him?" But, I really don't know.

I was in Chungking from January 18 and I left in early April [1945], so I was only in China for a relatively short while. It's a confused and ineffectual period in a way.

Hurley wanted to talk to me, as soon as I arrived, and this was when he gave me the warning that if I interfered with him, he would break me. I said I had no intention of interfering with him. After all, any military or other commander needed intelligence, information, and I felt that was my job. Also I was working for the army, which was something he never really accepted. He felt that he was coordinating all American activity in China including the army.

Wedemeyer agreed that I was to work for him and said not to pay too much attention to Hurley's blusterings. But, his idea of what he wanted me to do was quite different from what it had been under Stilwell. [tape off]

Levenson: Did you feel threatened by Hurley, genuinely threatened?

J. Service: Oh, certainly it was a very threatening atmosphere. The whole atmosphere in Chungking was threatening. The embassy staff was operating under very difficult conditions. Hurley had his own little separate embassy really in a sense. He was communicating not with the State Department but with the White House, ignoring the State Department, using the "Mary" Miles navy group communications, not even the embassy or State Department radios. Also, he was threatening the staff and preventing their reporting anything that was unfavorable.

But Wedemeyer wanted, I think, a political agent much as John Davies had functioned in India. He had known John in India and Southeast Asia Command headquarters where Wedemeyer had been deputy with Mountbatten.

I was breaking up with my Chinese friend Yun-ju. That had to be gone through. Then, Sol Adler was away. He was back in Washington I think at that time. So--and perhaps it was fortunate in a way--I wasn't able to move back into his old quarters.

I stayed for a while, as I recall, in army billets, and then moved in--there was an extra bed at the embassy mess--with the counselor and the secretaries. I moved in with them.

Political Adviser to Wedemeyer: Meeting with Chou En-lai

J. Service: I did a sort of a diplomatic job for Wedemeyer. Some Free French representatives were in China and they wanted American help for getting into Indochina. Our official policy then was we weren't going to help the French get back Indochina, since that was Roosevelt's policy. We had to tell them we were very sorry but we couldn't give them any assistance at that time. Later on they got some I think.

Wedemeyer's staff were all new people practically. Everybody that was associated with Stilwell was given the heave-ho. A new crew came in with no China background.

The whole tone of the headquarters had changed, "Well, Stilwell tactics didn't work, and we're just here to get along with the Chinese." So there really wasn't much desire for political intelligence.

Levenson: You've raised an interesting question. You said, "Stilwell's staff was given the heave-ho, but you, who got labelled as the primary culprit--Wedemeyer asked for you to come back. Have you any explanation for that?"

J. Service: [chuckling] Yes. Wedemeyer was going through a process here. He didn't really make up his mind all at one time. I think that the heave-ho was particularly on the military people, because Stilwell did have a lot of old classmates from West Point and people he'd known in the army. Some of them were good and some of them were not terribly good. They were rather obsolescent types, and that's one reason they were in the CBI theater, after all. This was not where the main action was. Wedemeyer wanted to bring in his younger people.

But Wedemeyer did have an idea of needing advisers. He was very much of a staff man. Eisenhower had his political advisers, and there had been some down in the Southeast Asia Command. This was an accepted thing. I think Wedemeyer wanted to have experienced people. He wanted it at first. Later on he very much went with the tide. As he saw things develop and as Hurley became powerful and Hurley's views were accepted, why, then of course he turned against us.

But, as we'll see later on, in this early period Wedemeyer was still at least toying with the idea of working with the Communists and working out some compromise. Everyone thought--even Hurley--that if you just bore down, the Communists would cave in, and that then we would be able to work with the Communists.

At any rate, Wedemeyer did recognize that I was sent back to China with the understanding of the State Department that I would maintain contact with the Communists. He said, "Be patient. We can do this later on, but we can't do it right now."

Hurley was in a very inflamed state of mind. There was a big incident, a row, with Wedemeyer's chief of staff, General McClure, over an OSS mission that had gone up to Yen-an with some proposal for cooperation. The OSS had a lot of people who were available in Europe and had been working with the Maquis and the Resistance in Europe, behind the lines. The idea was that OSS would bring them out to China and do the same thing up in north China with the Communists.

Levenson: Where they would blend beautifully, of course, with their Caucasian faces! [laughter]

J. Service: Well anyway, in wars we do funny things.

This business of lying low and not interfering with Hurley proved to be very difficult. Chou En-lai was in town for negotiations which had died out, petered out. He looked me up and, of course, the Communists were desperately trying to find out just what was American policy.

Levenson: Chou En-lai looked you up. Did he send a message? How did he get in touch with you?

J. Service: I'm not quite sure right now just how he did it. I imagine he probably did it through his assistant Ch'en khia-k'ang or through one of his staff people who may have either telephoned me or come around. As I recall, Chou came to see me, but maybe I'm wrong on that. But, I have a recollection that Chou came to see me. I didn't look him up. I was at this time trying to be fairly cautious.

Levenson: What had alerted you?

J. Service: Hurley himself, what he was doing to his staff. I've got a lot of correspondence we can put in later if you want, an affidavit by Ringwalt, for instance, of an episode where Ringwalt had submitted a report about some of the Lend-Lease arms being used by the Kuomintang against the Communists. Hurley has T.V. Soong in his office and calls Ringwalt in and shows the report to T.V., who says, "There's no truth in this." So, then Hurley upbraids Ringwalt on the spot.

Levenson: In front of T.V. Soong?

J. Service: In front of T.V. Soong. This sort of thing.

Hurley was very fond of having meetings with representatives of all the American agencies, and having each person stand up and give a report of what he was doing. He had me stand up in front of the crowd and say that my job was purely political reporting.

I had to report the Chou En-lai visit. Chou En-lai was very discouraged about the negotiations and said that they were as good as dead. I reported by letter. I don't think I wrote an official report on it.

Levenson: By letter to whom?

J. Service: To Vincent who was the head of FE [Far East desk] at this time.

J. Service: Sometime early in February, Ludden came back, Ray Ludden, a Foreign Service officer who had gone up with the Dixie Mission. He'd been on a long trip to the guerrilla areas, way out to the area fairly close to Peking. He traveled over a thousand miles through the guerrilla areas.

He was a fresh mind. He hadn't been intimidated. He wanted to talk to Wedemeyer. He and I went to see Wedemeyer. We had an outline. He told Wedemeyer what great potential there was for cooperation with the Communists.

Wedemeyer was very interested and said, "Well now, I'm going to Washington very soon with Hurley, and we'll undoubtedly talk about these things." He wanted us to write out more fully what we'd discussed, which we did in a memo on February 17. It's in the book by Esherick* and in U.S. Foreign Relations. Then he gave orders for Ludden to go to Washington to be there at the same time. But Ludden was never called in Washington.

"The Situation in China": A Joint Despatch from the Embassy's Political Officers, February 28, 1945

J. Service: Hurley and Wedemeyer left. Soon after [George] Atcheson, who was chargé d'affaires, said to some of us that he thought we should give a report on the situation since the Department hadn't received any full reporting for some time, and give them our estimation of the situation.

Atcheson was a very traditional diplomat. One didn't expect him to suggest anything as bold and daring as this. We agreed with some pleasure and as we talked, it was suggested that I do the first draft, because I had been writing a good deal along this line.

I wrote the original draft. We talked it over among us and there were a few changes made. I think Ringwalt was there, Freeman was there, a man named Yuni. There were four or five officers in the political section.

Then we gave it to George, and he made only one substantive change. That was to add the phrase: "The presence of General Wedemeyer in Washington as well as General Hurley should be a favorable opportunity for discussion of this matter," which was a very good bureaucratic change to make.

*Esherick, op. cit., February 28, 1945, pp. 358-363.

Dear John: (Davies)

Well we finally overcame the nausea that overwhelmed us and ended up by getting in with both feet. Al* says he agrees heartily with our general view of things, that he is going to try and do something about - within the limits of action of a soldier -- and that he wants both of us to stay with him. Things are looking up - but only very moderately so far.

Al did not want me to send you this stuff direct. He suggested routing through the Dept. I have asked to do it through Chip. Let me know how it works.


We have a jeep. An office (but a lousy one, except for convenience, right next to the new HQ. And the General says he's going to get us a house. And the Political Advisor is being given a few odd jobs and asked a few questions. Also they have been promised a stenographer clerk. But fingers still crossed on that one.

The biggest problem is whether the 'small whisker** (also known as "paper tiger"), "Major Blimp" and various other less complimentary names) is to come back. What can you do? I don't need to tell you anymore. Except that things are worse than when you were here. Much worse. And everybody now thinks we Americans are crazy. And George the A# is in tears, most of the time.

Be sure to continue to lend me your guidance and advice as in the past.

God, I wish you were going to be in Wash. the next few weeks.

Love to Pat.



* General Albert C. Wedemeyer

** Brigadier General Patrick Hurley

#George Atcheson

J. Service: I think I was the one, but I'm not sure, who suggested that it might be helpful in giving the message more impact--and also a good thing to show solidarity with Atcheson--if we all signed the message. Normally a message is signed only by the head of the office. So, we put this phrase at the end, "This telegram has been drafted with the assistance and agreement of all the political officers of the staff of this embassy and has been shown to General Wedemeyer's Chief of Staff, General Gross."

This went off, and when it got to Washington there was a big explosion when Hurley saw it, although--as I pointed out in my monograph The Amerasia Papers--the State Department agreed wholeheartedly with it, sent it to the White House, and so on.

This was fairly well discussed around American circles in Chungking. The fact that we were sending it was discussed. We took it over to the army, and the chief of staff, Gross, who was acting in the absence of Wedemeyer, agreed to it wholeheartedly.

Levenson: When you say discussed around town you mean--

J. Service: I'm talking about American newspapermen. Newspapermen we trusted knew about it.

Levenson: So, you would assume that the Kuomintang also knew about it?

J. Service: No, I doubt if they did because the press people we talked to were perfectly secure.

This was the end of February. I tried to settle down but without much success really. There wasn't quite the interest in the teashop gossip type of reporting that I had done so much of before.

Return Trip to Yen-an

J. Service: In March I got word, and I'm not sure just how the word came to me--Chou En-lai had returned to Yen-an--word came to me through the Communists that it would be a good time to be in Yen-an. What I understood from this was that the party congress was about to be held. We had discussed many times the party congress and my hopes of being there.

I talked about it with Atcheson and also with the army. Since contact with the Communists had been the principal reason for my going back to China, everyone agreed I should go to Yen-an. I got official orders and went and started reporting again from Yen-an.

J. Service: The spirit had changed in Yen-an. The Chinese Communists weren't sure just what American policy was. They felt rebuffed. They were angry at Hurley because he had come up there in November and worked out with them their five points and agreed enthusiastically and signed them. Then as soon as he got back to Chungking and found out that Chiang Kai-shek didn't like them, he had gone back on his word and had become in effect a spokesman for the Kuomintang.

Relations had changed as far as cooperation went. They had more or less given up hope there was ever going to be any cooperation with us.

Morale in the [American] group had gone down. The man that was temporarily in charge was very suspicious of me and rather annoyed at my being there. But I made it clear to him that I had army orders and I wasn't reporting through him. I was reporting direct. We don't need to talk much about the reporting. It's all been covered.

"Mao Tse-tung Proposes to Come to Washington."?

Levenson: Were you aware that, as Barbara Tuchman and others have reported, Mao was prepared to go to Washington if an invitation could be secured?

J. Service: This is all a mystery to me because I don't recall that they ever mentioned it. I still remain unconvinced about the whole thing--

Levenson: Really?

J. Service: --because the message was supposedly sent by this relatively junior officer who was in charge temporarily--either a major or lieutenant colonel. I just don't know, whether he misunderstood something, whether he got it second hand, or what.

Mao or Chou never said a word to me. They never said a word to John Emmerson who was there at the same time. I just think it's all still rather a mystery. Either that or they were embarrassed about it and realized they'd made a mistake. I don't know.

Levenson: A mistake in what sense?

J. Service: A tactical mistake in sending a message to Wedemeyer and asking that it be kept secret from Hurley. They requested that this not be made known to Hurley whom they didn't trust at all.

Levenson: They, meaning the Communist leaders?

J. Service: The Communists, yes. That's not a very smart way of going about things, to deal through a junior officer they don't know very well and don't have very much confidence in. Send it through army channels. If they had really meant it seriously I would expect that Chou would have gone to Chungking and would have tried to talk directly to Wedemeyer.

It just is uncharacteristic of a very astute and adroit diplomat, which Chou En-lai was even at this time, to do it in this way, through this officer. So that I am not convinced even though the messages exist from this officer to [army] headquarters. They exist as messages drafted by an American, but I've never heard anything from the Chinese about it.

This was one of the things that I would have liked to have probed when I was in China in '71, but Chou didn't want to talk about the past. He wanted to talk about the present. "No use talking about what's finished." He shut me off when I tried to open it up. So I'm still unconvinced.

Levenson: That's interesting. A modern creation of a myth?

J. Service: Well, there is a piece of paper there. But it's very surprising that, since I was in contact with these people during this period, I never heard of it.

The Communist Plan to Take Over Manchuria: Service's Despatch Lost

J. Service: The Chinese were extremely friendly to me and talked very frankly. The congress was still delayed. It didn't actually take place until fairly late April. I'm not quite sure why they kept waiting, mostly, I think, to see what was going to happen in relations with Chungking, what the Generalissimo was going to do about calling a constitutional convention.

People like my old friend Chen Yi, the commander of the Fourth Army, were extremely frank and told me in great detail about their plans for moving into Manchuria, how they were already

J. Service: preparing, getting their cadres ready, getting poised and already moving in, infiltrating people into Manchuria for the attempt to seize it before the Kuomintang could get there.

At any rate, we got these urgent, urgent, urgent orders for me to return to Chungking immediately and go to Washington soonest--

When I went through Chungking--I was only in Chungking for one day--headquarters asked me if there was anything I wanted to dictate, anything that I had in my mind I hadn't been able to write when I was in Yen-an.

I said yes, there was one thing I thought was pertinent, and I sat down and dictated to the chief of staff's secretary, additional information on the Communists' plans for going into Manchuria. I had already written some, but I had more details to write.

Somehow, this has disappeared. We've never been able to find whatever happened to that. It would have been very helpful, in loyalty board and other hearings, to have had it, but it disappeared without a trace, at least as far as the army is concerned.

Service Recalled to Washington, April, 1945

Levenson: What were you wanted for back in Washington?

J. Service: Hurley had found out in Washington that I was in Yen-an, and that apparently enraged him. He stormed over to the State Department, demanded I be recalled. The State Department said, "He's not working for us. He's working for the army." Then he went to Stimson. The orders were issued and signed "Marshall," given highest priority. I was ordered home on army orders, and then released.

This was the beginning of controversy and disagreement in Washington, you might say. In 1944 when I'd come home, everyone was interested in what I had to say and there was pretty general agreement. But this time people were already beginning to divide a little bit.

Some people in the State Department--Drumright, for instance--were arguing that there was a civil war in China, the Communists are in rebellion, we can't have any dealings with them. There

J. Service: were people in the Far Eastern section, particularly the old Japan contingent, Grew, Dooman, and other people, who represented the anti-Communist point of view.

The European people were anti-Communist, bitterly anti-Communist. They couldn't believe that there was any difference between Chinese Communists and Russian Communists. So, you began then at this period to have a sort of splitting in the Department.

As soon as I got in Washington I went to the State Department and was sitting in John Carter Vincent's office just after I arrived, when his telephone rang. He picked it up and said, "My God." Roosevelt had just died.

Assigned to Committee to Draft New Foreign Service Legislation

J. Service: My original assignment--I was told--was that I was going to have a liaison job between the State Department and the Pentagon, more or less on handling information, intelligence reports and so on, making sure that each side was informed by the other.

After a couple weeks, before this job started, they said they had changed their mind and I was put on a task force that was preparing to write new Foreign Service legislation.

The Foreign Service was administered under a 1924 act, the Rogers Act, which had set up the modern Foreign Service, taken it out of the spoils and political field, and made it a career service. This was out of date, and it was felt that the Foreign Service needed to be modernized.

So, there was a task force set up, and I was one of the six or seven people, mostly young and reputedly with ideas, put on this group to study various proposals, and produce draft legislation.

In May, rather surprisingly, I got a double promotion. Promotions had been held up during the war, and so to rectify it, some people were given double promotions, which was rather unusual. That came through in May, I think May 18 or 19, the double promotion from grade six to four.

Feels Exploited by Jaffe, Roth, and Gayn

J. Service: It had no connection in my mind, but before this change was made I met [Andrew] Roth, and then Roth introduced me to [Philip] Jaffe. [Mark] Gayn had also come into the act.

Levenson: These were people, just to put them in context, who were--

J. Service: Gayn was a free lance writer who had done writing for Saturday Evening Post, Collier's, magazines like that. He had published articles which were obviously based partly on my reports. One of them was practically a steal of my June 20 [1944] report. He was getting, as many people were, background information, being allowed to read reports and so on.

Roth was a young chap working for the navy, and he had come to the I[nstitute of] P[acific] R[elations] session I had in the fall of '44, talked to me then. Gayn had written me letters, hoping to meet me when I got to Washington. They were all indicted in the Amerasia case. Gayn had written me letters before.

But all this is gone into in so much detail in all my hearings that I think we don't want to waste time going through it all here. Anybody that's going to be this much interested, I think, is probably also going to have read the transcripts of the Loyalty Board hearings where it's gone into ad nauseam and the Tydings committee.

I began to feel that I was really being exploited by this group of people.

I went to New York and talked to the Foreign Policy Council. [T.A.] Bisson was one of their research people, and he had invited me for the weekend.

I said, "Sure." I was glad to meet Bisson. He'd been in China. He'd stayed in my house in '37 when I was alone in Peking. He'd been in Manchuria and then stayed with me for a while. He lived out on Long Island.

Then it turned out that Jaffe was also invited. He called up and was going to give me a ride out there.

I didn't have any feeling that I was under any cloud or threat or anything. What I had done with letting Jaffe see some of these reports I'd written in China was not different from letting many other people see them. They'd been circulated fairly widely and many people had read them, for instance, in John Davies' office in New Delhi.

J. Service: On June 6, Vincent asked me to write a memo about something that was happening in the international Communist field. The French Communists had just had a very blunt calling down by Stalin. It was a signal that they were going to have to stop wartime united front line and start a more independent line. Vincent asked me whether I thought this was going to apply to China. I wrote a memo and said that I didn't think it was going to. The Chinese were going to follow their own line.

I walked up to Vincent's office to give it to him, and I noticed some people hanging around the hall outside. I asked them if I could help them. "Oh no," they said. "We're just waiting for somebody."

Then later on I walked out of the building and walked down the sidewalk--lunch time this was--and saw them coming out of another door very hurriedly. It seemed very odd to run into these guys twice.

I was staying in the apartment of a girl in the Far Eastern division that was on leave. She knew I was alone in Washington--Caroline was still in California--so she said, "Well, just use my apartment while I'm away." She was away for a week or something. After leaving the office, I went to her apartment.

"We're FBI. You're Under Arrest"

J. Service: About six thirty, the doorbell of the apartment rang. I opened the door, and here were the two guys that I'd seen in the State Department. They said, "We're FBI. You're under arrest," and so on.

They came in and I was naturally a bit stunned. They asked if they could search the place, and not being smart or experienced, I said yes. They said, "Where are the papers? Where are the papers?" [staccato] Well, they didn't find any papers. They thought I had the place stacked full of my reports.

I said, "My reports are all in my desk at the State Department."

Anyway, they searched the place, and they found a sort of private code that Davies and we "advisers" used writing among ourselves. Our letters had to go over Japanese territory in Burma. There was always a possibility of the plane being shot down, so we had an agreed on private code of using fictitious names.

200 19th St. SE.
Washington, D.C.
June 7, 1945

Dear Mother:

You will have heard long since, I fear, that this address really means the Washington jail. It is a strange place to be writing from.

Reports written by me have been found in the possession of Mark Gayn and Phil Jaffe. They had some of them before they even knew me but the fact that they now do know me implicates me. I am innocent of the charges and am confident that I will be cleared. But a trial seems necessary. And that will take time.

I am interested in the instigating force or forces behind this.

Do not worry about me. I am having the help of Judge Helmick in getting a good lawyer. And believe it or not, after the first shock of the idea, I find myself quite comfortable. I would judge that as such establishments go, this is one of the best.

I am sure the Service escutcheon will remain untarnished. So keep your head up if the story gets in your newspapers and tell the neighbors you don't need their commiserations if they offer them.

The State Department is working to get Dick home ahead of the arrival of his replacement. So he should be with you before too long.

Very much love and admiration
knowing that you will take this
crisis as you have taken all others.

Jack

Transcript of letter on lined paper

J. Service: Stilwell wasn't Stilwell. I forget--Just code names, this sort of thing. Sort of silly. This was how Dixie got started. We referred to Yen'an as Dixie, and so it was the Dixie Mission.

I was taken to the FBI offices and we had a long talk. I said, "This is crazy." I was perfectly willing to cooperate. We had a long, long, long session. They kept referring to little notebooks. They obviously knew all of my movements. They kept jogging my memory. "Did you see so and so? When was it?"

Finally I said, [chuckling] "You've got the dates here. I can't remember."

I don't know how long it took, but they wrote out a statement which I finally signed. Later on, of course, my lawyer was very sorry about that. I don't think we need to go into it. We'll include this in the record, can't we?

Levenson: Oh yes, we can.

This is a terrible question to ask, but how did you feel while this was going on?

J. Service: Actually, I felt more terrible after I got in the jail than I did here. At this point I was just sort of flabbergasted and stunned, angry, but mostly just stunned I think.

Although these people were very clumsy in their tailing tactics--all this business of hanging around outside my office door in the State Department, chasing out another door of the State Department when I was out going to lunch, and this sort of thing--they obviously had instruction on how to interrogate. They were not giving anything away. They didn't ever tell you anything. I kept trying to find out what it was all about. They kept saying, "We're asking the question."

Then they called up, while I was there, they called up the big cheese. They didn't say it was Hoover, but this was what I was supposed to assume. "Yes, he's being very helpful." I was supposed to be impressed by this and I was somewhat.

They sent out eventually for some sandwiches. I complained it was getting late and I was hungry. I was supposed to have supper that night with a girl that was working in the office. They called her up and told her that I would be unable to meet her.

Eventually we were taken, quite late at night, to the U.S. Commissioner's office to be arraigned. He set bail at \$10,000. All three of us were there, Roth, and [Emmanuel S.] Larsen, and myself, the three people in Washington. The other three people accused in the Amerasia case were in New York.

J. Service: You can see from the picture that I'm angry. By this time it was late at night. There's a picture of the three of us sitting like--I made an ill advised complaint to the commissioner. The FBI likes to get maximum publicity for all this sort of stuff, so they had all the newspapers alerted.

This is Larsen. He tried to talk to me in Chinese, and I said I didn't think it was a good idea for us to be talking in Chinese there, with the newspaper people all hanging around. That made him very angry; he was a strange character. He wanted to find out what I knew, who else had been arrested.

Of course, none of us knew any of the details, who was involved. It was obvious that they were interested in Jaffe. Most of their questioning was about him.

Jail. Charged under the Espionage Act

J. Service: We were taken to jail and processed in. This was very late at night. This is not much to waste time over. Processing into jail is about the same, I suppose, anywhere.

There's an account in Solzhenitsyn's First Circle of a young chap who was a foreign office guy being taken to Lubyanka, and it's not too different from the District of Columbia jail.

Levenson: What did they do?

J. Service: You're forced to strip--you take off all your clothes--shoved into a shower room, wash off thoroughly, given a one piece garment. Mine was ripped in the crotch, and I said, "Can't I get another one?" [imitating jailer] "You better take it. It gets pretty cold up there in the cell block, ha, ha, ha." You know, this sort of thing. The attitude of the people in these places is pretty chilling.

You're put into a cell. You've got a blanket and a mattress, absolutely nothing else in there. They won't let you have a belt or anything like that. This was very late at night by the time this was all finished.

The next morning they took me down to finish the processing, which they hadn't been able to do the night before because the photographers weren't on duty, and I had to be photographed.

J. Service: By then the jailers were very much interested because the daily papers had come out, big spread, pictures. "Hey, you pretty big guy, huh? What d'ya think of this? Must be hot stuff."--sort of attitude.

You asked a while ago about how I felt: I think that the period in jail, especially when I woke up the next day, was very, very depressing because you felt so completely disgraced. You know, how could one possibly come back from this sort of public degradation? I was pretty low.

I wanted to telephone, but the official rule is that you can only telephone your immediate family. Caroline was in California. I saw no point in trying to phone her. Apart from your immediate family, you can phone a lawyer.

I didn't know a lawyer, so, they said, "Here's a list." They've got a list that they give you. These are lawyers who presumably are interested in taking care of people in on larceny or burglary charges or routine things. But, I didn't want any of these lawyers. I wasn't going to call up just a lawyer blind. My case was not the ordinary run-of-the-mill criminal case that most of these guys were used to handling.

By afternoon my sister-in-law--My younger brother's wife was in Washington. He was in Moscow. She had had a hard time in Moscow. The kids had been sick and there was no satisfactory housing. They had come back to Washington just shortly before.

She had gotten in touch with people in the State Department and they in turn had talked to the former judge of the U.S. Court for China, Judge [Milton John] Helmick, who was in Washington. They had arranged bond and that evening, that night actually--I was only in there one full day--I came out.

The next day I had to go around and talk to the bondsman who was a black man, very pleasant guy. He wanted to meet me, apparently, and get some sort of an opinion of how good a risk I was.

Levenson: That's unusual, I think.

J. Service: Well, maybe. Maybe he wasn't used to handling espionage. After all, you see, I was charged under the Espionage Act, which is silly because none of us were accused of espionage really. But there wasn't any other act apparently that could be used.

Using the Espionage Act, of course, gave the Chinese Kuomintang press a field day because they cheerfully and loudly printed that I was a Japanese agent, Japanese spy.

No Help from the State Department

Levenson: What sort of help did you get from the State Department?

J. Service: None at all. The State Department was almost immediately subjected to a lot of criticism. Roth had a book in the press which was critical of State Department policy on Japan. Roth represented the American left, which thought we ought to get rid of the Japanese emperor because he was a war criminal, had certainly been involved in decisions and couldn't be absolved of all responsibility.

Grew was the other side. We must preserve the emperor as an institution that will help hold the country together.

Jaffe was also sort of left. He was Communist or very close to the Communists. He was a very good friend of Earl Browder, who was the leader of the American Communist party during the war.

Gayn generally was considered liberal.

At any rate, the liberal press, New Republic, P.M., which was a newspaper in New York then, Washington Post, Irving Stone, even Winchell and a lot of the columnists, felt that the Amerasia case was politically motivated, the whole thing. And they had good cases--precedents--where classified material had been made available to people like Ernest Lindley who spoke for the State Department point of view.

There was a famous case at this time of Lindley having written some article in Harper's or Atlantic Monthly based entirely on classified State Department materials that were made available to him.

I think Grew was the acting secretary at this time for a short while. James F. Byrnes may have been out here at the UN meeting and Grew was therefore acting in Washington. At the first press conference, Grew made some remark, "Well, it's really nothing to fuss about. We heard a noise out in the chicken coop, so we just went out there and caught the fox."

Levenson: The fox being you?

J. Service: Yes, I and the others. So, at any rate, I went around to the State Department and asked to see somebody and of course, couldn't see Grew, but I saw somebody in the Secretary's office.

J. Service: I said, "Look, I object to this sort of statement. It's pre-judging the case." The man looked as though he'd seen a ghost. He said, "You mean, you're not guilty?"

I said, "Of course, I'm not guilty. I'm going to be cleared, and it is very foolish of the State Department to make this kind of statement."

The State Department discontinued [chuckling] such statements.

Choice of a Lawyer: No Common Cause with the Other Defendants

J. Service: At any rate, to go back to the account, Judge Helmick had made some inquiries, and he'd heard of a man named [Richard Strobach] Munter, M-u-n-t-e-r.

I went around to see Munter. He was very confused by the whole thing, just as the FBI people were confused. They couldn't understand why I had all these Communist materials, why I was interested in Communists, why I was dealing with Communism, and all the rest of it. He couldn't understand all the ramifications of the case. It seemed very complicated to him. He'd never had anything like this. But, he agreed to handle it on a contingency basis. I had to pay him \$2,000 down, which my mother loaned me, as I recall. He made the various appearances that were necessary --you plead not guilty and so on--appearances in court.

Then we waited for a grand jury. The government took it to a grand jury that was about to expire and then withdrew it for reasons we don't really know. They may have had some problems in the case.

In this early period, I was angry. I felt that my career had been ruined. It just didn't seem to be possible that I could come back into the State Department disgraced. I was thinking about resigning, about taking a job as a newspaper man. The New York Post was interested in my working for them.

I went up to New York. Larry Salisbury had just retired from the State Department. He was working for the IPR in New York. I went there. I saw lots of friends in New York, people that had been in China, Epsteins and other people--Gunther Stein was in New York--and talked to a lot of people.

J. Service: Some of the other people in the case wanted to get in touch with me, wanted to work together. The Field papers, P.M. and the Chicago Sun, I think it was, owned and operated then by Marshall Field who was quite a liberal guy, supplied a lawyer and took over the defense for Gayn because Gayn was writing for them.

They offered to take on my defense, but I thought I'd better not make common cause with any of these other people, just do it on my own.

I had talked to Currie and people like that who were much concerned, Vincent, in the State Department. I had talked to a lot of Foreign Service friends, and they urged me—and it began to sort of sink in—to calm down and to fight the thing out, since I was innocent of anything beyond indiscretion, which was not an uncommon kind of indiscretion. They convinced me that I would win and be able to continue and the public impression would be much better than resigning.

So this was what I finally did. Currie urged me to talk to a man named Corcoran, "Tommy the Cork," who was a very good friend of his. All these people were New Dealers together. It ended up with Corcoran actually as my lawyer, unofficially, with Munter the front man.

I've got a long memorandum here that I had to write in '51 for the lawyers which we'll put in the record. I don't see any point in my repeating a lot of it.* [tape off]

These are actually two memoranda that I wrote in early 1951. This first one gives a more detailed account of what I was doing after the arrest, and it leads into the Currie-Corcoran contact, Currie putting me on to Corcoran and Corcoran taking over. The second one completes it and goes into specific detail about my relations with Corcoran.

*On deposit in The Bancroft Library.

Links Between the FBI, "Mary" Miles, and Tai Li: An Early Collaboration to Prepare Jack as Scapegoat for America's "Loss of China"

Levenson: Now, more than thirty years later, have you arrived at a judgment as to why you were picked as the prime culprit for America's so-called loss of China?

J. Service: Yes. The Chinese were looking for a scapegoat after the Stilwell affair blew up in their face. They'd had it in for me for various obvious reasons.

But there is also, an FBI angle in here that I think--I can't prove it--but I think is quite clear. I've mentioned the Sino-American Cooperative Organization, SACO which was a navy and Chinese secret service, Tai Li, operation. The Chinese wanted to get police instructors, instructors in police methods. They had had this from the Germans, but after Pearl Harbor the Germans had finally departed. So the Chinese wanted whatever the Americans could offer.

"Mary" Miles was quite proud of the fact that he had FBI cooperation. I don't know whether these people were on leave, but he always spoke of them as FBI people working in his outfit, supposedly on police methods, police training. The Chinese Communists say that they were also instructors in methods of torture. There were FBI people there.

According to "Mary" Miles, they taught things like poisons, drugs, and God knows what secret means of murder like we've heard about the CIA trying to use against Castro. "Mary" spoke about this quite freely in his talks with American government officials as one of the advantages of his arrangement.

There was a lot of opposition among Americans and also among Chinese to collaboration of this type with Tai Li. Stilwell was opposed, and Wedemeyer was opposed to it. Stilwell told me once that Marshall had told him you just had to quit fighting it because Admiral [Ernest Joseph] King had put his foot down, insisting that the navy was going to have a piece of the action. So, there was nothing we could do about the "Mary" Miles--

Levenson: King?

J. Service: Admiral King was the chief of naval operations. He was the opposite number of George C. Marshall who was the head of the army.

J. Service: I had written quite a number of memos about Chinese hatred of Tai Li and the political dangers in our collaboration, some for Wedemeyer and some for Stilwell. I had been asked about this by Jaffe, and I had mentioned something about it. Jaffe knew about it.

Jaffe's telephone was tapped, and the FBI certainly knew about my view, my criticism of the association with Tai Li. But, the interesting thing is that never, in all the accusations and interrogations, has anything of this surfaced.

It's a suspicious fact because the FBI leaked all sorts of things to friendly newspaper people and to friendly people like the counsel for the minority in the Tydings hearings. But this has never leaked, and the fact that it hasn't leaked makes me suspicious.

The FBI told the Department of Justice within a week of my return from China--or I think on the very day I returned from China--that they had solved the Amerasia case and were willing to have it taken to court. This was before I'd ever met Jaffe. When I stumbled into this, I think they obviously wanted to have me included.

In the Tydings hearings, the Department of Justice was asked about my inclusion in Amerasia or the timing, and they made sort of a lame excuse: "Well there was information indicating contacts, and ninety percent of cases are solved after arrest by confession." So, they thought it was worthwhile to arrest me. But they admit themselves that the case against me was very weak.

When Hurley resigned later on [November 26, 1945], he made various accusations about my giving my reports to the Chinese Communists. He and other people spread reports about my contacts with Chinese women and so on, particularly Chou En-lai's secretary, as I mentioned before.

It wasn't until Hurley agreed to testify in the Davies case in 1953 that we discovered that he'd been fed forged materials by Tai Li, forged materials supposed to be notes between me and Teddy White, who was the Time man, setting up meetings to discuss opposition to Hurley and how we could get Hurley recalled, things like this. These were forged notes. No such meetings took place and no such notes were ever exchanged.

I don't think that Tai Li--who insisted that Hurley not show these to anyone else and then return them to him--I don't think that Tai Li's people, Chinese, were up to doing this in a very convincing way. I think they undoubtedly had cooperation.

Levenson: From the FBI?

J. Service: From the FBI people or from "Mary" Miles' people who were with the FBI people. I think that the fact that my sister-in-law picked up this story from a wife of a Chinese embassy person that I was going to be in trouble, indicates there was collaboration very early on.

Levenson: When did she pick this up?

J. Service: It was before my arrest, some time before my arrest.

Levenson: Did she alert you?

J. Service: No. I didn't hear about it until later.

Levenson: Why was that?

J. Service: Because I don't think anyone thought anything of it. It was lady gossip, that sort of thing. I think that it is obvious that there was collaboration between the FBI, navy and Justice.

When I was in Japan at the end of '45, Wedemeyer came through, going from China to the States for consultation. He wanted to get hold of me and John Emmerson who'd been out in China. He was very friendly and told us that he'd written commendations for us. I think we already knew about the commendations. But he'd also put in to get us a medal which the army can give to civilians for meritorious actions.

When he came back from the States he did not see us. The only person he saw was a man named [Max] Bishop whom he'd known in Southeast Asia Command. Bishop had been in Ceylon, political adviser down there. He told Bishop--I didn't know this from Bishop directly; I only know it second hand from somebody that Bishop told it to--that Wedemeyer had seen J. Edgar Hoover and had been told by J. Edgar that they had evidence that Service was a Communist but they couldn't prove it in court.

Hoover obviously had a great interest in the case. One of McCarthy's favorite lines was that Hoover had said there was a hundred percent air tight case "against Service." Well, when we pinned Hoover down--he never would reply directly--but he replied through the Department of Justice, he said he'd never made such a statement. This was a statement that I think very obviously he had made or FBI people had made.

J. Service: All this is not really answering why I was arrested, but describing maybe how it happened. I think unquestionably FBI interest in the case was prompted by FBI cooperation with the Chinese secret police under Tai Li.

Then, Fulton Lewis apparently also picked up something; he was broadcasting then for Mutual Broadcasting Company. This was before the big days of TV, and he was a very popular radio news broadcaster then. Mutual, I think, was very worried about the broadcast. They got in touch apparently with Corcoran. This was why these memos were written, to try to get the record straight.

We have a transcript of the broadcast which we had in advance. My interlineations are where he departed from the actual script. He adds a word here and there with a very, you know, accented, sarcastic tone. He makes it a much more lively document orally than it appears in the cold print.

Levenson: How did you get an advance copy?

J. Service: Because Mutual got in touch with Corcoran. Corcoran talked, I think, to Mutual, and the script was more or less agreed on. I'm sure it was not as libelous as it originally was. Also, it does not reveal the fact, the obvious fact, which was that the FBI was tapping telephones. I don't know how many phones. But, the original accusation in the Fulton script would have involved the attorney general of the United States in giving information about the case to Corcoran.

State Department Security Entirely in FBI Hands

Levenson: Were you aware at the time that your phone was tapped? You say, "of course" now.

J. Service: Yes, we assumed by this time that we were tapped.

Levenson: I'm speaking about '45.

J. Service: Forty-five, yes. After the arrest we assumed we were tapped.

Levenson: But, before the arrest--

J. Service: No, we didn't--no. I had no feeling of threat or of anything wrong at all. After my arrest, then everybody in the State Department assumed their phone was tapped. Everyone in FE assumed their phone was tapped.

Levenson: Do you now, and did you then—sounds like a pickup of the McCarthy style speech—bitterly resent the lack of support you got from the State Department?

J. Service: Oh, no.

Levenson: I'm sorry. That was a loaded question. I'd rather rephrase it. It's unimaginable to me that you'd be thrown to the dogs in that way.

J. Service: Well, the State Department was completely unorganized for anything. They had no security division or security section. They had one man who was sort of liaison with the FBI and a couple other agencies, who was in charge. They just left security entirely up to the FBI.

The FBI apparently suspected everyone in FE, or practically everyone in FE, because in their eyes the whole State Department policy of being agreeable to collaboration, cooperation with Chinese Communists, was just crazy. It was one that they couldn't fathom.

I don't think that anyone at the top of the State Department kept in touch with what was going on or realized what the FBI action was going to lead to.. [John Carter] Vincent was head of FE and he was, I think, under suspicion just as the rest of us were.

The security liaison, a fellow named Lyon, just left everything in the hands of the FBI.

I certainly resented the Grew statement which I protested, about the fuss in the chicken coop and catching the fox. Nothing like that happened again. Well, one might say the State Department could have warned me, but I think once things were started, why, there wasn't very much they could have done. If they had known more at the top, they might have educated the guy at the bottom as to what was going on.

I acted in a completely unbureaucratic manner. I was talking to people, very freely and frankly, talking outside the State Department. I loaned reports. They weren't from the files. They were my own reports. This was all a little bit irregular. I obviously felt that I had authority to discuss things with the press, which I had had in China but didn't really have in Washington. It had never been clarified, how much authority I had in Washington to behave in the way I was behaving.

J. Service: We had already reached a point, as I said, in the Department of having a debate as to what policy should be, whether we should try to maintain a neutral position in China. Some of us were already talking fairly freely that we were backing the wrong horse if we got behind the KMT.

China Policy: State Department in Ignorance of the Yalta Agreement for Four Months

Levenson: The Yalta agreement was February 11, 1945. According to the resume that appears in the Tydings hearings, the Chinese Communists did not learn about it until much later.

J. Service: Yes, I'm sure they didn't know about it until July or August. Of course, the State Department didn't know about it themselves until July. Chiang Kai-shek named a Communist member to the Chinese mission at the UN conference that established the UN. I saw them in Washington in August, early August I guess it was. and told them about Yalta. I think it was a surprise to them.

The operating people in FE did not learn about the Yalta agreements until they were on the ship going to the Potsdam Conference. Vincent was a member of the group that went with Truman to the Potsdam Conference which was July.

They had been told to prepare position papers to guide the delegation's discussion on policy in the Far East. While they were on the ship, Secretary of State Byrnes came down to Vincent's cabin and, according to Vincent's account to me, threw the papers on the bed and said, "Sorry, but these are all no use," and then proceeded to tell Vincent about the Yalta agreements. This of course threw all of our thinking and planning into a cocked hat. Up to that time we'd all been operating blind, all the assumption about American neutrality in China were meaningless.

Levenson: What comment do you care to make on that, thirty years past the date?

J. Service: Incredible. To keep your own operating people in ignorance is bad. But, the terrible thing was that the Yalta agreement was founded on such completely erroneous reasoning and assumptions. It was based on the idea that if we made a deal with Stalin, the Chinese Communists would very nicely and quietly go along with what Stalin told them to do, which was the exact opposite of what all of us in the field were busily reporting.

J. Service: Who advised Roosevelt and how he came to the idea is still a mystery. But, it guaranteed the civil war, which was what we all had been working so hard to prevent. We knew a civil war would not only be a long, drawn out, disastrous civil war--but it would result in a Communist victory. I must say by this time some of us weren't sure that was a bad thing, but for American policy it was certainly a bad thing.

Jack Cleared Unanimously by Grand Jury on Amerasia Charges

J. Service: Back to Amerasia. The big issue was whether or not I was to appear before the grand jury voluntarily. If you're the accused and volunteer to appear before the grand jury, you waive all rights, all immunity, and you have no counsel present.

The lawyers were concerned because the case on the surface looked so weak that we assumed that there must be some manufactured stuff or some Chinese stuff in the background. We wanted to find out whether or not it was just what we knew about or whether there was some trap being laid.

Corcoran eventually called me and said, "Okay, everything is all right. You can go ahead." I suppose my phone was tapped, but Corcoran's phone was probably also tapped. The person who Corcoran presumably talked to was Tom Clark, who was the attorney general. This was introduced into the Tydings hearings, presumably based on leaks (or information) from FBI people.

During the McCarthy period there were two very new and popular professions that got a lot of attention, ex-Communists and ex-FBI officers. Ex-FBI people were all over the map and providing all sorts of information and getting jobs as security people, becoming experts and advisers to people running blacklists and so on.

Robert Morris, the minority counsel for the Tydings committee, obviously had information that some sort of--information, I used the wrong word--some accusation, some sort of a fix, was put in. So, he interrogated me in the hearings.

Levenson: Jack, at this point I think that I would like to ask you--because I realize that we're only at the beginning of your loyalty hearings--what were the forums and dates of your various judicial and legislative and administrative hearings?

J. Service: The easiest way to answer that is to simply insert here a list that I prepared for my lawyer, Mr. [Charles Edward] Rhett, at one point. Does it have a date on it?

Levenson: Oh, that's fine.*

J. Service: This gives a list of all of them, I think.

Levenson: Good. As far as I can recall, the only case in which there was a jury of ordinary people was the grand jury in the Amerasia case. How did you feel about presenting your case--and I know you appeared voluntarily--before ordinary, non-specialist people?

J. Service: [chuckling] Nineteen forty-five is quite a long time ago. Actually I didn't have a chance to present my case. I submitted myself for questioning--is really what it amounted to. The Department of Justice attorney, in other words the equivalent of a prosecuting attorney, asked me various questions about my involvement with Jaffe and the other people, but primarily Jaffe. These were all facts that had pretty well been gone over. I was repeating some of the material that had been in my statement that I gave to the FBI, which I assumed the grand jury had. They obviously were familiar with the general circumstances of the case.

Then the foreman of the grand jury took over and asked some questions. This was not especially hostile. It was not particularly difficult questioning because it related to fairly recent events, and as I say, it had been gone over.

Then the foreman and some of the other members of the grand jury asked some questions about relations between people in my position, the government, and the press, particularly when they had information, as I did, about developments in foreign countries the press people couldn't get to, get direct knowledge of.

It was a fairly friendly--friendly is too strong a word--non-hostile meeting. It was what, twenty people. I don't remember the composition now really, but it was just sort of a cross section. They were neither friendly nor unfriendly I think, certainly not out to get me. It lasted--it's hard to say now whether it was an hour or two hours. It wasn't a terribly long hearing.

*See Appendix II.

J. Service: I think I mentioned the fact that I'd had a son born that morning, and that I hoped that it was going to be a good day for me. They sort of laughed in a friendly way.

Of course, the Senate committee was quite a different matter. That was divided very strongly. The Tydings committee was two Republicans one of whom, Hickenlooper, was very unfriendly, and three Democrats who generally were on my side I felt.

You had two counsel, one majority counsel who was inclined to try to develop the case in a way that was favorable to you, and a minority counsel who was vicious. He was later the man who was the committee counsel in the IPR hearings, Robert Morris. He was obviously being fed information by the FBI and any place else he could get rumor or gossip and scandal.

Levenson: We can talk about that later as we get to that. Thank you.

J. Service: You want to turn that thing off?

Levenson: Okay. [tape off]

The Family's Reaction

Levenson: What was your family's response to these events? You've described your reaction to your arrest as total disgrace.

J. Service: The family didn't accept that. I think all of our spirits picked up pretty much when, as I say, a large section of the press, including the Washington Post, the New York Herald Tribune, and so on, became critical of the way the whole case had been handled, the way it seemed to be politically motivated, to silence critics and so on.

My mother never faltered. I've got correspondence which I think we can put in as papers. We don't need to have them all in the record here. Caroline was obviously distraught. She came on to Washington fairly soon from Berkeley. I'd already gotten a house. I think we were waiting for the children to finish school. She had her baby the day that the first [atomic] bomb dropped and the grand jury met. And the day that the grand jury decision was announced was the day that the Japanese announced they were willing to surrender.

Levenson: You certainly were upstaged by a number of enormous international events!

Reparation

Little attention was paid to the action of the grand jury last week in the case of the six officials and journalists charged with dealing in secret documents. There were matters of greater import to think about, but now that the mind is more or less accommodated to the end of the war, the case should not be unheeded. It was held by the grand jury that insufficient evidence existed even to warrant a court trial of Jack Service of the State Department, Mark Gayn, a freelance journalist, and Kate Louise Mitchell of *Amerasia* magazine. Their bail of \$10,000 each, accordingly, is being refunded. The case of the other three—E. S. Larsen of the State Department, Andrew Roth of the Office of Naval Intelligence and Philip J. Jaffe of *Amerasia*—will go to trial. The charge is one of conspiracy in the abstraction and use of Government files and records.

Any comment on the case of the three against whom indictments have been preferred must be suspended till the case has been dealt with in court. The three persons who have been allowed to go free, however, deserve something more than a grand jury release. The release has fortified the feeling on the part of those, ourselves included, that the action of the State Department had a political motivation. Leaks of so-called secret memoranda are by no means uncommon in Government departments. This is so well known that the fact that this was the only case to be taken up gave it the appearance of persecution. Former Undersecretary Grew, knowing full well that the singling out of these persons was of itself suspicious, promised at the time that the charge was the beginning of a general investigation. His implication was that the sources and recipients of other leaks would be proceeded against. But there has been no suggestion of any further proceedings, and it is our guess that the investigation stopped with this case.

The case, as the outcome of the grand jury inquiry bears out, was so thin that the layman could not help but get the impression that espionage was in the State Department mind. Three persons have been cleared not only of that cloud but also of responsibility for leakages; reparation in the public mind, however, is still their due. We suggest that Secretary Byrnes should make amends to the released three without delay as a matter of elementary justice. In respect of Mr. Service, reparation should take the form of reinstatement as well as apology. And what was back of the incident, in the absence of a statement from the department, deserves inquiry by the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. The morale of the entire department, as well as the integrity of the public service, is involved in the clearing up of the atmosphere in which this case is wrapped.

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J. Service: I forget how I got news of this. The minority counsel on the Tydings committee tried to make something out of it, that I heard it from the Department of Justice. I'm sure I didn't hear it from the Department of Justice--it was probably from one of my lawyers, Munter probably.

I was downtown and walked around to the Washington Post-- I knew the Washington Post people quite well; they were friendly-- and went in to see Herb Elliston the editor. He had been in China in the early days--a lot of newspaper people had wandered to the Far East and worked on English language papers in China or in Japan.

I said, "It's just my luck that the grand jury clears me on a day that all the front page will be about Japanese surrender. He said, "Don't worry, you'll be on the front page," and so I was, in a small story.

Pro Forma Probation and a Posting to Japan

J. Service: The Department then was confronted with having to do something about me. I was asked to appear before something called the Foreign Service Personnel Board, which doesn't meet very often, but is supposed to handle disciplinary cases.

I think they were a little embarrassed. The man who was running it, Julius Holmes, who was I think partly responsible for the way the thing was handled in the State Department--in other words in accepting the idea that all of FE was under suspicion--he said, "Service, you certainly violated this regulation." He showed me a regulation about criticism to newspaper people of officials of friendly governments.

This was a regulation that had been passed during the 1939-'40 years when a lot of Americans were unhappy about American neutrality and very critical of the Nazis. This had been put in the regulations then to stop Americans sounding off about Hitler openly.

I said, "Yes, of course, I violated this." They said, "We'll have to put you on probation." The time was limited. Maybe it was six months.

Then, they said they'd send me to a European post. I said I thought it would be a mistake to send me to a European post since the Chinese Kuomintang papers had made such a field day

J. Service: out of this thing, accused me of being a Japanese spy. I thought that it would be wise of the Department to send me to a place in the Far East, although everyone realized I couldn't go back to China where I would be persona non grata.

So, they said they'd think about that, and in a few days they asked if I'd be interested in going to Tokyo with George Atcheson. He had indicated he'd be willing to have me. I was very pleased. George was being sent as State Department representative with MacArthur. So I went out to Japan with George to be his executive officer, his number two.

Washington Post Editorial: Accused with Maximum Publicity;
Cleared with No Publicity

J. Service: Before that though, Elliston of the Washington Post had called up and asked me to drop by. He asked me what the State Department had done--this was about August 20. I said that I'd been reinstated, I'd gone back to work, and that I had received a letter, I think, from Byrnes and from Grew.

He said, "By God, I think that we ought to say something about this. There's been no publicity." I said, "I'm not sure that I can release these letters to the press." He said, "Don't worry. We'll take care of it."

The next day he had an editorial, quite a nice editorial about doing something about people that get accused with a lot of publicity but cleared with no publicity.

I went down to see Ben Cohen who was regarded as a friend of Currie's. I said that it seemed to me that the State Department ought to let me release the letters from Byrnes and Grew. He said, "Don't do anything. I'll take care of it." This was Ben Cohen who was another one of the New Deal crowd that had come into Washington with Roosevelt in the 30's, been a big figure in the early days and close associate of Corcoran's.

The next day at the Secretary of State's press conference these two letters were given out as a press release. You can have them if you want them, but they've been printed in many places. So then I was officially reinstated.

Levenson: Clean as a whistle?

J. Service: Clean as a whistle. All right now--I had an odd footnote to that though. [chuckling] Late in August, before I went to Japan, I happened to be in FE when Grew, who was resigning, came around to say his farewells. Of course, he was an FE man originally himself, a Far East man.

I was a little bit embarrassed. I felt this was maybe not the place to be. But everybody was sort of falling in line, so I fell into the tail of the line. Grew was coming along, shaking people's hands. But somehow before [chuckling] Grew got to me, he just changed his direction and went off. Apparently he didn't want to shake my hand!

Levenson: Embarrassed?

J. Service: I don't know what was in his mind, but we didn't have our meeting at any rate.

Various things happened during my arrest period that were sort of interesting. I don't know whether they're worth mentioning or not.

Stilwell was then out in Okinawa. He'd taken over command of the Tenth Army when commanding General [Simon Bolivar, Jr.] Buckner was killed. His family had me around for breakfast to show solidarity and support.

The Chinese Communists had a member in the delegation that came to the San Francisco UN conference. It was Tung Pi-wu, an old friend of mine. He was accompanied by Ch'en Chia-k'ang. The delegation came to Washington from San Francisco. Linebarger, who had been in Chungking but was now back here, arranged a supper for them. Some of us who'd been in Chungking came to the supper. I went around also and saw them in their hotel.

When we came out of the room, out of their room in the Raleigh Hotel--a rather rundown hotel in Washington--as soon as we came out of the room, two men came out of another room, a few doors down the hall. It was so obvious--came out and waited for the elevator with us because they were obviously seeing who it was. It's just a very obvious FBI tactic.

I had become more accustomed to the FBI at this time. The FBI used to tail me for a while. Eventually I think they gave up tailing me, but we assumed that our phone was tapped always.

Levenson: Were you ostracized, cut, et cetera, by people other than Grew who wouldn't shake your hand?

J. Service: Not at all. This was a big surprise. As I said, my first feelings were that this is a terrible, terrible disgrace, to be arrested on espionage charges. The Vietnam War objectors got used to going to jail. It became sort of a badge of honor. But, under those circumstances, it felt like an unmitigated disgrace.

But I remember Vincent introduced me to Dean Acheson, who was assistant secretary at that time I think. Acheson joked about it, "Well, you don't look like such a dangerous man."

I had lunch at the Metropolitan Club with Mortimer Graves, who was the secretary of the American Council of Learned Societies, and he was very much interested. He became treasurer of a legal fund that was started to raise a little money to pay costs.

I don't recall anybody, except people like Dooman and a few Japan types, who seemed to treat me as a leper. Most of the people carried on as normal.

While Out on Bail, Served as Expert Consultant to the Pentagon on Report on the Chinese Communists.

J. Service: One interesting experience. An officer over in the Pentagon called me. He was Wedemeyer's man in the Operations Department, OPD, in the Pentagon. Colonel Lincoln, "Abe Lincoln" he was called. He said, "We've got a big report here," and showed me two big volumes that had been prepared by their research people. They had a big research shop in the Pentagon working on China.

He said, "We've got a summary here that's been prepared. We think it's pretty good, and Wedemeyer thinks it's pretty good, and we'd like you to look it over."

I started looking at the summary and things began to seem odd, mentions of "Soviet-type this and that." So I went back to the basic stuff, and a distortion was clear.

Levenson: This was an account of what?

J. Service: An analysis of the Chinese Communists.

J. Service: It had been prepared by the research people in Washington. It was based primarily on our reporting from Yenan, not only mine but all the other army and OSS people sending in reports, various reports from other sources. It was a huge compilation of stuff, as complete information as they could get on Chinese Communists.

Then, the summary had been prepared I believe, by a man who had lived in China, a naturalized American--originally a Swede--who'd been a free lance newspaperman. He was violently anti-Communist, and wrote his summary on the line that the Chinese Communists were complete appendages, stooges, of the Russian Communists, following the Russian line and methods and model.

I said, "Can I sit down for a while?" He gave me a desk. So I wrote out very hurriedly, some contrasts between what was said in the summary and what was said in the basic report and said, "The summary isn't worth a damn. It's written by someone who is so prejudiced that he just can't see straight."

Lincoln was quite surprised by this. Apparently, from what I heard later on, from people who worked in MIS (Military Intelligence Section), the thing was squashed. It was later on rewritten and published by [Lyman] Van Slyke at Stanford just a few years ago, thirty years or so after the event.*

It seemed odd that here I was, you know, on bail, awaiting grand jury hearings, but the Pentagon still was willing to accept my views!

"Find the Bodies" for the Tokyo Office

J. Service: My duties, when I started work again were really to organize or help organize the office in Tokyo, to recruit personnel. We had to "find the bodies" to staff an office. I worked as a liaison between the Foreign Service personnel office and FE.

*Lyman Van Slyke, The Chinese Communist Movement; a Report of the United States War Department, July, 1945, Stanford, Stanford University Press, 1968.

J. Service: I went over to the Pentagon and talked to Eddie Reischauer who was working in uniform at that time, tried to get Reischauer, who was a classmate and housemate in college, interested. He decided, I think wisely, he didn't want to be a part of the occupation. So, he turned us down.

X NORMAL FOREIGN SERVICE CAREER RESUMES, 1945-1950

MacArthur's Japan: Separate Communications Mean Separate Accommodations: Mitsui Bank Building, the Directors' Suites

J. Service: Atcheson went out to Tokyo as political adviser. An old friend from China, Reynolds, who'd worked with Pan American, was then working with the Navy, helping to operate the Navy Transportation Service, NATS. Reynolds found out that Atcheson and I were going through, and persuaded us to go NATS; it was very nice. [laughter] They were very good to us.

At any rate, we went out and landed at Yokosuko, across the bay from Tokyo. We were flown across in a small three seater plane, as I recall, over the bay. It was not long after the surrender, and all the navy was there. The whole U.S. navy, and the Japanese navy and the Australian and the British navies, joined, were all lined up there in Tokyo Bay. It was a terrific sight.

Anyway, we landed in Tokyo and our first call was, of course, on MacArthur. He was very cordial, very pleasant. He had refused to have various other State Department people. He'd refused Grew. Then Dooman thought he would get the job, but MacArthur didn't want Dooman.

He'd accepted Atcheson partly, I think, because Atcheson was not a particularly well known person, was not going to grab the limelight; and perhaps also because Atcheson was not a Japan man, would not therefore presume to advise MacArthur as an old expert. At any rate, he was cordial.

The question finally came down to communications. MacArthur was very sensitive about any outside people operating under him. He insisted on having control. Our instructions were that we were to have our own communications with the State Department.

J. Service: If we'd had army communications we would have to send all our communications to the War Department. We were supposed to have our own communications sent direct to the State Department. MacArthur said, "Then you can't be in our office here. You can't be in our headquarters. You'll have to be separate."

We were told to contact the headquarters officer concerned with requisitioning Japanese buildings. John Emmerson was there by that time. He was joining us. We checked the list of buildings and found out the Mitsui main bank building hadn't been taken over. John said, "Why, that's a good building." We went over there. Most of Tokyo was flattened by the bombing and fires.

We went to the Mitsui main bank building, an imposing granite building, went in, found the building custodian--he was bowing and scraping--and said we required some space. He started showing us around downstairs.

I said, "Wait a minute. Have him bring us the blueprints," all this through an interpreter. He found the building blueprints. I said, "Where are the directors' offices?" Seventh floor. So I said, "We'll go to the seventh floor first." We went up. Beautiful panelled offices, each one about twenty-five by twenty-five or thirty by thirty. I said, "This is the space we'll take." The army was furious about it later on. [laughter]

At any rate, we set up shop. The army gave us some clerical personnel. The State Department was finding various people that lived in Japan, that had worked in Japan, some Foreign Service officers.

We had to handle a lot of Nisei Americans who'd been trapped during the war and had American citizenship. They'd been born in the States. We set up a consulate in Yokohama which handled those cases.

I won't go into a lot of detail about the work there. It was not terribly important. John Emmerson was there and worked with the government section of the headquarters, keeping in touch with all the new political parties that were starting up. All the political prisoners were released from jail. It was a very exciting time to be in Japan.

Herb Norman represented the Canadian interest there. He was a wonderful scholar, famous scholar on Japan, Meiji Japan.

Max Bishop, Volunteer Aide to the FBI, Photographs Jack's Memos to Atcheson

J. Service: I've already mentioned the Wedemeyer visit and his return. Bishop, who was the man he talked to when he came back, was a State Department man on Atcheson's staff from very soon after our office was set up. Bishop was mostly interested in exploring events before Pearl Harbor.

He had been in the State Department in 1941 when they were trying to work out a modus vivendi, when there was talk of Konoye meeting Roosevelt someplace in the Pacific and having a talk. The U.S. named Konoye as a war criminal.

Bishop was furious about this and he became very much wrapped up in trying to prove that we could have averted the war by doing something else in '41. So he wasn't very helpful in the office.

Eventually, after talking to Wedemeyer, he asked one of the army GIs who was working in our office, to bring him documents on which I had made notations. I was executive officer, there was a tremendous lot of material passing through, and to save Atcheson reading everything, I would make notations or call his attention to things I thought he ought to see.

Bishop got this GI, who was sort of chief clerk, to bring these notes to him. Then he took them out of the office and was having them photographed by the local secret service people, apparently as a volunteer helper for the FBI.

Levenson: Why?

J. Service: I think his motivation was mostly patriotic: it was also jealousy. Some of the Japan people in the State Department felt eclipsed by the fact that China men (Vincent, Atcheson) had been given the top jobs--even relating directly to Japan. The Japan men seemed excluded. Atcheson was China. I was China.

Bishop was particularly bitter. He and I had both been leading our class all the way through. Recently, with a double promotion, I had gone ahead of him. I don't know that this was one of his motives.

Levenson: Did he believe you to be a Communist or Communist sympathizer?

J. Service: I don't know. He certainly believed me to be either a Communist dupe or Communist sympathizer, one or the other.

Hurley Resigns, Blasting Service and Atcheson: The Press
Interrupt a Foreign Service Celebration

J. Service: In late November the press called the office one day about a flash that had just come over the wire that Hurley had resigned. I went in and told George about it.

Some way or another we had gotten some whiskey. MacArthur wouldn't allow whiskey to be brought into Japan because shipping space was scarce. George had complained about this in the hearing of the "principal naval officer present," whatever the title is, in the dining room at the Imperial Hotel. We lived in the Imperial Hotel, George and I, which was limited to chiefs and executive officers of staff sections.

Anyway, soon after that, a case of whiskey, I.W. Harper, was delivered to George's door! For safekeeping we had taken some of this down to the office. We had the whole floor, with all the directors' offices, including the vault. So we had it in the vault.

Without saying anything more, I just went down the hall to the vault and got a bottle of whiskey and brought it up to George's office. The rest of the staff by that time had assembled to join in the excitement. We had some paper cups and were just having good slugs of whiskey when suddenly the press was at the door, because by this time they had gotten more news about Service and Atcheson--For instance, they were the principal culprits accused by Hurley in his letter of resignation.

Levenson: Accused of--?

J. Service: Working with the Communists, opposing American policy and telling the Communists that he didn't represent American policy. Also working with the imperialists and so on and so on.

It's a long blast, a famous blast. There's a whole section in U.S. Foreign Relations for 1945 on the Hurley resignation, which they decided was worthy of handling separately, pages 722 to 744. This contains a lot of telegrams that George sent off.

Poor George was frantic. Well, it was his first experience with anything like this. Also, he had much more at stake. He was already at the top. He was designated as ambassador to Thailand. He was temporarily in Japan before going on to his post. I think he saw his whole career being shattered.

LARCHMONT, N.Y., Dec. 10, 1945.

Senator TOM CONNALLY,
U.S. Senate,
Washington, D.C.:

Theodore White, who as president of foreign correspondent club of China, is eminently representative and informed, is fully empowered to testify for me.

ANNALEE JACOBY.

NEW YORK, N.Y., Dec. 10, 1945.

Senator TOM CONNALLY,
Washington, D.C.:

This is to inform you that Theodore White is qualified to represent my views in any statements he may make before Senate concerning State Department officials accused by Hurley stop having lived ten years China myself would be willing testify on overall China question if needed.

JACK BELDEN.

BACKGROUND OF WITNESS

The CHAIRMAN. Now, Mr. White, when did you first go to China?

Mr. WHITE. I first arrived in China in January 1939.

The CHAIRMAN. How long were you there?

Mr. WHITE. My headquarters were in Chungking, and they have been in Chungking off and on for the past 6½ years. I would travel to various fronts. I have been in India for a few months, Burma, Dutch East Indies, Australia; and I had two trips back to America. I would say that the total of my years in China was 4 years, but basically it has been coming and going to the various fronts in the Far East, out of China.

The CHAIRMAN. When did you come back?

Mr. WHITE. Two years ago.

The CHAIRMAN. Were you there while General Hurley was there?

Mr. WHITE. Yes, sir; and I was there before he was there, years before he was there, and all the while he was there.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you know Mr. George Atcheson? I believe his name is George.

Mr. WHITE. Yes, sir; I do.

The CHAIRMAN. He was a Foreign Service officer out there.

Mr. WHITE. I am very proud to know him, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you know Mr. John Service?

Mr. WHITE. I do.

DEFENSE OF ATCHESON AND SERVICE

The CHAIRMAN. It has been testified here by General Hurley that these two gentlemen, who were career men, were engaged in sabotaging the U.S. policies and efforts in China. Do you know anything about that?

Mr. WHITE. I know of no attempt whatsoever to sabotage General Hurley's policies in China by any career officer of the State Department; and if you will permit me, sir, I would like to say a few words.

The CHAIRMAN. Just go ahead in your own way.

Senator VANDENBERG. How would you know whether they were sabotaging it, or not?

Mr. WHITE. Senator Vandenberg, we newspapermen in Chungking lived in a very rough situation. I met these men in the field. When you

first man to go to Chungking to do some of the political groundwork necessary for the construction of a new government in China after the war. He was the only American who was not used in bombing Japan. Later he was to go to General Stilwell to investigate just what aid they could be

brought with people you know what they think. I have had no access to any Embassy documents, but you cannot live with men day and night and be with them in discomfort and danger and not know what they are doing. The American policy as laid down by Secretary of State is

bivouac with people you know what they think. I have had no access to any Embassy documents, but you cannot live with men day and night and be with them in discomfort and danger and not know what they think.

The American policy as laid down by Secretary Byrnes, as I understand it, was for the creation of a united, democratic China; at least that was the testimony given here last week. I know that those men zealously fought to achieve that, just by living with them. I do not think it would be possible for any member of the press in Chungking to be unaware of any conspiracy or of any attempt to sabotage Ambassador Hurley.

Senator VANDENBERG. Well, it might not be a conspiracy. It might be a difference, a very fundamental difference of opinion as to whether or not you should or should not, let us say, arm the Communist forces in the north. I do not quite see how you would qualify as a witness to determine whether or not that was their point of view, and whether or not they were encouraging their own point of view.

Mr. WHITE. May I answer you as some length, sir?

Senator VANDENBERG. Oh, surely! Go ahead, because I am not being critical, I am merely being inquisitive.

Mr. WHITE. Yes. I think the basic issue here involved is this—whether or not any officer or any reporting observer of the State Department should temper his reports to agree with the opinions or prejudices of his superiors. Now, I feel that any man who tempered his actual, factual reporting in the field to agree with what his superiors thought would not only be useless to the United States but he would be dangerous. I want to make this point—that the men whom General Hurley I believe has charged so seriously, most of these people were responsible, except for Atcheson, to General Stilwell and General Wedemeyer. They were operating as part of our military intelligence network in China. They were assigned to various specific tasks. Service, for example, went to orders of General Stilwell to Yenan to investigate the situation there. Another officer, Mr. Raymond Ludden, went on orders. They reported the facts. “We want to know of what aid the Communists could be to us.” “They will prove to be of great aid politically, no matter how much they were fighting the Japanese.” These were military missions; these men did go there, and they reported these things. If their opinions differed with those of General Hurley, that is regrettable; they reported the facts as honestly as it can be done.

I would like to tell you now, there is a very broad classification of people called “career diplomats,” and in the American press they usually appear as “cookie-pushers,” but these men were out in the field all the time.

The CHAIRMAN. Speak a little louder, please, sir.

Mr. WHITE. Yes, sir. Most of these people, except for Atcheson, were out in the field. They were out there in military orders. Service, for example, has a brilliant record in field service for our Government during the war. Service was the first man to go in the northwest to Kansu, to see whether the oil field which had just been discovered could be used for military purposes. Service was the first man to go into Honan Valley to find out what was going on there. He was the

first man to go to Chengtu to do some of the political groundwork necessary for the construction of air bases there, to be used by the B-17 bombers that were later used in bombing Japan. Later he was to go to General Stilwell to investigate just what aid they could be to us.

DIFFERENCES OF OPINION AND HONEST REPORTING

Now, I realize that the main difference of opinion between General Hurley and Mr. Service was as to the use, the power, and the value of the Communist arms to the American policy; but it was Mr. Service's duty to report these things. Sir, I do not believe it would be possible in Chungking for a man to attempt to conspire with the “Communist armed party” as General Hurley calls it, in an attempt to overthrow the government of Chiang Kai-shek, without the press corps knowing of it. Having known Service so well, having lived with him in places like that, he would be guilty of monumental duplicity in every hour of his daily life if he were actually conspiring. You cannot talk with a man in the field for so long and not realize what he is doing. I am absolutely sure has not not conspiring with anybody to overthrow our Government. He was reporting the facts as he saw them. Senator VANDENBERG. Let me ask you a question. You keep using the word “conspiracy.” I do not conceive that this is a matter of conspiracy. A man might have a perfectly honest opinion which could be deadly in its impact upon American policy. Would you say that, for instance, if we had furnished lend-lease to the Communist armed party, it probably would not have resulted in the fall of Chiang Kai-shek's government?

Mr. WHITE. If you are asking for my opinion on the China situation—

Senator VANDENBERG. Yes, I am asking for your answer to the question. Is it your opinion, if we had furnished lend-lease to the Communist armed party, that the government of Chiang Kai-shek would not have fallen?

Mr. WHITE. No, sir; I do not believe so. Furthermore, I do not believe that that is the opinion, if I may say so, of General Stilwell or of Ambassador Gauss, who I feel should be called to testify about these men. I do not think it would have fallen.

Senator VANDENBERG. If there are those who thought that it would, then their opinion of those who would recommend such a policy would necessarily be that the opinion was inimical to the American attitude?

Mr. WHITE. I quite see that there would be people who would think that, but any junior officer who would agree with the opinion of a superior when he did not sincerely believe it himself, would be guilty of gross negligence of duty. It is his duty to report on what he has seen and on what he knows of China. An employee's superiors can either accept or reject his recommendations, but he must report, as an intelligence officer, himself, the situation as he sees it.

Senator VANDENBERG. That is the question for the committee to decide, and I do not think you were in a position to say whether or not these gentlemen were or were not loyal to the service when they were doing the thing you say they ought to do. That is for us to decide.

Mr. WHITE. I am not trying to transgress upon your prerogatives,

sir. I am merely saying that to the best of my belief and knowledge these men were serving their country as honorably as they possibly could, that they were reporting the truth, that no one of them ever attempted to sabotage, undermine, or otherthrow the government of Chiang Kai-shek.

Senator VANDENBERG. Well, I entirely respect your opinion, but I think it is hearsay as far as this hearing is concerned, and that is the only point I am making.

Senator AUSTIN. What you are doing is corroborating or trying to corroborate the opinion of Mr. Service, is it not?

Mr. WHITE. No, sir. There is a charge leveled against these men that they were attempting to overthrow the government of Chiang Kai-shek, and that they were attempting to sabotage American policy; and I am coming here and offering to testify that these men did not do so.

Senator VANDENBERG. Have you seen the papers to which General Hurley refers, upon which he bases his charges?

Mr. WHITE. I have not seen any paper addressed to the State Department by any embassy official. I have been a war correspondent in uniform, and I have seen, as war correspondents do at headquarters, documents on the political situation of China.

Senator VANDENBERG. If the State Department was as secretive out there as it is here at home, I would not have thought you saw very much.

Mr. WHITE. I did not.

The CHAIRMAN. Is that all?

VIEWS ON AMERICAN POLICY TOWARD CHINA

Senator WILEY. No. I want to ask a question. I can agree that a great deal of what you have said would be, in legal parlance, a conclusion, but as you have pointed out, here, you might tell us what these men have actually said to you about American policy. For instance, it has been stated, here, as I recall it, American policy was clearly defined, as laid down by General Hurley, and that these men stated that was not the American policy. Did you ever hear them say that?

Mr. WHITE. Never, once! Never, once!

Senator WILEY. Did you ever hear them say or see them do anything from which anyone might draw the conclusion that Hurley was wrong about the policy and they were right?

Mr. WHITE. No, sir. I think one of the finest expressions of American policy in China is a document written by General Hurley and never published. I would like to see the text of it, because from what I am told it represents their opinions, our opinion, and his opinion at that time. It was a document General Hurley sent to Yenan. A single copy of that document is still there, in which he states his belief that an agreement could be reached in China by the various parties on the basis of a full coalition government, and in which the parties would subordinate their armies. Now, every one of his, I believe, in China, all the newspapermen, if I may speak for them, and these men, whom I have known so well, have always believed that that is the best policy to be applied.

Senator WILEY. Then so far as you know there wasn't any difference between Hurley and Service and Acheson?

Mr. WHITE. I do not know what the precise nature of their differences was. I do know that Service and Acheson were reporting the truth at all times. If ever General Hurley found their opinions later on differing from his, he called them an attempt to sabotage his policy. Their opinions—what they wrote to the State Department I do not know, sir. I do know that in private conversation the policy they spoke of and talked of was always the American policy, as I understood it, broadly defined by our Government.

FURNISHING LEND-LEASE TO CHINESE COMMUNISTS

Senator VANDENBERG. I would like to ask just one more question. Was it your personal opinion, Mr. White, that we should have furnished lend-lease to the Communist armed party?

Mr. WHITE. Never, without qualifying it. I am against furnishing lend-lease to anybody without certain qualifications. I believe if a coalitionist government had been achieved we should have furnished arms to all armies fighting against the Japanese.

Senator VANDENBERG. Well, that is not quite my question. My question is whether you thought that it would have been a correct policy to have furnished lend-lease under existing circumstances to the Communist armed forces?

Mr. WHITE. Under the existing circumstances? No.

Senator VANDENBERG. Well, was not that the policy that your friends believed in?

Mr. WHITE. I believe that my friends were speaking of future methods, the way the situation was likely to develop. As you know very well—I am sorry. As you know, sir, while part of our military strategy at that time called for an eventual landing on the China coast, a landing on the China coast would have been very important. In the summer of 1944. To achieve that landing you would have needed Communist help, and to have that help for our landing, I would then have been in favor of lend-lease to aid our own troops.

GOAL OF CHINESE UNIFICATION

The CHAIRMAN. Let me ask you, Mr. White. Was it not the policy, or part of the policy of General Hurley to bring about a union of the so-called Communist armed party with Chiang Kai-shek?

Mr. WHITE. I believe he tried to do so, and I believe he failed.

The CHAIRMAN. Was not that the policy of the President and of the Secretary of State?

Mr. WHITE. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. And of everybody?

Mr. WHITE. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. That policy was based upon the theory, of course, that they could get them all to unite to fight the Japanese. Now, in that event, would it have been quite appropriate to furnish them lend-lease, so they could fight the Japanese?

Mr. WHITE. Why, of course.

The CHAIRMAN. And were not all of our representatives out there, supposedly, including General Hurley, and the State Department, here—were they not all in favor of that policy?

Mr. WHITE. They were.

The CHAIRMAN. They claimed they were in favor of that policy?

Mr. WHITE. Yes, sir.

Senator WILEY. Were you in intimate contact with these two gentlemen?

Mr. WHITE. Not with George Atcheson. With Service, yes; not with George Atcheson.

Senator WILEY. What was his reaction when he was ordered home?

Mr. WHITE. I can tell you that. I went to call on George Atcheson just before he left. He was sick in bed. He had had a hard time of it; and you will find this difficult to believe. At that time, he praised Ambassador Hurley to me.

Senator WILEY. I do not understand.

Mr. WHITE. At that time, he praised Ambassador Hurley. That was the last conversation I had with George Atcheson. My relation with Service was very intimate. We were friends of long standing.

Senator WILEY. What was his reaction when he was ordered home?

Is he the man you were talking about, who got sick?

Mr. WHITE. No; that was Atcheson. Service's reaction when he was ordered home—he did not know why he was being ordered home, at the time. Both Hurley and General Wedemeyer were in Washington. He did not know why he was being called by them.

The CHAIRMAN. Are there any other matters you want to submit, Mr. White? Is there anything else you want to say?

Mr. WHITE. No, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Now is your chance. Are there any other questions?

TESTIMONY SUPPORTED BY OTHER CORRESPONDENTS

Senator WILEY. What are those telegrams?

The CHAIRMAN. They were just telegrams from a group of other correspondents, saying that Mr. White was authorized to speak for them—Mr. Seavareid and Mr. Belden and some others.

Senator WILEY. How long is it since you have seen these correspondents?

Mr. WHITE. Perhaps 3 or 4 days, in New York.

Senator WILEY. They were all over there with you?

Mr. WHITE. In New York?

Senator WILEY. Were they all over in China with you?

Mr. WHITE. At various times. We were never all there at any one time, but all of us know the people who are under attack, and we wanted a chance to proclaim in public our faith in their loyalty and in their honesty and in their good service for our Government. That is, we feel that these men who underwent hardship, were really ordered into danger by our Government, should not be hauled up in public and so attacked without somebody speaking in their defense. They did work for our Government, which I believe was finer intelligence work than the organization of any other foreign country. It was magnificent work. Mr. Raymond Ludden, for example, went on a secret mission behind the Japanese lines, into the province of Hopei. It had been 6

years since any American observer had been there. It was a six-man mission. One of those men was killed, a captain of the Army. The other members of the mission were decorated. Mr. Ludden came back to Chungking, in January or February, I believe. It was, I believe, under the impact of his reportage, and what went on behind the lines and in the Communist areas, that Mr. Atcheson's report, to which Mr. Hurley referred, was drawn up.

We were surprised at these charges against them when we read them in New York, and we felt that we should tell the committee that we, as a nonpartisan group of newspapermen, felt that they had served our country as honorably as possible.

Senator WILEY. That is why you came down?

Mr. WHITE. Yes, sir.

Senator WILEY. Representing that group?

Mr. WHITE. Yes, sir. I have an aversion for seeing my friends falsely slandered.

The CHAIRMAN. That is all. The committee will recess until tomorrow morning, when we will meet in executive session in the committee room.

(Whereupon, at 12:30 o'clock, the committee recessed until tomorrow, Tuesday, December 11, 1945, at 10:30 o'clock, in the committee room.)

J. Service: At any rate, I wrote the State Department a long message answering Hurley's charges which again, I suppose, we can make reference to. It's page 733 to 738 of U.S. Foreign Relations, 1945, volume 7.

Levenson: Did you feel dangerously threatened by this?

J. Service: No, I don't think so. It seemed to be just a venomous kick from a senile, old fool. It seemed so incredible.

I had come through the Amerasia case and been cleared. Hurley had been frustrated that I hadn't been fired in the Amerasia case, and of course he had failed in China.

By this time the two parties in China were squaring off at each other. Hurley's attempts to bring about a peaceful settlement right after the signing of the Russian-Chinese treaty at the end of the war hadn't worked. What we predicted was coming true. The Chinese Communists were not going to lie down and play dead.

I felt that the Hurley letter, and its patently absurd accusations, was something that would be taken care of fairly soon. The Senate Foreign Relations Committee did hold hearings. Hurley did make a fool of himself. They discontinued the hearings because he couldn't make any case at all.

The hearings were buried until a few years ago when Fulbright dug them out and reprinted them as being of new and timely interest after the Nixon visit [1972] was announced. Up to that time it was sort of collector's item since it had existed only in transcript form.

Caroline was at the hearings. The official reporter was so interested that she was the wife of one of the men being accused that he gave her a copy of the transcript. That was quite a gift because you pay by the page for those things. Jack [George] Kerr brought it out to me in Tokyo.

A Siege in Hospital: Infectious Hepatitis

J. Service: In April I got quite ill, fever, and so on, and went to the hospital and they said I had infectious hepatitis. Admission to the army hospital (the old St. Luke's in Tokyo) was complicated by my Foreign Service status. The army manual categorized civilians only by their CAF (Clerical and Fiscal) rating. So they didn't know what kind of accommodation to put me in.

J. Service: MacArthur's army was run strictly by the numbers. They finally decided to admit me to an enlisted man's ward. I eventually worked my way up through the hospital. I was there for four months.

Levenson: Good Lord.

J. Service: There was nothing much they could do for infectious hepatitis. I didn't really care too much. They gave me glucose intravenously, and after about twenty-four hours I felt all right. I had a miserable diet, no fat at all.

Eventually they moved me into better rooms and better rooms. I became ambulatory, got a lot of chess, eventually a lot of bridge. They had jigsaw puzzles which I eventually became able to do upside down. The cookie-cutter design was standard!
[laughter]

The State Department was, I think, concerned about my long illness. We'd been trying to get the family out to Japan, but the army didn't have housing. Housing was very short. We never did succeed in getting that.

Then, they were going to send me home by hospital ship, but various things happened. I finally was released from the hospital in late August, came home by freighter, twelve passengers. By that time the State Department decided to send me to New Zealand.

Some Contributions of the Political Advisers' Office

Levenson: Before we go on to New Zealand, do you have any comments you'd like to make on the occupation and MacArthur's regime in Japan?

J. Service: I don't particularly want to go into all that. We could talk for a long time. Well, our office was accepted partly because we had personnel that the army found useful like Emmerson who made political contacts with new parties. We helped with the repatriation of diplomats who'd been interned in Japan or caught in Japan, neutral diplomats. We did useful things for the army administration SCAP. [Supreme Commander Allied Powers]

I, of course, was friends with some of the newspaper men. Ed Snow was there and various other people that I'd known in China. I heard in a conversation with one of them--This was fairly early

J. Service: on. They talked about the problem of the rapidly emerging new publications. It was a very yeasty time in Japan. This was freedom all of a sudden. New magazines were starting. Intellectuals were active. Parties were forming all over the place. These newspaper men were talking about the problems of paper. Some of the Japanese trying to start magazines couldn't get paper. All the paper mills were controlled by the Zaibatsu, the big trusts which we were breaking up.

I had an idea. I wrote a memo which we sent to headquarters pointing out this problem and suggesting controls on newsprint so that new publications would be able to get some--there was short supply anyway--and so that it wasn't all monopolized by the established papers.

Sure enough, without any acknowledgment to POLAD (the Office of the Political Advisor), SCAP did issue an order instructing the Japanese to set up some controls of newsprint so that new publications, democratic publications would have a chance.

Our office also became useful when they set up something called the Allied Council for Japan. We had to give the Russians and the British and the Chinese--actually the Chinese didn't care--a nominal share in the Occupation. It was obvious that we intended to run it ourselves. We were not going to allow any occupation zones by any other powers. But as sort of a front we set up an allied council, on which the Russians had a voice.

The first man that MacArthur delegated for this job was an anti-aircraft general on his staff. His staff was incredible.

Levenson: Incredible in what sense?

J. Service: A lot of them were the Bataan gang, people that had been on Bataan, and with him all the way through.

At any rate, they all got promoted. They all got important positions. The anti-aircraft general was MacArthur's deputy in the Allied Council, and he just couldn't handle either the Russians or the very astute Australian that was put on there, MacMahon Ball I think his name was, who did his fair share of needling. After all, MacArthur made it pretty easy to put in a needle occasionally.

In desperation, MacArthur turned to George Atcheson to take over the Allied Council, and George did a much better job. This was the sort of thing that a diplomat should be able to handle. So George became MacArthur's deputy on the Allied Council for Japan, and this made the status of our office.

Levenson: They talked about two emperors in Japan.

J. Service: Well, there was only one that was important! When they met, they met of course at MacArthur's place, not in Hirohito's place.

MacArthur took over the embassy, and we had a lot of hassling about that. His staff did it in an arbitrary way, just moved in when they were getting ready for MacArthur to come. Grew's and other people's effects were stored there, packed and stored. They had unpacked these things to use them to furnish the place without Grew's permission. The offices were taken over as barracks for MacArthur's "Honor Guard."

New Zealand, 1946-1948: An Idyllic Interlude

[Interview 10: October 19, 1977]

Levenson: You left Japan and got back to California in September, 1946, right?

J. Service: Picked up the family, had a short vacation and then went out to New Zealand on the ship Monterey. It was a very pleasant voyage. The ship had been semi-reconverted from wartime use. We had triple-decker bunks in our cabin, which was very handy because it gave a lot of place to throw things, nine bunks and only five slept in. Because of our children we had to eat at the first sitting, which was inconvenient, eating at 4:30 p.m.

New Zealand was an idyllic interlude in our life. It was a lovely country, a very friendly and congenial people. It was getting the family together for the first time in six years. We'd had short vacations and leaves, but the period of a few months in Washington in '45 had been hectic, upset of course. So, this was getting acquainted and settling down as a family.

Levenson: Did you feel at that point that you were set for a conventional Foreign Service career?

J. Service: Oh yes, quite so. It was getting back into the groove of conventional Foreign Service work. The ambassador, Avra Warren, I think was not, shall we say, overjoyed at my being assigned. He'd expected someone else to come, someone whom he had known, to be his deputy chief of mission, DCM. But, the State Department had to find a spot for me, so the other man got pushed aside.

J. Service: After a short while I think Warren decided I was okay, that I could be trusted. He was a very active person, who loved hunting, fishing—limitless energy, rushing around the country. He liked to give speeches and talks.

When we got acquainted and he had sized me up, he was quite content to let me run the office. He lived out in the country about forty-five miles from town over a mountain range, narrow, windy road. He came into the office very seldom.

There was one thing that he insisted on, that he have all communication, all direct personal interviews and communications with the prime minister, Peter Fraser. Fraser was also the foreign minister, a nice, avuncular, elderly man, leader of the Labor party, who'd been a preacher in his youth.

In Chungking, Gauss had wanted to have someone along to write the memoranda of conversation, but Warren's tactic was to come charging into my office after one of his meetings with Fraser, walk up and down, and relate the conversation. "I said this," and "he said that." Then Warren would say, "Well, write a telegram," and he'd take off for the country.

He wouldn't see the telegram until the next time he was in town which was several days later. He never objected. He always accepted what I had written. This didn't happen, of course, every day. It was only an occasional thing.

The New Zealand government people were nice to deal with, very congenial. They were just starting in external affairs. They were quite inexperienced, but we could talk very freely and frankly.

A Busy Office: Trade, ANZUS, the Trust Territories

Levenson: What was America's policy toward New Zealand?

J. Service: There were a lot of trade problems, mainly New Zealand wishes to ship more lamb and cheese, dairy products into the States, which our farm lobbies were very active in keeping out. We were anxious to export to New Zealand, motor cars and things like that, machinery. They had Imperial Preference, so they were pretty well tied to the United Kingdom. But UK couldn't take all their dairy products, and so they obviously wanted to expand their market.

J. Service: We were interested in weaning them away from the United Kingdom. They felt themselves to be the most loyal of all the dominions, prided themselves certainly on their loyalty and ties to the homeland. I think our policy was, "Well, this is a new day and age, and we should establish closer ties out in the Pacific."

I was chargé for eight months, between Warren's departure and the next man's appointment.

Levenson: Were you then acting ambassador?

J. Service: Yes, for eight months. During that time a young man in the Foreign Office, whom I got to know very well, said to me one day that he thought that New Zealand was beginning to be able to think of the same kind of relationship that we were thinking of. This was something appropriate for a personal letter to the State Department desk officer despatch, because it was given to me very informally.

Later on we got the ANZUS Pact, the Australia-New Zealand-U.S. alliance and security pact in the South Pacific, which isn't as strong now as it was, but it's what we relied on really to pull New Zealand and Australia in to support our own intervention in Vietnam. It came to its full flowering in the Dulles days. I may have had some part in it, telling the American government that there was a possibility of this alliance.

Levenson: Did the Antarctic enter into American policy thinking?

J. Service: Not very much. Americans had an expedition down to the South Pole led by Admiral Byrd, B-y-r-d. They came through New Zealand. We put them up. It wasn't a particularly hot topic.

We were also trying in those days to organize the South Pacific Commission to bring in all the Trust Territories and the Trust powers in that area, the French in New Caledonia, Australians in their Trust Territories and so on. That was started during that period.

We also signed one of the first Fulbright agreements with New Zealand while I was there, for exchange of scholars and professors. There was some surplus money from Lend-Lease that was used.

We were trying very hard to purchase some properties for residents' use. It was a fairly busy office, and a very congenial and a good staff. Marshall Green was the junior man in the office at that time. He was just beginning as a Foreign Service officer.

J. Service: As I mentioned in my speech to the Foreign Service Association, the first chore I had was a report that he had written trying to analyze and predict the forthcoming general elections. Warren handed this to me, fresh off the boat, for me to advise whether or not we should send it in to Washington.

I knew nothing at all about New Zealand politics. Green had done a very systematic and thorough job, quite largely because he had a very good New Zealand woman in the office who was working as a typist-stenographer, in the political section. She really knew New Zealand politics.

Anyway, they predicted Labor would win by four seats, [chuckling] and they won by four seats! [laughter] But Warren almost didn't send it. He didn't want to send it because, as he said, "Everyone I've talked to tells me National is going to win." Of course, his friends were mostly huntin', shootin', fishin', [laughter] and the mayor of Wellington. The various people that he knew, upper crust social people, and so on, were all Nationalists.

But we did send it in, and Marshall Green went on to greater glory. He was quite annoyed though, [chuckling] poor fellow, at my being given the decision about what to do about his report since I was, as I say, completely uninformed and ignorant.

Washington: Promotion to Class II, and Appointment to Foreign Service Selection Board, 1948

J. Service: You asked about whether I thought the future was okay. In April, 1948 I was promoted to class II. I'd been put on a sort of probation, the pro forma punishment that was given me in 1945. Promotion meant that this had been disposed of. A promotion put me in a very conspicuous spot in a way; I was the youngest man in my class, both in age and in years of service. So this was very good news.

Then, in late '48 I was ordered back to Washington for duty on the Foreign Service Selection Board. At that time they had two panels, one for senior grades, one for the junior grades.

I was to serve on the junior panel and then remain in Washington to take charge of an office called Foreign Service Planning, which was the budget and management office of the Foreign Service. The Foreign Service was then quite separate from the departmental service.

J. Service: In March, '47, the President had set up the loyalty security program officially.

Levenson: Now, this is Truman.

J. Service: This is Truman, executive order 9835. Already there were beginning to be rumblings of-- I think Whittaker Chambers had already started accusing people, Bentley also, and so on. But, you know, we seemed to be in the clear. The promotion seemed to seal it all, wipe out the past.

Levenson: You had your clearances.

J. Service: Yes, except I didn't know about these at the time. There were forms sent out when the executive order was put in. Everyone had to fill out some forms. I've got my memo that I circulated to the office staff, instructing them all to fill out [chuckling] these forms and send them in. In fact I've got my own form. It was completely innocuous, you know.

Levenson: So, you were cleared in '46, and '47, and again in '49.

J. Service: That we know of. This is all put together from testimony that State Department people have given in various committees, because appropriations committees almost yearly later on began to ask them for this sort of information. McCarthy made a great deal of, "How many times have you cleared this man?"

The selection board was to meet in early January. As I recall, I flew direct to Washington because I had to stay in Wellington until my successor arrived. Caroline and the family came home by ship, and then I flew home and went direct to Washington. Caroline and the family stayed out here in California. I think the children went to school. I'm not sure, maybe not. Caroline probably has that sort of thing.

The selection board was an arduous, interesting experience.

Levenson: How responsible was your work in that?

J. Service: There were five members of the board, four of them Foreign Service, all from diverse backgrounds and experience. We tried in those days to have people who not only represented the various geographical areas, Asia, Africa, South America, Europe, but also the different functions, political, administrative, economic, and so on.

J. Service: Then there was one outside man who in our case was a man named Gordon Craig, who is a professor of European diplomatic history at Stanford, a very outstanding man. He at that time was at Princeton. He and I shared a room at the Roger Smith Hotel, down on Eighteenth and Pennsylvania.

Levenson: What's funny about that? I see you smiling.

J. Service: Oh nothing. I was just remembering. It wasn't a very pleasant experience. [chuckling] There was a pile driver building a new building just outside our window. It was a terrible place to wake up in the morning.

There's no particular relevance here, but we each had to read the dossiers of all the people that we were considering, who were eligible for promotion. We had classes VI, V, and IV, I think. You had to give each person a rating, one for lowest and five for highest.

But you could only apportion your marks according to a certain formula. Only ten percent could be given the highest rating, you see, and ten percent the lowest rating. There were percentages for all of the ratings.

When each person had done this, then we sat down and exchanged our scores. There was to be no discussion of cases until after this stage was reached. If on the basis of the discussion, you had any change of views--then you had to announce to the others the changes you made. If you upped somebody's rating, then it meant you had to lower someone else's rating so your numbers would still fit.

Then we consolidated all the scores. So, we got a ranking of the whole class. The Department would decide how many promotions could be made. Say there were to be twenty-five made. They had to take the top twenty-five people on the list.

They could reject somebody, but if they did reject somebody they couldn't promote anybody with a lower score. Then it went to the Senate and had to be confirmed by the Senate. It was an important and, I think, a very responsible job.

Questions of Security and "Raping the State Department Files"

Levenson: How much did questions of security enter into your deliberations at that point?

J. Service: Oh, they weren't supposed to enter in at all. We were not supposed to be concerned at all with security. This is one of the things that we found. We were fairly early. You see, there was a Foreign Service Act that came in in late 1946. We were meeting at the beginning of '49. We were either the second or the third board. I'm not sure. Forty-seven, '48, '49, it must have been the third board.

All sorts of material was put in the dossiers. Some of it was security material. One of the recommendations we made--we made a list with a whole lot of recommendations--was that this material that really should have been security, SY, information should be taken out and given over to SY.

There were various things put in the files, unsubstantiated accusations, nut letters, some just wild accusations. Things like that should be taken out, investigated, and then thrown out or sent to SY.

The stuff was not at all well organized. One of our recommendations was to work out a new format for the dossiers, a four-position folder so that summary material would be together, efficiency reports in one place, and end user reports together, and inspector's reports in their own slot. The plan was adopted, and our dossiers were very much improved and very much cleaned up.

I got many accusations on this later on, which we don't particularly need to have now. One of McCarthy's "loyal underground" claimed the Foreign Service files had been raped. This was mainly this business of cleaning up the files.

The 1946 Foreign Service Act had a new provision for "selection out" from the Foreign Service. There had never been any such provision before, so dead wood could simply accumulate. The new system was modeled after the navy's system, a fairly rigorous selection out. It was not to take effect until three years. We were the first board that actually did any selecting out.

Senators Told of Tampering With State Dept. Secret Files

By David McConnell

WASHINGTON, Feb. 4.—A State Department file supervisor testified today that confidential and secret documents on Foreign Service personnel were milked of derogatory matter and some material marked "burn" before folders were submitted to department promotion and evaluation panels and the Federal Bureau of Investigation.

Mrs. Helen B. Balog, supervisor of the department's Foreign Service file room, told a Senate Investigation subcommittee headed by Sen. Joseph R. McCarthy, R., Wis., that John Stewart Service, ousted Foreign Service officer whose loyalty was questioned by the Loyalty Review Board, had day and night access in 1948 and 1949 to the personnel records while he was assigned to a project to revamp the filing system.

She said emphatically, however, that she had no knowledge that it was Mr. Service who had tampered with the folders.

There was much of the bizarre and much of typical governmental bureaucracy in the file supervisor's testimony. She said officials would check out material for as long as eighteen months and that hundreds of State Department employees had access to the files.

She was caustic in her denunciation of the filing system and the methods of control over outgoing files. She said an authorized person could call for a file but upon its return there was no way to check whether papers had been removed because the contents were neither documented on the jacket nor numbered.

She said under oath that one

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letter of recommendation signed by Owen Lattimore, Far Eastern expert indicted in December on perjury charges growing out of testimony that he had said he never promoted communism or Communist charges, disappeared from the file of a Foreign Service officer.

An unfavorable report in another Foreign Service officer's file was ordered "burned" in violation of the law, she said. It concerned Melville Osborne, a staff officer, and was written from the Guatemala Embassy. Knowing that it is illegal to burn such documents, Mrs. Balog said she took it to Perry Ellis, a Foreign Service officer, who instructed her to leave it with him. Mr. Ellis now is listed as First Secretary of the Embassy in Mexico City.

File Fell on Floor

It was through an F.B.I. agent, she testified, that she learned the Lattimore letter of recommendation was missing from the file of Frank Schuler, Foreign Service officer now stationed in Paris. She testified that an F.B.I. agent had asked to review the file and as she was handing it to him it fell and the contents scattered over the floor. While the agent was examining another file, Mrs. Balog reassembled the contents but noticed that the Lattimore letter was missing.

She said she distinctly remembered placing the letter in the Schuler file because at the time it was received she had noticed the Lattimore name and it had impressed her because "he was in the news."

Sen. McCarthy charged in 1948 that Mr. Lattimore was the "architect" of the nation's Far Eastern policy and accused him of an affinity for Communist causes.

Mrs. Balog also testified that there had been cases where files on former Foreign Service officers were sent to the recruitment section when the employees reapplied for jobs. There, in some cases, she said, the jackets were stripped from the files and they were placed in "new applications for jobs" folders. Such folders are automatically burned after a year if the applicant is rejected, she said.

One such case was that of Vladimir Toumanoff, whom Sen. McCarthy identified as a Russian-born naturalized citizen assigned to the department's recruitment division. The Senator said Mr. Toumanoff would be the lead-off witness in tomorrow's continuation of the investigation.

Jessup's Name Comes Up

The name of Philip C. Jessup, who recently resigned as an ambassador-at-large, also entered the testimony when Mrs. Balog testified that his file had been kept out for more than a year, and when she attempted to locate it the staff worked for two hours tracing it



Associated Press wirephoto

Mrs. Helen M. Balog, supervisor of the State Department's foreign service personnel files testifying yesterday

down. She said it had been charged to the department's legal adviser but turned up in the office of Robert Ryan, assistant chief of the Foreign Service personnel bureau. She said Mr. Ryan frequently withdrew files.

Mrs. Balog said it was not until last year that she learned that when files were sent to the performance division, all derogatory material was removed and placed in a file there. Until then, she said, she assumed all the information was in files under her custody, and it was not until 1952 that she began advising F. B. I. agents to "go upstairs" to see if there was further information on persons they were checking.

Case of Service

Mr. Service was arrested in 1945 in the "Amerasia" case, which involved charges of unauthorized possession or transmittal of government documents. He was cleared by a Federal grand jury the same year. The case developed when Federal agents raided the offices of the magazine "Amerasia" and found many documents marked confidential and secret.

In view of his connection with the "Amerasia" case, Sen. Charles E. Potter, R., Mich., said that his file revision project was like "putting an arsonist in charge of a match factory."

Sen. McCarthy commented when recessing the hearing that his subcommittee would want to find out who ordered the burning of the "derogatory letter" described by Mrs. Balog. He said this was "clearly an illegal act."

J. Service: We had a hard time in considering some of the junior officers. If they were unlucky and got one bad report—they might have served only in one post, or had one chief who was unsympathetic or a low grader—they might be given a low rating and forced out.

The selection out time was very limited, very short, for the lowest class. It was regarded as probation, something like either two years or three years. If you're not promoted you were given the heave-ho. We recommended some changes there.

There was also the question of people who had come in during the war. There was the Manpower Act which enabled people to be brought into the Foreign Service auxiliary, and then they were brought into the Foreign Service laterally without beginning at the bottom and the usual type of examination.

The question was whether or not they would be promoted. We were the first board to promote any. We had quite a lot of dissension inside the board on that policy, but our precepts, our instructions, required us to not discriminate against these people.

My brother was in one of the classes that we were considering, so I withdrew from the panel while his case was under discussion.

Levenson: Your brother Dick?

J. Service: Yes. But, I had to put in a score for him, because otherwise it wouldn't have added up right!

Levenson: Did he get promoted?

J. Service: Yes, he did get promoted. The head of that board is living here in Berkeley now, a man named [Donald B.] Heath who lives down here, old and rather failing now. We had many arguments I'm afraid.

Anyway, it was a very exhausting job.

The Scripps-Howard Press Blasts Service's Appointment to Selection Board

J. Service: Very soon after the board met, the Scripps-Howard papers got news of my being on the board and came out with a great blast that Service, that Amerasia character, was sitting on a board that was

J. Service: deciding all Foreign Service promotions and assignments. It was a very exaggerated type of thing, sensational. All this sort of stuff is in the clippings files.

I went to the administrative people and said, "Do you want me to retire from the board?" I was perfectly willing to do it. "Absolutely not! Scripps-Howard is not dictating who serves our selection boards," et cetera, et cetera. So, I carried on.

The Department was very brave about my staying on the board, but they obviously were worried. So, my assignment to the Division of Foreign Service Planning was changed. They felt it better to find an invisible job for me.

Levenson: Just one minute. How did Scripps-Howard find out that you were on that board? In the university this sort of committee is very, very confidential.

J. Service: I just don't know. I don't know how it got out. Gossip, Washington is full of it. But membership of the Selection Board was not secret. There always have been superpatriots, and the State Department had its share, generally down in the clerical levels. These are the people that became McCarthy's quote, "loyal American underground."

There were some of them in personnel whom we later were able to spot. So, I would guess that that was how it got to Scripps-Howard.

Scripps-Howard had always been very fierce on the Amerasia case. They were the most violent in 1945. Gayn had a suit against Scripps-Howard and one of their specialty writers, who made a sort of a career out of the Amerasia case, a man named Frederick Woltman, W-o-l-t-m-a-n. It may have been Woltman who picked it up. I've forgotten.

An Invisible Job: Special Assistant to the Chief of Foreign Service Personnel

J. Service: Then I was given sort of a back room job called Special Assistant to the Chief of Foreign Service Personnel, which meant that I was available for anything he wanted--special assignments. Primarily my job was to be the person to tell Foreign Service officers coming in from the field what was in their dossier.

J. Service: Foreign Service efficiency files were confidential in those days. But there had to be some way of answering people--You know, "Why didn't I get promoted? What was wrong? What did my chiefs criticize?" So, I was the Foreign Service wailing wall. Now it's become a much more bureaucratized establishment, a regular counseling service, three or four people. But the service was small in those days, [chuckling] and I did it all.

Also I worked with the unit that took care of the selection boards, the writing of precepts for the next board, selecting the people to serve on the board.

I instituted one thing which apparently aroused a lot of antipathy in the Foreign Service among senior people. People had very individual standards. Some people would never give an "excellent" because excellent is perfect. Some people gave practically everybody excellent.

I suggested that we simply supply the selection board with a breakdown of each rating officer's ratings. This man, for instance, rated eight officers. One was excellent, three very good, four good, and so on.

Levenson: You said this proposal aroused the anger of some of the senior people.

J. Service: Yes, for reasons which I've never really understood. I don't know quite why they were so angry--felt that this was an invasion of their privacy or showing them up, I don't know.

Efficiency reports were extremely important. The selection boards had to rely on them very heavily. Inspectors' reports were perhaps even more important, but your superiors' reports were very important.

When the service was still small, you could have some idea of a chief, whether he was a tough chief or whether he was an easy chief. But the service was beginning, at this time, to grow rapidly. So it seemed to me a very logical thing to provide this information on rating habits. It wasn't derogatory at all.

There was one man in Belgium that was very hard on junior officers. He was the old line, diplomatic person, very fussy apparently. So the junior officers never got a good rating. Junior officers, because they had such a short period in that lowest class, could lose their whole career, could be fired on the basis of his rating alone.

J. Service: One of the things we did was to change the regulations so that no one could be selected out from the junior grade until he had served in two posts and had ratings from two different officers.

Changing Character of the Foreign Service: Some Difficulties for the New People

Levenson: Did you notice any difficulties for what one could loosely call new people? I know that the Foreign Service, at least the China section in the 30's somehow got atypical people, Midwesterners, non-Eastern establishment, et cetera, people like yourself with slightly atypical backgrounds. After the war, as I understand it, many more "atypical" people came in, Jews, people who hadn't been to private schools, and so on. Was this beginning to present any sort of problem with the old hands?

J. Service: I don't think on any overall basis. In certain instances, like this one I just mentioned, this man in Belgium. He obviously belonged to the old-school-tie group.

You know, Grew represented the old Ivy League tradition, socialite, wealthy background. He was involved in a historic furor in 1924 when the consular people were consolidated with the diplomatic service. Up to that time they had been separate. Consular people were second class citizens.

Apparently, the committee that carried out the consolidation was dominated by people, of whom Grew was one, who discriminated against the poor consuls, and there was a big hullabaloo about that.

We had some of this after the war, but I don't think it was so much on the old Ivy League, socialite basis. It was against the people who were brought in on a special--non-examination--basis during the war.

Also after the war there were special examinations given, much less rigorous, for entry into the Foreign Service. A lot of people from the armed services came in. Many of them had excellent backgrounds, and were very capable people.

But the old line Foreign Service felt that this was coming in the back door. They hadn't really worked up from the bottom. This was the hassle I was talking about on the selection board, as to whether some of these people should be promoted.

The China White Paper: A State Department Boomerang

J. Service: Meanwhile though, I think before we take off for India, I've got to talk about the White Paper, the China White Paper. In hindsight it's remarkable that intelligent and experienced men in the Department, people like Dean Acheson and so on, had so little realization of what a hot topic China was. They should have known, because China had been a hot topic since '45, and all through the Chinese civil war--the civil war had been going on--the Department had been under tremendous pressure.

Before Truman was elected [1948], and then particularly after Truman was elected, he was bitterly attacked. The critics charged, "We're letting China go down the drain."

By the summer of '49, it was apparent that [Kuomintang] China was finished. All through the civil war we had abstained from anything which could be interpreted as being critical of the central government, Chiang Kai-shek. We couldn't appear to push him out of China.

By the summer of '49, the administration had had enough of criticism. They were going to counterattack and defend themselves, prove that they had done everything they could to support Chiang, that it was not our fault that the Communists were winning. It was Chiang's own failings.

The administration decided to put out a White Paper, but they didn't foresee what the effect was going to be, how this would really boomerang, which it did.

My selection board work was finished, and Caroline and I came out to California and had some vacation.

John Davies was then serving in the Department on the first policy planning staff with George Kennan, when it really meant something, under Acheson.

John called me and said that it had been decided to add an annex to the White Paper, summarizing the views of some of us in the [China] field who had predicted what was going to happen.

Apparently the State Department wanted to have it both ways. First it hadn't done anything to push Chiang Kai-shek, and also it wasn't so stupid that it didn't know what was going on. So they decided to put in some of our field reports.

J. Service: John wanted to know if I could get back to Washington and help write this annex, since we presumably knew our own reports better than anyone else. We drove rather hurriedly across the country, eliminating some of the visits we were going to make.

In Humboldt, Tennessee, on a hot Sunday afternoon we were driving down the main street of the town, and some black kids in a car coming from a side street ran right into the side of our car. It wasn't badly damaged, but had to be left there to be fixed up. I got on a train and went to Washington where I put together annex 47 of the White Paper, which is reports of officers in the field. [shows book, pp. 564-576]*

Levenson: Thank you.

J. Service: I would have been happier, maybe, if we had put in some whole reports. After discussion we decided to do it by subject: Soviet intentions, Chinese Communist background, Kuomintang disintegration, and so on.

These are all excerpts from reports that we wrote. It was accepted without change, as I recall, and was incorporated in the White Paper.

At this time, oddly enough, I was also shown a draft of Acheson's long letter of transmittal. It's really an introduction to the book. It's got Dean Acheson's name on it, but the first draft was done by a man named John Melby who had been in China after I was--he came in after I did--whom I knew quite well, who was later fired, primarily because he was the editor of this White Paper, I think. The pretext was different, but I think this was the real reason.

At any rate, I suggested that they had been unduly critical of the national government during the Kuomintang decade, '27 to '37, and I suggested that they had done some constructive things. I suggested some revisions that actually improved Chiang Kai-shek's image.

Levenson: It's a formidable volume.

J. Service: Oh yes.

*United States Relations with China, with Special Reference to the Period 1944-1949 (Department of State Publication 3573, August 1949).

Levenson: Over a thousand pages.

J. Service: It was sensational, of course. It came out in the fall of '49. It was bitterly attacked by [Representative Walter H.] Judd and the China Lobby. It couldn't avoid criticism because it couldn't be the whole record. As big as it is, it had to omit a good deal.

I was critical of it in my Amerasia Papers because, of course, it had to protect the State Department's face in a sense. Thus it doesn't indicate that the State Department agreed with our February 26 [1945] telegram from Chungking. It prints the message, but not until later, twenty years later or more, was it revealed that the Department had sent it to the White House with commendation and support. But, perhaps that was too much to expect.

Gauss Predicts Danger for Foreign Service Officers Identified as Despatch Writers

Levenson: In hindsight what could have been done to protect the Department and Foreign Service officers?

J. Service: In hindsight--Gauss was the only smart man. Gauss said to me that we made a great mistake in letting our reports be in there. [chuckling] Of course we were pleased. You know, we thought this was fine. We even thought it was good to have it on the record, to prove we were right.

But Gauss said it was a great mistake to put people in the limelight in this way by having the authorship of reports identified. He was absolutely right. This gave information and ammunition for the attacks on us. This was all used later on. It proved to a lot of people that we were the villains.

What could the State Department have done? Well, it's hard to say. [pause] I don't think that it was necessarily the wrong thing to do. The character of public opinion and the nature of the issue was something that probably couldn't be predicted, even by a wise man. I don't know if that should have stopped an attempt to clear the record.

The editors had to make some difficult decisions. They eliminated the Wedemeyer report because it recommended a trusteeship for Manchuria. This proposal would annoy and hurt

J. Service: the Chinese. But this allowed the report to become a mystery. Many people assumed the Wedemeyer report had recommended more aid to China, which it really didn't. The mistake was being unduly worried about the susceptibilities of the Chinese.

Maybe they should have had it done by outside people. Maybe they should have turned the material over to scholars earlier. They did eventually. They asked Feis to come in. Feis wrote a book, a privileged book, China Tangle*, but that was several years later. Perhaps outside people could have seemed a bit more convincing than people who obviously had a self-serving interest, as every government has—it's fairly common.

Levenson: There's one more question before we leave the China White Paper. Had it been made clear to you at this point or had you yourself arrived at a conclusion that because of Amerasia and because of the Communist victory in China, that you were not likely to have any further Foreign Service career associated with the Far East?

J. Service: No. I was assigned to India, after all. No, I didn't expect to be finished in the Far East, particularly with the Kuomintang government having lost.

Levenson: How much active interest were you able to take in FE?

J. Service: Oh, I didn't try to. I thought it was much better for my friends in FE for me to stay away. We still had good friends, but it was all personal.

I did have some discussions at this time on a personal basis--about Vietnam, because this was the beginning of our involvement in Vietnam, '49, whether we should supply the French. This was with a young man I had worked with in 1945.

He was a young man going out to Saigon. We had several talks. I thought it was a hopeless cause. He disagreed with me. His background was all European.

Then a younger friend of mine who had served in Chungking--not a China service officer, but an EUR man--was very anxious for me to talk to some of the people from the European area, French types, who were very anxious for us to support the French in Indochina.

*Herbert Feis, The China Tangle; the American Effort in China from Pearl Harbor to the Marshall Mission, Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1953.

J. Service: They took the line, of course, that France was all-important, and this is what Acheson says in Present at the Creation. It was essential that we support the French in Indochina because we needed French support for our policies in Europe.

FE generally was anti-colonial, trying to end colonialism, and anti our involvement in Vietnam. A little later Melby, whom I mentioned, went out on a survey trip with some Pentagon types, and he recommended the same thing. But FE lost. The EUR was all-powerful in the Department at that time.

When Congress met in early January [1950], there was a leak to the press that some sort of a circular had been sent to posts in the Far East anticipating the fall of Taiwan to the Communists.

Levenson: The fall of Taiwan?

J. Service: Yes. The mainland had fallen, and Chiang had fled to Taiwan, but he didn't have much to fight with. The National Security Council had decided that we had no strategic interest in holding Taiwan. We would give economic, but no military aid, to Chiang Kai-shek.

Some sort of a circular had been sent out, guidance for information purposes, that we were to minimize, not to maximize, the probable loss of Taiwan. It was not to be regarded as a disaster for American interests. Knowland, who was known as "the senator from Formosa," jumped on it, and demanded to know who drafted it, was it Davies or was it Service?

Then McCarthy jumped in the Senate and said, "Oh well, Service is the same man that was arrested in the Amerasia case." Judd made similar noises in the House. There was a great furor for several days. The State Department refused to reveal who had drafted this memorandum. It had been approved, of course, by high people.

Levenson: Was it you?

J. Service: No, of course not. I had nothing to do, as I've been saying, with anything in FE.

A Friendly Chat with Senator Knowland

J. Service: So, I said, "I'll go call on Knowland because after all, he's my senator." The State Department congressional relations people said okay. Then I said, "How about calling on McCarthy?" The

J. Service: congressional relations people said, "Don't touch McCarthy. He's dangerous. He's bad business."

So, I went around to see Knowland, and we had a friendly chat. I assured him personally that I had nothing whatever to do with any Far Eastern matters for quite some time, and didn't draft this circular.

We talked about coalition governments. There had been Communist members of governments in Western Europe. Coalition governments hadn't meant the end of the world. We had been simply trying to prevent a disaster in China, the disaster that had now come about.

He didn't agree with me completely, but admitted some logic in my position and that it wasn't necessarily disloyal. Then, I told him about winning the Oakland Tribune marathon around Lake Merritt in 1932. That surprised him! [laughter]

Levenson: What was the atmosphere of the meeting?

J. Service: Very friendly toward the end, rather stiff and bristly at the beginning. By the time we ended, he was quite cordial, and he always was after that. He never attacked me after that. When I was working in New York for SARCO--our offices for a while were in the same building where the UN mission offices were--we met a couple of times in the elevator. He knew he knew me. So, I spoke to him one day and reminded him who I was, and he seemed pleased to meet me.

Posting to India

J. Service: The Department was concerned, going back to my job, was concerned about my being a problem to the State Department, particularly in Congress. I remember I was introduced to a congressman named Karl Stefan from Nebraska.

Apparently there were considerable efforts--sort of missionary work--being done in the appropriation committees to try to convince them that I was not the dangerous character that Scripps-Howard had been writing about. Stefan invited me up to lunch on the Hill, very pleasant. He agreed that I was a fine fellow and had me to lunch there in the House of Representatives dining room up in the Capitol--introduced me to a few of his colleagues. He did feel it had been a mistake to have put me in such a conspicuous place as the selection board. This was the general attitude of the Department.

J. Service: Dean Rusk, for instance, apparently felt very agitated that I'd been put in such a visible spot. He felt it was better to get me out of the Department--out of the country. It was decided to send me to India. I was assigned to Calcutta in November, 1949.

Just before we left Washington--this was January, 1950; actually January 25, 1950--[Alger] Hiss was found guilty in the second trial. I said to Caroline at the time that this could be very bad news. It seemed very threatening. But, that's about the only recollection I have of any real premonition of trouble.

I had to finish up things in the Department. I'm not sure when I started consultation, but it was fairly late. We were in Washington, as I recall, through January [1950]. I don't think we left Washington until the beginning of February.

XI THE FIRING

McCarthy Opens Campaign Against "Communists in the State Department." Names John Stewart Service

- J. Service: We came out on leave in California, and then McCarthy started his speeches around Lincoln's birthday, early February, Wheeling, West Virginia. All sorts of numbers, 207, 257, 81, 57, and so on.
- Levenson: Numbers of what?
- J. Service: Of people employed in the State Department who were Communists or pro-Communist.
- Levenson: Or traitors.
- J. Service: Or traitors, security risks, and so on, all sorts of things. Perverts were apt to get thrown in too at that time.
- Levenson: Perverts then meaning--?
- J. Service: Homosexuals, but they were usually called some such name, you know.

I assumed, of course, that I would be in the list. McCarthy had already attacked me on the floor of the Senate. So I went every day down to the Berkeley Public Library to see the New York Times. Senators challenged McCarthy: he couldn't just indulge in this sort of wild, random accusations. They wanted some evidence.

He said to protect the rights of people, he wouldn't give any names, but he would give some details. Then he went through eighty-one cases that he said were the real substance, the core of his accusations.

J. Service: None of these eighty-one cases fitted me. I called up the State Department, called the chief of Foreign Service personnel, my old boss, the man I'd been working for. I said, "Well, what do I do? Here I am. Do I go to India or not?"

He says, [loudly] "You're not on the list. Go! Take off!"--the intimation being the sooner the better. [laughter]

We were going by freighter from Seattle. As Caroline has probably said, we were in the mid-Pacific, going the great circle route from Seattle to Yokohama on our way to India. The freighter had twelve passengers. We all got friendly with the officers.

We got to know the radio operator. He had taken our son Bob, who was about thirteen at this time, up to his radio shack and the purser had given Bob a job doing this or that.

The radio operator one night at supper said, "Say, is your name John Stewart Service?" I said, "Yes." He said, "There's been a lot of stuff about you on the radio news, talking a lot about you in Washington." This was the first intimation we had. We went up and heard a news broadcast over his radio.

A day or two later I got a telegram from the Department saying I should return because of charges by Senator McCarthy. The family could either remain in Japan or go on to India.

We decided they should go on to India. We expected that there would be a hearing. We knew from the radio broadcast that a Senate committee had been set up--but something that shouldn't take long. So Caroline went on to India to get the children in school and get settled. I flew back from Yokohama.

Levenson: How did you feel at this point?

J. Service: Oh, hell. We were not well informed. We didn't really know what was happening. The news broadcasts were very sketchy. Certainly annoyed, uncertain of course, about what was going on, but not particularly concerned. After all, I'd been through the Amerasia case and gotten a unanimous clean bill.

Frantic Press Conferences. "I Welcome This Chance to Have an Investigation. I Have Nothing to Hide"

J. Service: I wasn't prepared for the tremendous hullabaloo. But every place the plane stopped, the press were after me. I evaded them once by simply staying on the plane.

Levenson: Were they hostile?

J. Service: Oh no. Well, not really hostile. They were just sort of pressing, and asking the same foolish questions. "How do you feel?"

Levenson: [laughter] Sorry.

J. Service: You keep saying, "I welcome this chance to have an investigation to clear the air. I have nothing to hide." You keep saying the same thing. And yet they pursue this at every single stop.

What surprised me was the friendliness of the people on the plane.

Levenson: A regular commercial plane?

J. Service: Yes, Northwest Airlines. When we got off in Seattle, they all gave me a friendly hand clap. This was true all the way through. With one or two exceptions, you always have friendship from people that know you, even on just a sitting beside you in an airplane basis, or tradespeople, liquor store clerks you deal with-- Anytime anybody has any sort of personal relationship with you, they don't believe any of this garbage at all. They're very friendly and sympathetic.

Levenson: What conclusions do you draw from that, Jack?

J. Service: You read about somebody in the paper, it's somebody far away. There's no intimacy or humanity. He's just a sort of cipher. You can believe something about somebody like that. But if you actually live next door to a person or see him, why, what you read in the papers doesn't seem to affect you.

The Department Turns Out in Force to Meet Jack's Plane

J. Service: The Department went all out. The Department's policy was obviously to meet McCarthy head on. A big welcome was planned for me. I don't know how much planning. But, word went around, "Go out and meet Service."

J. Service: The chief of personnel was out there. A lot of people I'd worked with in the Department the year before were there. Some friends in the Foreign Service were there. I think Marshall Green was there; I forget.

I came into the Department--[John E.] Peurifoy, who was the administrative head of the Department, the deputy assistant secretary for administration, or whatever the title is, he greeted me.

There was a Foreign Service lunch on--The Foreign Service Association had monthly luncheons at that time. I wasn't planning to go. I was busy with other things, and I thought it might be an embarrassment for me to go. Donald Smith and various other people insisted I go. At the lunch I was introduced by the president of the association, who merely said, "We know nothing about Service's case, but he's got friends."

They gave me a big clap, a rising clap. McCarthy soon found out about this and made a big thing about it in the press--Foreign Service Association members had been ordered to give Service an ovation, and so on.

I don't remember any particular accusation over Department officers meeting me; but the fact that I was given facilities and help by the Department was later criticized in the press. There was sharp criticism of any official help or assistance as favoring the accused.

"You've Got to Have a Lawyer"

J. Service: Peurifoy said, "You've got to have a lawyer."

I said, "I don't want a lawyer." I'd been stuck for two thousand dollars by this man in '45 who really didn't do anything. He just turned out to be sort of a front man. "Why do I have to have a lawyer?"

He said, "This is serious business. You've got to have a lawyer."

I tried various people. One was an old friend, Joe Rauh, R-a-u-h, who had been a neighbor of ours. His son had been a very good friend of Bob's. But he was already tied up with the Remington case.

J. Service: Somebody said, "Go talk to Arnold, Fortas, and Porter." I went and talked to Abe Fortas, who later was Supreme Court judge. But he was representing Lattimore. Almost everybody was already getting involved.

Peurifoy said, "Talk to the legal adviser." His name was Fisher, Adrian S. Fisher--"Butch" Fisher. He was very helpful. He canvassed a lot of possibilities, and then finally he came up with a firm that he knew quite well, Reilly, Rhetts and Ruckelshaus.

Reilly was an older man, quite conservative. They were actually labor lawyers. Reilly, the older man, was a very good friend of Senator Taft and of some of the Republicans in the Senate, conservative people.

The younger man, Rhetts--Harvard Law School, had come to Washington in New Deal days, and had a reputation for being a very thorough, meticulous type of lawyer--which we, it was obvious by this time, were going to need.

They agreed to see me and I went to their office. Ed and I liked each other as soon as we saw each other. They said, "Sit down and tell us about yourself." They wanted to know pretty much everything. Ed was, as I say, a very thorough guy. We had a long talk. Then: "We'll call you tomorrow."

The next day they called and said okay, they would take me. No fee, but they would be happy if I could cover overhead costs. A lawyer has to have an office and hire secretaries and so on. We went ahead on that basis. We also agreed that I would not "take refuge" in the Fifth Amendment.

Ed then devoted full time for months and months and months, pretty much full time, on this case. Occasionally he had to break off because he also had a practice to do. He really, as he got into the case and found out how much it involved, had to devote most of his time to it.

Levenson: At that preliminary meeting was it a sort of adversary discussion to try to probe any possible weak points in your story?

J. Service: Oh, yes. He said, "I expect you to be perfectly honest and frank." It was adversary in the sense of being probing, yes--not antagonistic. But you expect a lawyer to really want to know the truth about the case. I didn't resent that at all.

J. Service: We became very close friends, so much so that when they went to Europe a year or two later, we were designated guardians of their children in case anything should happen to them.

Lauchlin Currie Refuses to Testify

J. Service: The first thing that we did was to go and talk to [Lauchlin] Currie. Currie had left the government. He'd been accused by Bentley of being in some sort of a Communist cell that Bentley had had contact with. Currie denied the charges, and no further effort was made to investigate him.

Of course, Bentley had made charges against a good many people, some of them probably with some basis; others, doubtful basis.

At any rate, Currie was then working for, I think, the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development. He rather surprised us by saying that he was very sorry, but he felt that we just shouldn't call on him. He wouldn't be able to be of any help. I've forgotten all the rationale, but it wouldn't do our case any good, and by inference it wouldn't do him any good perhaps. I don't know.

This really meant that we had to fall back, shall we say. We couldn't bring him in to testify about his involvement in things like talking to the press, the sort of non-bureaucratic way in which I was functioning in the period leading up to the Amerasia arrest.

Levenson: How did you take that?

J. Service: Disappointed. But in any case, Lattimore's wild-swinging attack on McCarthy hadn't gone over very well. He really got down and slugged it out with McCarthy. He called McCarthy as many names as McCarthy called him. This didn't sit very well with the Senate.

We were thinking at that time of the Senate as being the more important forum really.


Levenson: More important than—?

J. Service: The State Department's Loyalty Security Board.

Speech of Senator Joe McCarthy
Wisconsin Retail Food Dealers Association
Milwaukee, Wisconsin
August 6, 1950

Then we come to John Stewart Service. Service was arrested by the FBI in connection with the theft of hundreds of secret government documents. The FBI testified they had microphones in the hotel room of Jaffe, whom they labelled as a Communist, when Service visited him. The microphone recording showed that Service discussed military secrets with this Communist while the war was still on. Service admitted having turned over to him classified State Department documents. At the time Service and his five co-defendants were arrested, J. Edgar Hoover, according to a Washington paper said, "This is a 100 percent air-tight case of espionage." But Service did not go to jail. However, Under-Secretary of State Joseph Grew who insisted he be prosecuted, left the Department. Acheson took over and service(sic) was re-hired, promoted and put in charge of placing personnel in the Far East area.

The Tydings-McMahon Committee said he was a bit indiscreet, but that it was oh so unfair to expose him.



John S. Service and Senator Joseph R. McCarthy departing Senate Foreign Relations Committee hearings, June 1950

Two Board Levels: The State Department's Loyalty Security Board
Under the Civil Service Commission's Loyalty Review Board

J. Service: One thing I might as well explain now--was that there were two levels of boards. Each department under the loyalty security program had its own board which was called the Loyalty Security Board. Then up above, set up by the president, nominally under the Civil Service Commission, there was something called the Loyalty Review Board.

The Loyalty Review Board had the authority to review all cases to enforce uniformity of standards. They interpreted the executive order as giving them the right to call up and hear or reverse lower courts' cases that were decided in favor of the employee. In any case, no one objected to their having the right to supervise.

All cases were decided by the department boards and then went up to them for this review process--usually called "post audit." My case had numerous clearances by State Department boards and had been sent up to the review board.

The review board--this was apparently at the beginning of 1950, early 1950--had decided since I had never been called for a hearing, since I'd never been presented any interrogatories or given any sort of charges or accusations or asked any questions, that my case should be sent back to the State Department board for them to hold a hearing and ask me to appear.

McCarthy had a spy--I mean a "loyal American underground"--in the Loyalty Review Board staff. So, he got this news before the State Department did. His accusations against me were based on this leak from the Loyalty Review Board, that my case had been remanded back to the State Department board--for hearings. This was what took everyone by surprise because the State Department didn't even know it when McCarthy did.

Anyway we expected the State Department to be detailed and difficult. But we thought of the Tydings committee which had been set up by this time, a subcommittee of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, to hear McCarthy's accusations and charges, as being the principal forum, because of its public importance.

Lattimore's tactics had offended really some of the people who were inclined to support him simply because he had been so extreme and violent. It wasn't a dignified way to act. We decided it would be better tactics to be low key, to admit some

J. Service: blame. It was obvious that I had behaved in an abnormal fashion. We couldn't explain in detail why I had. We had to admit some indiscretion. That was generally our policy. So that, the Currie business was not an overwhelming disaster. [tape off]

Levenson: As it happened by fluke, I was present at the Lattimore hearings. What makes you say that Lattimore's approach was a disaster?

J. Service: I think this may have been a subjective judgment by my lawyers. I may have overstated it, but they were in contact with all sorts of people. As I mentioned, Reilly was a friend of some of the senior, older senators. He may have gotten it from them. They were always in contact with a lot of other lawyers who were following these things very closely.

I think the general feeling was that Lattimore might have helped himself if he hadn't been quite so combative. He overdid it. Certainly I couldn't have played that same kind of role. I'm just not the kind of person. Also, I was a government employee. Lattimore was not. He was a private citizen, had been outrageously attacked, and had a right to be outraged.

But, we just felt that it wasn't good tactics for me to try to do a Lattimore. A little more dignified, a little more calm approach seemed to us to probably be more likely to bring along the people in the Senate that we wanted to bring along.

Letter of Charges: On Salary, with Office Space and a Stenographer

J. Service: The Department was very helpful. The board gave us a letter of charges. Do you want it?

Levenson: Yes, I think so.

J. Service: You want to turn that off till I find it here? [tape off]

Levenson: Thanks, I have it, March 24, 1950.*

J. Service: The letter of charges is not very specific, but the basic charges are there. They didn't go into detail, and they said in effect to simply answer everything derogatory that had been said about

*See Appendix III.

Excerpt of remarks of Herve J. L'Heureux, Chairman of the Executive Committee, Foreign Service Association, while presiding at its monthly luncheon March 29, 1950:

"I hope you have enjoyed your lunch. There is one thing we have today that is different -- Service! Yes we have Service. By this I mean John Service, who has just arrived from the Far East." (The audience applauded for more than two minutes, before the speaker could proceed). "John Service is a fellow-Foreign Service Officer. He is a colleague. He is one of us. He is a member of our Association. As such, he is a 'fraternity brother' and, as a fraternity brother, he is entitled to our affection, to our esteem, to our confidence, to our best wishes.

"I do not know whether John Service is guilty of the charges that have been made. I have not seen his record. I do not know precisely what charges have been levied. But I will say this: Until such time as the charges have been proven by a court or other body of competent jurisdiction, he is innocent. He is entitled to our respect, to our support, to our assistance. As John Service goes forth to meet one of the greatest challenges of his entire career, let us, his 'fraternity brothers', express to him our every good wish; let us pray that his cause may be righteous, that he may be given facility of expression, strength and courage to wage his defense successfully, and that the cloud that tends to despoil his honor may soon be dissipated." (At this point, the audience rose and gave John Service a tremendous applause that had in it warmth of feeling and of friendliness). Mr. L'Heureux continued;

"I just wish to say one more thing: As a body, our Foreign Service has been pretty free of scandal. We need not bow our head in shame. We are not infallible. We are human. But, man for man, I am prepared to match our Foreign Service with any organization, with any group -- on the Hill or in the valleys -- in intelligence, ability, judgment, integrity, devotion to duty, patriotism, morals and loyalty!"

(signed) Herve J. L'Heureux

J. Service: me, everything that I knew about, everything that appeared in the papers, that they wanted to clean the slate once and for all, and do an exhaustive job.

The Department gave me office space in the offices of the Foreign Service inspectors, because most of their people are away. They only come in twice a year for consultations, so there was desk space there. There was a Foreign Service clerk-stenographer, a woman clerk who was on leave and in Washington temporarily. She was assigned to me. So I had help and facilities.

They were fairly cooperative in trying to get me files. I, of course, wanted to have my own despatches. It's hard to run them down and locate them, but they found a lot, which later on we had George Kennan read as a witness for the board and evaluate.

George Kennan reviewed all the reports of mine that we could find. He's got comments on a lot of them which--start at page 2481 in this Part 2.* They don't appear right in the transcript, but appear separately for some reason.

Levenson: Were you on salary at this time?

J. Service: Yes, I was kept on salary. We kept putting off the hearing because we found we had a lot of work to do. We finally started about May 26 [1951]. Actually I got back to Washington at the end of March. Ed Rhetts started working just about April 1. By May 26 we started hearings.

Levenson: I've seen some of the documentation and it seems to me the most extraordinary job that you got all that material together in such a short time. What sort of work schedule did you have on this?

J. Service: [chuckling] Oh well, there wasn't any work schedule. We worked just as long as we could, you know.

We may want to put in the record the citation. I don't know. The transcript was eventually given to the Tydings committee, and then it was printed by the Tydings committee. A report of the transcript of my hearings appears in part 2 of the Tydings committee report. State Department Employee Loyalty Investigation, Part 2, pp. 1958-2509.

*In Tyding Committee Report op. cit.

State Department Loyalty Security Board Hearings

J. Service: There were hearings before the State Department board, not every day, but almost every day, from May 26 to June 24, sometimes fairly long, some days not so long, depending on the board members' available time. They were, of course, all people with other jobs to do.

The head was Brigadier General Conrad Snow, a man named Theodore Achilles, and [Arthur G.] Stevens. Stevens and Achilles were both from the EUR division of the Department, so they had no connection with me in the past, no connection with my work. It was thought desirable, of course, to not have people from the Far East.

I won't go into the details here. We asked for Hurley to appear, but Hurley declined. He would have had to agree to cross-examination by my attorney if he had appeared, and he didn't want to do that obviously.

Levenson: Were you under oath?

J. Service: Oh yes, certainly. It was all semi-judicial. You're under oath and a transcript is taken. The witnesses were all under oath, and evidence has got to be by oath or affidavit.

Levenson: Did you ask Bishop to appear?

J. Service: We asked the board to ask Bishop to appear, and word came back that he didn't think he had any information additional to what he'd already given. So he would not appear, in other words. There was no way to force him to appear.

Levenson: Were there others whom you asked who did not appear?

J. Service: I asked for affidavits or testimony from a couple of people--they were army--who'd known me in China or in Japan, and they declined. But I didn't particularly hold that against them. They were army officers, and they were concerned, obviously, about what it might involve them in.

Other people, General [Frank] Dorn, who'd been Stilwell's closest friend and subordinate in China, and Joe Dickey who had been head of G-2 and people like that appeared without any hesitation, testified very fully. My former chiefs, [Ambassadors] Nelson, Johnson, and Gauss appeared.

FBI Interviewing Methods

J. Service: Gauss' testimony was interesting in one way, for showing us what happens in your FBI interviews. Hundreds of people were interviewed by the FBI. There are always two of them. They talk to you, and then they write their own notes down.

What eventually comes back may be quite different from what the person said, because it's a selective process of what they want to put down in the notes. Then even that is probably selected again for writing up their report. In other words, they're not looking for good things; they're looking for bad things. Gauss was able to counteract some of the things that the FBI credited him with having said, but this was a problem in this whole process of interviews by FBI people.

At one point when they were talking to me, I tried to have a secretary in the room, and they wouldn't talk with a secretary present. I wanted her to take notes. I said, "Well, you're taking notes. Why can't my secretary take notes?" They said, "Sorry, but we won't talk to you on that basis." So, you're always alone, and there are two of them. You don't know what they write down, what notes they take.

The State Department Loyalty Security Board had a windup hearing on June 24. They told me then that their decision--up to that point--was favorable. They were in a tough spot. We were all unhappy, shall we say. The Tydings committee hearings of McCarthy's charges had been going on for three months and had produced a great deal of furor, but no clear refutation in the mind of the public of those wild charges.

By and large, the Department was quite helpful. We got a lot of information. We knew, for instance, that some of my reports in Jaffe's possession had Larsen's fingerprints on them, so he'd gotten them from Larsen; not from me. Information of that sort was proper to give us but if they'd wanted to be unfriendly, they might have withheld it.

Some of the wiretap information was rather amusing. They tapped a conversation between Jaffe and Gayn soon after I came back from China in 1945. One of them asked the other had he talked to Service and what did he think of him? The other man said, "Why, Service isn't even a liberal." [laughter] At any rate, the board gave a favorable decision and then we moved on the Tydings committee.

The Tydings Committee

J. Service: We had a lot of hassling about whether the Tydings hearings would be open or executive. The committee wanted to have them closed. We insisted that they be open because McCarthy was finding out, from either Republican members or probably from the minority counsel, Robert Morris, something about what had gone on, which then he would give to the press in a very distorted way. This is a problem in Washington all the time of course. We've seen it more recently in other hearings. McCarthy was so unscrupulous and tricky about leaking stuff that had gone on in executive hearings that we wanted to have it all out in public.

At the last minute they agreed to our request to make it open. I called Lisa Green and my sister-in-law Helen and a few people rushed down. But there wasn't very much of a crowd of supporters because it wasn't until the last minute that we knew it was going to be open. Anyway, that was not particularly important.

The transcript is all in Part 1, pp. 1257 to 1453. We had three days of hearings. The third day they insisted on being closed because they'd had this so-called secret recording of a conversation between Jaffe and myself. It wasn't a recording at all. It was a transcription, an alleged transcription, of some sort of a wiretap or a listening device put in a room in Jaffe's hotel. It was incomplete, very garbled, and some parts unintelligible.

We got finally a statement out of the Department of Justice, and they said that it was excerpts, portions, of a transcript and that the original had been destroyed. We've never been able to get any access to the original. It's got me, as we say in the testimony, it's got me saying things that I couldn't possibly have said. It was scrambled and was obviously of very poor quality. But the FBI destroyed it, so we weren't able to get it.

Levenson: What about the legality of the process? The whole Amerasia case was surely flawed by this?

J. Service: Of course. It's been argued that we should have made more of an issue--perhaps by refusing to be interrogated on the basis of such clearly illegal evidence. We didn't make any contest on admissibility. We took the point of view that when the loyalty of a public officer is involved, we were not going to make an issue of whether or not the evidence was obtained in a proper way. In a court of law, of course, it would not have been

J. Service: admissible. Both the minority and the majority counsel got into hassles about this. Of course, all the members of the Tydings committee were lawyers, so they would do some more arguing.

The first day we had a long, long session. This was before there was TV. Photographers all over the place, lying down on the floor and flashing lights in your face. It was very annoying. I think they finally chased them away. Tydings was the chairman.

McCarthy got himself into a seat right behind Tydings. Hoping people would get pictures lined up, he sat there scowling the whole morning.

Photographed with McCarthy: "Oh, Hello John!"

J. Service: Then at the noon recess--This had been a long morning. I'd read my statement and had some interrogation, and I was tired. We came out of the caucus room. A photographer came up and wanted to have a picture of me standing in front of the door.

I said, "The hell with it. You guys have been taking pictures all morning. You've got plenty of pictures. I just want to go and have some lunch."

Ed Rhetts said, "Oh come on, Jack. You might as well be agreeable. He doesn't mean anything. He's just trying to do his job, you know."

I stood in front of the door, the photographers got set, and then right out from behind the door popped Joseph McCarthy. He'd been hiding behind the door. He'd put this photographer up to it. So, we got this picture of startled me.*

Levenson: Yes, I saw this picture recently in Dick Solomon's book, A Revolution is Not a Dinner Party. It's a repulsive picture, isn't it. Didn't he call you John?

J. Service: This was later on. The last day as soon as the executive session was over, he came charging in to talk to the minority counsel to find out what had gone on. I was leaving with Ed Rhetts. We were going out the door.

*See p. 365a

J. Service: He was coming past me. He says, "Oh hello, John," in a most friendly, offhand way, you know, the son of a bitch. You just wish that there was something that you could have said or done, but it takes you so by surprise that you just pass on before you have any chance for any rebuttal.

Too Cool and Calm?

J. Service: There was an interchange with [Senator Henry Cabot] Lodge which I think is off the record. Lodge was trying to find out how much I was privy to inside information, planning and so on. I wasn't, of course. I wasn't taken into any of the meetings at all in the headquarters. I wasn't in on military planning.

But, I did know about the messages we were getting from broken codes.

Levenson: Japanese codes.

J. Service: Japanese codes. I was in on that, but of course I'd sworn completely, oath to the death, and so on. He started asking me about this. I wouldn't talk about it. We had quite a bit of a hassle with Senator Lodge about this, as to whether or not I could discuss this question. I think he got the idea that I had some knowledge of it.

Hickenlooper was very unfriendly, and Morris was very unfriendly. He had, obviously, cooperation from the FBI.

We were surprised-- During the hearings with the State Department board new material kept coming in, that we (and they) hadn't heard about before.

What was happening was that they were apparently feeding this stuff to Morris, but since they were giving it to Morris at the Tydings committee they had to give it to State Department people also.

Most of it was the contents of my desk. You recall after I was arrested, I was asked, "The papers, where are the papers?" They weren't in my apartment. I said, "They're in my office." Then they went and took everything, all the contents of my desk.

J. Service: Later on, after the grand jury cleared me, all this material was returned to me by the Department of Justice, as being my personal property. But, of course, they kept photostats of it all. This stuff then was now turned over to Morris, personal letters, personal correspondence, my address book. A lot of this correspondence was rather cryptographic. It was notes to people out in China.

I had written some note to Teddy White about prospects of Hurley being recalled. It didn't mention Hurley of course, Little Whiskers, or something like that, I forget--because the general feeling around here [Washington]--this was the Truman administration by this time--was that "good jobs should go to good party members." In other words, Hurley was a Republican politician, and why should he be ambassador to China?

This was wonderful stuff, Morris thought. I pointed out if he held it up to the light he could see that I'd erased the word "Democrats."

Levenson: The tone at the hearings at times is viciously antagonistic. How did you withstand those pressures?

J. Service: Well, you know, you had to be cool, although some of the press people told me informally that they thought I should have shown a little more heat, you know. They thought that I was being too cool and calm. But, it seemed to me the best way to do it, the way we were doing it.

Annoying, sure. I think that my tone of voice may have been a little more heated than appears in the printed page. I don't know. I tend to be too wordy of course, as I am here now. I think this annoyed the senators or whoever was interrogating me. Sometimes I got too detailed, but by this time I'd been doing my homework for a long time and I had an awful lot of information. I'd been through the State Department board as sort of a warm up exercise, so I was primed. I probably was too verbose and too lengthy.

I had a funny experience after one of the hearings. People shared taxis, you know, in Washington. We were going back toward the State Department. Several people got in the taxi, newspaper people. One of them didn't say a word to me the whole time, but when he got out, as he was getting out of the car, he said, "I don't know how you think you can fool anybody with the shit you're saying up there," and walked off.

Levenson: Who was it?

J. Service: I have no idea. He left before I had any chance to reply.

Levenson: How much of that sort of thing did you get?

J. Service: Very little, very little.

By this time the Korean War had started. June 25, I think was the day it started. That was just before my last hearing on June 26. They were anxious to wrap things up and stop the hearings. So, finally they did and wrote their report. It was ready in late July. It was presented as a committee document and approved by the committee and then presented to the Senate.

They had a terrific hassle in the Senate as to whether or not they would accept it. There was about two or three days of debate. Somehow I got tickets and was in the gallery. No one recognized me.

It was very exciting because Tydings went after McCarthy hammer and tongs, offered to play a tape recording of his speech in Wheeling, West Virginia, which McCarthy later on had weasled about and denied he'd said this and that and so on. Tydings had a tape recording, but they wouldn't let him play it in the Senate. But, it was very dramatic and very exciting. The Senate split on strict party lines as to whether or not to accept the report of the committee.

Levenson: The conclusion of the report was--

J. Service: The conclusion of the report was very favorable to me. Do you want the report? It's a fairly hefty tome. They investigated the Amerasia case very, very thoroughly, a great deal of investigation of the Amerasia case all through these books. Their report goes into it in detail. They rejected Hurley's accusations.

The minority was going to put out a second report, but Hickenlooper never did. Lodge put out a very brief report in which he said that the investigation in the Service case was complete. He was satisfied with that, but he wasn't completely satisfied with the report in some other ways. For example, he didn't think the Lattimore case had been conclusive. It hadn't been complete or something of this sort.

It was very favorable as far as I was concerned.

Living from Pillar to Post

J. Service: I'd been living in Washington, sort of camping on friends. I stayed with Phil Sprouse at first by his insistence which, since he was head of Chinese Affairs, was something of a gesture of support and courage on his part.

Most of these people suffered later on for this association.

Levenson: With you?

J. Service: Oh yes. One of the problems that all of them had, was to explain their association and friendship with me. I stayed in a lot of different people's places.

Eventually I spent several months in a little attic room at the Freemans' (Fulton Freeman, Tony Freeman, an old friend in the Foreign Service). They had a small house in Georgetown.

Ed Rhetts, as I said, came to Washington in the New Deal time, just after he finished law school, in the mid-30's and worked in various war jobs. He knew all the Washington lawyers, the New Deal crowd. They had a house out in Virginia, near Seven Corners. It's all built up now, but in those days it was country.

This was summer time, of course. They had a baseball game every Sunday afternoon, and a lot of Washington people would show up, and people from The Washington Post, Alan Barth, the chief editorial writer, a man named Al Friendly.

I got to know a great many people. Currie had been part of the same group, but he wasn't the baseball playing type, and he, at this time, wasn't associating with them at all apparently. Ben Cohen, I used to see occasionally.

I had supper with people like Eric Sevareid. I remember meeting [Senator Hubert] Humphrey at the Severeids. Humphrey was talking about what a shame it was and how outrageous and so on. But, at that time, the best that the Democrats could think of was to try to outdo McCarthy, to prove they were more anti-Communist than anyone else. Humphrey was even talking about outlawing the Communist party. They were playing into the right wing's hands.

I used to go down to the office. After all, I was getting paid. But for a long time they didn't give me any jobs.

J. Service: I got very much interested in Civil War history. I read a lot of books on Civil War history, multivolume works of Douglas Southall Freeman and Bruce Catton and so on. I used to go out and visit these battlefields--a lot of them are near Washington--when I could. I made a hobby of statuary in Washington. I used to know every statue in Washington, I think.

Works Informally for Legal Adviser's Office: A Massive Indexing Project

J. Service: I got started indexing. I was indexing the Tydings hearings for my own case, and that turned out to be useful for the Legal Adviser's office because that office was in charge of the State Department's interest and involvement. They found out I was indexing it, every day's transcripts. They got the transcripts for me and I would index them.

Then, in May, 1951, there were the MacArthur hearings. MacArthur had been fired by Truman and came back from Korea. They had joint hearings by the Senate Foreign Relations and Military Affairs committees--a very big affair. I indexed those for the Legal Adviser.

Theoretically--I was sitting in an office that dealt with supplies and equipment. But, [chuckling] I barely knew the people in the outfit. I didn't do any work of that sort; it was a place where I could be hidden away.

Then eventually in July, the I[nstitute of] P[acific] R[elations] hearings started. What happened was that the Tydings committee hearings were considered by right-wingers, the conservatives of the China Lobby, to be a failure. The Tydings report had come out, damning McCarthy, rejecting McCarthy's charges, ridiculing McCarthy's charges.

Then, the idea came up of investigating the IPR, which included everyone who was connected with the Far East. [tape off]

During this whole process I was really working for the Legal Adviser's office. Several times I was able to suggest material for them to use for rebuttal, material which they could feed to friendly senators. That was the way it was done. Senators who were friendly to the administration would be given questions or given material, given leads. I've got my index boxes of the Tydings hearings. You want to see them?*

*To be deposited in The Bancroft Library.

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Sample cards from Service index of
Tydings committee hearings

Levenson: Yes. [tape off]

When you gave me copies of the Tydings hearings I was appalled at the difficulty of trying to find one's way through those thousands of pages. You've just told me downstairs in the basement that this is a unique copy of the index that you made at that period on the Tydings report. It's a wonderful scholarly resource. Those boxes are--?

J. Service: They're both Loyalty Security Board. One is the documents, and the other one is testimony.

Levenson: Would you illustrate what you did, what sort of use it was to the Department?

J. Service: They were very much concerned about anybody in the State Department that got involved. See, John Carter Vincent, page 4. We've got cards and cards on Vincent. Everything about Vincent is there, so the State Department could check immediately, and would call me and ask me what my files showed.

Levenson: Then, these other two files--

J. Service: We had to accumulate a lot of material. Eventually we had more than four hundred thousand documents that we used for reference or for evidence. So, we simply had to have those indexed and cataloged. That's what that file is.

Then, there were a lot of documents that were FBI documents, "B documents" for bureau documents. These were things that were seized in Jaffe's offices and so on. We were allowed to get access to those, although we couldn't keep them. We had to have some way of referring to those.

I was also being called on by the biographic information people in the research section of the State Department for information on [Chinese] Communists. The Communists had just come to power, but we didn't have much dope on them, so that I would be called sub-rosa.

Impossible to Locate All Jack's China Despatches

J. Service: We also had my despatches, those that we were able to get hold of. So we had a whole series of these things that we could refer to. This was cross-indexed. Despatch number so-and-so, "See Document 182." You had to have various cross-indexes.

J. Service: We had the Yen-an reports, and those could be run down. See Document 164. It's also a B document. A lot of these things appeared several times. If they were in Jaffe's office they'd be a B document.

Levenson: Did the creation of these files really help you in preparation of your case and your eventual victory in the Supreme Court?

J. Service: Oh, not so much after it got into court. It helped some, but this was mainly for use in the hearings themselves. When it got into the courts it was a matter of the legal issues rather than facts or rather than the actual circumstances of the case.

We had to do some research, of course, for preparing the briefs, but by and large, it was just for use in the proceedings themselves.

Levenson: You never did get, until the 1970's as I recall, the complete collection of your despatches?

J. Service: No, it was impossible during the hearings to get them, because the only way they could look them up would be by our giving them some clue, despatch number or something like that, how it had been sent in from the field, from Chungking. We didn't know that in many cases. So, there were a lot of things we couldn't find. The file section people did some searching for us, and they found a good deal. The list that Kennan read, it's quite long but it's not complete. We got some despatches that had been found in Jaffe's office, these B documents. That helped us.

U.S. Foreign Relations have printed a lot, a great many actually, in the volumes for those years. Then, when Esherick wrote his book [Lost Chance in China] we had more clues.

He didn't go to Washington, but he wrote to the archives and they dug up things. They said that they couldn't really go through the files themselves. If we wanted to go to Washington and go through the archives for that period we were free to do so. But, we had enough. We had too much already, and Esherick didn't have the time.

I never have tried to assemble a complete collection. But I probably have most of the important ones since these were the ones most likely to be selected for partial or complete reproduction in Foreign Relations.

The 1950 Elections: Tydings Defeated, McCarthy's Menacing Power Grows

J. Service: I was saying before that after the initial strong support, the Department had to pull in its horns, be more careful, particularly after the November, 1950, elections when Tydings was defeated and a nonentity was put in. McCarthy got great credit for the defeat of Tydings. This really added greatly to his political threat.

The State Department decided that the sort of confrontational standing up to McCarthy, the tactics Lattimore used, wouldn't work. After the election, they became very much more cautious.

But, my friendly relations with the Legal Adviser's office on indexing the hearings and providing rebuttal information material, that continued. And so did my private life in Washington which put me close to a lot of important people, although I was a non-person in the State Department.

Caroline came home from India in the spring of '51. The Department couldn't decide what to do with me.

The State Department board had told me in June, when they finished the case, that they were satisfied. But new information kept being produced. New accusations would come in. Every time this happened, the case had to be reopened. It was very difficult to ever bring anything to a close.

The Ground Rules Change: From Suspicion of Disloyalty to "Reasonable Doubts of Loyalty"

J. Service: Then, the standards were changed. Originally, there had to be a reasonable basis to consider you disloyal. Then that was changed to reasonable doubts of loyalty. All cases had to be reconsidered under the new rules.

Levenson: You were disloyal until you could prove yourself loyal?

J. Service: That's right, yes. When you get a certain amount of notoriety and get talked about enough in the press, people come up with all sorts of wild accusations, some completely frivolous, some easy to disprove.

J. Service: Anyway, they decided that I would have to be kept in Washington. It was publicly announced in December, 1950, that I had been cleared by the State Department. But this was only provisional.

They brought Caroline home. She came home in the spring of 1951. The children stayed in India for school and then came to the States.

By this time there had been rapid inflation due to the Korean War. It looked as though we were going to be staying in Washington. Of course, we expected to be cleared. There was no expectation of what finally happened.

So, [chuckling] we bought a house, at the worst possible time. It was sometime in the summer of '51. We shared ownership with my brother, Dick. This was the first time we'd ever owned a house, but we managed.

Caroline actually had saved some money during World War II. I had gotten an allowance for her, a rental allowance for her to get quarters. But, for various reasons she stayed on with her family. The allowance was not very large. But, anyway she had been able to save some money, and so she had something like six or seven thousand dollars that she saved. This was the down payment for our portion of the house.

The State Department, as I say, was wringing its hands about what to do with me. By this time Foreign Service personnel and departmental personnel had been brought under one personnel office. Pete Martin, I think, may have been head of personnel. I'd known him quite well in 1949 when I'd been working in the Department. He wanted to know if I couldn't volunteer for some specially arduous duty or something and get out of the State Department for a while on leave. He suggested the CIA. So, I said, "Okay, I'll try." I didn't think the CIA would take me!

I went over, saw a friend who had been in OSS during the war, and asked if the CIA could use me on some sort of "Mission Impossible." Of course, [chuckling] their security people were not going to have anything to do with me, so that fell through.

Levenson: It seems a bizarre notion in the climate of the times?

J. Service: Yes.

Then Martin said couldn't I retire? I pointed out the law and so on. I couldn't retire until I was 50, and I wasn't planning to resign. Anyway, the Department was unhappy.

J. Service: At one of these meetings I sort of blew up about the dilly-dallying and pointed out that I had been trying not to implicate people who had been in the administration and people who had been my superiors such as Vincent and Currie.

I wrote a letter about this to Vincent. I think the easiest way to handle it is just to put the letter in the record.*
[tape off]

Levenson: Thank you for that. That's May 16, 1951, six pages.

Kuomintang Propaganda from Taiwan Supplied to United States
Senators and Translated by Library of Congress Staff

J. Service: About this time--in February actually I think it was--the press told us that Chinese intelligence reports from Taiwan had been supplied to some senators interested in the question of China policy--the assumption was Knowland and McCarthy--and that they were being translated for the senators by the Library of Congress.

I went up to the Library of Congress and talked to the head of the Far Eastern section, which was old Arthur Hummel [Sr.], you know, compiler of Eminent Chinese of the Ch'ing Period.

Levenson: Oh, sure.

J. Service: I wanted to get either copies of the Chinese originals, or copies of the translations. He was very sorry, but the Library of Congress couldn't allow me to. It was an agency of the Senate or the Congress, and they could only work for Congress. So, it was something that he couldn't let me have. Whichever senator it was, and I assume it was McCarthy, he leaked the reports to Fulton Lewis. Then Fulton Lewis had a fine sensational series of his reports.

"Chiang Kai-shek had a wily crew of Chinese counter-intelligence agents on his payroll." It describes how they followed John Stewart Service around, and it has the silly garbage about my having an affair with Chou En-lai's secretary. Chinese Mata Hari. It's just absolutely, absolutely ridiculous sort of stuff. Anyway, that's sort of an interesting exhibit maybe.**

*See Appendix IV.

**See Appendix V.

Levenson: I certainly think so.

J. Service: I wrote some corrections and so on, but I didn't try to publish them. Nothing was ever done with them. I just pointed out the many errors and inaccuracies.

Levenson: To whom did you send that stuff?

J. Service: I didn't send it to anybody. [laughing] There was no use trying to get in a public fight with J. Fulton Lewis Jr. Oh, you have a question?

Levenson: Yes, I had a question, Library of Congress and Arthur Hummel. Public funds, light security--how was it that you couldn't get copies?

J. Service: Well, this was what he said. A mission had been given to him by whatever senators were involved--he wouldn't even mention what senators it was--and therefore it was confidential. So the only thing we had was what Fulton Lewis Jr. was able to get and publish.

Levenson: Were you ever aware of Chiang Kai-shek's counter-intelligence following you around?

J. Service: Oh yes, in Chungking certainly.

Levenson: But not in Washington?

J. Service: No.

Levenson: This business of the Chinese Mata Hari, was this picked up by other press people?

J. Service: Not at the time. No, the press ignored this. It was so silly I don't think there was very much on it. My press clippings would show.*

Levenson: Do you feel that there were slightly more respectable press standards then of invasion of private life than exist now?

J. Service: Yes, I would say so. Also there was somewhat more reserve about McCarthy by this time than there had been when he started. This was in '51, and a lot of his stuff had been proven to be baloney and the press was considerably more skeptical about some of it by '51.

*To be deposited in The Bancroft Library.

Jack Requests that the Secretary of State Remove His Name from the Promotion List

J. Service: The selection boards met every year at the beginning of the year. In early 1951 they met, and I was eligible for promotion. I was talking to a man named Butrick, an old friend who'd been in Shanghai. He'd been outraged at the recommendation I'd made when I was in personnel in '49 that retirement age for career ministers be reduced to sixty like the rest of the Foreign Service. Under the Act at that time it was sixty-five. We had too many career ministers and one problem was getting rid of them.

I forget now what the connection was, why I happened to be seeing him--we were talking about the selection boards, and the lists apparently were out--he was annoyed about some of the people that were on the board. Something he said gave me a tip-off that I probably was on the list that had been selected for promotion.

I realized that this could make a real problem for the State Department because under the regulations if they cut my name out, no one below me would be able to be promoted, you see. So, I wrote to [Carlisle H.] Humelsine. I wrote the secretary of state, of course, but I took it to Humelsine who then was the acting administrative man--Peurifoy had left--asking that my name be taken off the list if it was on.

Later on I found out I was on the list. It would have been very nice, of course, to have been class I. But I would never have gotten confirmation at that time, so I was not really giving up anything by withdrawing my name.

An Intimation of Trouble

J. Service: About this time we got an intimation of trouble. I was talking to Tony [Fulton] Freeman, whose family I'd been living with for part of the time. Tony was in the Department. Some American woman had come to see him in some agitation after she'd had lunch at the Chinese embassy.

By now, it had appeared in the press that Service had been cleared. The wife of the Chinese ambassador had said, "Isn't it terrible how they could clear that man Service?" Then, she went on with the story about my having an illegitimate child in China.

ADDRESS OFFICIAL COMMUNICATIONS TO
THE SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

(COPY)

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
WASHINGTON



March 23, 1951

AIR MAIL

The Honorable
The Secretary of State
Washington, D.C.

Sir:

I have the honor, risking presumptuousness, to lay before you a personal request.

Perhaps I may be excused, in the light of the following factors, for assuming that the Selection Board which convened in January, 1951, may have considered me for promotion:

- (a) this is my second year of eligibility for promotion;
- (b) my Selection Board rating in 1950, according to information supplied me at my request through established channels, was relatively close to the promotable zone;
- (c) an efficiency report, which I have no reason to believe would be unfavorable, was assumedly available to the Board for six months (August 1, 1949 to January 31, 1950) of the most recent efficiency reporting period;
- (d) the Board presumably had knowledge of the favorable reports in July, 1950, by majority and minority members of the Senate Foreign Relations Subcommittee and also of the favorable decision and review of my loyalty case by the Department of State Loyalty Security Board and Deputy Under Secretary for Administration.

I understand, however, that the Loyalty Review Board has not yet taken action, either favorable or unfavorable, in my case. Under this circumstance of the loyalty clearance process being still incomplete, I would consider it inappropriate to accept promotion.

My request, therefore, is that I not be considered for, and if selected be permitted to decline, any class promotion until after favorable action has been taken in my case by the Loyalty Review Board. If the Selection Board has already recommended my promotion, I ask that my name be removed from the list. I assume that this action on my part will not prejudice my being considered for promotion by the first and following Boards subsequent to the clearance which I am morally certain will eventually be given me by the Loyalty Review Board.

This request would have been made earlier if I had had knowledge or expectation that final action by the Loyalty Review Board would be so long delayed.

Respectfully,

John S. Service
Foreign Service Officer

J. Service: This woman came into the Department, rather agitated, because she wanted to be sure that the "full facts were known." She or someone else apparently also went to the FBI. So, a few days later the FBI came around to interview me.

Anyway, we wrote a long letter to the Loyalty Security Board about this whole business, pointing out absurdities in the story, the claim that Val was a Communist, and so on, and noting that the child was born seventeen months after I left China.

Levenson: Thank you.

J. Service: We told this to Caroline, but I don't think we told the children about this at this time because we didn't expect it to become public. Later on it was obvious that it was liable to become public.

When we get to the Loyalty Review Board we'll find that the Loyalty Review Board had this same story, although they never used it in the hearing. But this was very much in their minds. We got more information later on.

"Pertinent Excerpts"

J. Service: In the fall of 1951, the IPR [Institute of Pacific Relations] hearings had been going on for a long time and had ranged all over the map. The McCarran committee used it to bring in everything they could.

They used Wedemeyer to attack me. They never called me. They didn't want me to appear, I'm sure. By pulling excerpts out of various reports that I had written, they got Wedemeyer to make some very foolish statements.

I wrote an article which the Foreign Service Journal published in October 1951 which was called "Pertinent Excerpts."*

Levenson: [laughing] That's a good title.

*See Appendix VI.

J. Service: Perhaps I'd better give you an unmarked copy. That's an offprint.

Levenson: Oh, thank you.

J. Service: Anyway, this got some notice and was printed in a number of different places. The Boston Herald picked it up, and the paper in Providence. This was the Providence Evening Bulletin.

Levenson: With favorable comment?

J. Service: Oh yes. It was favorable. But it was sort of embarrassing for the Journal a couple months later to have the blow fall.

Loyalty Review Board Hearings Under Ex-Senator Hiram Bingham,
November 8, 1951

J. Service: On October 11, we got a letter rather surprisingly--it was surprising to us--from the Loyalty Review Board, saying that they were going to hold their own hearings. That's the letter.*

Levenson: From Hiram Bingham, ex-senator from Connecticut.

J. Service: It says that "the charges [reading from the letter] will be based upon the charges heretofore issued to you by the Department of State Loyalty Security Board."

We had gotten a specific charge from the Loyalty Review Board, so we assumed--we read this literally--assumed that our charges would be the same. There wasn't much for us to do in the way of preparation. We just sort of went in and said, "Here we are." We didn't prepare a case.

The thing was actually held in early November, November 8. Three very distinguished elderly lawyers. The early morning hearing was very rigorous and concentrated heavily on Jaffe and my association with Jaffe. I was very discouraged at noon time, but Ed [Rhett] said, "Oh, don't worry." He didn't think it was that bad. These guys were good lawyers, competent and experienced and they knew how to conduct a good cross-questioning.

*See Appendix VII.

J. Service: The afternoon was rather deceptive because it was very relaxed. They asked me about what life was like in Yen'an and my contacts with Foreign Service officers. Everyone laughed about some of the reports such as the views of Captain Alsop.

Bingham was present himself most of the time--a rather forbidding, scowling presence--just as an observer. But, he wasn't a member of the panel.

A staff member of the Loyalty Review Board asked some silly questions. He was a real know-nothing type. The only one of his questions I recall was to the effect that I had referred to "C-C" many times in reports, to the "C-C Clique," and did this mean Chinese Communists? Well, of course, the C-C Clique is well known to anybody involved in Chinese affairs. It meant the Ch'en brothers, Ch'en Kuo-fu and Ch'en Li-fu--the right-wing clique of the Kuomintang. This was the expertise of the staff of the Loyalty Review Board.

We said later on that we would like to submit a memorandum, and they said we could. We got a delay until we could get the transcript. The transcript has never been printed. Here's a copy of it.*

As soon as I read the transcript it was clear to me that they had in their minds quite different charges from the ones in the original letter of October 11. The original charge was that I was a Communist or associated with Communists in such a way as to betray the security interests of the United States. The charge that they had in mind was a different thing in the regulations, a different section in the regulations about "willful disclosure of confidential information."

I pointed this out to Ed. I wrote him a short memo, I think, and I pointed out how the whole thrust of the questioning indicated they were confused about what charges I had been given in my original letter.

Ed said, "By God, I think you've got a point here." So, he went over to see the board. They were very embarrassed. They said, "Yes, that's right." They apparently never even read the original charges.

*To be deposited in The Bancroft Library.

J. Service: One funny thing, when Ed Rhetts went to talk to Hiram Bingham about the mixup in the charges, he noted that the only book on China, and very prominently displayed on Bingham's desk, was Freda Utley's book. I forget the title--I think it is The China Story. She was an ex-Communist, and it's a violently anti-Communist, pro-right wing diatribe.

Ed Rhetts made some reference to the book, and Bingham said, yes, he thought it was pretty good. Of course, [chuckling] it may have been done for intimidation, I don't know. [laughter] But, it's not generally regarded as a very authoritative book on China.

So, then what to do about the mixup in the charges? They said, "Well, we can have hearings all over again if you want." But, they didn't think it would make any difference.

Ed's own feeling was that these were very experienced, reputable lawyers. They suggested a stipulation that the hearings were conducted as if we had been informed of the charges. Ed said that his reaction was, as a lawyer, that these people would not use a technicality like this to hang one. Therefore, it must mean that they were going to decide in my favor. He thought we'd be okay to go ahead and sign the stipulation. So, we signed, waiving my right to a new hearing.

Levenson: Was that your downfall?

J. Service: Well, no, not really, because they had decided to fire me anyway. If we'd had new hearings it wouldn't have made any difference. But it enraged Ed Rhetts. He felt that it was low tactics.

They had decided that they were going to fire me. They had decided on the morning of November 8 when they had lunch together. They sat over in one part of the dining room, and we sat in another part of the dining room. Obviously by lunch time they had made their decision and reached their conclusion.

The afternoon session was just so that it didn't look too much like a kangaroo court. In other words they wanted to make the hearing last a little longer, but they hadn't really any need to know much more, so the afternoon was very relaxed. I don't think that signing the stipulation was our downfall in the sense it could have altered things any.

Levenson: In your opinion what were the grounds for their decision at that time?

13 Nov
and
14 Nov

2x
4608 Butterworth Place NW
Washington 16, DC
Nov. 10, 1951

Dear Mother:

prepare by reviewing

This is Saturday afternoon and I am sitting here in Ed Rhett's office. Had hoped to get some work done but don't seem able to get my mind on it.

The Loyalty Review Board hearing was Thursday — all day. We had prepared no brief, simply tried to ~~review~~ everything as thoroughly as possible and ~~then~~ put ourselves at their disposal for such questions as they might wish to ask. After all, they had called the hearing and we thought we had covered everything in the first hearing before the State Dept Board.

What we got was an extremely rigorous "expert" interrogation. Not unfriendly but leaving one exhausted and feeling as though he had been run over — and back and forth — by a bull dozer. That was for 3½ hours during the a.m.; devoted entirely to contacts and conversations, etc, with Jaffe. Here of course the great difficulties are: the "defendant" can't see the evidence in the hands of the Board; (2) that "evidence" is not the actual recordings but what the FBI says was said. Here you are at the mercy of a number of factors such as failure of the FBI agent or device to record clearly, and obvious confusion and apparent summarization. One result is alleged statements which are unintelligible, contradictory or impossible. (3) Finally, my few conversations with Jaffe had no particular significance at the time and were no different in content or substance from conversations with many others. It is therefore impossible after 6 years to remember them separately or with any detail.

The afternoon session — about 2 hours — was very different — relaxed and general, and apparently designed chiefly to draw me out and give them some chance to size me up.

The Board panel was apparently the best that could have been put up. All three lawyers (2 from New York and 1 from Boston), older men from top firms and all with excellent reputation. Ed's professional reaction was that short of the Supreme Court, it would not be possible to assemble a more experienced and capable group, whose fairness and objectivity could be more relied on.

A second point on which we were much pleased was that it was immediately clear that they had all studied the full record meticulously and were minutely familiar with it. What we had most feared was that the sheer bulk would prove too much. We were quickly put to rest on that: they had even done things such as reading my reports.

We were given a complete option as to what course we wished to pursue further. It was clearly unwise to try to keep going that day: it had already been exhausting, not only to us but also to them. Ed felt, however, that it would be desirable — for the record — to tie up some of the points raised during the day in a more complete and thorough way than had been possible during the oral "hot and heavy". We are therefore planning to prepare and present a partial "brief" in writing. Since we probably won't get the transcript of the hearing itself for 2 weeks, we have been given 3 weeks to submit the brief. Neither Ed nor I feel that this will have any effect on the outcome. These men know the case so thoroughly that their mind is made up — we think favorably. However, for the sake of the record, our brief — which will be a sort of summation — may be a good thing.

Of course all this works to delay the final result — but what are a few more weeks! We should have their verdict sometime in December. Caroline is unhappy over the delay but I cannot help that.

Much love,

Jack.

J. Service: These people were under a great deal of public pressure, the atmosphere of the times. They were convinced, I think, that the State Department had been too lax. They didn't understand anything from personal experience about the wartime background, the special circumstances in China, the relations with the press.

They obviously were informed about my personal life and were very concerned about that.

Later on we got a leak, again through McCarthy, of the minutes of the discussions in which they apparently all agreed that the State Department should have declared me unsuitable and fired me on those grounds.

Levenson: On moral grounds?

J. Service: On moral grounds. We'll come to that pretty soon.

Some Further Notes

Levenson: Was there anything of substance in the off-the-record discussions that you can now talk about? This "off the record" occurs three times in the Loyalty Review Board transcript. These may be irrelevancies.

J. Service: Oh, good Lord. I don't remember, except I suppose we may have had some discussion of the same business that we had off the record in the Tydings thing about Japanese codes.

There's one thing that's absolutely certain and that is that they did not-- Nowhere in the hearings and nowhere in the report and findings was there ever any mention of my having had an affair in Chungking. This was completely ignored. There wasn't any mention of it by the board or any members during the hearing nor, as I say, in their decision. I just can't recall now what was off the record.

The silly thing about this whole thing is that the panel, you see, the Loyalty Review Board, does not consider security and they do not consider unsuitability. The only thing that they consider is loyalty. Their whole case was built on my association with Jaffe. But, in their internal discussion apparently there was a great deal of discussion about my personal affairs and love life, if you will, which is completely outside their purview. That's why they couldn't make any mention of it in the decision.

J. Service: But, my being given access to these coded, deciphered Japanese telegrams was, of course, long after my affair with Yun-ju, and the army knew about it. I made sure that G-2 knew about it right at the very inception, so that the army didn't consider me a security risk.

Levenson: One of the things that struck me very strongly was the fundamental ignorance of some of the members of the review board as to circumstances in China in '44 to '45, the geography, et cetera. Mr. Clark asks you about Yen-an and what were the physical conditions there.

"Was there anything in the way of hotel accommodations there?"

You say, "No, sir. I need a map."

Mr. Alger says, "Oh, never mind that."

J. Service: They were retired lawyers, all reputable citizens, mostly corporate lawyers from New York, I think. But they didn't have any background or knowledge. The only thing you can say is that it was a far better panel than we had later on when Davies had his hearings, when you had somebody from the Small Business Administration and someone from the Geological Survey or something like that, completely outside any relationship or knowledge of foreign affairs or the conduct of foreign affairs.

These people, as I said the other day, I think had pretty much made up their minds beforehand.

Levenson: What about standards of evidential validity, the sorts of things that lawyers are supposedly trained in doing, assessing the value of evidence?

J. Service: I would say that the most shocking example of that was the Senate later on. I don't remember these people being so outrageous.

Levenson: Why, in your opinion, did Humelsine take so long perusing your record? He must have known it backwards and forwards by this time.

J. Service: Things did keep coming up, you know. I think I mentioned before that the Loyalty Security Board would make a decision, and then there would be a new evidence. This kept happening. We had the new Chinese intelligence stuff that was put out by McCarthy through Fulton Lewis. Then, we had the Chinese embassy starting

J. Service: the story about my having an illegitimate child. Then, we had changes in the regulations, change in the standards, and every time, it all had to be reconsidered.

Humelsine and the State Department were in a real quandary. The Loyalty Security Board, the State Department board, cleared me, but Humelsine didn't want to have to grasp the nettle because he knew there was going to be a lot of heat. So, I think he put it off and put it off, because they really didn't know just what was going to happen if they publicly cleared me.

He couldn't give his final okay until the Loyalty Review Board had post-audited it. The system then was that the Loyalty Review Board had to post-audit. They had thrown the case back once already before. So that they had to wait for the Loyalty Review Board.

That's probably the most important reason of all really, in practical terms. He felt he couldn't make any sort of final and firm decision until the Loyalty Review Board had acted. The Loyalty Review Board was subject to these same things, the changing of standards, new evidence coming in, and so on.

Levenson: Do you feel that you were used as the Department scapegoat in the China matter?

J. Service: No, I don't think so. I wasn't used as the Department scapegoat. There's just no basis for that. The Department, as I say, was pretty much on my side. The State Department at the Humelsine level, the top level, tried to cut its losses at the last minute. They weren't going to make any fight about it. But, up to that point they had stuck by me through a lot of thick and thin.

I was a scapegoat in a sense, a whipping boy-- That isn't the right word. I turned out to be an easy, vulnerable target for McCarthy and for the China Lobby and for the Kuomintang and for [Albert] Kohlberg, K-o-h-l-b-e-r-g.

Levenson: Right. That's the end of what I had prepared.

J. Service: Let's shut it off and have tea. [tape off]

Fired as of the Close of Business. "How did you Know so Soon?"

J. Service: About this time my friend [Raymond P.] Ludden had received an interrogatory. Many people were beginning to receive interrogatories. John Carter Vincent had been called back to the Department to testify before the IPR hearings. [John Fremont] Melby had been given interrogatories.

Ludden was very concerned about how to handle it. There was some question of the procedural details. I said to him, "Well, let's go down to the Loyalty Security Board's office." They had an office there in the main building of the State Department.

So, we walked in, and it was like the time when I complained about Grew's statement about the chicken coop. The man's face just froze. He said, "How did you know so soon?"

I said, "Know what?"

So, he said, "The Loyalty Review Board has ruled against you."

They told us about it. The secretary had red eyes. She obviously was upset. Everyone was upset. There wasn't much to do.

I called Ed, and he immediately asked for a delay, asked for an appointment to see Humelsine so we could talk the thing over. Humelsine wouldn't see us till five or five-thirty.

Alan Barth from the Post came over to the office. We talked, and Ed felt very strongly that we had a case, that the Loyalty Review Board did not have this authority to overrule cases that had been decided in favor of the employee. They could be an appeal board, but since the State Department had not appealed, they couldn't arbitrarily assume control of a case, as they were doing, and then decide against the employee.

We went in to Humelsine at five, and by that time the press releases were out. The State Department had a lengthy press release, the full text of the Loyalty Review Board's decision, and the full text of their own board's decision, and saying that I would be fired as of the close of business the next day.

Humelsine refused to consider any delay or hold it up. [paraphrasing Humelsine] "Too late. Press has already got these releases."

PERSONAL STATEMENT OF JOHN S. SERVICE

The Loyalty Review Board's decision is a surprise, a shock and an injustice. I am not now and never have been disloyal to the United States. The Board expressly states that it does not find me disloyal.

What it has done is to base a "reasonable doubt" on a single episode which occurred six and a half years ago, which has been freely admitted by me and known to all responsible quarters since that time and for which I have been tried and unanimously acquitted at least nine times.

That episode involved discussing normal and proper background information with a journalist whom I believed, and had every reason to believe at the time, to be nothing more than the editor of a reputable specialist magazine dealing with the Far East. The selected background information which I gave him did not adversely affect, or even deal with, the national interests of the United States, nor did it come within the meaning of regulations defining the classification SECRET and CONFIDENTIAL. The information involved was known, or at least available to all of the American correspondents in China. The only thing that kept these facts about China from an ^{un}informed American public was a foreign censorship. The same information had been used repeatedly by me, with official approval, in discussing the situation in China with other writers and researchers in the United States.

I am confident that my record of 18 1/2 years' service to the American Government and the testimony of the many people who have worked with me during that period will support me in my conviction that there is no doubt of my loyalty.

December 13, 1951

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
FOR THE PRESS

DECEMBER 13, 1951

NO. 1088

The Department of State announced today that the Loyalty Review Board of the Civil Service Commission has advised the Department that this Board has found a reasonable doubt as to the loyalty of John Stewart Service, Foreign Service Officer.

Today's decision of the Loyalty Review Board is based on the evidence which was considered by the Department's Board and found to be insufficient on which to base a finding of "reasonable doubt" as to Mr. Service's loyalty or security. Copies of the Opinions of both Boards are attached.

The Department of State's Loyalty Security Board, on July 31, 1951, had reaffirmed its earlier findings that Service was neither disloyal nor a security risk, and the case had been referred to the Loyalty Review Board for post-audit on September 4, 1951. The Loyalty Review Board assumed jurisdiction of Mr. Service's case on October 9, 1951.

The Chairman of the Loyalty Review Board in today's letter to the Secretary (full text attached) noted:

"The Loyalty Review Board found no evidence of membership in the Communist Party or in any organization on the Attorney General's list on the part of John Stewart Service. The Loyalty Review Board did find that there is a reasonable doubt as to the loyalty of the employee, John Stewart Service, to the Government of the United States, based on the intentional and unauthorized disclosure of documents and information of a confidential and non-public character within the meaning of subparagraph d of paragraph 2 of Part V, 'Standards,' of Executive Order No. 9835, as amended."

The Opinion of the Loyalty Review Board stressed the points made above by the Chairman -- that is, it stated that the Board was not required to find and did not find Mr. Service guilty of disloyalty, but it did find that his intentional and unauthorized disclosure of confidential documents raised reasonable doubt as to his loyalty. The State Department Board while censoring Mr. Service for indiscretions, believed that the experience Mr. Service had been through as a result of his indiscretions in 1945 had served to make him far more than normally security conscious. It found also that no reasonable doubt existed as to his loyalty to the Government of the United States. On this point the State Department Board was reversed.

The Chairman of the Loyalty Review Board has requested the Secretary of State to advise the Board of the effective date of the separation of Mr. Service. This request stems from the provisions of Executive Orders 9835 and 10241 -- which established the President's Loyalty Program -- and the Regulations promulgated thereon. These Regulations are binding on the Department of State.

The Department has advised the Chairman of the Loyalty Review Board that Mr. Service's employment has been terminated.

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Levenson: Was this cleared by the secretary of state?

J. Service: We don't know for sure, but as far as we could find out, the State Department immediately got in touch with the White House and said, "What do we do?"

The White House said, "You've got to fire him. Too much heat. The president has appointed the Loyalty Review Board, he can't overrule them, and you've just got to go ahead and fire him."

Levenson: When you say, "the White House," do you have any idea whether it went as far as Truman?

J. Service: We just don't know. He had a legal adviser named Murphy. I think we've got some correspondence with him. It may have been Truman. We don't know.

The whole attitude of the State Department people under [Dean] Acheson was to save him as much as possible because he'd been burned so badly on the Hiss case, you see. After Hiss was convicted he made a statement, "I will not turn my back." The repercussions and backlash on this had been venomous and terrible.

One of McCarthy's famous—not famous—one of his favorite ways of referring to me, for instance, in public speeches was, "John Service who Acheson will not turn his back on," you know, this sort of thing. I'm not sure whether Acheson was involved. I suppose he must have okayed it.

Levenson: Did you know Acheson personally?

J. Service: Not really. I'd met him in '45 just briefly after my arrest. I was going out to lunch with John Carter Vincent or something, and we ran into Acheson and had some sort of joking conversation for a short while.

Rhetts had tried to appeal to him at one time to move things along when our case was being delayed, and there's a letter somewhere in the stuff here. But, I'd not had any personal contact.

A group of Foreign Service officers tried to talk to him about the case, but I'm not sure how soon they were able to do this. It couldn't have been this day because no one knew it during this day. It must have been afterward.

I think he intimated to them that he just couldn't do anything about it, his hands were tied. So, I think it all points to the fact that the real decision was made in the White House.

Outrage and Indignation

Levenson: What was the impact on you compared, for instance, to the Amerasia disaster?

J. Service: The Amerasia thing, as I said, I felt a terrible sense of shame and disgrace. In this one I didn't at all because it was just outrage, indignation.

The press bothered us for a while. We started getting crank phone calls and crank letters, but then I'd been getting crank letters all the way through. That didn't bother me so much. The phone calls were a nuisance.

Levenson: What sort of crank phone calls?

J. Service: Oh, obscenities. "You lesbian--" Caroline's mother was visiting us and she'd pick up the phone and this breathy voice calling her a lesbian. Cranks got loyalty and homosexuality all mixed up with the State Department. It was crazy.

Eric Severeid had a fine broadcast which I suppose I can dig up--a very friendly broadcast.*

Well, the next day I went around to say goodbye to some people in the State Department. [tape off]

Practically Bare. No Job, No Retirement, No Pension, Nothing, No Insurance

J. Service: The Foreign Service Journal ran a good editorial. Some Foreign Service friends wanted to start a defense fund. It seemed desirable to have a well known sponsor. Howland Shaw, an old timer, retired, former chief of personnel, was suggested. I talked to him. He immediately and gladly accepted the idea. In fact other people had already spoken to him. So he wrote the letter suggesting the fund.

We got a lawyer outside, an old friend of mine, outside the Department to act as treasurer--he agreed to do it--John Reid, R-e-i-d. We promised people that they would be anonymous, because McCarthy at that time was trying to find out who contributed to such causes. There had been a fuss about my earlier fund in 1945, and exaggerated amounts had been put out. Actually, I had turned some of that money back and suggested it be given to Larsen.

*See following pages.

Eric Sevareid - Dec. 14, 1951

This reporter would like to step a bit out of character, on two counts. I would like to make a few purely personal assertions, unprovable by their nature, but the truth of which I deeply believe, and to make these statements, not about an issue, but about a man. I wish to talk about Mr. John Service, whose long career as an American diplomat was broken last night, when the federal Loyalty Review Board concluded that his loyalty to his country was in doubt.

This must be personal because my knowledge of this case is personal; I have known John Service over a period of eight years, in China and in Washington. It is my personal conviction, based on much first hand knowledge, that the American diplomatic service contained no more brilliant, devoted, self-sacrificing field agent--his unusually rapid rise in the service, the extraordinary prophetic quality of his reports from China attest to that. It is also my unshakable personal conviction, based on not only the same testimony the Review Board considered, not only upon intimate memories of the special wartime atmosphere and procedures at the period of the Amerasia case, but also upon the instinctive human knowledge which friendship produces, that John Service was, and is, a completely loyal American citizen. That is not only one man's belief; it is the belief of all his colleagues in the diplomatic service; it was the belief not only of the grand jury which first heard the Amerasia story; it was the belief of all those able and honorable men who conducted not one, two or three, but six other investigations of this most thoroughly investigated loyalty case in American history.

Certain things must be understood - no new evidence was produced by Senator McCarthy or before the Review Board; all of

it was in, years ago; Service has never withheld a shred of evidence he told the whole story freely and openly. Immediately he realized the Amerasia crowd were not the responsible journalists he had been assured they were. It should be understood that the Review Board has not found him to be disloyal; it has decided only that it has a doubt as to his loyalty; under the new ground rules on these cases, that is all it had to find. Under these rules, the accused, contrary to the ancient rules prevailing in court of law, does not enjoy the benefit of the doubt. Mere doubt can destroy a reputation, a career, all that makes life worth living for a citizen who happens to be in the federal service.

In a career without blemish before, without blemish since, John Service made one serious mistake; he gave verbal and documentary information about China, as background, to journalists who were not what he thought they were. In wartime, background briefing by diplomats and soldiers was a necessary and commonplace procedure. He gave me similar information in China, when we first met, but not, may I add, without having me vouched for, despite my uniform and credentials. He was not a careless, loose-tongued man, by any means, but he did make one mistake.

He was by no means alone in that. At least, once in the war, General George C. Marshall, as Chief of Staff, briefed a number of us on highly secret information, when there was present a journalist who later turned out to be a strict communist party liner. Despite their facilities, Marshall's security officers had made a mistake, an honest mistake. The same kind of mistake, I feel certain, has been made time and time again by high ranking diplomats and officers in briefing groups of reporters. No one has suggested, or would suggest that there is any doubt, reasonable or otherwise, about the

loyalty of those officials. Service's mistake was an honest one. But his career and his name have been destroyed.

I have said all this because a reporter has a special obligation to report any personal knowledge of a public issue, and, because friendship carries with it, certain obligations, too.

J. Service: Of course, I wasn't old enough to retire, so they returned my contribution to the retirement fund. I got a lump sum payment for my accumulated leave, but they agreed to hold that over till the next year so that it wouldn't all be taxable in one year. But even that made a problem for income tax. I had about a half year of accumulated leave, which is the maximum you can accumulate in the Foreign Service.

The State Department Foreign Service Association had a group insurance policy with Equitable Life. One provision was that if one left the service they had to convert your policy to an ordinary life policy. You had to drop out of the group policy.

I went around to see the Equitable man in town in Washington who dealt with the Department for years on this group policy. I wanted to buy a term policy because it was a lot cheaper. I could get more coverage. At that time I had nothing, you see. I was practically bare with no job, no retirement, no pension, nothing, no insurance. So, I wanted to get term, and he refused to sell it to me.

The only thing he would do was what he was required to do by the agreement, give me ordinary straight life. I said, "Why?" He said, "Well you know, after all, you might jump out of a window or something." This was apparently a reference to the case of Larry Duggan, who had done just that after accusations and rough interrogation by the House Un-American Activities Committee.

Exhausting Administrative Appeals

J. Service: We immediately tried to appeal. Before you can take anything to a court you have to exhaust all administrative appeals. So, we appealed to the Loyalty Review Board.

About this time McCarthy got some leaks of minutes of Loyalty Review Board discussions. He tried to get these published. He gave them to some of the press. We found out about it from The Washington Post. [tape off]

Some reference was made to it--I see, I've got a clipping here from the Post--but they didn't use all of it. It talks about my association with a woman who was alleged to be a Russian spy, which my letter denies. It talks about how they felt that Service was "unsuitable for public service," said by Perkins.

J. Service: There was a lot of discussion about the State Department not having discharged anybody or allowed people to resign. In the Post Office Department, ten percent of all persons examined were found worthy of separation, the Commerce Department, six and a half percent. The average was about six percent. The State Department was zero. These are statements made by Mr. [Hiram] Bingham, the chairman.

Levenson: I think that's very interesting.

J. Service: We wrote to the board asking for these minutes, and that was declined. I think all this correspondence we can put in here later on.

We appealed to the Civil Service Commission which is over the Loyalty Review Board, and they refused our appeal. Then we wrote to the president. A presidential staff member wrote back saying that he was very sorry, but there was nothing he could do.

We appealed the decision, but we also appealed the fact that these minutes were prejudicial.

After the president had rejected any reconsideration or appeal, then there was nothing to do except to take it to the courts. Ed felt we had a good case. He was confident we could win on this question of lack of authority by the Loyalty Review Board.

But it was going to be a long business. We realized that we probably would have to go all the way to the Supreme Court. But he was willing to do it partly because he'd developed a very strong personal interest, and also he felt that we'd been outrageously treated by the Loyalty Review Board.

So, we went ahead. I promised him that I would not withdraw. He didn't want us to get involved and then pull out. I think that's probably a good place to stop, isn't it?

Levenson: Yes. Thank you, Jack.

XII FROM FIRING TO REINSTATEMENT

[Interview 11: October 24, 1977]

Some Addenda: Transcripts, Personal Relations, Effects on the Family, Finances

Levenson: Was it normal practice for transcripts of loyalty hearings to be given to the subject of the review?

J. Service: It was at that time, but they changed all this almost immediately. There was a great furor because the State Department published the rationale of the Loyalty Review Board in their decision.

When the Republicans came in, and maybe before that, I think they tightened up everything and stopped giving you transcripts. I'd had the transcript of my hearings before the Loyalty Security Board in the State Department. I also got transcripts of the Loyalty Review Board.

When I had new hearings later on, in 1958, after I came back to the Department, there was no transcript. I think it was to prevent such things as giving them any publicity that they stopped doing it, although it was a hindrance to the man who was being accused, making it more difficult for him.

Levenson: What other circulation if any did it have, to your knowledge?

J. Service: It didn't have any that I know of, but as I mentioned last time, an employee of the Loyalty Review Board was leaking stuff to McCarthy, so that we don't know what further circulation it may have had through means like that.

Levenson: Were you personally ostracized at this time?

J. Service: After the firing there were a certain number of people in the State Department, because of their positions, who felt that they had to discontinue contact. But, they were very few.

J. Service: I wasn't pursuing anybody anyway. I had made it a point in New York, for instance, not to look people up. I thought that if they wanted to see me they would look me up.

Then there were some people that I didn't want to see. Jaffe and people that had been associated with Amerasia, some of them made tentative gestures and I indicated, I thought pretty clearly, that I didn't want to maintain any of that relationship.

People like Brooks Atkinson said to me afterward, "Why didn't you look me up?" [chuckling] Well, I thought that it was really up to them to take the initiative, you know.

Levenson: Then, you found for me this Saturday Evening Post article by Drew Pearson, "Confessions of an S.O.B.," 1956. How much validity do you think there was in his comment?

"Despite all my precautions I feel that I was responsible for a serious injustice being done to two government servants. One was John Service, a State Department Foreign Service officer, who was fired on the charge of being a poor security risk because he had talked to newspapermen and others. One of those newspapermen, I suspect, was I, for on at least one occasion I went to Service's apartment and talked with him about Patrick J. Hurley with whom he had served. . . . Later, I learned that microphones had been planted in Service's apartment."

J. Service: I talked to Pearson a good many times. As I recall that particular incident, at least what I think was that incident, he called me and came around and picked me up. Then we went riding in his car, which I assumed was caution on his part. But, it's true that if our phones were tapped, why, it was known that he called me.

But, he was simply asking about the story that Hurley and [General Robert B.] McClure had almost come to blows at some sort of a gathering in Chungking. He wanted to find out if a story which he'd already heard had any basis in it or not.

Levenson: Had it?

J. Service: Yes.

Levenson: How did you maintain your spirits through this long ordeal? I don't know how you date it, whether you call it a twelve year ordeal, from '45 to '57, or shorter than that. But the strain of it must have been overwhelming at times.

J. Service: Well, I don't think it was a strain for most of that period. The tough period was these eighteen months or so, from March, 1950, till after I was established in New York. You might call it two years, I suppose.

After we were established in New York I had a job. Then the matter just had to rock along through the courts. We were sort of used to living with it, and it wasn't very much on our minds.

I don't know. I think probably the fact that I was steadily engaged, busy, most of the time-- There were long periods when there wasn't anything to do, but as I said I managed to try to keep myself occupied one way or another.

It was much more difficult in many ways for Caroline than it was for me. We were separated, in '45 [Japan] and again in 1950. She went on to India and I went to Washington, so that she was isolated and I wasn't very good then or ever at writing letters. So that certainly was difficult for her.

But even when she came back to Washington she very sensibly, I think, kept out of the day to day legal work that we were doing. I think she just decided to leave the details to us, which was a good thing because she and Ed [Rhett] rubbed on each other a little bit.

Ed's methods of work are more like mine, dilatory but then working very hard to a deadline, doing very little work in the morning but getting progressively more efficient or effective-- or at least you think you are--as the day goes on, so that we did a lot of work at night and times like that.

Caroline likes definite and specific answers. She wants to know when is something going to happen, how long it's going to take, what is going to be the likely result, which of course was the sort of answer no one could give. We had no way of knowing when Humelsine was going to act, or what was going to be the next move. So, as I say, it was probably tougher on her than on me.

It was hard to know how much the children were affected. I don't know whether Caroline mentioned or not, but the day after the firing we told them they didn't have to go to school if they wanted to stay home. But they went to school and apparently had no problems. At least they said no problems.

Ginny finished second in her class and got an award. We were in northwest Washington, with a lot of other government people. I think many of them were sympathetic. A lot of them were fairly sophisticated by this time on this sort of thing.

J. Service: After we got to New York, as I say, things were much less tense. We actually lived a fairly normal life.

Levenson: What about your mother?

J. Service: She lost some friendships. Some China people, particularly missionaries, tended to stick to the Kuomintang and consider me to be of the devil. With those friends, Mother just broke off relations. But she had a good many staunch people that stuck by her.

I went out to see her in October 1950, just after the hearings were all over. My brother, Dick, was in Moscow, and his wife was living in Washington. He got a vacation from Moscow and came out to Germany, I think, and Helen went over and spent some time in Germany, a couple of weeks or something.

Helen let me use her car, and I drove across the continent, saw my mother, and we had a very fine visit for a few days in Claremont.

Then I got word that Helen unexpectedly had returned to Washington which meant that she wanted her car. So I drove from Claremont, California to Washington D.C. in three days.

Levenson: Before freeways.

J. Service: [laughter] Here's a card, for instance, to Caroline's parents. This was early '51.* They were worried. I think that they were far more worried than my mother because my mother just assumed, as I did, that everything was going to come out all right.

Caroline's father was a somewhat nervous man. I'm just telling him there, and this is indicative I think of my attitude, "Don't worry, don't worry. We're going to come out all right," which was what I, at least, firmly believed.

Even when I was fired I don't think that I thought of it as a shock. I hadn't expected it. I don't think that I was as concerned about a job as perhaps Caroline was, simply because I've got enough arrogance or conceit to be sure that I could get a job.

I'd done all kinds of work really in the Foreign Service, and it just seemed to me unthinkable that I wouldn't find something to do. It didn't turn out to be that easy, but at least I wasn't panic-stricken or paralyzed with the idea that we would starve or not be able to find something to do.


*See following page.

Dear Mother and Father:

Feb. 9, 1951

Nothing to worry about! Caroline and children are all well and I am hearing regularly. Last letter was Feb. 1 which I received yesterday ... am mailing it to you. I suppose she must be busy if she has not been able to write. No news here. Can't tell yet what will be the effect of the Remington conviction but it will certainly be used by the GOPs to discredit the Loyalty Boards, the loyalty program and the whole administration. There is nothing we can do but wait ... calmly and patiently there is nothing to fear. Don't worry and fret.

Much love to all

Jack

Levenson: You mentioned your brother, Dick, in the Foreign Service. Was his career affected by your troubles, and if not, how did he escape in the climate of those times?

J. Service: I think as far as the State Department was concerned--after all, the State Department was never really out to get me, though a few at the top like Humelsine wanted to shield Acheson. But the working State Department understood my situation and had approved my views.

You can't measure it, and it may not be appreciable at all, but Dick certainly didn't suffer and it may even have helped him a little bit in sort of a reverse way. I mean that people wanted to demonstrate that they had no prejudice, the same way my son, Bob, has done well. I think the State Department tried to lean backward to show that there was no prejudice.

Dick had the advantage of not being under Hurley in Chungking, not having to confront Hurley or be in a row with Hurley. He did not sign the telegram of February 28 because he was off in Kweilin where he was under another man, Ringwalt. He didn't have as much chance for independent reporting as I did, and generally he just was able to keep out of the line of fire.

Now, I'm not sure that if Dick had been doing a lot of independent reporting whether he would have been as outspoken in his expression of views as I was. He just isn't quite the same kind of person. He's more of a diplomat.

Dick actually went up to class I very rapidly. That's why he was forced to retire, because they got so many people in class I they finally had to put in this rule setting a time limit of twelve years in class I.

He was a very good administrative officer, a good person dealing with people, excellent. I don't think that his strong point particularly was political reporting, although he did some.

[pause] We were saying something about the tenor of the times. Here's a letter from me to my mother in late, November 23, 1952. I'm describing John Davies's going through Washington. He'd just been having some preliminary hearings. He also went through this whole process several times.

I had started to take him to the airport. Then, because of bad weather the airplane did not take off. We lived not too far from Kennedy, which was then called Idlewild Airport. John started to come back home with me but then decided he'd better not, as

THEY FOUGHT COMMUNISM AND WERE SMEARED



Jack Moffitt



Fred Niblo, Jr.



Hedda Hopper



Adolph Menjou



J. McGuinness

Patriotic Americans who were leaders in the fight against Communism in Hollywood. They paid a price for their loyalty, only to find that now it is "popular" to oppose Communism, and every fellow traveler in the movie capital may be heard spouting his "love" for America the while he produces, writes, plays in films that seek to destroy America.

These "PETS"
of the State
Department
played ball
with the Reds
and were
promoted.




John S. Service

SALUTE TO ADOLPHE MENJOU

When a fellow needs a friend and he comes out of the blue like Menjou did for the American Way of Life, one never forgets. I have watched his triumphs with unbounded joy. He became the greatest stealer of pictures in the business. His editor, in *Front Page*, is one of the greatest performance in history. He was considered not only the finest groomed personality in the film capital, but the world, and he was elevated to stardom. When the time came, however, for Menjou to choose between protecting his country in witnessing against communism or in favoring the industry, crawling with reds, he uplifted the flag and downed the subversive element, which cost him a small fortune and stardom. Like MacArthur, there was no price on Menjou's patriotism and, again like MacArthur, he proved you can't go wrong doing right—just as Truman and his gang have shown they can't go right doing wrong. Adolphe Menjou today is one of the most respected actors in pictures, looked up to for counsel and displaying many qualities of a statesman. Fulton Lewis, Jr., who has accomplished so much for his country, recognized Adolphe Menjou's superiority and invited him to take over his column for one day in *The Examiner*. Reading this, I found that, added to his other talents, Menjou is a masterful writer. Here, in a few, terse, well selected words, he paints a vivid picture of the international scene and suggests a remedy. "Why," Menjou asks, "did we demobilize the greatest armed force in world's history until some degree of stability had been accomplished?" Following is an all-important panacea that should be in every newspaper, broadcast by radio, television, and from every pulpit. "I believe," says Menjou, "THE COMMUNIST PARTY IN AMERICA SHOULD BE OUTLAWED BY CONGRESS. Some say it would drive them underground. WHERE ARE THEY NOW? I only know a handful who will admit membership. If we drive them deep enough, they will have trouble breathing."—Jerome Storm, *Desert Hot Springs Sentinel*.



John Davies



John Carter Vincent

J. Service: he was undoubtedly being watched and trailed. So he decided not to stay with me, an old friend from childhood days, because we were presumably being watched and trailed. It's just an example of the spirit of the times.

The Government Denies that Jack was Fired for Reasons of Loyalty or Security: the Loyalty Review Board's "Forced" Unanimity

J. Service: Now, we don't have very much press coverage, but at one time in the course of legal arguments, the government tried to argue that I had not been fired for loyalty or for security. This is an outrageous argument that only lawyers could dream up. But, we'll come to it in due course. The lawyers wanted me to dig up the clippings. I made this collage simply to show that there was no doubt in the minds of the people that I was fired for loyalty.*

Levenson: This is a fantastic thing.

J. Service: One thing about the standards at this time was that although the Loyalty Review Board insisted on my being fired, they said in their last paragraph, "We are not required to find Service guilty of disloyalty, and we do not do so." They also said they did not find that I was a Communist, but nonetheless they were determined that I was going to go.

I'm not sure whether I mentioned before or not, but Eric Sevareid on December 14 gave a very nice broadcast. He used his broadcast period for something about me, which I don't know whether you want to see or not.

Levenson: Yes, please.

J. Service: Eric told me later on that he'd had considerable trouble over the broadcast. Apparently some CBS stations were unhappy, and some people in CBS were unhappy about it. But he went ahead and did it.

Before I go on, let me say one thing about the Loyalty Review Board. The vote on the panel, we were told, informally--Reilly found out through his friends--was two to one. Apparently very strong pressure was put on the third member to change his vote to make it unanimous.

*See following page.

- J. Service: This fact was used by people like David Lawrence. There was a lot of criticism of the decision in some of the papers, The Washington Post and so on. Lawrence was able to say that the vote had been unanimous. Krock of the New York Times came out and talked about the high quality and outstanding character of the people of the panel and so on.
- Levenson: What sort of pressure would that have been? How would a retired respectable Republican lawyer be vulnerable to it?
- J. Service: Perhaps the argument went like this. We're going to be under criticism, we should make a united front. I'm not sure just how they persuaded him to change his mind. I wasn't there obviously. Apparently he was willing to make it unanimous.

Allegations Equal Evidence: Evidence Equals Fact

- J. Service: Before we go any further, I think we ought to bring in this transcript of a hearing by the State, Justice, Commerce, and Judiciary Subcommittee--in other words the subcommittee that deals with State Department appropriations--of the Senate Appropriations Committee.* This was a meeting they held March 25, 1952, just three months after my firing, in which they've got Humelsine along with the director of consular and security affairs, the head of the division of security, chairman of the Loyalty Security Board (poor old Conrad Snow whose name they have wrong), and so on. The whole thing is just badgering Humelsine on my case, how could Humelsine have cleared me, which Humelsine had admitted that he did several times, in the knowledge that I had been living in Chungking with a woman who was a Communist, who was in Russian pay.

Humelsine keeps coming back to the fact, or trying to come back to the fact, that these are allegations, but they're not evidence. Yet these are lawyers on the panel. They're all lawyers--McCarran. Then there's Lister Hill, Bridges, Saltonstall, Ferguson, McCarthy. Ferguson had been a judge. McCarthy had been a judge. Humelsine makes a poor case. He doesn't point out where the evidence came from. He just points out that it couldn't be backed up.

*With the Service papers on deposit in The Bancroft Library.

J. Service: They tried to ask Snow some questions, and Humelsine refused to let poor old Snow say anything. Nicholson said, "There's no indication that she was a Communist." But, then they just keep coming back to the "fact." Allegations equals evidence, evidence equals fact. The whole thing is a very weird performance.

The interesting thing about this is that it was removed from the transcript on the instructions of the subcommittee. We've got it here. "The subcommittee on Wednesday, March 26"--in other words the next day--"on the motion of Senator Saltonstall," who defends Caroline--

Levenson: Defends--?

J. Service: Caroline, that after all she was a virtuous woman. You can read it.

"[The subcommittee], after the matter was raised by Chairman McCarran, agreed that the Department of State could remove from the original transcript the references to Mr. Service, and the carbon copies of the transcript would be filed in the safe in the office of Senator McCarran, subcommittee chairman."

Nonetheless, this transcript turns up in the personal papers of Senator [Styles] Bridges. It was found just this year, [1977] by an academic researcher named [Robert] Newman, from the University of Pittsburgh, I think, in Bridges' papers, although it had supposedly been removed by committee vote.

Bridges received very heavy contributions in his election campaign from the Chinese. This was alleged at the time, and he never denied it. He was one of the leaders of the China Lobby. The fact that these particular senators were deciding the State Department appropriations is evidence of the kind of pressure the State Department was under. McCarthy, Ferguson, McCarran, Bridges--

Levenson: Did any of this leak out at the time?

J. Service: The discussions in the Loyalty Review Board had leaked. McCarthy brings those stories back into the Senate Appropriations Subcommittee. The whole thing is verification of the fact that McCarthy had an informer within the Loyalty Review Board.

177 East 78 St.
New York 21, N.Y.
March 3, 1951

Mr. John Service
1327 30th Street, NW
Washington 14, D.C.

Dear Jack:

Of course I'll tell you all I know about Valentine Chao's baby.

I saw Val first in New York in August, 1946. She was living with Mrs. Percy Chen, who asked me to come to her apartment to help someone from Chungking. It was Val, who was going to have her baby soon, and was desperate. I'd seen her often at parties in China, but her English and my Chinese were so poor that we'd never actually talked. She had a scholarship in the Yale drama school and a job teaching Chinese at Yale that fall; but she couldn't keep an illegitimate child with her in a dormitory, and she'd found no one to care for it. She asked if I knew how to find a good but inexpensive foster home. I had a large house in Larchmont, New York, with a servants' wing in which our Nisei gardener had accumulated about six members of his family. After many discouraging visits to agencies and dirty crowded foster homes, I asked the gardener's wife -- who seemed like the perfect person -- if she would take care of the baby. She agreed that she would, for a small sum each month which Val paid herself.

The baby was born on September 19, 1946, at the Park-East Hospital in New York, and named Hsieh Yun-hui. (By the way, might the hospital have a record of the baby's and mother's blood types?) Val listed the father on the birth certificate (which I still have) as John Hsieh, white, an engineer, born in California. She debated for a long time about the baby's surname. She thought of using Chao, but wanted to avoid the label of illegitimacy. She had almost decided to call the father John Smith, because she knew that the child would not look completely Chinese -- and it did have blonde hair and blue eyes. A letter from her mother made her decide on Hsieh, her mother's maiden name. Her mother wrote that she understood and forgave Val, and would be glad to raise the baby on the Hsieh family land.

Val stayed with me for a few weeks after the baby was born, and visited occasionally over weekends for most of the next two years. I had taken it for granted that the baby was yours, since it seemed understandable that a romantic dramatic person like Val would want the child of a man she loved and couldn't have. I probably embarrassed her constantly by this romantic assumption, and it took her six months to confess that the father was a major she'd met in Shanghai late in 1945 or early in 1946. She showed me his picture and a letter he'd written her, and told me his name; I'd never known him, and I don't remember it. I'm convinced that she was telling the truth, because it was a painful admission for her to make. She was afraid that I'd be so disillusioned, after my ideas of a great lifelong romance, that I'd insist she take the baby away. She said that she had not seen you for over a year before the baby was born and knew that she would never see you again.


I'm not sure who might remember the baby's father. General George Olmsted of Des Moines, Iowa, knew about the baby; he assumed, as I did, that you were the father; but he saw Val occasionally here,

and had been in Shanghai when she was -- she may have told him finally George Kennedy of Yale wanted to adopt the child; he may know. Lao Shaw, author of "Rickshaw Boy", saw Val often here; she may have told him.


I think, by the way, that Communist convictions had nothing to do with Val's return to China. I heard her criticize the Chiang government loudly, but I also heard her dread and fear a Communist one. She hoped to find acting jobs here in New York to support herself, but couldn't; and she was having trouble getting her passport renewed. She even thought for a while of going to Canada to re-enter the country so that she could get permission to work. I think she finally got permission to stay for a short time as a student, but not as a worker, and she left most unwillingly simply because she no longer had money to live here. She went back by way of England, hoping that she'd find an acting job and be allowed to stay there. The last time I heard from her was a letter from France, saying that she'd given up completely and had no choice but to go back to China; and she added hopefully that perhaps there might be less censorship than under the old government so that she might act after all. She promised to write often to let me know how she and the baby were getting along. That was 1949, and I've heard nothing since.

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO BEFORE ME

Sincerely,


FRANK SPITZER
NOTARY PUBLIC, STATE OF NEW YORK
No. 31-3792933
Qualified in New York County
Certificates filed in the following offices:
Queens, Bronx & Kings Counties
Commission Expires March 31, 1953


Annalee Jacoby Fadiman

 April 6/951

Commitment to Lawyer to Fight Case to the End

J. Service: I mentioned earlier that I had decided to challenge my dismissal in the courts. My lawyer, Ed Rhetts, wanted to be sure we'd stick with it. Also, he was quite insistent that he stay in control.

We talked to the A[merican] C[ivil] L[iberties] U[nion], which was not very brave in those days. The ACLU was not leading any fights against McCarthy on behalf of McCarthy's victims. They were willing to help, but only on the condition that we put ourselves in their hands.

Then there was another rather left-wing group, Emergency Conference for Civil Liberties. We would have had to put ourselves entirely in their hands, too, and we didn't want that.

Anyway, I assured Ed that if we went in I would stay with it to the end. He realized that there would be very little in it financially for him. We had tried up to this point to cover overhead, but we hadn't really done that. We'd been able to scrape together a couple of thousand dollars here and there.

Friends in the State Department started a fund, but that only raised, I think, a total of about \$7,000. Some of that was done by friends like Joe Rauh persuading people to give a thousand dollars. Purposely, I never knew who gave money to that fund. I didn't want to know who had given since that would involve my knowing who had not given. I preferred not to know, but also as I said the other day we had promised people that their contributions would be anonymous.

A lot of people helped Ed in preparing the case. He had a very good friend named [John L.] Burling whose father was one of the senior partners in Acheson's law firm. Covington, Burling, et cetera was the name of the firm. It was one of the biggest—famous Washington firms.

Jack Burling, Ed's friend and contemporary, found that, I think, he didn't fit very well in his father's firm. He was really out of work, and devoted a lot of time to my case. Various other people in Washington and New York were interested in the case and they all helped.

We—I always speak of Ed Rhetts and myself as "we," but maybe I should say Rhetts and the lawyers—realized that we probably could only win on a very technical, legal point, but we tried to get everything into the hearings, into the court proceedings that we could.

McCarthy Reveals Review Board 'Transcript' Hitting State Department

Sen. Joseph R. McCarthy (R-Wis.) yesterday released a partial transcript of a meeting of the Federal Loyalty Review Board in which one member complained that the State Department's loyalty program was "completely ineffective."

Board chairman Hiram Bingham was also disclosed to have told Secretary of State Dean Acheson personally that the Department's loyalty panel was "out of step with the rest of the program."

McCarthy refused to say how he obtained the transcript. But he vouched for its authenticity as a faithful recording of a closed board meeting last February.

The meeting was held before President Truman changed the loyalty regulations to permit the dismissal of a government employe if there is "reasonable doubt" of his loyalty.

Under the previous regulations, a man could be fired only if the board had affirmative evidence that he was disloyal at that time.

According to the transcript, the pending change in the regulations was one of the topics under discussion at the meeting.

At one point, according to the reported transcript, Lawrence W. Meloy, the board's executive secretary, mentioned that the State Department's loyalty panel members took the attitude that "they're there to clear the employe and not to protect the government."

"We've been arguing with them since the program started," Meloy said.

Board member Garrett Hoag was quoted as saying he was "disturbed about the State Department—their remarkable record of never having fired anybody for disloyalty."

He suggested that perhaps the board ought to call President Truman's attention "to the fact that the program simply does not work in that department, and let him worry about it," according to the transcript.

"It seems to me," he was quoted as saying, "We assume some responsibility when we sit back here for three years and know that the country rests in a false sense of security."

Hoag added that the public believes "we are looking after their interests here when we know darn well that it (the loyalty program) is completely ineffective in one of the most important departments of the Government."

Under the terms of Mr. Truman's loyalty program executive order, he said, the Review Board should not merely serve as an appellate court but should supervise the whole loyalty program.

"It is quite intended," he said, "that we shall keep a weather eye on the whole program and presumably do something about it when we find that there are fallacies and weaknesses."

Bingham then revealed, according to the reported transcript, that he had taken up the

State Department's loyalty program with Acheson personally the previous Friday.

"I called his attention to the fact that his board was out of step with all other agency boards," he said.

"In the Post Office Department," Bingham was reported as stating, "10 percent of all persons examined were found to be worthy of separation from the Government. In the Commerce

Department, 6½ percent. The average was about 6 percent. The State Department, zero."

Bingham said Acheson was "very much impressed by what I said, and promised to look into the matter immediately."

He said Acheson "obviously" took immediate action because the following Monday a Department security officer telephoned to ask if anyone in the State Department opposed the pending change in the loyalty regulations.

J. Service: The fact that we had never been able to get, for instance, the transcripts of conversations with Jaffe. The FBI finally admitted that they had been destroyed, that all they had were digests, excerpts, summaries.

We tried to get the Loyalty Review Board minutes where they had talked about percentages and talked about affairs that really were not their concern and on which I had not been questioned. We tried to get as much of this type of material as possible into the judicial process. This is one of the principal reasons why we had so much trouble in getting into the court.

Our first complaint, you see, was a big fat book. [showing original complaint] This took us a long time to prepare.

Levenson: One hundred and forty-six pages.

J. Service: Yes, and it has a lot of exhibits. I don't think I have all the various complaints. I've given some materials on the McCarthy period to the Truman Library.

I must say that the attitude of the Department of Justice was as different as possible from the Department of State. We'd always had an ambivalent relationship with the people at the top of the State Department. The administrators really regarding me as a hot potato. "Can't you go work for the CIA?" or "Can't you think of retiring?" or this or that. "We've got to save Acheson." Whereas below the top, everyone was basically cooperative and friendly.

The Department of Justice all the way through was as ugly and as unpleasant as could be. It was strictly a very tough, hardball, no-concessions legal confrontation. They charged us with bringing in excessive, irrelevant matters and had the complaint rejected.

If the complaint is rejected then you have a right to submit an amended complaint. This process went on and on. Finally, in 1955, our third amended complaint was accepted in court. In other words that was a fourth complaint. There was the original complaint, and then we submitted three amended complaints.

Each of these was a long process of rewriting, boiling down, meeting whatever objections the judge raised.

Ed Rhetts had moved away from Washington. His practice there had run into problems. We don't need to go into that.

Levenson: Were they in any way connected with his defense of you?

J. Service: I don't think so, although obviously he hadn't been contributing much to the firm. But, I don't think that was why the firm broke up. He and Gerry Reilly, I think, had some differences of opinion generally.

Ed had always had an interest in politics, and he wanted to establish residence back in Indiana, which was his home, southern Indiana, and run for Congress. He almost made it. I think if the primaries had been honest, he probably would have.

But, he was running against a sheriff. He had several counties, and the sheriff in one of the counties piled up an enormous majority which wiped out Ed's majority in all the other counties in the district. So, there was a little suspicion, shall we say, about the way the votes were counted!

Anyway, this all required my traveling to Indiana or to New York for consultation, letter writing and so on. The third amended complaint was finally put through.

Job Hunting

J. Service: I got a lot of letters of sympathy and offers of help on job hunting from all sorts of people. Some people sent checks. I could have gone to New Zealand, but we didn't want to go. I don't think any of us wanted to leave the U.S. That was the point.

Sevareid's broadcast brought in an offer by somebody who had a small boat supply business. He was a dentist, and he ran this as a sideline. He decided that he didn't really want it, so he asked Sevareid to offer it to me. But it didn't seem a very likely thing.

The husband of one of Caroline's aunts who had a secondhand book business in Providence, Rhode Island, which was not making any money, offered that to me.

Various friends knew people. Avra Warren, who had been the American ambassador in New Zealand, my old boss, was a friend of Nelson Rockefeller's. Various other people I had known knew fairly high people in General Motors, some corporations, foundations, and so on.

So I did a lot of running back and forth from Washington to New York talking to people, but it always boiled down to the consideration that I was a controversial character.

Levenson: How were you received in general?

J. Service: Generally a friendly reception. I think most of the personnel people I talked to were really embarrassed. But they just didn't dare touch me. The corporation people would generally say, "Well, we have stockholders, and there will be stockholder complaints," and so on. Foundation people were worried because foundations were under attack.

I talked to people at UNICEF. They were under attack for hiring people that were politically left. Trygve Lie caved in on that question and gave the U.S. veto power over any people they hired, which meant, in those days, people like McCarran, and members of the Internal Security Subcommittee, the House Un-American Activities Committee, and so on. They were really given a veto power over any Americans hired by the UN. All these things turned out to be dead end. I was running up against this controversial character business.

A Surprise Offer From Clement Wells of Sarco. "We'll Tell You the Difference Between a Steam Trap and a Mouse Trap."

J. Service: One day I got a letter from a man I'd never heard of, Clement Wells. I can't find the letter unfortunately. It's one of the treasures I've put away so carefully that now I can't find it! But, I can almost remember it. He said, just very short and businesslike, "I've read about your case. I think you've been badly treated by your government. I don't know what your plans are, but in case you are looking for employment, I think I might have something that would interest you. If you wish, please call on me or write," or something of this sort.

He was a manufacturer of steam traps and steam specialties. I first had to find out what they were. I went down to the Washington Public Library and dug around, found out what a steam trap was.

One of my introductions was to a business man, who wanted to help but couldn't give me a job himself. He was willing to get a Dun and Bradstreet report on Sarco. It turned out that it was a small, privately held company with very good credit ratings. It seemed to be a substantial outfit.

Another friend, Bob Barnett, an old China friend in the State Department, was very concerned that I protect myself-- He thought this offer was so strange that we ought to investigate

J. Service: it. So he approached General Snow, the head of the Loyalty Security Board. [laughter] Snow made some inquiries, and it turned out that the security people had nothing against the company. Apparently it was not a front for some leftist or Communist outfit.

I went up to New York and saw Mr. Clement Wells, a small, old-fashioned man in a corner office in the Empire State Building sitting behind a rolltop desk. He was very pleasant, an Englishman. He said, "I suppose you don't know the difference between a steam trap and a mouse trap, but never mind: we'll tell you. We'll show you." Very cheerful. I tried to tell him I didn't know any foreign languages except Chinese. I don't think he ever heard that, because he was always surprised to find I couldn't speak French or German.

I decided to think about it for a while. Then, I wrote back that I would go to the factory. He suggested first that I go to the factory at Bethlehem, Pennsylvania for a week. I went there, I think, sometime in March [1952].

I worked for a week at the factory, and by then I felt that I really would like to stay another week. So I had two weeks working on the assembly line in the factory, doing odd jobs. They moved me around a bit, but I was regarded as sort of a curiosity.

Before Wells took me on, he had me meet the other executives, the other top men in the New York office, and of course they didn't know what to make of this. Their questions tended to concentrate on how much engineering background and practical plumbing and engineering type information I had. They had no basis for refusing me or arguing against me at that time. Later on they did.

Levenson: Would you explain what a steam trap is, what it does, and why it's important?

J. Service: A steam trap is an automatic valve that closes to steam and opens to water. Generally speaking, wherever you use steam as a heat medium after the steam gives up its latent heat, it's condensed from steam to water, then you want to return the water to the boiler because it's still got some heat in it. You don't want to waste that water. You return that water to the boiler to be made into steam again. So you have a closed system. But, you've got to have some sort of an automatic valve in there that lets the water go back but holds the steam in the equipment.

J. Service: The simplest example is a laundry press or a dry cleaning establishment. Under every pressing board there's a steam trap. So that millions of them are in use. A big refinery like the Standard Oil refinery in Linden, New Jersey, for instance, will probably have six thousand steam traps in it, because you've got to run steam all along the oil lines, all through the refinery so the oil doesn't freeze up and congeal. But that water you want to get back, keep the steam in.

They work on all sorts of different principles. Eventually I got into a rather exotic type of steam trap, but we'll go into that later.

You asked the other day about the meaning of Sarco. I found that I do have some Sarco history files. Apparently the company that Wells was working for when he first came to the United States was called Sanders, Rehders and Company of London, England. Sanders and Rehders Company is where the Sarco name came from. It is an acronym.

After two weeks at the factory I came to New York and started work. I lived with some old Oberlin friends out in Scarsdale for a while.

Dean Rusk, by this time, was out of the State Department. He was the head of the Rockefeller Foundation. He lived in Scarsdale also. We often used to see each other on the train going down to work. We were never good friends, but there were cordial greetings, occasionally a short conversation.

After I'd been in Scarsdale for a while I moved in with some New Zealand friends who were running the New Zealand consulate and working at the UN delegation. They could use me as baby sitter.

Caroline and the family stayed in Washington so the children could finish the school year.

Levenson: What were your responsibilities when you first went into Sarco, and how did they develop?

J. Service: The responsibilities were to assist in and help develop the export business. That was my primary responsibility. Very soon after I came in, Wells started a new company called Sarco International. He was rather prone to have small, separate companies. He was the owner of all of them. To satisfy legal requirements, his wife or one of his employees would hold one or two shares, but actually he was the sole owner. He set up--this was advantageous for tax reasons--he set up a separate little company called Sarco International to handle foreign business.

HISTORY OF SARCO.

In 1911 the Sarco Fuel Saving and Engineering Co. (the predecessor of Sarco Company, Inc.) imported some engineering appliances from Germany, principally CO₂ Recorders, Gauges and Steam Flow Meters, and these specialties also included a few steam traps made by Herrman Sandvoss of Duesseldorf.

Four of these steam traps, the expanding cartridges of which were made from rubber tubing, were installed experimentally in the office of Dr. Gruenther, Professor at Stevens Institute, Hoboken, N.J. who was a personal friend and associate of Lewis Sanders, then Vice-President of Sarco, N.Y. They failed due to bursting of the rubber sleeves, whereupon Dr. Gruenther suggested the use of helical metal tubing which had been invented and patented by Solomon Frank of Frankfurt in 1896.

Sarco passed on this suggestion to Sandvoss who immediately applied for a patent in Germany without any recognition of New York.

This was the origin of the Sarco Steam Trap. Almost simultaneously Warren Webster of Philadelphia started using annular metal bellows in radiator traps. Using the suggestion passed on to Sandvoss he started making a series of devices using Frank's invented helical tubing the patent on which had expired.

Sarco owed nothing to Sandvoss or his Company, Samson Apparatebau Akt. Ges. The name Sarco was invented in 1909 by Gustav Binz who was for years an employee of Sarco but at the time worked for Sanders & Co. Ltd. of London, England, who used the firms initials S.... for Sarco.

The Samson Company has made many misrepresentations. The invention of steam traps using helical corrugated tubing was solely that of Dr. Gruenther of Hoboken, New Jersey, USA.

J. Service: This wasn't a full-time job at that time. There just wasn't that much export business. So I was also given the job of handling government contracts, particularly navy. Practically every navy ship that was built had some of our traps on it, so we were bidding on those.

But basically it was exports. Eventually I had to make trips to South America, Europe, particularly South America. I made two trips to Cuba, I think, and a couple trips to Puerto Rico.

There were some discouraging periods, especially when I first started in Sarco. It wasn't very exciting work, and the export business wasn't very much. There was a feeling I should get some experience with selling. They wanted me to go out and do some calling on potential customers. But they didn't want me to interfere with anybody else's territory. Different people, salesmen, had certain customers, so what I was doing was what was called "cold turkey" calling.

You go in on somebody who may be a prospect, some manufacturer or dry cleaning establishment or something like this, who was not already a Sarco customer. I did it over in Brooklyn for a while, and this was, you know, discouraging work. I found I wasn't a very successful salesman.

One day after lunch I was standing looking into the window of Altmans's, which is almost across the street from the Empire State Building, just one block over I think from Empire State, and heard my name called. It was the secretary, the Foreign Service girl who had been in Washington and had been assigned to me as secretary when we were getting our case ready for the Loyalty Security Board. She'd had her two years in the field and had just come back. Just by chance she happened to be passing by and saw me. We went and walked in the park.

I think that was about the worst period, the first six months or so.

Levenson: Was this a depression that you were going through?

J. Service: Oh, I suppose you could call it that, yes. The job just seemed to be a dead-end job, not really getting anywhere. Later on things picked up.

Levenson: Did you feel yourself at much of a disadvantage in having little technical experience except for architectural drafting?

J. Service: Well, yes and no. I've always been a reasonably good problem solver, whether it's understanding a steam trap or what is needed to meet a market demand. It wasn't terribly high level. There were some technical aspects, of course, but even there, one could learn fairly easily.

If your customer wants to know how big a trap is going to be needed, say on a water heater or something like that, it's fairly simple to figure out the size of the tank and the amount of hot water he requires at such and such a temperature an hour. From that you figure out how many BTUs you need, British Thermal Units. Then you know how much steam you're going to need. That gives you the amount of condensate, and the size of the trap.

I learned to use a slide rule to do these calculations. It was very effective on field calls. In Cuba I visited all the sugar factories the whole length of the island. Sugar factories use a lot of steam traps. The heat source for the boiling down of the cane juice is steam.

One problem was that there are a lot of different types of traps. A lot of the maintenance or technical supervisors and our sales people abroad simply didn't recognize the suitability of one trap for one application but not for another.

I remember going into one sugar factory in Cuba. I was escorted by the salesman from our local representative in Havana. We said we were from Sarco. He said, "Oh, Sarco! I know Sarco." He went back and dug around in the back of the storeroom and brought out a big box full of traps. He said, "Sarco traps, no good!" They'd all been ruined.

I asked him about steam conditions, distribution lines, whether or not he had superheat. They did have some superheated steam. He was trying to use thermostatic traps, and they cannot operate on superheat conditions. It's just death on them. He needed another type of trap, what we call a bucket trap.

Jack Improves a Multipurpose Thermodynamic Steam Trap

J. Service: I realized very early that we should try to get more of an all-purpose trap that could be used under all kinds of conditions where the technical level wasn't very high. This was one reason why I started pushing what we called the thermodynamic trap, because this was a simple, rugged trap that could operate under almost any conditions.

J. Service: The so-called "thermodynamic" trap was a special type which Sarco had been producing in small quantities. As I recall, the only customer was the U.S. Navy. The body was cast steel. There was only one moving part: a stainless steel disk. It could tolerate superheat, operate in any position, accept very high pressure (as well as low), and stand up to almost any abuse or non-expert installation. Of course, there were some disadvantages. The cast steel body was heavy, cumbersome, and very expensive. On flashing condensate, the trap would shut off (close) at about 30°F. below saturated steam temperature. This reduced its efficiency for many applications--where the process may require that the trap maintain the highest possible temperature in the system by not closing until saturated steam temperature is reached.

In fact, in order to prevent the trap from holding up condensate for too long a period (until it could cool enough for the trap to open in its normal way), the disk (which was the closing device) had a bleed slot across its lower face, which seated across the outlet. The effect of this was that there was a very small continuous outflow of condensate (or steam, if no condensate was present). This steam outflow, though small, represented a waste of heat.

Furthermore, another manufacturer had a trap (actually quite different from ours in operating principle) which in fact depended on a continuous, varying flow between two chambers. This bleed through was written into his patent specifications. On this basis (despite the basic difference in the traps), the other manufacturer had for some time been threatening Mr. Wells with a suit for patent infringement. Wells had acquired the thermodynamic trap somewhat informally (it had been developed by a man in Australia) and had no American or other patent.

Mr. Wells abhorred the idea of a lawsuit. And he may also have disliked the prospective of lawyer fees and other costs. At any rate, he asked me to take over the fairly voluminous files, including patent searches and reports, that had apparently been accumulating for some years. I was to advise him what Sarco (he) should do.

It did not take much study to realize that the only point of contention was the bleed slot. If we could eliminate this, the other manufacturer would have no basis for complaint. The question was whether (and how) this could be done. Furthermore, the elimination would have to be done without impairing the already rather low efficiency of the trap--in other words, by causing the trap to operate even further below the temperature of saturated steam. Finally, by this time, I had been in the business long enough to realize that cast steel bodies was an

J. Service: old-fashioned, high cost, low volume method of production. The competitor who was trying to sue us was using bodies from stainless steel bar stock, which also facilitated the use of automated machinery for boring and cutting.

Remaking the trap from stainless steel bar stock and without the bleed slot would not only save us from a lawsuit. It should enable us to expand the sales of the trap in the U.S., beyond its current small volume use by the navy for special high pressure installations. Most importantly, in my export-oriented mind, it would give us a relative foolproof, all-purpose trap which should be well suited for general sale in export markets where technical know-how was a problem.

As I became absorbed in this whole patent study, and as these visions began to unfold, I talked to the Sarco sales engineers (who I was working alongside and lunching with every day). They were dubious. I then tried some of the engineers at our factory in Bethlehem, including the man who was nominally in charge of development. My suggestion was that the existing proportions of the trap need not be considered immutable. There were a number of variables: the size (area) of both inlet and outlet; the diameter (area) of the valve disk; and the volume of the holding chamber above the disk. If the ratios between these various elements were experimented with, it should be possible to alter (and maybe improve) the operation of the trap--and find a way of making it work satisfactorily without the bleed slot.

No one seemed interested in doing the experimenting. When Wells set up his own manufacturing, soon after World War I, his factory manager and chief engineer had been a secretive, but technically highly regarded man who he brought over from England. This man, who had died only a few years before this, had done the original design and testing of the thermodynamic trap (from the rough description which had come from Australia via Wells' British company). No one in Sarco knew the details of his tests and development work. But since he was a careful and competent engineer, no one thought there was likely to be any good result from redoing his work.

Through Oberlin friends (John Reid and his wife), we had become well acquainted with a professor of hydraulic engineering at Brooklyn Polytechnic. When I talked to "Midge" [Ernst Leland Midgette] about my ideas, he became much interested. It was not far removed from his own speciality of hydraulics. He started calculations (far beyond me, of course) on the potential of changing the ratios of the variables. Furthermore (and very providentially) he had laboratory and shop facilities. Eventually, he produced a small working model. At least he was convinced it would work (since he was in hydraulics, his laboratory had no high pressure steam installation for us to try it out.).

J. Service: Because of the work Midgette had done, we decided to make a disclosure to a patent attorney. Wells, who in effect was the sole owner of all his companies, had had a habit of putting patents in his own name even though the work may have been done by engineering staff in the factory. It seemed only fair to me that Midge have this protection. At this point, I was also not sure where my own interests might lie.

We gave the working model to Sarco. The general attitude was: "So what!" But they did send it down to the factory to test. (It was rather typical of some of the people Wells had working for him, and I suppose of the general skepticism, that neither Midge nor I were notified when the tests would be made so that we might be present.) At any rate, the result was general astonishment. The trap operated without a bleed slot. But it also operated much closer to saturated steam temperature, and had a capacity several times greater than the existing trap of comparable size.

With the tests so encouraging--in fact, exciting--the sales people assumed that the factory would go into production as soon as possible. So I had to tell them that, in view of all the work done by Midgette (after their own non-interest), we had already made a legal disclosure to a patent attorney. This tied Sarco's hands, and all hell broke loose. I immediately became a traitor and worse, if possible.

Levenson: Why did all hell break loose?

J. Service: Not so much Wells as other people. Wells, at that point, did not realize the value of what we'd done. Other people felt that I was trying to pull a fast one, and to some extent I was pulling a fast one. I hoped to get something out of this certainly, and I wanted my friend to get something out of it.

We even talked very tentatively of starting a separate company to manufacture the trap for Sarco. That didn't get anywhere, and there would have been a lot of problems anyway. I've got a paper that Joe Rauh signed saying that he would be glad to invest \$20,000, [laughter] but I'm not sure whether it was serious or not. But we would have had to raise capital and start a factory and so on. We would have been dependent pretty much on Sarco.

It was a thing that we simply didn't want to have taken away with no compensation at all. We finally did agree to give, assign the patent rights to the company.

Levenson: In exchange--?

J. Service: In exchange for nothing really. They just agreed to employ Midgette as a consultant on the patent and in the development of the trap. He got some consultant fees out of it, not a great deal.

As the story will unfold, of course, I eventually got cut in on the ownership of Sarco. But Wells would never make any connection between the two. Wells felt at this time that people would not be really interested in the small trap. If they were buying a trap, they wanted to really know they were getting something. He felt that they would prefer the old trap, which was far more expensive for us to make and far more cumbersome and heavy and less efficient. Our trap eventually made the company a very prosperous company.

Negotiates Contract with Steelworkers' Union and Avoids a Strike Against Sarco

J. Service: For several years, Wells had me join the management team at our factory in Bethlehem, Pennsylvania, to discuss the yearly union contract. One year, we had reached an impasse, long sessions with representatives of the union as well as the union agent, and getting nowhere.

Levenson: Which union was this?

J. Service: Steelworkers. We all sat at a big table. Everybody had made speeches and taken firm positions. We reached an impasse, and everybody shrugged their shoulders and said, "Well, we're going to have a strike."

My lawyers, Rhetts and Reilly, were labor lawyers. I talked to them and gave them a copy of our contract. A number of times in the past we'd had these strikes, and then Wells had always caved in and eventually met the union terms, because he couldn't stand to have the factory closed for very long.

Reilly, I guess it was, said, "Look, you know, the best way to do this is to try to have a private meeting with the union agent, work out terms, and then have it ratified by the plenary session with all the representatives."

But, he said, "You've got a terrible contract," because we had never paid any attention-- There were a lot of things in there that are not normal, too favorable to the union side. So, he suggested, "Be somewhat generous on the wage, particularly if you can justify it by productivity and so on, but try to tighten up your contract."

J. Service: I suggested to Wells that it was foolish for us to accept the inevitability of a strike. He told me to go down and try to fix it up. I went to Bethlehem and called up the union representative and asked him to come around to the hotel and talk that evening. Then the next day, we reached a settlement and avoided the strike.

Levenson: Jack Kahn says that you were chosen to do this because you were the only executive who had worked in the factory?

J. Service: Oh, I don't think that's true. I think I was the only one who had worked in the factory, but I don't really think that had very much to do with it. The people did know me from the fact that I had worked there. Of course, they knew the other management people too.

This labor negotiation was very much resented, particularly by the manager of the factory. He felt he had been pushed aside—for which he can hardly be blamed.

Levenson: Your career exemplifies a great deal of the rhetoric in the English political system, at least up till the postwar period which suggests that a good liberal arts education qualifies a man to do anything, and that the top ambition of people, at least in England, should be either the Foreign Service or the Treasury. If you can do this, you can succeed in any walk of life. Any comments?

J. Service: Yes. I would look at it that Foreign Service experience qualifies you for a great many things--the Foreign Service is a generalist occupation, normally speaking--and if you're a successful Foreign Service officer, why, you can do many other things. Lawyers will argue the same thing about the profession of law.

But I agree with you that a good liberal arts education does have great value in preparing one for Foreign Service.

Denied Lease in Apartment Building Owned by Equitable Insurance

J. Service: To go back and pick up the story, Caroline stayed in Washington and in the spring we had to find an apartment. I answered an ad in the paper put in by a man who was living in something called Fordham Hill, big high-rise apartments up in Fordham. He wanted to sublet his apartment.

J. Service: I went up to talk to him. He was a very pleasant, young Jewish doctor if I remember right. We agreed; everything was fine; I liked the apartment, but his lease required him to get approval of the owners. The next step was that the Equitable people--Equitable Insurance owned it--wanted me to provide some references, some information.

I gave three references. One was Dean Rusk. One was this man I'd been staying with for a while up in Scarsdale who at that time was head administrator for the Ford Foundation. He'd formerly been a chief administrative man in the Department of Commerce. The third was an old friend, Marty [Professor C. Martin] Wilbur at Columbia.

The only thing the company did was to come down to Sarco and ask if this was the man who'd been fired by the State Department. We were then informed that the apartment was no longer available.

Levenson: That must've been a terrible blow.

J. Service: I think this probably made me madder than anything else in this period. I mobilized people in the State Department and my lawyers, and John Reid who was a member of an influential law firm in Washington.

The Equitable people were absolutely adamant. The apartment had not been rented. The man who was wanting to sublet it continued to keep me advised in a friendly way of what was happening. He even pressed the thing himself. But, they said, "There would be complaints from the neighbors because of the type of people that would probably be there," if we were in the apartment.

Levenson: What did they mean?

J. Service: I suppose they assumed that I was a wild-eyed political extremist or leftist. The people who actually came to our eventual apartment were often ambassadors and former prime ministers of New Zealand and all sorts of people like this.

At any rate, that was an unhappy episode. Of course, as soon as I could get other insurance I canceled what insurance I had with Equitable. I'd had to convert my Foreign Service group insurance to straight life, but later we found another insurance company that would sell us term insurance. So we broke off with Equitable. I was terribly annoyed that they didn't ask me why I was discontinuing my policy. [laughter]

First Court Hearing: Judge Curran Finds Firing Legal Under
"Unlimited Discretion of the Secretary of State"

J. Service: The first hearing on my case was before Judge [Edward Matthew] Curran in June, 1955. Just before we were heard, the Supreme Court had decided the Peters case. Peters was a doctor who worked in the government.

His case was one like mine where the Loyalty Review Board had assumed jurisdiction. It had been decided favorably by the department board, and then the Loyalty Review Board had taken the case over and reversed the lower board. His appeal was challenging the legality of the Loyalty Review Board's action.

The Supreme Court had upheld Peters. This was, of course, exactly the point that we had argued right in the very beginning when we tried to get the State Department to give us twenty-four hours delay to present this argument. Curran had no choice--he had to apply this to our case.

But he decided that it really didn't make any difference. The action by the Loyalty Review Board had to be expunged from the record--it being null and void--but the Secretary of State had the right, unlimited right, to discharge me under something called the McCarran rider, which was a rider to all the appropriation bills.

This was the point at which the government started to argue that my firing had not been on loyalty or security, but had simply been at the unlimited discretion of the Secretary of State.

We already had a letter from Humelsine, saying that it had been purely because of the Loyalty Review Board decision. Eventually we discovered that Acheson had given an affidavit saying that it had been done purely because of the Loyalty Review Board.

We got a lot of friendly letters of congratulations, but from our point of view it wasn't really a victory because I didn't have my job back. Curran still upheld the firing. The next thing was to go to the Court of Appeals, which we did in 1956.

An Oily and Unctuous McCarthy Charges Jack with Being an Employee of the CIA

J. Service: This was about the time that we actually were called for a hearing by McCarthy in New York. McCarthy was then head of something called the Government Operations Committee. This was when he and [Roy] Cohn and [David] Schine were leading a high, wide, and handsome career investigating USIA, United States Information Agency libraries all over Europe and this sort of thing.

Levenson: What happened at the hearing?

J. Service: It was a strange performance. I got a call at the office. Somebody speaking very quickly said his name was Cohn. I dealt with several people named Cohn. One of the jobbers that I often had calls from was a man named Cohn. I didn't really realize who it was. He said, "We want you to come down here and answer some questions."

I said, "Wait a minute. Who are you and what is this?"

He said he was Roy Cohn, counsel for the Senate Committee on Government Operations, and they were having a hearing down at the courthouse in Foley Square, U.S. Courthouse, and wanted me to come right down.

I said, "Well, I can't come right down now."

He said, "You can get on the subway and be down here in fifteen minutes."

I said, "I think I've got a right to have a lawyer."

He said, "Call your lawyer and tell him to meet you here."

I said, "My lawyer is in Washington."

He said, "Well, if you're going to be unpleasant about it, the committee members will have to wait over then till tomorrow. But, we expect you here at ten o'clock,"--I think it was--"in the morning,"--whatever the hour was. "This is a telephone subpoena."

Levenson: I never heard of that.

J. Service: So, I said, "Well, okay. I'll try to get a hold of my lawyer and see if he can come from Washington. We'll try to be there." I didn't make any firm commitment.

J. Service: The Sarco people were alarmed. Sarco lawyers were the firm of Greenbaum, Wolff and Ernst. But the man who handled most of the Sarco business was a partner named Leo Rosen. [phone rings; tape off]

As I mentioned before, I was handling government sales, particularly to the navy. So we assumed that he was going to attack the company or something like that for employing me on this thing.

Actually, I saw no government documents or classified plans. We would get only a request to bid on a certain number of traps of such and such a size and variety. We just sent in a bid.

Of course, I wanted to get people from my firm in Washington. Rhetts was on a trip in England, so Reilly said he would come up. We met for breakfast at the Biltmore Hotel I think, right near Grand Central. Rosen joined us. The two lawyers and I didn't know what to expect, but the lawyers said that I should start in by saying that I was appearing voluntarily, in other words that we didn't recognize any telephonic subpoena.

They had someone on just before me. We didn't hear that, of course. It was a closed meeting. We were finally brought in. I was asked to give my name and address.

Then, as instructed by the lawyers, I carried on saying that I was appearing voluntarily. The questioning was done by Roy Cohn, and this set Roy Cohn off. He became quite irate, saying that there was no need for such a statement and I was there at the invitation of the committee, that certainly a telephonic request had considerable weight.

McCarthy saw what the furor was all about, and stepped in in a very judicial manner, and said we didn't need to waste time on this matter, that I was there and, of course, realized that an invitation by a committee was something that shouldn't be lightly treated.

Then he announced that they had a signed affidavit--I didn't know there was any other kind except a signed affidavit--that I was actually an employee of the CIA, and had been one since my discharge from the Department.

Levenson: What?

J. Service: An employee of the CIA. Well, this staggered us. [laughter] This was so unexpected and so bizarre that I think we all showed considerable surprise. We said I wasn't--had no connection with the CIA. The CIA had nothing to do with my employment.

J. Service: This was in a period when he was trying to find something to hang the CIA with. He had a great row on with the CIA and was trying to get some information on them.

It's true that at one time when the State Department was trying to find someplace for me to go, I had talked to somebody in the CIA. So, maybe somebody in the CIA--because the people in the CIA leaked too--just assumed that my working for a steam trap company was such an absurd idea that it must be a cover. I don't know.

Anyway, we agreed to provide all sorts of affidavits that we sold nothing to the CIA, received no pay, or had no dealings with the CIA, in other words the CIA had not nominally bought steam traps to pay my salary or anything like that. We went away somewhat bemused and mystified by the whole deal.

Levenson: What was your impression of McCarthy at this period? Was he slipping??

J. Service: He was particularly loathsome, I thought, at that time. But, I don't remember thinking that he was slipping. I never thought he was very high, you know. His manner was very oily and unctuous. I think he realized very quickly that somebody had given him a bum piece of information. I don't think that he was inclined to press the matter very much.

Schine took almost no part in the ceremonies. He was there. Cohn was more or less pushed aside when we got in this initial hassle over the telephone subpoena. After that I think McCarthy did all the talking, and it didn't last very long. We agreed to provide material that we had not any dealings with the CIA, and that was about it.

Jack's Mother Dies

J. Service: We said a good deal in the early stages here about my mother. I ought to mention the fact of her death. She had a stroke in the summer of '54, and we brothers all went out to California. She was living at a retirement colony for Christian workers, missionaries and so on, in Claremont, California. She had a little cottage there which she had built, under terms that you give it to the retirement estate when you die.

There was a little hospital--a fairly simple hospital--for the retirement colony. Instead of hiring full-time special nurses, the three of us sons took turns caring for her, just as we had for our father.

J. Service: As soon as my brother Dick, who was in Brussels, arrived, she insisted the doctor stop any more medication, any attempts to keep her going. But, nonetheless she did keep going.

After about two and a half weeks or so she was getting better, so we all had to disperse. I had a lot of talks with her. She told me a great deal about herself and her marriage and life.

She gave us instructions that her ashes were to go back to China to be put beside my father's ashes in my sister's grave in Chungking.

She said that beside her desk we would find a box with a notice that she'd prepared for friends, a poem really about her death. She had all the envelopes addressed--three hundred and sixty some.

Levenson: Remarkable. Thank you, Jack. Shall we pause?

J. Service: No, let's go on. The only thing to be inserted was the date. They were all ready to go. She had a second stroke, and I went back a second time in October. But she lingered on, and I had to leave. My brother Bob, the forester, was the only one there when she died. They had memorial services just as she wished.

Levenson: Have you been able to carry out her wishes about her ashes?

J. Service: That's a sad story in a way. California law was very restrictive at that time. In California they have to be put in some sort of a proper repository. Bob simply said that her wishes were that they were not to stay in California. So he mailed them to me in New York. We kept them for fourteen years or so, more than that. By about '69 I finally decided it was hopeless to expect to take them back to China. So Bob and I took them up and scattered them on a Sierra mountaintop.

Levenson: She loved the mountains.

J. Service: A few years later--but no one ever could have foreseen it then--they could have been taken back to China. When we did get back to China in '71, the cemetery in Chungking had disappeared. So they couldn't really have gone in the grave of my father.

Mrs. Grace Boggs Service's death announcement and poem, written by her.

625 MAYFLOWER ROAD
CLAREMONT, CALIFORNIA

Written March, 1943

Set up, printed and signed September, 1943

October 20, 1954

A whisper stirred old pine-trees,
A fleeting shadow swept a wall,
Light foot-steps climbed a mountain,
A scent of honey over all . . .
Long echoes filled a river canyon,
A glacier moved its inch today.
Did you, by chance, look out the window,
Or did a lady pass your way?
Today's the day appointed!
So while the world rolls smoothly on,
I've slipped away to Bob, my husband,
No one should grieve that I am gone.

Grace B Service

Source of Hurley's Charges Revealed at John Davies' Hearings:
From Tai Li via "Mary" Miles

J. Service: About this time [John] Davies was going through his hearings. I think this was early '54. The ground rules had changed. As I mentioned before, you no longer had a departmental board. It had to be all people completely outside your department so there would be no possibility of favoritism, special treatment, old school tie, or anything like that.

He had a former Inspector General from the army, and the other people on his panel were from the Small Business Administration, a technical bureau, and so on. None of them had any understanding about the situation in China.

Hurley had agreed to appear, but this was because the defendant, or his lawyer, no longer had the right to do any cross questioning. It was apparent as Hurley testified that he had Davies and me completely confused in his mind; many of his accusations and a lot of things he was saying applied not to John but to me.

John asked me if I would come up to try to straighten things out. Of course, I did so gladly. It was during these hearings that we found out the basis of a lot of the charges that Hurley had been making, these accusations of my giving copies of my reports to the Communists and conspiring with Teddy White and so on. This had been fed to him by the Chinese, by Tai Li, I imagine through "Mary" Miles through the navy connection.

Hurley had been told, and had agreed, not to say anything about it to anyone. So he had not said anything about it even to the counter-intelligence people in headquarters. He'd given all the papers back, so we've never been able to see what sort of stuff really it was. Hurley's memory was not very good. He was very fuzzy.

Levenson: Where are those papers now, do you guess?

J. Service: Hurley gave them back to "Mary" Miles or Tai Li. So I assume they've been destroyed. Hurley said he did not keep them.

Anyway, this was an absolutely hopeless situation. I was depressed by these ground rules. It seemed to me that Davies had no chance, which was true. I myself was attacked very strongly in the board hearings for having been fired. In other words, my credibility was questioned.

Levenson: How did you take that?

J. Service: I made some attempt to point out that it had not been on loyalty. But you can't really defend yourself. The fact is you've been fired, and that's an obvious fact.

Life in New York

J. Service: We don't need to talk much about life in New York. We were in an apartment house out in Kew Gardens.

You remember the Equitable Life Insurance people refused to rent me an apartment? Incidentally, there's quite a file on that which will be in the papers. So, when I then looked for another apartment and found one in Kew Gardens, I went to the company's head office in downtown New York to make sure there would be no hitch, no trouble.

It was a Jewish company, and I saw the head man. He laughed when I told him who I was and why I wanted to be sure he knew. His attitude was, "So what?" He simply wanted to know if I had a job.

We moved into a Jewish community. This was sort of, how shall we say, a turnabout for that wrenching experience with Jewish immigration in Shanghai, that we moved into a refugee community in Kew Gardens. German was often heard on the streets, and practically all the people in the apartment house were Jewish.

Some of them we got to know quite well. One of them helped us get some term insurance. Many of these people were most enthusiastic, most touched, when we won our case in the Supreme Court. This was something that they thought was absolutely terrific.

The school that Philip went to was almost entirely Jewish.

Up to this point I had known very few Jews. There were none in the Foreign Service. My missionary background didn't put me in contact with any. I'd had a friend in Chungking, Sol Adler, but that was about all. We never found any discrimination or unpleasantness from any of the Jewish people we knew, with the conspicuous exception of Roy Cohn who was working for McCarthy.

J. Service: Quite a few of the people I dealt with, jobbing business and so on, knew who I was and sometimes they would comment on the fact or something of this sort but always in a friendly way. I never had any unpleasantness.

Wells' wife was Jewish, and a lot of the people in Sarco were Jewish. So was Ruth Greenfield, the woman that I worked with who'd been handling the routine side of the export business. She's continued to be a very good friend of ours, although she might well have resented my coming in, because she could have expected to move up and do some of the work I did.

Levenson: And about Philip, was this any problem for him? Did he ever feel that he would have preferred to be like the majority of his school-mates?

J. Service: I don't think that he had any particular feelings on it. He belonged to a Cub Scout pack. That had its interesting sides. It was practically all Jewish also. Most of them were recent immigrants, trying very hard to be American and have their sons be American.

I was astonished, after my own Boy Scout experience in Shanghai, to find out how nationalistic this whole thing had become with saluting the flag, and great ceremony about who had the honor of carrying the flag, and so on. We hadn't had anything like that in the Boy Scout troop in Shanghai.

Through some of these people in the apartment house I got recruited or interested in working for a Democratic group in Queens that was pushing [Adlai] Stevenson in the 1952 campaign. I canvassed the neighborhood, did precinct work, passing out literature, things like this.

It was a non-regular Democratic group. The Democratic (Tammany Hall) establishment in New York was not very savory, and not very enthusiastic about Stevenson. So, this was a sort of a grassroots activity, very much like the C[alifornia] D[emocratic] C[ouncil] movement.

After the campaign, when Stevenson had been defeated, they decided they wanted to maintain some nucleus of an organization, keep themselves alive for the next campaign. They asked various people to sign up, so I agreed to put my name down.

One Saturday morning a group of these people asked if they could come around to our apartment. They hemmed and hawed for a while. I sensed their dilemma, their problem. So, I said, "If you're worried about having me down as one of the members or founding members of this new group, I'd be very happy to withdraw."

J. Service: They all breathed a sigh of relief. But it was a great embarrassment to my Jewish friend who had been urging me to sign up.

Levenson: What went on inside you when that occurred?

J. Service: Oh, by this time I was sort of used to it.

Levenson: Did you get angry?

J. Service: Not against these people, no. There wasn't any point in being angry. I said, "Isn't this your problem?" They agreed it was. I said, "Sure, I don't want to make trouble. I'll withdraw."

It was a belt-tightening period. I was making about \$12,000 in the State Department, and Mr. Wells offered me \$9,000, but mentioned there would be some bonus if things went well. So, I accepted the job on those terms. The bonus was usually \$1,000, and sometimes as high as \$2,000. Obviously, we had to make quite a serious reduction in our scale of living, because we had other expenses at this time.

Levenson: What were the worst effects of the belt-tightening on you and the family?

J. Service: We rented a fairly modest apartment and had to be pretty careful on magazine subscriptions and entertainment, things like that. Caroline did some work to try to bring in a little extra income. I think she's probably told about her part-time work.

We were able to send the children to Oberlin, but partly because they got some scholarship help. Bob got a scholarship. He couldn't have gone to Oberlin, I'm sure, without having gotten a scholarship. He also got a scholarship to Magdalen College School in England that Caroline has probably mentioned. My mother sent some money.

We got along. Wells, when he later on retired and put me in as president of Sarco International, told me to fix my own bonus. But that put me in an odd position, so I said we'd continue the arrangements we'd had before.

I forgot to say when we were talking about finances in New York, that the first year we were there was particularly tough. Not only the salary was small, and we had to wait until the end of the year to get a bonus, but also I got a payment from the Department for accumulated leave. In the Foreign Service you could accumulate up to 180 days leave.

J. Service: Since I hadn't used the leave, why, the value of the leave was paid to me in a lump sum, which gave us a terrible shock when we came to pay income tax for the year, because the tax bill was much larger than we had anticipated.

I had some embroideries, quite a number of embroideries. My father was very keen on Chinese embroidery. He had bought a lot of these, picked them up in Chengtu in the years after the 1911 revolution. There were old gowns and so on, some of them very good.

Well, [laughing] the market for Chinese embroideries and old Mandarin gowns wasn't very good, because we only were able to sell them for \$200, which sounds ridiculous now. But, this was 1953.

Then, my brother, who had been stationed in Moscow and gone on leave into Germany, had picked up a Leica camera which he'd sent me, which I had never used. We sold the Leica to help pay our income tax.

The children had board jobs at college and worked in the summers. Sarco was able to help, and other people. We managed to get them jobs every summer. Anyway, that was no great hardship. I'd done the same: board job and work in the summers. So, they carried on the tradition.

What I think we missed a good deal about New York was that it's so different from life in the Foreign Service or even in Washington, D.C. In the Foreign Service generally you're in a rather close and cohesive group. You see each other socially outside the office as well as inside the office.

In New York everyone disperses after the office, so that you're all living in separate suburbs with almost no getting together outside. You have an annual Christmas party, which your wife does not go to. Otherwise there's no socializing.

We tended to leave New York weekends. We had friends up in Connecticut, some cousins and friends in New Haven. People like the Silbers lived in New Jersey. Ed Snow lived up in Kloster. Kloster's just north of Palisades on the New York side of the river.

We had to make some choice of friends, whether we were going to see some people or not. People like Snow and the Silbers. Fritz Silber has always been left in politics; he was an active supporter of [Henry] Wallace in the 1948 campaign. People like that we decided to maintain our friendship with.

- J. Service: Other people we didn't. The Adlers had gone to England by this time. We didn't try to keep up some friendships. For instance, people who had been associated with Jaffe.
- Levenson: How much of it was your fear of "guilt by association" and how much of it was sensitivity to the risks of people knowing you?
- J. Service: The question of people knowing me I left up to them. That's why I said that the initiative, generally speaking, had to come from them. There wasn't much question of worry about guilt by association. I simply didn't want to have anything to do with the Jaffe connection. That was a very traumatic experience as far as I was concerned, and it was one that I wanted to forget about.

I didn't have any real possibility of seeing Adler until after I was reinstated and went to Liverpool. But he realized it was not a good idea, and I certainly didn't think it was a good idea to take any steps because I didn't know what Adler's reasons for going to England were. Although he'd been cleared in the departmental loyalty board, when things got hotter he had left.

People like Snow and so on, definitely there was no fear of guilt by association, or I didn't care. This was a risk that we were prepared to take. Snow was being accused in those days of being Communist or pro-Communist. There was a campaign against his wife, and she was blacklisted.

People like the Silbers, Priscilla Yard's husband--the Yard family I mentioned before--we just had to make some decisions, and this was a risk that we were prepared to take, if it was a risk.

Jack Buys in to Sarco

- J. Service: Wells retired in early 1955. He'd been talking about it for some time before that, and there had been various plans for his retirement. Apparently he actually wanted to make me president of the company. But, he found--perhaps to his surprise but not to anyone else--that this united the various factions in the company like nothing else ever could.

His methods were rather roundabout. He never liked to have anyone clearly as second in command. He had three or four people that he played off. All of them thought they had been promised the job of sales manager. Most of them at one time or another had thought that they were going to be made president when he retired.

J. Service: So for me to be brought in as a newcomer and then for him to suggest that I be made president--he thought there would be advantages I suppose in my being more neutral, impartial; I don't know--but anyway this was something he couldn't do.

A deal was finally worked out. He wanted to have me join the new group that would be taking over. It was a very complicated arrangement that was worked out with the lawyers. We would buy one of his companies, and then that company, after we had bought the stock in it, would then buy the other companies, except for Sarco International which he kept himself.

It required an investment. I was to get one-eleventh of the stock. That one-eleventh was to be \$5,000. The company actually at this time wasn't making very much money. Looking back, it appears to have been a very favorable deal. Actually, it was no giveaway because the company was just barely keeping going. It paid no dividends. He had never paid dividends. That was part of his policy. He took the money out in other ways rather than dividends, because dividends have to be taxed.

Wells offered to loan me the \$5,000. It would be a loan, but actually I would be holding the stock for him. I would be his inside man, inside the new board of directors, to watch things for him and report to him.

It just happened that we were having dinner with the Silbers when this came up. I mentioned before how the Yard family has come into my life at various times. I was describing the situation, and Priscilla Yard Silber said, "Well, I could loan you \$5,000."

So, I took her up on it and surprised Wells the next day by saying that I would be very glad to take up the stock, the one-eleventh share, but that I would pay for it myself. So of course, [chuckling] having made the offer, he could hardly withdraw it.

Levenson: Did he query the source of your funds?

J. Service: No, no, no. He was a good business man, and he didn't raise any questions about that. I'm sure he knew perfectly well why I preferred outright purchase.

Levenson: Why did you?

J. Service: To be my own man, to have it independently, not to be holding it for him.

So I became one-eleventh owner of the Sarco companies and one of the stockholders. It soon developed that another man named Cumming and I were the minority. The other four stockholders

J. Service: formed a very tight group. They finally bought out one of the group, and the remaining three tried to force us out in various ways.

We eventually had to start a lawsuit, because they tried to sell the company to an outside firm, but on terms that would be very beneficial to them. They would stay on and run the company with large promises of retirement and salary and so on. But, we were able to go to court and get the thing quashed. That was in '61.

Eventually we sold our stock to the Canadian Sarco company. There were Sarco companies all over the map. The Canadian Sarco company was having a very hard time with the New York people.

Wells had left affairs between these various companies in rather a confused state. A lot of the operating agreements and contracts were not very clearly drawn. Sarco Canada did some manufacturing, but was largely dependent on the New York company for materials and supplies. They were anxious to get Cumming's and my minority stock to give them a foothold inside the company. Thus we were able to sell advantageously.

As I mentioned, when Wells retired he kept the ownership of Sarco International. He had been president. I had been vice-president. When he retired, I became president. We were having more and more problems, operating difficulties, with the small group that was running the main company. We had shared premises with them in the Empire State Building. We moved out over to 20 Park Avenue and ran our own shop. Business at this time started to pick up very rapidly, quite largely because of the thermodynamic trap, the new trap, which was only really coming into production by late 1955. Our sales really mushroomed.

A new Sarco company was started by Wells in Germany. That began to make money. We had royalty agreements with various other companies. Sarco International originally was started with a very small investment. It was just a sales company. But in 1957, Wells sold it to the English company for 100,000 pounds. [laughter] Well, that's neither here nor there.

April, 1956: Failure in the Court of Appeals

J. Service: To go back to the court business, the district court had ruled the action of the Loyalty Review Board to be invalid. But still upheld the legality of my discharge. So we took it to the appeals court. In April, 1956, they had a hearing in Washington--three judges, very unsympathetic.

J. Service: They went all the way with the government, that I could be fired for any reason, with no justification, at the will or whim of the secretary. Therefore, the firing should not be considered as either for loyalty or security. It was just because the secretary of state decided to fire me. That was announced in June. Then we decided to try for the Supreme Court.

Levenson: How had you expected the verdict to come out in the appeals court?

J. Service: We had a little hope, but we drew some rather poor judges. Decisions in the court of appeals may be influenced by which judges you get, and we didn't get a favorable draw. The cards just didn't come right. Some judges we felt might have been a bit more sympathetic to our arguments. The ones we got just didn't see any merit at all in our argument. They were unanimous: three to nothing against us.

Appeal to the Supreme Court

J. Service: Ed Rhett was determined to go on. He felt he needed some help. He'd never argued a case in the Supreme Court. He'd never been admitted to Supreme Court practice. The first step is to apply for a writ of certiorari.

He had a friend in Washington named Warner Gardner. His practice was mostly admiralty law, but he had had a lot of experience in Supreme Court practice. He had a young lawyer in his office named Vern Countryman, who actually did most of the work on preparing the petition for a writ.

The petition was submitted in the fall of '56, and was accepted. In other words, at least four judges on the Supreme Court, I think, have to be in favor of hearing the case, of granting the petition for a writ.

Levenson: Now, this was the Warren court, which we know was a liberal court.

J. Service: Right.

Levenson: So, you had expected the petition to be successful?

J. Service: We thought we had a very good chance. We thought some people on the court would be favorable. Whether or not we'd have four or not, we weren't so sure.

J. Service: Then we had to get down and work on the brief. I got into the act here in a way because the government was arguing, you see, that a discharge, such as mine, could be at the sole and unrestricted discretion of the secretary of state. Warner Gardner felt that we had to base our case largely on the fact that the Department of State had some regulations covering this whole question; that when you have regulations, as long as they are in force they have to be followed; that the Tydings committee had been informed of these regulations and had accepted them, in fact they made no objection to them; that the report of the Tydings committee had been debated in the full Senate very fully, actually for most of four days I think, and no objections had been made. So we had a case that these facts were known to the Senate and accepted by the Senate. The Senate, if they had objected could have said so, because there was this other McCarran rider which gives the secretary free hand, you see.

I did a good deal of this research. This will all be in the files which I'll give to The Bancroft Library. We don't need to say much about it now, but I went back to the Congressional Record and got all of the debates in the House and showed the number of hours that had been spent, pages in the Congressional Record, the number of senators who had taken part in the debate, and so on. All this is in here.

Levenson: When did you do this research? Were you still working full time for Sarco?

J. Service: Yes, but in the evenings and so on. I think I may have taken a couple of days off, because I spent several days in the New York Public Library. I was thrown out of the library when they closed the doors for the evening, and then I went home and wrote a long series of letters.

At any rate, it gave Warner Gardner a chance to say that it was the only case he'd ever had where the client did the most valuable research, because in the decision this was picked up by the Court members!

The Supreme Court Decision: Unanimous in Favor of Jack

J. Service: In April, we had the hearing. We went to Washington.

Levenson: What were your feelings appearing before the high court of the land?

J. Service: You don't "appear," of course. You simply are permitted to sit in the audience.

Levenson: Oh yes, I knew that.

J. Service: The argument is purely a legal argument. Well, it was tremendously impressive. It was exciting in a way and awesome. We were, of course, very interested in how it was done--I'd never seen a Supreme Court action before--and in the questioning which is a very unusual type of proceeding. The judges break in all the time, and it's very difficult for lawyers because of the fact that they can be continually interrupted with interjections of questions by different justices.

It was fairly clear that my lawyer, Rhett, who argued the case--he did the actual argument--was having a much better time than the government man. The Solicitor General was present. But most of the argument was by the same lawyer who had handled it through the district and appeals courts. Later, he also carried on through the court of claims. He was unyielding and extreme and a very nasty guy. He had trouble with some hard questions on the government's rather extreme contentions.

We didn't know when the decision would come about. It didn't come until just as the court was ending its term.

It was a unanimous decision, which was more than we hoped for. We left the hearing optimistic that we might win by six to three. We didn't know that [Tom] Clark was going to disqualify himself. He sat on the bench, but he disqualified himself.

Levenson: Why?

J. Service: He'd been attorney general during the Amerasia case.

[Interview 12: November 4, 1977]

J. Service: One thing that really impressed me was the warmth of Chief Justice Warren. Part of the session on the second day was swearing in new lawyers who had just been admitted to practice before the Supreme Court. This is a rote thing occurring, I suppose, almost every session; yet he did it with impressive sincerity, welcoming these people to practice before the bar in a very warm, human way.

The other thing was the intensity and the intellectual quality of the hearing itself, of the argumentation. We'd had the district court, and then three judges in the appeals court who were very cold and distant. But here you had these nine people, all of them

April 4, 1957

Dearest Mother: Well, it is all over, and I have a great feeling of relief and of hope. Ed Rhetts was splendid. He had his material well organized, he presented it clearly and cogently, and he did not get rattled or show any nervousness—which latter he must surely have felt. I do not see how anyone could help but be nervous before that august Court. Ruth Rhetts said that she shook hands with the Government lawyer after he had presented his side and that she had never felt colder hands. But I want to write a full account of the whole proceedings.

On Sunday, after we had time to talk with Gin and Bob, we decided that Jack and I would go to Washington by train on Monday evening. This would give Jack at least one office day. Gin, Bob, and Phil would rise at dawn, drive to Washington, and get to Helen and Dick's about noon. There was no way of knowing exactly when the case would come on. The number of cases are scheduled for the week, and then they go on one right after the other, but occasionally one is delayed or rescheduled, or something of that sort. Our train to Washington was both slow and late. Dick met us and we got out to the house about midnight. Talked for about an hour and went to bed. Tuesday morning Jack talked with Ed and then went to pick him up about 11 so that they could be at the court at 12. No one really thought our case would come up on Tuesday. I stayed right at Helen's. Talked with Diana by phone and also with Uncle Wes. Diana had told Frankie and Wayne we were coming down and I phoned them on Wednesday morning as I did not want Frankie, who was probably busy, to think she had to try to come to the Court. Diana told me that your letter mother which she would bring out to Helen's that evening. Our plan for the afternoon was that I would meet Jack at Connie Green's about three o'clock and then if the case was on we'd go over to the court. Gin, Philip, and Bob arrived right at noon. After a quick lunch at Helen's Bob and Gin went off to get their places to sleep—Ginny with Diana and Faith, and Bob at the Rauhs'. Unfortunately his old friend Mike had already gone back to the U. of Michigan. About two o'clock I went to Lisa's with her to check up on her little boy who was sick. We had barely gotten in the door when the phone rang. It was Jack saying that Ed had just been told his case would be up about three-fifteen. We had told the kids to meet us at Connie Green's too at three, but I was able to get hold of Gin by phone to tell them to come right to Court. Helen went from her house, and Lisa and I got in a taxi and rushed off. The reason for the meeting at Connie Green's was that Connie is now living in a darling little old-fashioned frame house right smack across the street from the back entrance to the Supreme Court. Nothing could have been more convenient. Jack met Lisa and Connie and me there about a quarter to three and we all went over to the Court. J. sat in some seats reserved for families of pleading lawyers and members of the Court, but the rest of us all sat in the public seats. The children arrived shortly after we did, Uncle Wes got there about four o'clock, and a few friends who have followed the case for years, such as Olie Rauh and Rosalind Burling, were there. Joe Rauh and John Reid, both of whom can plead before the Supreme Court, came and sat inside the bar, back of Ed Rhetts. The Washington lawyer was in N. Y., thinking the case would not come up that day, but it really didn't matter as Ed was the only one to talk. (The Wash lawyer was in Court on Wed.)

Now I will tell you a little about the court procedure which I didn't know before. On the days the Court sits they are there from 12 to 4:30 with a half hour from 2 to 2:30 to have lunch. This makes four hours of listening to cases—a really tough grind. Our case was allotted two hours, one hour for Ed, and one hour for Mr. McGuinness, the Gov. lawyer. And one hour means one hour—not 59 minutes or 61 or 62 minutes. Also the cases follow one another immediately without any break. When we got into the Court room I immediately noticed that Mr. Warren's chair was empty and I was quite unhappy as we didn't want an eight man court. But then I listened to the case going on and soon found out it was a California railroad case, and I

Letter from Caroline Service to her mother describing the Supreme Court proceedings

that Mr. Warren had still been Governor of California when this case started thru the courts and so had disqualified himself. He entered the Court at 3:25 and took his seat. The California case ended at 3:27, and Jack's case, No. 407, John S. Service Vs. John Foster Dulles, began at 3:28. (Jack is suing the Sec. of State, who right now is J. F. D.)

Before I tell you about the case I want to say something about the Court. The room is not much larger than the Court of Appeals where we were last year, mother, and the accoustics are 100 percent better. The lawyers had a microphone to talk in to and I could hear almost everything the Justices said. Facing the Justices, on their dais, and reading from left to right, they sat in this order.

Brennan, Clark, Douglas, Black, Warren, Frankfurter, Burton, Harlan, Whitaker

Black, Frankfurter, and Burton, ^{and} little men, and I couldn't see more than their heads above the long table or rostrum behind which the Justices sat. Warren, Douglas, and Harlan, and Clark are all big men and they seemed to tower over the others. Brennan and Whitaker are medium sized. The backs of the Justice's chairs are all different heights depending on what each man wants and finds the most comfortable. And I believe each Justice takes his chair with him when he ~~leaves~~ retires from the Court.

Soon after Ed began his argument Justice Frankfurter began to interrupt with various questions, and during both arguments Frankfurter asked most of the questions and brought out most of the points that he wanted ~~clarified~~ clarified and amplified. On neither day did Justice Burton or Justice Clark open his mouth. Justice Brennan asked more questions than anyone else except Frankfurter. As far as I can remember Justice Whitaker didn't ask Ed anything, but he did ask McGuinness some questions. ~~Justice~~ Justice Douglas asked a few questions of both men. Chief Justice Warren asked Ed almost nothing, but did ask McGuinness quite a few questions; and on Wed. both Justices Black and ~~Justice~~ Harlan put some very tough questions to McGuinness. In fact I think that Justice Black asked the most searching and cogent questions of all, altho Frankfurter certainly did most of the talking and most of the spade work. I must say that they gave Ed a far easier time of it than McGuinness. Olie Maun, who was sitting next to me, said that in her opinion we had a friendly court. She should know something about it as Joe has often argued cases before the Supreme Court, one just last month in which I understand they gave him a very rugged time. I felt too that the Court was "Friendly" and was trying to get at some facts. You can't imagine the difference between these men and the ones on the court of Appeals. These Justices were trying to find out things, and the three men on the court of Appeals last year, just sat there like stone images most of the time. At 3:28 a red light came on (I couldn't see it) and Ed was thru. The Justices all arose as one man and walked out. And that was that for the day. I felt and still feel that things went very well.

Since Connie had offered her house as a place to talk the few of us who were at the court including Faith and Ed, Faith's brother, Lisa, Helen, Gin and Bob, and one or two others, went to Connie's house for about an hour. I think we all felt as tho we had been running a hard race and that at last we could relax. Oh, yes, Delia was there too as she had gone to Washington to see the doctor Faith works for about her (Delia's) feet. About six o'clock we all went back to Helen and Dick's and later Diana, Ginny, and Bob and Faith came out there for drinks. The Pennys and Greens and ~~several~~ ^{several} dropped in too, and later, those of us who felt like it went out for a Chinese meal at the goodeking restaurant in Washington. This paragraph is quite mixed up. We asked Uncle Wes to come to Connie's after the court but he felt he should run along as he had to pick up Mante Sttie somewhere, and also he has a very hard time hearing and talking with strangers. It was very kind of him to make the effort to come to Court at all.

On Wed. he had to go to the funeral of Mrs. Richard Parks and then on to a luncheon so Tues. was the only chance to catch a glimpse of him.

Wed. morning I got up quite early and phoned the McCurdys in time to catch Wayne before going to work. Had a good ~~talk~~ talk with both him and Frankie but there was no time to try to see each other as we planned to leave Washington right after the court in the afternoon. I think that the next time Jack goes on one of his long trips I'll go to Washington for about a week, taking Philip with me, and then I'll have time to see people. Also ~~if we have~~ next winter, ~~or even~~ ~~if we have~~ I'll see if I can get Dennis up here some weekend to visit Philip.

We knew that the case would continue as soon as the Court opened on Wed. so we were right in our seats before noon. Dick was there (he had ~~also~~ come the afternoon before when he could get away from the War College), and also Marshall Green and another State Dept. friend who ~~came~~ came during their lunch hour. The Court opened on the stroke of 12. About 7 minutes were consumed swearing in new lawyers who are now privileged to plead cases before the Supreme Court. They must be lawyers in good standing and they must ~~also~~ be introduced by a lawyer who already has the right to plead before the court. Mr. McGuinness started his argument at 12:07. He had hardly got going before Justice Frankfurter jumped into the fray, and from then on, till 1:07 it was mostly Justice Frankfurter arguing and questioning Mr. McGuinness. I could not help but feel a little sorry for him because he had no choice but to argue this case for the Gov. and the Justices were not easy on him. They kept coming back and coming back to the affidavit given the Gov. by Mr. Acheson (when the Gov. thought the Loyalty Review ~~Board~~ Decision was legal—before the Peter's case argued before this same court) stating that Jack was being fired solely because of the decision of the Loyalty Review Board a decision which is now illegal. Justice Frankfurter and ~~Justice~~ Justice Black wanted to know how the Gov. could now say that Jack was fired for ~~that~~ reasons when Mr. Acheson said it was solely ~~that~~ reason. Of course I think that is the nub of the case, ~~but~~ whether or not we win it. The Gov. now contends that none of this matters, that Jack could have been fired as a public relations measure (McGuinness was just about forced to say something of this sort because of the facts of the case) or he could have been fired for any reason, or he could have been fired because of the Loyalty Review Board decision even though ~~he~~ ~~didn't~~ ~~agree~~ ~~with~~ ~~a~~ ~~word~~ of it. And even though it was all illegal it should still be upheld by the court. Well, I do not believe that most of the Justices think this way. Again, I do not know the legal intricacies of the law so no one can foretell the outcome; but I do feel hopeful and encouraged. Gin and Bob and Diana all came to court together the second day. They were all intensely interested in the argument. I think that all of us who heard both days think that the chances of winning this case are good. In fact ~~xxx~~ I will enclose in this letter a little sealed envelope with my guess on how the case will come out, and how the justices will vote. Mother, will you please open it on the day of the Decision and see how near right ~~I~~ ~~am~~ ~~I~~ ~~am~~ I am. Please keep carefully put away until then!

After the case was over, we talked outside for a few minutes and then our family went off with Helen and Dick to have lunch with them at the War College. Diana couldn't come as she was due at the Post. The War College was beautiful with flowering cherries and forsythia. After ~~xxx~~ a hasty lunch we said goodbye to Dick, rushed out to the house and picked up Philip and our bags and all five of us started off for New York. We came across the new Chesapeake Bay Bridge at Annapolis and had a lovely drive ~~xxx~~ across the Eastern Shore of Maryland. Home about 10:30. All dead, but all feeling fine. All of us slept this morning except Jack who went to the office to do something there. Except for last Monday he hasn't been in the office for a month, and we still live by steam traps and will probably continue to regardless of the outcome of the case. When I woke up this morning it was snowing and it has been coming down all day in great wet flakes. Looks like January. What a contrast to the warm, sun-shiny day in Washington yesterday. The only bit of sight-seeing we did there was to drive around the tidal basin to

J. Service: obviously intently following the argument and breaking in, as I said before, asking questions, interrogating, trying to press points that they were interested in following.

By this time the whole thing had been narrowed down, resolved to one particular issue: if a government department has regulations, is it required to follow its own regulations?

It was obviously a very intent intellectual exercise, with all these people very much awake, none of them sitting back and just listening. It was a very stimulating procedure.

Levenson: In contradistinction perhaps to some of the Senate subcommittee hearings?

J. Service: Oh, yes. Oh, yes. That's true.

Levenson: How would you compare it, just to skip chronologically, to the hearings before the Fulbright committee, in 1970, where again there seems considerable acuity, though the organization is rather loose.

J. Service: Yes, it's much looser and everyone sort of takes off in his own direction a little bit. The thing that's so surprising about a Senate committee is how few people show up. There were something like seventeen or twenty members of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, and we had five or six there, but not all at the same time. One senator would drift in and ask some questions, and maybe he hadn't heard what went on before. It was very easy going and disorganized. At the Supreme Court, of course, everyone was there and everyone was obviously paying attention.

Back now to the waiting for the decision. We kept expecting it from week to week. Monday is the decision day. Each Monday would come, and we didn't get it.

It finally came on June 17 [1957]. I had a statement prepared, which was fortunate. You want to turn that off a minute?

Levenson: Sure. Did you have two statements prepared just in case?

J. Service: Just one. [laughter]

Anyway, this was a new day, the day of TV. Almost as soon as the Supreme Court decision was announced, TV people descended on us, both in my office and then later on out at our apartment. Fortunately, as I say, we had a statement ready.

I am thankful for the Court's decision and for our judicial system which gives each American the means to protect his rights and reputation.

For almost nineteen years I was proud to make my career in the American Foreign Service. Every chief under whom I worked and every competent and authorized review of the facts found my service useful and loyal.

In December, 1951, the world was informed that I had been summarily dismissed for "doubt of loyalty". Administrative appeal was refused, and legal action became my only recourse. Through it, the unfounded action of the Loyalty Review Board was declared illegal and expunged. The Government eventually conceded that my discharge was not based upon doubt of my loyalty or security and that its sole basis had been the illegal action of the Loyalty Review Board. Now the discharge has been declared illegal and the slate is cleaned.

My debt is great: to my attorney, Mr. Charles Edward Rhetts, who accepted the case of a stranger more than seven years ago and, without regard for his own interests, has since devoted his great ability to clearing my name; to the several attorneys who in association with him have contributed to this outcome; to a courageous employer who was willing to give a job to a man publicly defamed; and to hundreds of friends whose unshaken confidence supported my family and me in this long fight for vindication.

J. Service: Everything went pretty well. The State Department reacted as we had more or less expected or hoped. I was called down to Washington in a few days. They talked about the formalities of coming back in. I had to fill out various forms, security forms and so on, organizations I belonged to and all the rest of it.

The first thing we had to do, though, was to get an order prepared by the district court. In other words, the Supreme Court simply reversed the original finding in the district court, remanded the case to the district court, which had to now write a new order in compliance with the Supreme Court's findings.

That finally came out on July 3 [1957].

Preliminary Contact with the State Department on Procedures for Reinstatement: Another Loyalty Clearance Required

Levenson: After the hearing before the Supreme Court you knew that a decision would come by the end of the term. What did you do while you were waiting?

J. Service: We were concerned, of course, with what to do when word came out, particularly if we won, as we hoped and rather expected. I decided to get in touch with the State Department, because we didn't want to be in the position of working out my reinstatement in the press. We wanted to have some sort of an understanding with the State Department beforehand if we could.

Levenson: How did Mr. [Joseph C.] Satterthwaite--I guess he was then Director General of the Foreign Service--respond?

J. Service: He asked me--as I recall, it must have been telephone, because I can't find any correspondence--asked me to come up to Washington. I saw him and another officer. The point was that they wanted me to understand that even though I won in the Supreme Court and my reinstatement was ordered, it would still not relieve me from the requirements of going through the security clearance process.

Levenson: Again?

J. Service: Oh, yes, because the Court, of course, would not decide that. The Court would decide whether the firing had been improper, procedurally improper. And [the State Department position was] that I would have to go through clearance again. I said I understood that and took it for granted, but that I was nonetheless anxious to persist. So that was the main content of my contact with the State Department before the actual decision came out.

Levenson: Was this formal, friendly, or—?

J. Service: Oh, very friendly. Satterthwaite, oddly enough--this is the small world department--had come from the same little town in Michigan where my father's father had lived as a young man. He knew a lot of my family relatives in this little town of Morenci, Michigan. I had known Satterthwaite casually in the service.

I think these people were a little dumbstruck. The State Department was, I think, nervous and worried. They would have preferred that I just go away. But personally they were friendly. The State Department, certainly the career service--has basically always been sympathetic and friendly in my case.

Going back to the Supreme Court [chuckling], can I just add one little note that I was going to put in? After I'd retired and was in Berkeley, Warren was here on the campus for some reason.

Levenson: The opening of the Earl Warren Legal Institute?

J. Service: Yes. There was a function at the Faculty Club, and I forget now just how I happened to be invited. But anyway, I was. So I introduced myself to him, and we had a very pleasant, friendly chat which confirmed my impression of the warmth and genuine decency of the person, the humanity of the man.

I'm not sure that he actually remembered the case. He said he did, but--

Levenson: Oh, I would think so.

J. Service: --I don't know whether he really did or not. He obviously didn't want me to press him on the details. [laughter] But, we had a very friendly meeting.

Justice [William O.] Douglas had been in India and met Caroline. Later on when the Foreign Service Association gave me my luncheon in '73, I think it was, he was invited. It wasn't my suggestion. He was invited, but he wrote a very nice letter saying that his health prevented it. So, he didn't come to the luncheon.

Leave from State Department to Wind Up Sarco Company Business

J. Service: I asked for leave from the State Department to clear up my affairs with Sarco. Wells was very [chuckles], I think, well, unhappy in a way. He was pleased, but he was unhappy about my leaving.

But I had told him right at our very first meeting, when we had our first interview about a job, that I was fighting my case in the courts and would expect to go back if I was successful. So he'd always known this. But like everyone else, he thought that the chances of winning were practically zero. No one really thought we were going to win.

Without a ready candidate to put in my place, Wells decided to sell the export company, Sarco International, to his English company, Spirax. This was a very good company which had developed quite independently, with some excellent people running it. It was based in Cheltenham.

The two top Spirax people came over to Zurich. I went to Zurich and we worked out all the details of the sale. Then I had to go back to London with them because they had to get the Bank of England to approve the foreign exchange. It was 100,000 pounds sterling, and Mr. Wells wanted it in U.S. dollars.

I went and sat in on the talks. I was very pleased at one point because the Treasury representative--they had been talking a good deal about the value of the export company and how it had been developed and so on--the Treasury representative pointed out that they had not included any undertaking and commitment by me not to enter the steam trap business. [laughter] I quite gladly gave them a commitment not to go back into the steam trap business as competition!

It was approved and went through, again to the annoyance of the people in New York, because they felt that this was a slap at them, as it was. They hadn't been given a chance to at least offer or to bid on the company.

Levenson: Wells was how old by then?

J. Service: Wells was in his eighties. I don't think we ever really knew. It was always sort of a mystery, just how old Wells was.

Salary Level

J. Service: Going back to arrangements with the State Department, they had to consult with the Department of Justice on various matters such as the level at which I would be reinstated, what to do about back pay. All the questions of back pay had to go to the court of claims. But, as a preliminary to the argument in the court of claims, the Department of Justice required the State Department to reinstate me at the closest equivalent to the salary at which I had been discharged. Of course, in the meantime, there had been salary increases. But also, in the State Department there are automatic yearly steps if your performance is satisfactory.

When I was fired I had been in class II at step IV. With this jiggery-pokery at the Department of Justice, the State Department was forced to reinstate me at a lower step, at step II. So, actually my status was lower.' [phone interruption]

Actually, of course, I should have been reinstated at the top of class II at step VI, assuming that the automatic increases would have been received, which was common unless you have an unsatisfactory performance, and of course disregarding the fact that I'd been selected for class I in 1951, but there was no way to get it.

We had to wait till it had been settled in the court of claims, which then took us another six years. But, let's discuss that later.

The Department was worried about my investments in Sarco. We had to convince them that there wasn't any conflict of interest in my owning some stock in Sarco.

Levenson: What was the difference between that and say, somebody who'd inherited a block of real estate?

J. Service: They were worried that I was involved in a company that did export business, and so on. It was all rather farfetched.

At any rate, I came back to the State Department at the beginning of September, I think it was, 1957.

Service vs Dulles as Precedent

Levenson: Before we start that I would like to get on the record the importance of the settlement of the case, Service vs. Dulles 1957, to the other people caught up in the McCarthy era. As I recall, for the other China Hands who had subsequently been fired it had no impact on their cases because department regulations had changed. Is that correct?

J. Service: That's right. They had changed the regulations so as to remove any basis for legal redress. They made it impossible for people to appeal to the courts.

Levenson: Do you interpret that as a view that there was, at least in some circles, a feeling that your case was bound to succeed, going back now to '52, '53?

J. Service: I don't think that they expected it to succeed, but they simply wanted to remove the possibility of people bringing suits. They wouldn't have any more argument about it, just get rid of people summarily.

My case has had application in many other cases. After the firing of [Watergate Special Prosecutor Archibald] Cox, the court in Washington decided that Cox's firing had been improper because the regulations of the Department had not been followed. It was decided by Judge Gesell, invoking precisely the principle on which we'd won. But, Cox was not interested in being reinstated. So he didn't pursue the matter. I'm sure that it has had an effect on a good many people. But I don't know of any loyalty security cases that it has been applied to.

Levenson: Or other classes of people involved in the McCarthy period?

J. Service: I don't know of any. Of course, other people have been affected by the earlier decision, the Peters case [Peters vs Hobby], which was that the Loyalty Review Board had no authority to assume jurisdiction of a case that had been decided in favor of the employee. Other people did benefit from that, although I don't know of any people that were actually reinstated.

Levenson: Thank you.

XIII UNCLASSIFIED STATE DEPARTMENT DUTIES, 1957-1962

Reorganizes State Department's System of Moving and Storage

J. Service: Before I came back, the Department notified me and the press that I would be doing unclassified work. It was in transportation, handling personal and household effects of people transferred to and from abroad. It was a very expensive matter, and the State Department did not do it in a very efficient, organized way. There were some packing companies in Washington that traditionally had handled the business. But they really did it on what amounted to a cost-plus basis. There was no limitation on what they could charge, and the customer, of course, was pleased if it was done in a super way, so the costs were super also.

The Department wanted me to make a study and make recommendations as to how shipment of household effects and moving people around generally could be handled more efficiently. So that's what I started to do. A great deal of emphasis was put on the fact I was doing unclassified, non-substantive work.

Apparently the Schulzes [Caroline's parents] were worried about this, because I see I have a letter here that I wrote them discussing why I needed, for the time being, to accept this type of work. I don't know whether we want to put that in or not. You might look at it.

Levenson: Quite a comedown from having been president of a company--

J. Service: Oh, well-- I obviously had to expect something like this. I was much too much of a hot potato to be given any substantive work, policy work, and besides I didn't have any security clearance at this time. So this was more or less what I expected. It was not a challenging job, but it was a chance to do something.

I did a lot of study. We got a lot of data together on shipments. I talked to a lot of other people in the business, talked to other government departments, how they handled their shipments, the Pentagon and other agencies that moved people around.

J. Service: We finally came up with recommendations. These included merging various functions into one unit. They were scattered. Writing orders was done one place. We had what we called dispatch agents or forwarding agents in various ports and they were handled by another agency and so on. We brought these functions all together in a new division which was called Transportation Management, TM, which of course [laughter] has now acquired a quite different meaning [Transcendental Meditation].

I drafted the necessary papers, putting through the bureaucratic process of getting it organized, the job classifications for the personnel, and so on. Then I became first head of Transportation Management.

We got letters, which are in the file, commending the amount of money that was being saved. We did, I think, a job that I don't have any apologies for. It meant, however, some fairly drastic changes in the way people's effects were handled, which caused a lot of people to be unhappy.

We had explored all sorts of ideas. At that time jets were just starting to come in. There was a real problem of using the old propeller planes. Somebody came up with the proposal that we could charter these old DC-6's, or whatever they were, and run a sort of a special Foreign Service, once-a-week flight to Paris or Frankfurt, something like that. Fantastic savings, but the idea of losing one plane full of 150 Foreign Service people was too much. We didn't go ahead with it.

It wasn't bad. There were some annoyances in it. I noticed that Jack Kahn's got one of them. The CIA would not have anything to do with me because of the fact that I didn't have security clearance. Of course, a lot of CIA people went abroad under Foreign Service cover. So when they had some need to consult with us, they would get in touch with my assistant and come over and talk to him. I'd let him use my office and my desk and they'd have their conversation. Afterward he'd discuss with me what it was all about, what we should do.

I knew from the trucking companies that trucked all of our effects shipments to the port of embarkation, that they always knew when it was a CIA shipment. The CIA were not bound by State regulations on the amount of cigarettes and booze. [chuckle] So, they always recognized CIA shipments, no problem at all.

Levenson: This was just shipping household goods, was it?

J. Service: Yes.

Levenson: And they wouldn't deal with you?

J. Service: No. We also shipped office supplies and things like that through all these dispatch agents we had.

Some Hostile Press Reactions to Jack's Reinstatement

J. Service: I was hassled a bit by the press. My coming back was a sort of one-day wonder. Some of it was quite unfriendly. Time magazine, for instance, had taken the attitude right at the Supreme Court decision that, "Well, now the Supreme Court has told the State Department the right way to do it. Let's get on with it. Do it the right way this time."

They dug up a lot of the McCarthy period stories about my views on China. I told the man that his research was very bad, that obviously if that was representative of my views, I had deserved to be fired. Then they just dug up more stories.
[chuckling]

But they were still basically unfriendly at this time. A lot of the press was. Marguerite Higgins wrote for the Herald-Tribune. She wanted to argue with me about American mistakes in coalition government and so on in Europe and Poland and so on. I told her I couldn't talk anything about Europe; I only knew about China. She didn't know anything about China, so we broke off our talk.

Levenson: Did you ever make any attempt to break into the press at this point?

J. Service: No. You mean to get a good press?

Levenson: Yes, or to respond to correct the record.

J. Service: No. I had some discussion over the phone with a Time man who wanted to write a story. This Marguerite Higgins I had an unpleasant time with. But, the rest of the people I didn't argue with. Most of it was friendly. It's fairly neutral, you see by the clippings.

Eric Sevareid used a broadcast to note my return--he'd had a broadcast about my discharge--and took me to lunch. I remember, very nicely, at which he said he was concerned about his own future and didn't think that his larynx, or his appeal, would last for many more years. I forget-- He thought he had five or six more

J. Service: years as a maximum. Of course, that was 1957. He's still there, but he's retiring at the end of this month, I think.

Odd Angles in the State Department

J. Service: There were some odd angles to my coming back. The State Department was touchy and nervous about my being there. Somebody dreamed up an idea of having experienced officers in the Department become "older brothers" to new officers just being commissioned. I received a notice and replied, of course, I'd be glad to do it, to have some younger buddy assigned to me. They quickly sent me a notice saying that the response had been so overwhelming that they didn't need any more. [laughter]

Soon after my reinstatement there was a new issue of the Foreign Service List. This did not specifically mention my discharge (which the court had ruled was to be "expunged from the record"), but it gave details of my employment by Sarco and Sarco International. The Supreme Court order was that I was to have all the advantages of continuous, unbroken service. Looking back now, it seems a trivial matter. But I insisted, and the Department agreed, that future issues of the Foreign Service List would have no reference to the break in my career.

Oberlin at that time had a program of inviting alumni to come back to talk about different career possibilities. I had done this several times many years earlier when I was stationed in Washington, going out and talking about the Foreign Service to anybody that was interested.

Now they invited me again. I suppose all the publicity reminded them of my presence. But the personnel people voted this down and sent some guy out who had never been in the Foreign Service himself, just some personnel type. They apparently were worried about possible publicity on my discussing careers in the Foreign Service.

Levenson: You had to clear a thing like that with the Department?

J. Service: Well, I did.

Levenson: Would you have done that before your firing, before the McCarthy period?

J. Service: I suppose not, probably. But, at this point, I thought, it's better to clear things. After all, I departed from the paths of being a good bureaucrat earlier and I was back on the path now.

There seemed to be general agreement that I could not be kept indefinitely on unclassified work, such as transportation management. The job was below my rank and seniority, for one thing.

J. Service: And there were regulations limiting the length of time a Foreign Service officer could spend in the Department without an assignment abroad.

I think the Department simply didn't want to grasp the nettle, didn't want to have to deal with the question. It may have been that they were hoping for me to retire. The letter I wrote to Satterthwaite, you remember, mentioned the possibility of my retiring early.

But I hadn't yet reached the minimum retirement age. I had to be fifty. In any case, I very much wanted to clarify my status and "prove something" by getting security clearance. Some of my friends in the Department felt that the only way to force the issue was to get a foreign assignment. They could hardly send me to a foreign post without a security clearance.

A New Style of Security Hearing

J. Service: In November of '58, the Department finally had new security hearings which, as I think I've already indicated, were very different from the old ones. They no longer had a Loyalty Security Board, or at least I didn't reach that stage because I was simply interviewed by some members of SY (the Office of Security).

No formal charges were presented, which meant that I couldn't have a lawyer. I also had no right to a transcript. I was simply there by myself to answer questions. I couldn't prepare or present any defense or call any witnesses, because the formula was that I was just called in to answer a few questions.

It went on for about ten days.

Levenson: Ten days?

J. Service: Not all day every day, but sessions for several hours a day for about ten days. I dug this out of a letter which I wrote about that time, so that jogs my memory.

We hashed over all the old business. Obviously they didn't put credence in the stories about Val [Chao]'s being a Communist spy or anything like that. It was a very unpleasant hearing in a way. The chief prosecutor, the person presenting the evidence and leading the questioning was Otto Otepka, who later on was

J. Service: fired by State because he had been leaking material from the files to the Senate Internal Security Subcommittee, Sourwine. But we'll come to that later on.

There was one Foreign Service man on the panel who seemed to be on my side and probably was the swing vote. The vote was two to one for clearance. Obviously the one against me was Otepka.

Last State Department Assignment: Consul to Liverpool

J. Service: At this time the Department planned to send me as administrative officer to Bonn. I was told by [Loy] Henderson himself that the army objected to my assignment. Just why the army should object or why the army should have the right to veto administrative personnel in the embassy, I don't know. Anyway, that was the story.

But Ed Rice was in personnel in the Department at the time. And he has recently told me that it was the West German government which objected to the assignment. It was not due to any objection to me personally. But the Cohn & Schine circus had played most of their Foreign Service havoc and gotten much of their bad publicity in American offices in Germany. Then several American senior officers serving in Germany had been McCarthy targets (Charlie Thayer, Miles Reber, et al). And finally and most recently, the West German government had had the unhappy experience of all the publicity relating to the John Davies' firing--he was counselor in the embassy at Bonn. The West Germans were afraid that there would be more controversy involving me. They have the right to decline to accept diplomatic assignments, so said no on me.

All this makes a bit of a mystery about Loy Henderson's excuses. A cover story? Or did the U.S. Army also object?

So I was then assigned as consul to Liverpool. By this time I had already spent sixteen weeks very assiduously studying German. Anyway, while I was at the Foreign Service Institute I insisted on taking an examination in Chinese. There was a big hullabaloo at this time in the Department about language abilities and qualifications. There had been a lot of stuff in the press about people being sent to posts when they didn't have any knowledge of the language.

I announced, to the surprise of the people at the Institute, I wanted an oral language examination in Chinese. The exam was by a very pleasant Chinese who was one of the instructors. There

J. Service: was also an observer. I forget his name, but he was an American who had some training in Chinese. I suppose he was a faculty member at the Institute.

The Chinese and I got into talking about [chuckles] various things--about de Gaulle and the atomic bomb--atomic testing was an issue at that time--and then about my next assignment. The Chinese just made up a phonetic approximation for Liverpool. I understood him all right, but the man that was observing said afterward, well, he thought we did very well, but he lost us at one point. I got a decent grade.

Levenson: Had you had any opportunity to keep up your spoken Chinese?

J. Service: No, none at all.

Levenson: What about your reading knowledge? Had you used Chinese material?

J. Service: No. I had been completely away. I could still speak some Chinese. I got a 3+, which I think was a tough grade. I think I really deserved a 4, on a grading scale of 5. But, they gave me a 3+, which makes me "reasonably fluent" or something like that.

I'd had no contact with China.

We had collected all of our effects by this time. They'd been stored for years in attics of various people in Washington. We had lots and lots of books including a lot of books on China. We simply lined them up on the big front porch, lined all the books up on edge and let any friends come and help themselves. Passersby on the street would come up and say, "What's this?" Then we'd say, "Help yourself." We gave away nothing really valuable but a lot of books. Of course, I never thought I'd have any more connection with China at all at any time.

Levenson: How sad.

J. Service: Then the house was rented after we left. The next tenant was a Norwegian officer. There were some bookcases in the house. They said, "Well, we have no books. Would you mind if we take the books just to have something on the shelves?" [chuckling] So, the leftovers were left for the Norwegians to put on their shelves.

Liverpool was a pleasant post. It had the advantage of a very nice house. We liked the idea of going to England. I went over early with Philip to get him into school because the English school year started rather early. Then Caroline came by ship.

J. Service: The English school was very concerned about whether they would admit Philip. They wanted an interview. The main purpose of the interview apparently was that the headmaster wanted to be sure that I, being an ignorant American, understood that discipline in English schools included physical discipline. I said we understood that.

Levenson: Meaning canings?

J. Service: Canings. Philip was never caned, but we agreed in advance that it was a condition of his being admitted. [laughter] It was a good school.

The Liverpool Consulate: A Visa-Issuing Office

Levenson: What were your duties as U.S. consul in Liverpool?

J. Service: Liverpool, basically, was a visa-issuing office for the north of England. London issued all the immigration visas for southern England, we issued them for northern England, and Glasgow issued them for Scotland.

The English quota is very large. It was always easy to get an immigration visa. So if anyone was coming to the States with the idea of staying for any length of time or might want to work, we usually issued an immigration rather than a tourist visa. It took away any impediments to working while they were here.

We issued a lot of immigration visas, which is a fairly complicated procedure, and also a great many temporary visitor visas. There were a number of Americans in the area. There had been an American bomber base in Burtonwood, not far away between Liverpool and Manchester. It had been a large base, but was practically closed down now. It was on stand-by basis, stores and warehouses, a supply base.

That had meant in the past there were a large number of Americans who needed passports. But this was practically all phased out when we were there, so that it was not a very exciting office. Political reporting and trade work were handled out of London.

We were occasionally asked to do something. At that time they were trying to blacklist firms that did business with Cuba. We did some foolishness about trying to report on companies that were trading with Cuba.

J. Service: It was a job mainly of running a visa-mill office and representing the United States. There had always been an American consul-general before I was there. Local people invariably called me consul-general simply because they couldn't conceive of anyone except a consul-general occupying the post.

I was senior to most of or many of the people that had been there. My rank entitled me to the title of consul-general, but it would have required Senate confirmation which the State Department was not about to try to hassle with.

I got invited out to a lot of formal dinners. The Royal Society of Chartered Surveyors, The Royal Society of Auditors and Accountants, and so on, ad infinitum. All these organizations had their annual dinner, white tie. Some honored guests give toasts to the city and port of Liverpool, or this or that. Consuls were fair game for this sort of thing. I did a fair amount of that.

Levenson: Did you enjoy it?

J. Service: No, I did not enjoy it very much. [laughter] I don't like giving speeches, but I had to do it.

There was a very active English Speaking Union. They were a lot of fun. We had a good deal of contact with them, turned over our house once a year for a big party.

Ginny came over and got married in Liverpool. We had a very small wedding for her. This was fairly early when we didn't know many people, but our inclinations anyway were to make it fairly small.

There was a large consular corps, about forty or forty-two consuls, but not all career consuls. A lot of them were honorary consuls, British businessmen or lawyers, insurance people, something like that, who for business or social reasons liked the position. There would be an honorary consul for the Dominican Republic or some country like that.

My predecessor had taken a very rigid view and refused to call on any of these people. I called on them all, which of course made staunch friends.

Levenson: Was there awareness, in the press or in your personal dealings, that you had been a very controversial figure in America?

J. Service: Yes, some. I'm not sure in the general public, but the people in the English Speaking Union knew about it due to the fact they were told about it at a very early meeting.

J. Service: I eventually became president of the consular corps and joined several clubs. It was a very clubby town. Some of the people in the London embassy were a little bit inclined to view club memberships as a barometer of success in the local community. At any rate, I joined more clubs than made sense, usually as an honorary member. You paid monthly dues but no initiation.

Anti-American Feelings

Levenson: What was the level of anti-American feeling?

J. Service: There was a great deal of criticism, anti-American feeling, since we had started up nuclear testing in the atmosphere at that time. Ban-the-bomb marches and parades were the order of the day. A delegation came and called on me and had a sort of sit-down in the office.

The police were very cooperative and friendly. The Ban-the-bomb people always gave advance warnings. They didn't pop in on you. They wanted to have the press notified, for one thing. So we knew they were coming and the press and the police were there in the next office.

I asked them to leave, and they said they would not leave until I promised them that the petition that they handed me was going to be given personally to Kennedy. I said, "Well, you know I can't make that promise. All I can do is to send it to the embassy in London which I'm sure will send it on to Washington. But there's no way for me to make a promise that this will go into the hands of President Kennedy."

So, they said, "Well, we'll have to stay here until you give the promise." They'd all been smoking my cigarettes and having some tea. It had all been quite friendly. Then the police came in and formally, one-two-three, asked them to leave and when they refused they hauled them out.

Acting Supervisory Consul-General for the British Isles

J. Service: At that time we had about eight posts, I guess, in the British Isles. There had been more. Now, they've been cut way, way down. Even Liverpool has been closed now. There was an officer in the London embassy serving as supervisory consul-general to

J. Service: keep in touch with these offices and make sure that they were handling their work properly. He was also in charge of the consular work in the embassy in London.

The man in that job was Don Smith who had been chief of personnel when I was in personnel in '49. He was due for home leave, and he recommended and it was approved that I go down to London to sit in his chair and hold the job while he was away, for about ten weeks I think it was.

That was very pleasant. I went down for a while and then Caroline came down. We lived in a little bed-and-breakfast hotel on Gloucester Place, not far from Grosvenor Square. My assignment was somewhat irregular since I wasn't the senior consular officer; but a lot of the people who were in charge of the offices in Great Britain had been brought into the Department under the Wristonization program which had recently consolidated the State Department civil service and the Foreign Service.

Levenson: Did you have any problems with the embassy people?

J. Service: None at all. The first ambassador was John Hay Whitney, and he had made a visit to Liverpool for a speaking engagement very soon after we got there.

Later on it was David Bruce, and he also visited Liverpool. My relations with both the ambassadors were very good.

Whitney came there fairly soon after I came to Liverpool. There was a large reception given for him by the English Speaking Union. I had to introduce him. You know, when you take over a new post it's a race to learn everybody, get to know everybody as quickly as possible, sort of selling yourself in a new community. He was quite impressed, I think, by the fact that I knew as many people as I did within a few weeks.

Dismal Career Prospects

J. Service: Actually, I felt I was doing a good job. I was getting commended. We had an inspection in Liverpool with very favorable comments.

Levenson: How big a staff did you have?

J. Service: We had four Americans outside myself, about twenty-two or so local staff.

J. Service: I heard various reports, rumors, that I'd been recommended for promotion by the selection boards, which were meeting each year. I began to wonder what really was the score. I wrote in each year. You could write to the Department and say, "How did I stand?" They would give you a general reply.

It was always the top half but not quite in the promotion zone. This got to be a frustration, and I think contributed to a period of depression I had in Liverpool. The doctor told me I better take up a hobby.

I went back to postage stamp collecting which I had given up when I was about eleven or twelve in boarding school in Shanghai. I still had my old collection, so I resuscitated that and started buying stamps at auctions and from dealers, joining a stamp society in Liverpool. It was a good idea. There were some very good auctions in London, still are. It's a very good center for stamps. I only collect Chinese stamps.

Levenson: Do you still keep it up?

J. Service: Well, I'm not active. I just don't have the time for it. After I came back to the States and got involved in being a graduate student I sort of tapered off. I've got a collection. I still go to stamp society meetings. The China Stamp Society has a chapter here in the [San Francisco] Bay Area. We meet once a month. But it doesn't quite have the fascination for me now that it did in Liverpool days.

Meanwhile, I had come on home leave in October of '61. I'd been two years in Liverpool, and so I came home in October and tried to find out where I stood. The Kennedy administration had been in now since the beginning of '61.

Levenson: As I recall, there were serious efforts made at that point to influence a change in American China policy?

J. Service: There were some, but they proved abortive. [Dean] Rusk apparently was very much against it. The man running F[ar] E[ast]--Roger Hilsman--tried to do something about it, and so did James C. Thomson who then was on the National Security Council staff. Anyway, that proved abortive.

Rusk had talked, when he came in as secretary of state, about rectifying wrongs. There had been high hopes that Kennedy himself would be more active, more willing to do something about victims of the McCarthy period.

J. Service: Anyway, I came back to Washington on home leave and talked to personnel. I had an interview with the man who had what was the equivalent of my old job, "The Wailing Wall." Now it was called Career Management and had become a regular section, with several people.

I found out that a summary had been written for the record saying that because of all I had gone through, it could be assumed or expected that I would be unwilling to take responsibilities and make decisions. Obviously, this had been put in to really prevent, to forestall, any board that wanted to promote me.

Levenson: Do you have any intuitions or ideas as to who did that?

J. Service: No. I have to assume that it was done with the knowledge or at the instigation or direction of Loy Henderson.

I thought it was a bit unfair, because as soon as I got to Liverpool, I had to make a decision on a very ticklish visa case. One of the younger leaders of the Labour Party wanted a visa to the United States, and our visa officer turned him down on the basis that he was left wing and perhaps a Communist. I forget the man's name but it's been in the news quite a bit. I had to explain to the visa officer that there were some very serious differences of opinion between the Labour Party and the Communists. I instructed him to issue the visa.

It seemed to me that I hadn't shown myself as being unwilling or unable to take responsibilities in the running of the Liverpool office. There had been some reorganization, and I had had some personnel problems. I'd been selected to go down to London and so on. So the comment that I was unwilling to take responsibility obviously was on instruction. The effect was an instruction to the selection boards not to promote me.

On the other hand, I have to admit that in my own letter to Satterthwaite, I had suggested I was resigned to the idea or accepted the idea of early retirement.

Levenson: What went on inside you at that point? Quite evidently by your early career and your subsequent performance you were entitled to expect a chance at the top.

J. Service: I think this was the most anger I ever felt at the Department.

Levenson: Did you vent it at all?

J. Service: No. I didn't think there was any point in making an issue of it. This was somebody's subjective analysis or judgment. What was more important, I felt, was trying to find out what the attitude

J. Service: was on assignment, transfer, and promotion. We had to do that pretty much at the White House level.

Roger Jones was at that time the administrative head of the State Department. I'd had some slight acquaintance through Bun Gladieux. Jones was not a State Department man, or a Foreign Service man, but a career civil service man in Washington who'd held various administrative jobs. He was very sympathetic and was very encouraging.

In fact he did, I think, push through what amounted to the rehabilitation of some people like Tony Freeman, who got an ambassadorship to Colombia and then later on Mexico. Jones kept urging me to hang in there and be patient.

[Interview 13: November 7, 1977]

J. Service: By this time they had had to put in a special regulation. The Foreign Service regulations had specified that you could only stay in class II for ten years. If you were not promoted in that time you were automatically retired. "Selected out" was the term.

My promotion to class II had been in 1948, so I was already reaching fourteen years. They had passed a special regulation, which really was just the "Service regulation," since it applied to no case except my own, saying that if you had been suspended or fired, removed from the service and then later reinstated, that the time out would not apply for selection out. This was a sort of an unwelcome embarrassment, shall we say--

Levenson: To the Department?

J. Service: No, to me. I had always been at the top of my class, and now had to have a special regulation to avoid selection out. I had fallen way behind all the rest of my class members. All the people that came into the service when I did, into class II when I did, had gone way ahead of me.

Levenson: Except for the other China Hands, who had been fired or resigned in the McCarthy period.

J. Service: Oh yes, there had been some of them who had been fired and some had retired. But even the ones that had stayed in the service, although their promotions had been held up by Scott McCleod--people like Tony Freeman--even those people now had moved ahead.

Levenson: Right.

J. Service: You want to turn that off a minute?

Levenson: Sure. [tape off]

J. Service: By the spring of 1962, we could get no good news. Things, I think, were looking more gloomy from the Washington end.

My brother, Dick, had become acquainted with Dean Acheson, the former secretary, the man who had fired me. As I recall, Acheson had volunteered to try to do some exploration of the situation. I don't think I even knew about it at the time, or if I did I said nothing would come of it.

But at any rate, Acheson wrote a letter to Dick dated April 20, in which he says, "After talking once with the Secretary of State," with Dean Rusk, "and twice again with Roger Jones, I agree with your conclusion that, 'The retirement should go through.' The secretary was understanding and well-disposed but seemed over-conscious of all the difficulties in the way of promotion."

I had already made up my mind anyway that it was a fruitless business. I had been told off the record, informally, that the Department was willing for me to stay in Liverpool, but that I could not expect any substantive job, any policy making or responsible job, and that I should not expect a promotion, and that they would undertake that I would not be retired or selected out. In other words, they would have to keep changing the regulation so that I was not forced out by being forcibly retired.

This seemed to me an untenable situation. I think Caroline might have been willing to stay on. I could have become a sort of an old man of Liverpool. But, as a post it was far less interesting, far less important than the post I'd held in New Zealand fifteen years before. At any rate, I put in for retirement.

I had come back to the Foreign Service in '57 with a good deal of realism, I think, about my situation and prospects. Then I had fallen away from that sort of stern and sensible attitude. I think I'd been deluded by the fact that I had gotten many, many commendations of one sort or another. I'm not trying to stuff the record here with various things.

I'd done well in the Department. A new administration had come in. So, the result was that I felt frustrated and a sense of failure in going out--

Levenson: Was this more acute than your distress in the 50's?

J. Service: It was a very great disappointment. Yes, very much of a disappointment, I think. This was more of a personal failure, I felt. But again, it was also somewhat like the first one, in that it was something that was really out of my hands, out of the State Department's hands. It was something decided, in an impersonal, distant kind of way by White House policy.

The White House was obviously worried about another long hassle with the Internal Security Subcommittee. They were already heavily engaged over Otepka, because State had fired Otto Otepka, who had been the big leak from the State Department to the [Internal Security Subcommittee] committee. I think they simply didn't want to complicate that issue by getting embroiled in my case again.

I'd been investigated and investigated and investigated. I didn't particularly fear any more investigations. I was quite resigned to go through with it. But the White House, I think, just didn't want to do it.

At any rate, I decided to retire. There's a rather nice letter here from Dean Rusk, which he might just possibly have written himself. After all he did know me, had known me.

Retirement: May 31, 1962

J. Service: My actual retirement was a bit more sudden than I expected. In the spring of 1962 there was a general, across-the-board increase in Foreign Service salaries. Whenever there's an increase in salaries there's a retirement problem. Our pensions are based on average pay for the last five years. If there's been an increase in pay, then everyone wants to stay five years to get the benefit of the higher base for the retirement.

To counteract that, to keep people from staying in after a general rise, the government offers a plum if you'll retire by a certain date: they give you a share of the benefit. In other words, they add one or two percent on your retirement. This particular plum was expiring May 31. If I was going to take advantage of it, I had to retire by then. I did and so did quite a number of others.

I was in London, and there was no particular celebration. It just happened that we had drinks at the home of an administrative officer. He invited us not for the retirement really but because he had stayed with us in Liverpool and was just repaying hospitalities.

J. Service: We stayed on in England because Philip's school didn't end until the end of July. Caroline and I went off and traveled on the Continent, took a cruise in the Mediterranean, which she'd always wanted to do.

The government let us stay in the house in Liverpool. There was no successor assigned yet. So, we stayed there and then came home in the summer.

Sale of Sarco Stock

J. Service: I should mention that all this had become a little easier financially because of the fact I had just sold my stock in Sarco Therm Controls. So we did have some funds to draw on, which gave us a little slack for things like a cruise in the Mediterranean.

The people in Sarco Canada eventually became interested in buying the minority stock interest held by me and Cumming. This was done in early '62. Cumming had a long hassle with the majority stockholders. They had tried to buy us out, force us out, induce us to sell at a ridiculously unfair valuation of stock. Then they tried to pull a fast one on us by making a deal with another company to sell the assets of the company.

They planned to sell the assets at an unrealistic, low valuation. Part of their own consideration was that they would get very good contracts to continue to operate the company, with fancy pensions and other benefits.

At any rate, we had to go to court. Wells' lawyers, whom we had gotten to know very well by this time, the Morris Ernst firm--Leo Rosen actually was the man that worked with us--we got an injunction to stop the projected sale. So we were able to preserve our interests.

Levenson: I find that very impressive. I've known career businessmen who've been euchred out in similar deals. How come you were able to prevent this?

J. Service: I think that we always had the sympathetic help and interest of Rosen's law firm, who had been Wells' and still were Wells' law firm. Leo Rosen by this time had become a very close friend, and he'd been involved in the hearing with McCarthy, you recall.

J. Service: So they had a friendly interest in our, or certainly my welfare, and I think the other man's too. The deal the majority stockholders tried to pull was pretty raw. One didn't have to be particularly astute to realize one was being euchred, shall we say, to use a more polite word. [laughter]

C. Service: Come look at our rainbow.

XIV BERKELEY YEARS, 1962-1977

An M.A. in Political Science

J. Service: I thought we'd probably come back to Berkeley--it seemed the logical place for both of us--and try going back to school, study and get a degree, a Ph.D. I wrote to several people. One of them was Woody [Woodbridge] Bingham here at Berkeley, whom I had known slightly. He was a friend of Edmund and Marian Clubb's, and a professor of Chinese history here at Berkeley. I'd met him in New York at the Clubbs' various times, although he and his wife had left Peking just before Caroline and I went there in '35.

I wrote to John Fairbank at Harvard, and also to Mary [Claybaugh] Wright at Yale. I'd met her during the '57-'59 period, I think, when I was in the Department.

The Association for Asian Studies must have had a meeting in Washington. Fairbank, who had always been very good at keeping in touch with me, had invited me to cocktails for a small group at his mother's home in Washington.

Levenson: I was there. Do you remember?

J. Service: I remember meeting Joe [Joseph R. Levenson], but Joe never remembered it. Were you there too?

Levenson: Yes.

J. Service: At any rate, I had met Mary Wright there, and she made quite an impression on me obviously. So, I wrote a letter to her. I was telling these people that I was thinking of retiring, going back to school, and did they have any suggestions, advice, and so on.

J. Service: Fairbank said that there were too many historians in the China field already and not enough political scientists and I should study political science! He recommended Berkeley because of [Robert] Scalapino being here, and Joe Levenson in history. He steered me away from history into political science.

Mary Wright was very keen on Berkeley because she had just read a manuscript--as a reader for the Stanford Press--Chalmers Johnson's book, Peasant Nationalism and Communist Power. She said it was a very good book and was very much impressed.

Woody Bingham was just perplexed at my whole idea. He was cordial and friendly and said, "Of course we'd be glad to see you at Berkeley." But, why anybody at the age of fifty-two, almost fifty-three, should start the long, arduous road toward a Ph.D., I think just escaped him.

In my ignorance, I didn't realize that to get into a place like Berkeley one had to apply long in advance.

Levenson: I was going to ask about that.

J. Service: I'm sure that back in 1927, when I'd been here before, one simply went down at the beginning of the term and registered. I had been a student, which becomes the point of the story here.

I called on Scalapino who was head of the department [Political Science]. He was cordial saying they would like to have me but there was this problem; I hadn't applied back in April when I should have.

I went around to the admissions office and got various forms. Reading the small print on one of them, it said that this required early admissions date did not apply if you had formerly been admitted as a graduate student at the campus, at Berkeley.

I had been admitted in 1932, in the fall of '32. I went back and asked them if they had a record, and sure enough they had a record. Even though I never finished the semester--I had dropped out in order to go to Washington to take the oral exams for the Foreign Service--I was there on the records as having been admitted in 1932. On this I got myself into Berkeley!

Levenson: Thirty years later.

J. Service: Exactly thirty years later.

1. Philip, Virginia, Bob, and Caroline Service,
Washington, D.C., 1957.
2. Joseph R. Levenson, left, with John S. Service,
Center for Chinese Studies, University of
California, Berkeley, 1964.
3. John S. Service, Aspen, 1972.
4. John S. Service receiving an honorary degree,
Oberlin College, 1977.
5. Jack and Caroline Service with Chou En-lai
in Peking, October 27, 1971.

neg card for all




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J. Service: The other problem was that since my undergraduate major had been in economics, and I had had only scattered courses in political science, they couldn't admit me directly to the graduate program. I would have to take some undergraduate courses in political science.

I, overenthusiastically, signed up for five. My adviser was Norman Jacobson. He thought I was doing a bit much, but at any rate, I was determined to try it. I soon found that four courses in political science [chuckling] was enough. I think that first year they were all political science. Later on of course, I took Joe, your husband's, course. They'll know who this is if I say Joe, won't they? [Joseph R. Levenson]

Levenson: I think so.

J. Service: I first took Joe's general course in Chinese history. Then I took a seminar later on which was very interesting and much fun.

Levenson: I remember his shock when you turned up in his class. He was always embarrassed that he had not been to China. I can remember very vividly him coming home and saying, "You'll never guess," with a big sigh and a look of alarm, "who I've got in my class." His feeling was not alarm at any of the political things, but the fact that you had been in China and he never had! [laughing]

J. Service: He gave some good lectures. I had a real grudge against his reader though. I think his name was Folsom.

Levenson: Ken[neth] Folsom? Why?

J. Service: I think maybe the first blue book, some question about the T'ang Dynasty, and I didn't bother about dates because I just assumed from the question and from the level of the lectures that Mr. Levenson wasn't terribly interested in knowing whether or not we could memorize dates. At any rate, the date of the T'ang Dynasty was something I knew so well that I didn't think I needed to worry about it.

I got very acid notes in the margins: "after all; this is a history course; we need some dates." [laughter; tape off]

At the end of the first semester--we were still on the semester system then--they accepted me in the M.A. program in political science. So I was embarked as a graduate student. I was not really happy with political science. I always held that against John Fairbank. My mind is not the right kind. I don't find abstractions easy to deal with, and the jargon drives me out of my mind.

J. Service: I really should have been in my first love--history. My real mind and bent is much more, I think, toward history than toward theory and political science.

Levenson: How did Berkeley's political science department fall in the political spectrum at that time?

J. Service: There was quite a feud going on then between the political theorists like Sheldon Wolin and the behaviorists. The behaviorists really won out. Wolin left.

Berkeley seemed to me to be overly academic. They look down on schools like Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies as being a "trade school," and so on.

This was the trouble with their Ph.D. program, as far as I was concerned. I couldn't escape things like theory and political behavior and American institutions.

I was much more interested in international relations and the Far East. But I couldn't really concentrate on that. I could include them as two of my fields, but I had to have two other fields in which I really didn't have the slightest bit of interest.

Levenson: Would you say that that's perhaps one of the reasons that over the years there have been relatively few candidates from Berkeley for the Foreign Service? This is something that has concerned me.

J. Service: I think definitely, yes. There have been some. But a man who is interested in the Foreign Service is much more apt to go to a school which is more practically inclined like the School of Advanced International Studies at Hopkins, or Tufts.

Levenson: How were you received by the other students? How did you feel as a nice, elderly graduate student?

J. Service: Most of them just thought of me as a pleasant old fellow, I suppose. [laughter] Actually I made some good friends with a number of students. Some of them were older students. They are not all young students at Berkeley by any means.

I was a reader for Chalmers for one of his courses. I made more money than he told Jack Kahn [\$1.37 an hour], but I don't remember just how much I did make.

I found out about the Center for Chinese Studies and went down and introduced myself, went to some of their bag lunches and affairs. I spent a half year sort of getting up to the starting line. So it took me two years to get the M.A. I got the M.A. in the spring of '64.

J. Service: Chalmers asked me once if I would be interested in working at the Center for Chinese Studies. I told him that this would be to my mind the best possible thing.

I had been passed with distinction in my M.A. exams which meant that I could go on for the Ph.D. I actually started it but by this time I had rather lost interest in the Ph.D. in political science. I really wasn't convinced I wanted to be a professor. But I did want to have a job and that's why I had come to Berkeley and come back to an academic community. I wanted a job in or near or around the periphery of a university.

A Job at the Center for Chinese Studies

J. Service: In the summer of '64 the center offered me a half time job as sort of supervisor-curator of the library. They had a professional librarian, a woman. She was from Taiwan and was educated in Taiwan. She knew almost nothing about mainland history or people, materials, books. So they needed somebody as a reference librarian and also to help on acquisitions.

Levenson: Who was then chairman at the center?

J. Service: Li Choh-ming was just going out, and Franz Schurmann was just coming in.

Levenson: What was the original purpose of the center? I forget exactly when it was founded. It was late 50's, wasn't it?

J. Service: Yes. I think actually '57 was when it was founded, but it didn't really start functioning until '58. It became apparent during the 50's, in the academic world at least, that we were losing out on a generation of China scholars. Our isolation from China, and McCarthyism were discouraging academic people from making a specialty of China, especially in the social sciences.

The Ford Foundation got interested. Some people here at Berkeley pushed and got a fairly sizable grant from Ford to set up a Center for Chinese Studies. Other centers were set up at Michigan, Columbia, and Harvard.

Levenson: As I recall, its mandate was limited to Communist China.

J. Service: That's right. Well, to contemporary China which was interpreted as being Communist China. A rather heavy emphasis was put on social sciences, which meant for a while that historians were sort of second-rate citizens and the humanities were completely out of the picture.

J. Service: This hurt a lot of feelings here at Berkeley. Of course, people like Bingham whose field was the T'ang Dynasty were completely out of the picture, although I think that he had been one of the people supporting the center. A lot of the Oriental Language people were out, although Professor Ch'en Shih-hsiang was in, I think, from the very start.

The first chairman had been a man in economics. I can't think of his name.

Levenson: Walter Galenson.

J. Service: Galenson, of course. Then Li Choh-ming who was in the School of Business Administration, but was an economist-- Here again it was a perfect case of Berkeley's sort of hyper-scholarliness that a man like Li Choh-ming, who was a very competent economist, couldn't get a job in the department of economics because they didn't believe in area specialization. Economics are economics, and therefore we don't need to have anybody with special knowledge of China and the Far East.

Levenson: I didn't know that.

J. Service: That's why he got an appointment in the Department of Business Administration, through Clark Kerr, I believe.

Levenson: Then, as I recall, the center was, by university decision, put quite a long way west from the university in the town center, above Woolworth's.

J. Service: The university said they didn't have space, and as long as we had funds from [The] Ford [Foundation] and Ford didn't object to some of those funds going to pay rent, why, the university just didn't offer us space. That was all.

Levenson: However, it definitely did remove the center from the hub of campus activities.

J. Service: Oh, very much.

Levenson: It made it hard for university people to incorporate it into their lives.

J. Service: But it did increase the togetherness, the collegiality, of the small group that were permanently down there, the staff, and the students who were fellows at the center. We were probably more of a group then, but we were isolated. We were completely off the campus, and we very rarely went on to the campus.

The Government Settles out of Court on Legal Costs, Pay Arrears,
and Retirement, 1963

J. Service: All this time our case was getting nowhere in the Court of Claims for various reasons. Ed Rhetts had been promised a political appointment. He had worked for [Hubert] Humphrey in the early days of the 1960 campaign. He'd been promised a job in sort of an agreement between Humphrey and Kennedy and he eventually was appointed ambassador to Liberia. So he had to pull out of the case.

In '62 Joe Rauh, who was an old friend of mine--I think I mentioned before--took over the case. On a home leave in '61 we'd had a hearing before the commissioner of the Court of Claims, a preliminary hearing to settle the facts. We had to deal with our same old antagonist in the Department of Justice, Mr MacGuineas, who was just as nasty in the Court of Claims as he had been in the other courts. He tried to introduce the substantive issues of violation of security and all the rest of it.

Levenson: Doesn't sound relevant.

J. Service: It wasn't relevant.

Levenson: What were the issues?

J. Service: Back pay, my legal costs, and the level of my retirement benefits. The government insists on deducting everything you earned on the outside, you see. They will not pay what you would have earned in full because they deduct your earnings. Then there was a lot of hassling over what I would have earned in the State Department because that depended on whether I got automatic pay increases, whether I got in-step, within class, step increases and so on.

But, in '63 Joe Rauh finally got people at a higher level in the Department of Justice, above Mr. MacGuineas, to be reasonable about it, and they settled out of court. I got about \$32,000, which was not nearly what we felt we should have, but it represented roughly, I think, the actual costs we could show we'd put into the case.

I had a check, for instance, for \$24,000, payment to Rhetts. I had paid something to the other lawyer who had helped in the Supreme Court. I'm not sure whether this is what the Department of Justice based it on or not. They included costs, for instance, of moving to New York and back from New York and so on. But, this seemed to be the figure they used.

J. Service: The main part of it was that they recognized that I had been reinstated at the wrong level, in other words, that I should have been reinstated at a higher level. So this increased my retirement pay. All this is in the Service papers.

Levenson: Did you feel in the end that you had been treated shabbily?

J. Service: Yes, to be perfectly honest about it. Yes, I think the whole business of deducting your outside earnings is a shabby trick for the United States government to do. If I had been a wealthy man, so that I could have afforded not to get a job outside, presumably I'd be entitled to claim all my pay. But because I had to go out and get a job in order for my family to live, and because I had been reasonably successful, all that gets taken away. I don't think this was fair treatment at all.

Levenson: Nor do I.

J. Service: Certainly not to have to fight in the courts for six years. After all I was reinstated in 1957, and it took six more years of very unpleasant nastiness with the Department of Justice to finally get this out of court settlement. I think it was definitely shabby.

Putting Down Roots

J. Service: We had a very good time in Berkeley when we came back. We looked around for a house for a while and didn't find anything immediately. Then we rented a house down here on San Antonio Road, a house actually that belonged to a man named Olney, who at that time was in Washington as administrative head of U.S. courts. He was an officer directly under the chief justice.

Levenson: Is that Warren Olney?

J. Service: Yes.

Levenson: He's one of our interviewees.*

*See Warren Olney, III: Law Enforcement and Judicial Administration in the Earl Warren Era, in process, Regional Oral History Office, The Bancroft Library, University of California, Berkeley.

J. Service: Oh really? Well, it was Warren Olney's house--small world department.

Before we rented the house I wanted to be sure that he knew that I was engaged in a lawsuit against the U.S. government. He laughed. He said he couldn't see that made any difference [laughter] to his job at any rate.

I joined one of the California Democratic clubs, the Grass-rootsers. A lot of faculty people were there. We used to meet in different people's homes. It got very active around the time of the Free Speech Movement, which started fairly soon after I started working at the center. [1964] One of our fellows, Riskin, was quite an active leader in the Free Speech Movement. We were very much taken up in that.

I joined the Unitarian Fellowship. I had a great feeling of wanting to put down roots, I think, to establish contacts. Caroline didn't have that feeling nearly as much as I did.

I had a great desire, having had my political experience before, I wanted to get into politics. There were no objections this time. I became a party worker, a precinct worker, passing out literature-- I've been in all the Democratic houses anyway in this part of Berkeley, passing out literature. I worked for [Eugene] McCarthy and then for [George] McGovern.

I was also a voting official. I became a precinct inspector. Then I was called for jury duty, and rather to my surprise, I was not rejected. It was a civil jury. I sat on five or six cases, and in all except one I was elected foreman of the jury [laughter], mainly I think by just being the oldest man there and not saying very much.

I should mention that I went through something like a sport car menopause, I think, at this period. I had always wanted to have a sport car and never had been able to, so I started out with an Austin Healey Sprite. [laughter] It was a little too small and light, so then I shifted to an MGB. Caroline didn't like that, and an open car does have some disadvantages. Next I had a Rover 2000 TC, which was terrific. But even that didn't persuade Caroline that good cars are meant to go around corners fairly fast. [laughter] All that engineering is to make them corner well. But Caroline just doesn't like to go around corners.

Levenson: Did you run into any difficulties after you came back to Berkeley?

J. Service: Well, that's the next chapter here.

Some Right-Wing Flurries about Jack's Working at the University

J. Service: Almost as soon as I took the half-time job at the center I got a call from some small paper down in Orange County, some very unpleasant person wanting to know whether the university knew about my background and whether they gave me any sort of a loyalty check or anything before they gave me the job.

It turned out that he was on the mailing list, I suppose, as I'm sure lots of other small town right-wing newspapers are, for hearings of the Internal Security Subcommittee, my old friends. So I went to the library and got the hearings.

It turned out that there was a long controversy going on in August, 1964, between the Department of State and the Internal Security Subcommittee. They were still having the big battle over Otepka's case, and they were trying to make all the difficulty possible for the State Department.

They had a memo or knew of a memo, which I suppose I might insert here. But they argued for several days with various State Department officials trying to get the State Department officials to give them a copy of this memorandum, which contained information from a third agency about my employment.

Allen Whiting, the principal witness, was in the FE branch of INR, the intelligence research section of the State Department. They had various other people. The State Department people said, "We can't reveal the contents of the memo because it's privileged, coming from a third agency."

Levenson: Did they identify the agency?

J. Service: No, the agency was never identified. We don't know whether it was the FBI or the CIA.

Finally at the conclusion of these hearings, Mr. Sourwine, who was the counsel of the committee, brings out a copy of the memorandum and asks the man, "Is this it?" They had it all along. Otepka presumably had stolen it from the Department, handed it to the committee. At any rate, here's the memo. It tells the whole story. [tape off]

Levenson: I'd like to elucidate some of these points. I see this memorandum is from R.L. Berry to Allen Whiting, dated July 21, and refers to a memorandum of June 10, 1964. When were you actually hired at the center?

J. Service: My employment had been talked about by June 10, but I didn't start work until July 1, 1964.

Levenson: But the memo reads, "On July 8, I conversed privately with Schurmann," et cetera, "and he was pleased at the idea and didn't show the slightest reservation about the appointment." He says he "fails to understand what is implied by the source's comment that this appointment, which was made at the recommendation of Scalapino over the objections of Franz Schurmann, places the governmental agencies interested in intelligence matters in the Far East in an awkward position, and Fong feels for that reason it should be brought to the attention of Whiting."

Who is Fong?

J. Service: No one knows. I don't know who Fong is, whether he's someone in Taiwan, or whether he's a Chinese [from Taiwan] informant of the FBI or CIA or what. There's nobody in the center named Fong. But, there were people in the center who were very close to the Chinese consulate at that time.

The interesting thing, of course, is that Scalapino really had nothing whatever to do with my appointment. As far as I know, Chalmers was the man that suggested it. At this time Scalapino was in the dog house in Taiwan. So whoever is putting this in is trying to smear Scalapino and make Scalapino look bad.

Levenson: And you.

J. Service: Yes, of course.

Levenson: And the university.

J. Service: That's right. Franz didn't object at all. Franz was, as far as I know and as he's always said, very enthusiastic about the idea. This was done by a person who wanted to give a kick to Scalapino, and wanted to give a boost or protect Franz Schurmann.

Levenson: That's really very interesting and particularly in terms of the way people's political perspectives change, to identify Scalapino as then being somewhat radical and Schurmann then as being somewhat conservative. These labels have become meaningless.

J. Service: Sourwine, who was the very nasty and unpleasant counsel*, was trying to push Whiting into saying that someone in the State Department had recommended my appointment. He was trying to establish some link that the State Department was interested in finding me a job. It is almost an echo of the old McCarthy hearing, that even though I'd been fired I was still working for the CIA. It was the same idea, that the State Department was trying to help me out or find me employment.

Levenson: Did this have any further repercussions?

J. Service: Not as far as I know. Clark Kerr told me that, "Oh yes, they did have some"--I forget just how he put it, but there were some noises made about my being employed, but that the university was not concerned.

A little sheet that was published down here in Oakland called Tocsin published an article about my working for the university.

Levenson: Nineteen sixty-five.

J. Service: Yes, that's later on.

Levenson: Is this a Catholic paper?

J. Service: I forget. I can't tell you much about this. [laughter] It's a right-wing paper. I don't think we need to do much with that.

Levenson: I believe that I may have brought you a copy of this. Do you remember?

J. Service: You mean you brought me that? I don't know where I got it.

Levenson: I know what happened to the copy I brought you because Caroline dumped it in the fire.

J. Service: Oh really? I'm much more inclined to hang on to things [laughing], masochism.

Levenson: As an experienced political observer, how did you respond to the upheavals on campus and in Berkeley which really started with the Free Speech Movement in 1964?

*J.G. Sourwine, chief counsel of the Internal Security Subcommittee, U.S. Senate.

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Security Case Star Works at UC Center

John Stewart Service, former State Department foreign service officer in pre-Red China and the star of well-publicized loyalty-security hearings, is living in Berkeley and working for the University of California.

He is employed at the University's Center for Chinese Studies at 2168 Shattuck Ave., Berkeley.

Service, who was identified as having "many contacts" with the Communist Party in testimony of Louis F. Budenz, was fired by the State Department in 1951 after an adverse ruling by the Civil Service Commission's Loyalty Review Board.

Budenz, former managing editor of the Communist Daily Worker, described Service as one of the persons within the State Department on whom the Communist Party relied to put over its policy in the

(continued on page 3)

John S. Service Working for UC

(continued from page 1)

Far East prior to the Communist takeover.

The Budenz testimony, given on Aug. 23, 1951, was part of a lengthy investigation conducted by the Senate Internal Security Subcommittee into the Institute of Pacific Relations. The IPR was a research organization which came under the control of a core of Communists and pro-Communists and turned into an instrument of pro-Soviet propaganda favorable to the Communist takeover of China.

Both Service and a State Department colleague, John Carter Vincent, were actively associated with the IPR. Vincent was named under oath as a member of the Communist Party.

Service was arrested in June 1945 by FBI agents for having turned over secret State Department documents to editors of the Communist magazine Amerasia. In 1957 the Supreme Court ruled that the Secretary of State did not have the power to dismiss Service. Reinstated, he later became consul general in Liverpool.

Entered as an exhibit in the IPR hearings was an article from the Daily Worker for Nov. 28, 1945, by the paper's then foreign editor, Joseph Starobin, in which Stewart and Vincent are lauded as "liberal elements" in the State Department who had opposed the reappointment of Patrick Hurley as ambassador to Chungking. The Communist movement had long sought Hurley's removal for his "openly anti-Soviet" policies.

Budenz explained that the inclusion of the names of Stewart and Vincent in the article, which appeared immediately after Hurley's resignation, was significant. "They are being recommended as people who stand for the things that the Daily Worker stands for," he said.

Starobin, author of the article, is the father of Robert Starobin, now a teaching assistant in the UC History Department and one of the early backers of the recent "free speech" rebellion. Young Starobin was arrested in San Francisco "civil rights" demonstrations last spring.

J. Service: Well, I was an interested and active spectator, yes. I was sympathetic and angry and so on. I felt the same anger that everyone else did, and I marched in the big parade at People's Park [1969], the big march, you remember.

I got into difficulties, I think, with Chalmers who has always been a very good friend, although we disagree very much. Our whole outlook is quite different. We got into difficulties really only during the Cambodia phase.

One of the big pluses, of course, about my whole job at the center was that it gave me very close contact with a number of graduate students, most of them very mature and responsible graduate students. My attitude toward the whole CCAS [Committee of Concerned Asian Scholars] endeavor was quite different from Professor Johnson's.

He got a report that they had taken over the center at one point, became very angry, and was annoyed at me because I had allowed them to have meetings there. I was there--not at the meeting, but on the premises--and I didn't feel that they were in any danger of taking over the center.

The CCAS people were not the people that were boycotting or disrupting Scalapino's classes. Our people were not engaged in things like that. That was the Red Star Commune or something like that, a very different type of outfit, I think a lot of them were party members, Communists or near-Communists.

Ph.D. Thesis Doctor and Occasional Editor

J. Service: From my point of view, the job at the center was very satisfactory. It soon became a full-time job.

After two or three years, I was offered a job by a new organization, a Chinese materials center in Washington, D.C. They wanted me to take that over and run it. It was under the American Library Association.

I declined the job, but I think that the people at the center felt that I had to be given a roughly similar salary here, which they didn't need to do. But it was very nice of them. So, I got pushed up so Specialist I. This meant a salary that was a burden to the center. I was quite content to work three-quarter time or something like that, sometimes half-time. I very seldom actually drew full-time salary, although generally I worked the full day, but felt I could quit early if I wanted to.

J. Service: The job itself wasn't always busy or demanding. Very often I had little to do. So, I started editing.

I was quite willing to edit or sometimes rewrite articles written by people at the center. I became a sort of Ph.D. thesis doctor.

Phil Lilienthal, whom I'd known for many years--he was out in China working for the IPR [Institute of Pacific Relations] in 1940 or '41--Lilienthal found out about my interest and asked me if I'd like to do some editing for the University of California Press. So I started doing occasional jobs for them, reading manuscripts, things like that.

Eventually there was a summer session at the University of Hawaii on libraries, particularly Oriental libraries. I went over and attended the summer school. It convinced me--by then the library was growing--that we needed a good, full-time professional librarian.

Our Chinese librarian had to leave. Her husband worked for Boeing, and he was transferred to Seattle. I had met a man in Hawaii that I thought would do the job well. They agreed, and I persuaded him to come here. We talked to various people, but the man from Hawaii was obviously the best one.

He came and he's been here ever since. He is a very good man, C.P. Chen [Chi-ping]. With him in the library there was much less need for my help. He was quite competent in acquisition--ing and reference and so on, so I became more, shall I say, an editor--particularly after Franz [Schurmann] finished his term as chairman in '67 and Chalmers Johnson came in.

Chalmers was quite interested in developing our publications program. He started the research monograph series. I became the editor of the research monographs.

A Friendly Meeting with Dean Acheson

J. Service: About this time Dean Acheson came to the campus, and we had a pleasant meeting. He gave a talk in front of Dwinelle Hall. I think it was on our relations with the NATO alliance.

After the meeting he was walking across the campus with [Edward W.] Strong. Strong was still chancellor, so this was before the Free Speech Movement got very far. I went up and introduced myself as a brother of Dick Service's. He laughed.

J. Service: We had a short chat walking across the campus, in which he pointed out that he'd had a hell of a time from his brother, Edward Acheson whom I'd known in Chungking. His brother had been a civilian working for the army in Chungking.

Also, he commented on the fact that the affidavit he'd given the government about my discharge had helped me a good deal, which it had. It had been crucial really, in our case, and confirmed what we had already suspected, that he knew very well when he wrote the affidavit that it would be a helpful one, because his affidavit says that he did not use his own judgment or consider the evidence in the case, but simply relied on the decision of the Loyalty Review Board. This was the basis for our claim that the State Department had not followed its own regulations.

Amerasia Again: Government Publication of Kubek's Scurrilous Two-Volume The Amerasia Papers: A Clue to the Catastrophe of China, 1970

J. Service: Early in 1970 various people got in touch with me about a new publication, a massive, two-volume thing that had been published by the Senate Internal Security Subcommittee, called The Amerasia Papers: A Clue to the Catastrophe of China, and urged me to get ahold of a copy and see it. I finally did. It nominally was an edited and annotated collection of the papers seized in Amerasia's offices at the time of the arrest in 1945.

But it had a long introduction, a hundred and seventeen pages I think it is, by a man named Anthony Kubek. It was really an attack on me, and based mainly, not on papers that had been seized in the Amerasia offices, but on my own personal collection of my reports that had been taken from my desk by the FBI and then later returned to me as being my own personal papers.

Levenson: How had he got hold of them?

J. Service: Obviously the FBI had kept copies of this material and had given it to the committee, just as the FBI, of course, had leaked all my personal correspondence, address book and so on, to the minority counsel during the Tydings [committee hearings]. In our own hearings before the L[oyalty] S[ecurity] B[oard], before the State Department board, this new material kept being brought in.

J. Service: You see, it hadn't been in the State Department at all, but since they had given it to the minority committee of the Tydings committee, they had to give it then to the Loyalty Security Board. It continually was interjected, brought into our hearings.

At any rate, this really annoyed me a great deal because it was just a rehash of the Amerasia business. It was an attack on what Kubek called the cover-up of the Amerasia case, alleged all sorts of behind-the-scenes crookery, skulduggery, political pressure, and prevention of prosecution in the Amerasia case. It greatly exaggerated my importance in the whole thing because it gave primary emphasis to a lot of these reports of mine.

I wrote a memorandum in September, mainly attacking Kubek, hoping to call attention to the errors and unfairness in the attack. I tried to get the Association for Asian Studies to take a stand. They talked about it, but they felt they couldn't. I thought of the American Historical Association.

John Fairbank suggested calm: let's not give Kubek the status of an historian. Kubek was not a member of the A[ssociation for] A[sian] S[tudies], so the AAS also really couldn't take any action.

My lawyers--Ed Rhetts was then back in Washington, and Joe Rauh--tried to talk to some of the members of the committee. Senator Ervin, Birch Bayh, and several others on the committee seemed potentially sympathetic. I was in Washington and we went around and called on them. We never could see the senators. We talked to their administrative assistants.

Birch Bayh said he was interested, but he was also thinking of running for president, and apparently he didn't want to do anything. We had a lot of nice talk, but no one actually would do anything. We doubted very much whether many of the committee had actually ever seen this or approved it. It had probably been done by the staff.

Levenson: Was this a government publication?

J. Service: Oh yes, certainly. It was advertised by the Government Printing Office.

Levenson: How often does the Government Printing Office put out a two-volume, so-called scholarly job? Is this a unique occurrence?

J. Service: Not entirely, but fairly unique [chuckling]. They have to print, I think, things that the committees give them, but we felt that this was an unusually scurrilous thing.

At any rate, we got nowhere.

Jack's Monograph: The Amerasia Papers: Some Problems in the History of U.S.-China Relations, 1971

J. Service: Some of my younger friends, particularly Orville Schell and Jim Peck, also Chalmers Johnson, urged me to do something, not quite so vindictive, not quite so concentrated on refuting Kubek, but also to talk about the policy angles of that period.

So I wrote my monograph, The Amerasia Papers: Some Problems in the History of U.S.-China Relations. It's not a very good title, but we wanted to have it next to Kubek in the library catalog file.

Levenson: Was it a relief to get down and write it out for publication?

J. Service: Oh, yes. I got very wrapped up in it. By this time, we had not only all the documents, some of which I got for the first time this way, but also the U.S. Foreign Relations volumes for '44 and '45 had come out, so we had a lot more material than had been available before.

I did a job on what policy was at the time, which I think refutes the Hurley view, except that Hurley did win support from the president. You can argue whether United States foreign policy is what the State Department says it is and what the State Department is trying to carry out, or what the president, for his own perhaps temporary whim, actually does. Of course, the answer is it's what the president does. That's the weakness in my case.

Fulbright Hearings: Davies, Fairbank, and Service Testify: A One-Day Sensation

J. Service: The center sent the Fulbright committee a copy of my monograph. I had known Fulbright slightly. I had negotiated one of the first Fulbright agreements, remember. When I came back from New Zealand in the Department I had met Fulbright.

At any rate, Fulbright had gotten a copy of my Amerasia Papers monograph. He had decided to have a hearing before his committee. It was to be an executive [closed] hearing. He had invited Fairbank, and John Davies who was in Washington, and me. I had agreed-- We were to go in July, 1971, I think it was. After we had agreed to go, the news came out about Kissinger's having gone to Peking and Nixon planning a visit to Peking.

J. Service: The committee meeting was closed, but when we came out of the committee room it was obvious that the committee or Fulbright had told the press about it. With the Kissinger visit and the tremendous hullabaloo about Nixon's visit to China [chuckling], all the TV people were set up. I recognized Roger Mudd and said, "My God, this really must be big stuff. They've got the first team here." He laughed.

Anyway, we were then interviewed by the press, somewhat to our consternation. John Fairbank is unflappable. We tried to get John to do most of the talking, but [laughter] we weren't entirely successful. At any rate, this was a great one-day sensation.

Levenson: I read the report of the committee. I found it most engaging, in violent contradistinction to the reports of the 40's and 50's.

J. Service: This was the first committee, as I started out by saying, the first congressional committee that I'd ever been present at where I didn't need counsel. [laughter]

Yes, it was a very pleasant hearing. The mood was nice.

As a result of the publicity on the Fulbright hearings, a man named M. Stanton Evans, who was one of the people who talks on the CBS Spectrum news radio programs, sounded off on my appearance before the Fulbright committee and brought up again all the dope on the Amerasia case and my conversations with Jaffe. To my great surprise I got a call from CBS over here at KCBS in San Francisco, offering me a chance of a rebuttal, which was the first time that this had ever happened.

So, I went over and I had three minutes. I gave them my three minutes' worth, rebutting Stanton Evans. I don't know whether you want this for the appendix or not, but there it is.

Levenson: Did you get any feedback from that?

J. Service: Oh, no. M. Stanton Evans, as far as I know, wasn't interested in continuing the debate. He just ignored it. A lot of people said, "We heard you on the radio." It's surprising how many people do listen.

Can we stop a minute while I go take a pill? [tape off]

Security Considerations: The Service Recommendation Not the Kiss
of Death for Foreign Service Applicants

J. Service: Something has just come into my mind. I've been making notes, but I forgot to make a note of this. Going back to my hearing, my security hearings after my reinstatement, 1958, one of the things that surprised me was that this man Otepka raised questions about some of the people whom I knew like Ed Snow, and particularly he objected to my knowing a man named Fritz Silber, who's the husband of Priscilla Yard, the woman who loaned me \$5,000 to buy the Sarco stock. This surprised me because it indicated that they'd had some sort of surveillance, either telephone or mail, to have known that I had been seeing some of these people.

I challenged him: "You say that I should not have known these people. How am I to know? What about them? What is their status?" Of course, he wouldn't provide any information. His comeback was that I should have known better. He wouldn't supply any information as to why I should not have had contact with these people. Well, that just is a footnote to the security hearings.

Levenson: To move on from that, did you have anxiety through the sixties in Berkeley about associations with Communists, whether you knew they were Communists or not? We had Bettina Aptheke, a leader in the Free Speech Movement, for instance, who announced that she was a party member.

J. Service: I just didn't have any associations with those particular people. I was perfectly convinced, perfectly confident in my own mind, that none of the people at the center that I was associated with were Communists. Kahn reports some conversation, which I think might be with Chalmers Johnson, about my asking something about Communists. I can't remember what Chalmers may be referring to. I think that it was about some paper or article that I was asked to read and comment on, which I thought was just a presentation of the Communist point of view.

I think that I did feel that my job perhaps was in jeopardy at the time of the Cambodia [protests], which was the climax as far as the center was concerned, because of my friendship with and membership in the CCAS. But it was something that never came to a head, was never really argued out, and rather quickly passed over.

Levenson: Did you have contacts through those years with some of the State Department people like Joe Jaeger who came out to assess campus opinion on the war in Vietnam, and I'm sure there were others.

J. Service: No, I didn't, but I did have several interviews with SY [Security] people who were investigating people applying for the Foreign Service.

Levenson: Oh really?

J. Service: Of course it was known on the campus that I had been in the Foreign Service. There's a sort of a Foreign Service fraternity here, people who are interested in foreign government service, not necessarily State Department. I was asked several times to talk to them.

Several people who became acquainted with me [in the] political science department or otherwise, came and talked with me before applying for the Foreign Service. Some of these people gave me as a reference. I talked to, I think it was at least three of these investigators. Those people all got into the Foreign Service, or were approved. One of them didn't go in the service, but two of them went in.

Levenson: So that your recommendation--

J. Service: Was not the kiss of death.

First Signs of a Change in U.S.-China Policy: Jack One of Four Americans Who Would be Welcome in China

J. Service: About this same time, out of the blue, we got a post card from Edgar Snow from Pao-an, where he had gone in 1936 before the Communists set up their headquarters in Yen-an, and where he first met Mao Tse-tung.

Somehow, to get a post card from Pao-an, China, from Ed Snow seemed like a message from the moon. Of course, things were moving. That was the real reason the Eastland committee brought out the Kubek books--to try to head off any move towards China by the Nixon administration.

Nixon started in fairly promptly with gestures toward relaxing our isolation of China. First he took off the strict boycott and then raised the limit on purchases that could be made, various things like that. Travel restrictions were withdrawn. American subsidiaries abroad, foreign subsidiaries of American companies were allowed to trade with China.

J. Service: On October 1, 1970, Ed Snow was invited to stand with Mao and the other leaders on Tian-an Men during the national day parade. The ping-pong team invitation was a few months later. Kissinger's secret visit was in July, '71. By August, the New York Times had gotten Scotty [James] Reston into China. Reston had a marathon interview with Chou En-lai, which was broken by an intermission for dinner. At the dinner table, there was some reference to the obvious fact that attitudes were changing from the former rigidities. It was Reston, apparently, who recalled that a number of Americans had suffered rather heavily because of their early views about the Chinese Communists. Perhaps, Reston suggested, it would be especially interesting to them to see the changes in China.

Chou seized on the idea with his characteristic alacrity, and spontaneously mentioned four persons who would be warmly welcomed in China "if they should wish to come." I was one of the four. The other three were John Fairbank, Owen Lattimore, and John Carter Vincent. The first I knew of this was a telephone call from somebody at the Times in New York asking what I thought about "being invited to China." The story had just come in by radio from Peking and wouldn't be appearing in the papers until the next day. I collected my wits enough to say that I indeed would like to visit China.

Levenson: What did you think of that?

J. Service: I thought it was great stuff. I was very pleased, of course. I wrote to Marshall Green, who was assistant secretary for FE and asked him if the Department would have any objection, and got the answer, no objection; to the contrary, they'd be pleased if I were to go. They were obviously fostering contacts.

I then wrote to Huang Hua, an old friend, who was then the Chinese ambassador in Ottawa. Canada had already established relations with China, and he was the first Chinese ambassador in Ottawa. I wrote to him, alluding to the news story and saying that I would indeed be glad to go to China.

He wrote back saying that I was invited. I had asked for Caroline to be included, so he was happy to tell me that we were invited to be guests of the Chinese government for a month or something of this sort.

Back to China with Caroline, 1971

J. Service: I'm not sure that we want to say a great deal about the China trip. It was a very moving experience simply to go back to China and see the changes, see what had happened, see a lot of old friends, not so many Chinese friends as foreign friends, the Adlers, Rewi Alley, people like that who stayed in China or, like Adler, had gone back to China.

The Chinese friends were most of them too old or too high up or their political health wasn't particularly good at the time. Some of them, of course, had died. My very good friend Ch'en Chia-k'ang had died, apparently of a heart attack, in a May 7 school, so I was told. Kung P'eng, the wife of Chiao Kuan-hua, at that time deputy foreign minister, had died. Another good friend named Wang Ping-nan, who was in Chungking during the war, was apparently in a May 7 school, and unavailable.

Then the older people like Chu Teh, Tung Pi-wu and others were simply too high or too old. I tried to see Madame Sun, but she wasn't very well, I was told, so I didn't see her.

Meetings with Chou En-lai

Levenson: What about Chou En-lai?

J. Service: We had several meetings with Chou En-lai, very pleasant. First was a session fairly early in October where he talked to all the Americans in China--and there were quite a group of us--and a few non-Americans brought in like Rewi Alley. I kidded him about being an honorary American. [chuckling]

Levenson: Was he from New Zealand?

J. Service: Yes, legendary New Zealander.

We actually met first at an October 1 dinner. But after a handshake, Chou En-lai was at a table far away; we didn't have a chance to talk to him. He and Chiang Ch'ing were up at the head table, along with others, of course.

Then we had this interview with the Americans in which Chou picked me out and said quite a number of things to me or about me. Later on before we left China, Caroline and I were invited to a meeting with him, which happened to be just the day after the Chinese had been accepted in the UN.

Chou En-lai, as Seen by an Old China Hand

Whether in 1941 or 1971, He Always Had 'the Rare Gift of Instant Rapport'

BY JOHN S. SERVICE


Few people who met Chou En-lai face to face were likely to forget him. He carried an aura of magnetic vitality. Being handsome was part. But one's first impression was caught by the eyes. Below the black, bushy, upward-tilted eyebrows, the eyes were bright, penetrating and looked right at you. You felt that you had all his attention, that he would remember you—and what you said. It was a rare gift of instant rapport.

It was like this when I first met him in Chungking in 1941. He was then a semidiplomatic representative from the Chinese Communists in Yen-an, who were growing in stature but not yet taken seriously by many as rivals for the national power of Chiang Kai-shek; and I, a young officer of the American Embassy—a Third Secretary, in fact, than whom in diplomatic terms there is no one more lowly. It was still the same, 30 years later in 1971, when I greeted him in Peking as the long enduring premier of China. The only changes seemed to be that his up-combed pompadour of black hair had lost its "un-Chinese" suggestion of waviness and had turned iron gray; and that his body, once fond of lounging gracefully in an easy chair, now showed some of the stiffness of age.

After that first meeting in 1941 and up until April, 1945, I had much opportunity to get beyond that vivid first impression. Talk was important in Yen-an, in northwest China, the Communist headquarters in those years. This was true within the Communist Party—to iron out differences, evaluate the shifting political balances in China and fit their policies to what they expected the future to bring. It was also true in their treatment of the few foreigners present. For we, and especially we Americans, were then an important part of the wartime political equation within China, and of China's uncertain future.

How committed, for instance, was the United States to the support of Chiang Kai-shek and his Nationalist Chinese government? Talking to Americans, then, was obviously important among Chou's several party roles. To it, he devoted unflagging energy and endless patience.

I watched him over those years as he met many American visitors, high or low, civilian or military, sophisticated in Chinese affairs or completely uninformed. Yet no ignorance seemed to dismay him, nor was any question dismissed as too trivial or irrelevant. Indeed, no matter how trying the circumstances, I never saw him show boredom, annoyance or fatigue.



Chou En-lai

By James Francavilla, The Tim

Then (as later in Peking) the time of day—or night—seemed to matter little. In the simple, informal life of Yen-an, where many lived in caves in the hillsides, he might stop by the sparsely furnished cave I shared with Col. David Barrett, commander of the U.S. Army observer group, known as "Dixie Mission." Or if I visited Chou's cave at the party headquarters across the river, Teng Ying-chao, his charming wife and companion of the Long March and a lifetime of revolution, brewed tea and asked that I stay for potluck.

Nor was there any bureaucratic scheduling that cut an interview short. It was natural to talk as long as the participants had something they wished to say. Astonishingly, this habit, too, persisted into his last years of activity in Peking when his duties as the executive head of government must have been enough to swamp more ordinary men.

My wife and I were suddenly called to see him the day after Henry Kissinger had left Peking (on his second pre-Nixon visit in October, 1971), which was also the day after China had been voted into the United Nations. We were surprised: It seemed the worst possible day to be imposing on the premier's time. Nonetheless, the talk lasted for an uninterrupted three hours.

Come to think of it, there was one interruption—of a sort. At one point a young woman came into the room and walked silently up to Chou's chair bearing a small tray with a glass of water and two pills. He took the pills and a gulp of water, made a small grimace and went on talking without a break in his thought.

Those Chungking and Yen-an talks with Chou were always a cerebral exercise, but a very pleasant one. He was urbane and good-humored, alert yet not tense and edgy, witty without sarcasm or malice, amazingly quick at grasping your thought but never impatient with your stumbling effort to state it, mental-

ly agile without being tricky, adroit without being bombastic. He was ever willing to meet an issue head on, yet always searching for areas of agreement.

One watched an active, purposeful, disciplined and extremely well-organized mind. He was, of course, trying to move us toward his (and his party's) views of China and the world—things that he believed in deeply and sincerely. But it was an effort that depended on calm reason, clear statements couched in moderate terms, a broad knowledge of history and the world, and an astonishing grasp of fact and detail. One was to be persuaded (or educated), but not overwhelmed or scorned for disagreeing.

At the same time, one felt that Chou regarded all these talks with Americans as having another value. Our reactions and attitudes—whatever they might be and even if they related to China—had a practical usefulness

Born in China of missionary parents, John S. Service was a U.S. Foreign Service officer and China specialist attached to the U.S. Army in the 1940s. He was dismissed by the State Department in 1951 during the McCarthy period, and was later vindicated by the Supreme Court and reinstated. Retired since 1962, he is editor of research publications at the Center for Chinese Studies, UC-Berkeley.

to him in the hope of better understanding the broader views and probable policies of a distant, enigmatic, and to them largely unknown America.

It was always a matter of give-and-take. He was frank and outspoken, and he expected the same. Disagreement did not upset him (he probably expected a good deal), but one sensed disappointment if you could not support that disagreement in intelligent terms.

So, to Chou, we were probing for a better knowledge and understanding of the Chinese Communists. And Chou, through Americans in China, was probing for an understanding of the United States. But the exchange was uneven: Chou was more articulate and adroit than we, and an authoritative spokesman for the Communists; we were only junior officers representing policy-makers in faraway Washington, whose thinking we knew only slightly.

And then history played a trick. The importance of the authoritative knowledge that Chou and Mao Tse-tung gave us was not recognized by President Franklin Roosevelt and the American policy-makers. And the impressions that Chou and the other Chinese leaders may have gained from Americans in China—at least until the new U.S. ambassador, Gen. Patrick J. Hurley, had been some time in the country and made his bed with Chiang Kai-shek—proved unreliable because we were so far removed in rank and distance from the policy center in Washington.

In January, 1945, before the die of American policy was finally cast, Chou was astute enough to realize the problem. He asked to come to Washington so that he could talk to President Roosevelt and learn, "from the horse's mouth," where America stood on the vital issues that concerned the Communists. That hope was thwarted by Ambassador Hurley. Historian Barbara Tuchman is probably right to doubt whether, at that late stage, it could have changed history. But it certainly would have called for a virtuoso performance by one of the world's most brilliant and persuasive diplomats.

Instead, as we know, Roosevelt and Stalin strangely found that their mutually unrealistic views on China coincided. So we had the Yalta agreement. That made inevitable a Chinese civil war in which the United States was hopelessly tied to the side of Chiang Kai-shek's Kuomintang. And thus was needlessly sealed the unhappy course of American-Chinese relations for the next 27 years.

Chou lived to see the reversal of this policy and the beginnings of the American detente he had sought so long ago. It was unfortunate that American dilatoriness in implementing the Shanghai communique, signed by President Nixon four years ago, robbed him of seeing it brought closer to fruition.

J. Service: I was surprised. We were about to leave, and apparently he determined that he was going to see us. So, we were crowded in although the meeting went on for, I think, almost three hours.

He didn't want to talk very much about the old times. I had hoped to get him to talk something about Hurley and that period of history I was involved in. But, he sort of brushed it aside, [saying,] "That's all past. Let's talk about the present."

Levenson: Did you have a feeling of an old friendship renewed?

J. Service: Very much so. He's a very warm, intent, sincere person. He remembered me very well.

That evening when the Americans were there he started thinking about who was around whom I had known. He suddenly thought of an old, now an old, man named K'o Po-nien, who had been one of the liaison officers assigned to our group in Yen-an. He later on became ambassador to Denmark and had various other diplomatic posts. He'd been a professor of history at some university before he joined the Communists.

This was eleven o'clock at night, I think, by the time we were at this stage of the interview with all the Americans around in a huge circle in this big room in the Great Hall of the People. He sent a word [loudly], "Call K'o Po-nien. Get him here!" [laughter]

So poor old K'o was routed out of bed, I'm sure. He arrived sleepy-eyed and blinking. Chou insisted a chair be brought in so he could be seated next to me.

There was a great deal of warmth, and Chou made a lot of complimentary references to me. The picture we've got downstairs, I think is quite characteristic. You've seen it.

When we had the private meeting with him he asked about old friends whom he'd known, Fairbank and Lattimore and various other people, about Dave Barrett who, after the Communists took over Peking, had been accused of fostering a plot against Mao's life.

That was a crazy, sort of a wild-eyed intelligence thing. It's a long story which we don't need to go into here. The Chinese had accused Barrett of providing money for the plotters who were supposedly using an old trench mortar from about a mile away to try to hit [chuckling] Mao Tse-tung while he stood on Tian-an Men.

Levenson: When was this, '49?

J. Service: Yes, this was '49.

At any rate, he said, "Mistakes were made and we're very sorry. Give my best regards to Colonel Barrett."

It was very, very warm and pleasant.

Levenson: Did you have any opportunity to raise the question of Mao's supposed request to come to America in '45?

J. Service: No. If we had had a chance to talk about that period--this was one of the questions I had in mind. But, he didn't want to have a historical session, so, I never did.

Levenson: Was your impression of him that he was well versed in international affairs?

J. Service: Oh, very well versed, most certainly.

Chou was a person with all the intellectual capacities of a Kissinger. I think no one had any better mind than he did. He had traveled a great deal, of course, as premier and as foreign minister. He'd been at the Geneva conference and the Bandung conference and many conferences around the world. He toured Africa. He was not parochial or ill-informed at all.

I think the Chinese do tend to put too much credence in foreign movements that they hope are strong. When we were there some of the Black Panther people were in Peking. They had some Puerto Rican group, the Young Lords from New York. They had one of these splinter Communist groups, a split off from the Socialist Workers Party. The Socialist Workers Party had gone against the Chinese because of their being willing to receive Nixon. Then one group split off, and they were invited to Peking.

You had the feeling that perhaps they gave these people more importance than they really had. But I don't think that Chou himself was naive at all.

Our private talk was mainly a tour of the horizon kind of thing.

Levenson: Briefing you?

J. Service: Yes.

Levenson: With the idea that you should take a message back with you?

J. Service: Well, I suppose so. Huang Hua asked me to come to Ottawa to pick up the visas before we went to China. I had told Huang Hua, so there would be no misunderstanding, that I wasn't going to China as a representative of the government, I wasn't going to China as a writer, but I expected I would probably write something, and that anything I was told or learned should, I thought, also be reported to my government.

So Chou knew that I would be interviewed. So it's possible that he was talking partly to the U.S. government, but Kissinger had just been there. I guess it was the day after Kissinger left.

Kissinger in Peking: An "Invitation" to San Clemente for Thanksgiving

J. Service: While Kissinger was in Peking, I was asked to talk to him. The way they put it was that Kissinger had heard I was there and asked to see me. Well I doubt that, because the eventual conversation made it quite apparent that Kissinger was very foggy about who I was.

Levenson: When you say "they," do you mean Chinese officials?

J. Service: The Chinese, yes.

Levenson: What was your impression of Kissinger?

J. Service: He's a very smart, intelligent, quick person. But I made a mistake. There were two other people there. There was [John] Holdridge and a man named Al Jenkins from the State Department. Holdridge I think was National Security Council, and Jenkins was State Department. They were present and I thought that they wanted my impressions of China. I'd been in China at this time for over a month.

So, I was talking about my traveling and things I'd seen. I was talking mostly to Jenkins and Holdridge, because they had some China background. Neither one of them had spent any time in China to speak of, but at least they were so-called China specialists.

That was a mistake. I was supposed, I think, to talk only to Kissinger. Neither Holdridge nor Jenkins would say a word. They were almost embarrassed by my talking to them rather than directing my talk to Kissinger.

J. Service: I changed. I got myself better oriented, shall we say. Kissinger asked me at one point, "Were the Chinese serious about Taiwan?" In other words, that they wouldn't have normalization of relations until we broke off with Taiwan.

I said, "Yes, they're absolutely serious."

He said, "You don't think they're bargaining?"

I said, "No, on this question they're not bargaining. It's a symbolic issue. They may be willing to accept some sort of a formula which would still not incorporate Taiwan, unified in the mainland, wholly. We have to recognize Chinese sovereignty, and that means we have to break off diplomatic relations with Taiwan."

I think Kissinger found this very hard to believe. He said, "Oh, my people are always telling me something different. They say they're like the Russians. This is bargaining."

I said, "No, this is not a bargaining point."

During this dialogue here I said something about Mao. He suddenly stopped and looked at me, sort of surprised, and he said, "Do you know Mao?"

I said, well yes, I knew him quite well.

Then the wheels went around for a little while, and a moment later he said, "Would you be willing to come to San Clemente?" Kissinger said, "When are you getting back to the States?"

I told him when it was. It was going to be somewhere before November 15.

He said, "Would you be willing to come to San Clemente? We're going to be out there about that time. We're going to be out at San Clemente for Thanksgiving."

I said, "Certainly. I'd be perfectly willing to come to San Clemente." He never mentioned the president's name, but it was obvious that coming to San Clemente, "We'll be there at Thanksgiving"--

I said, "Certainly."

Then he said, "As soon as you get back to Washington I want you to call my secretary and tell her where you can be reached and how we can get a hold of you anytime we want to." He said

J. Service: this twice and saw me out the front door and again made a point of this business of calling his secretary. He said, "She'll know all about it. She'll be briefed. But, we want to know how to get in touch with you."

I agreed to do that, and [chuckling] nothing came of it.

Services Mobbed by the Press in Hong Kong

J. Service: When I was in Peking the New York Times got hold of me and wanted me to write an article for their magazine. I agreed to do that. But I didn't try to write it in China.

When we came out and got to Hong Kong we were really unprepared--I wasn't prepared--for the terrific furor. I should have been. I should have been prepared really. There was a tremendous interest, you remember, at that period about Nixon's visit which was coming. Kissinger had just made his second trip to China.

When we got off the train in Hong Kong, we were simply swamped. Every newspaperman in Hong Kong seemed to be down at the railway station, firing questions, some of them friendly, some unfriendly.

The French news agency, Agence France Presse had a Chinese who wanted to bring up my old views, and did I still feel China was, you know, paradise, and so on and so on. At any rate, it was very hard to get away from these people.

The main thing, of course, was the Lin Piao affair. In China we heard nothing about Lin Piao. He obviously wasn't visible. There had been this rumor of a plane shot down. That was just before we went into China. All air traffic in China was stopped for a day or two. But, it hadn't yet been tied up in China with Lin Piao's being on the plane.

I had made various random inquiries in China, what had happened to Lin Piao, and was always put off. "Important leaders often disappear for conferences," or something like that, or "Lin Piao's health has been bad; maybe he's not well."

Only one man had said, "Well, later on it will become apparent." I should have perhaps been better attuned to realize that this was some sort of an intimation that the true story wasn't being told. But, by and large, Lin Piao was simply a non-subject. You couldn't find out. Nobody talked about him.

J. Service: When I got to Hong Kong, just having come out from China, everyone expected me to have information about this business. All I could say was, "In China you don't hear anything; you don't know anything," which made me look like a bit of a fool.

The press club wanted me to come and have a session with them at their luncheon. I declined. I simply wasn't set or prepared for this. I wasn't really trying to make a big thing out of the whole thing. As far as I was concerned it was a personal trip, a sentimental journey, if you want to call it that, rather than a news-gathering thing.

I did talk to the consul-general in Hong Kong, spent a day talking to him and to some of the people on the staff. I didn't ask and I wasn't told who they were. I had told the Chinese that I was going to talk to my government. And I had written out a summary. Right after we left Chou En-lai I borrowed a typewriter from the Adlers and had written out a summary of the talk. So, I had that.

Levenson: Back to old times.

J. Service: Yes. Anyway, we just sort of holed up. I'd gotten in touch with Loren Fessler. He used to be with Time magazine and then was working for the Universities Field Service. He found us a room in a small hotel, a comfortable enough room, but not one of the tourist hotels.

We stayed there. Various people tracked us down. I talked to a Newsweek man, Sidney Liu. Several other people, NBC and ABC got a hold of me. I was on the [Frank] McGee show, the Today show. We got out of Hong Kong as fast as we could and came home.

Levenson: How did Hong Kong seem after China?

J. Service: Oh, it was a terrible shock. It's depressing to come out of China and as soon as you get across the border you start seeing beggars, and filth, the crowded shacks, and all the development in the New Territories. The commercialism and the advertising and everything in Hong Kong is a cultural shock after you come out of China where we'd been for six weeks.

Plus the fact that we felt harried and pursued and unhappy--

The Oakland Tribune had a very enterprising woman that I'd met before I went to China. She called up long distance and interviewed me in the hotel. It was a pretty good piece in the Tribune, apparently was passed by old Senator [William] Knowland himself. He was still alive then.

Levenson: [laughing] That was a turnaround, wasn't it?

J. Service: Yes. Incidentally, while we're thinking of it, the big turnaround really came with the announcement of the Nixon visit and the Fulbright hearing, because all the papers and all the magazines, the news magazines, wrote it up quite extensively, wrote up the Fulbright hearing and our interview afterward.

The coverage was astonishingly different in tone. Newsweek had been less antipathetic, less hostile than Time in the old days. But, even Time magazine just fell all over itself to be friendly.

I had promised an article for the New York Times Magazine. I wrote it when I got back and sent it in. They held it for a while and decided not to use it.

There were several things wrong. Partly I simply can't get away from writing State Department reports. Also I think I didn't draw conclusions--didn't do the analysis. I tried to say, "This is what we saw," and let the reader draw his own conclusions.

So they turned the thing down. Harrison Salisbury, whom I had had some contact with before, heard that the magazine section had turned it down. He called me and said that he'd seen it, would like to make some excerpts and use them in the Op. Ed. page. I said, "Go ahead."

So he did, and they ran I think for three days in the Op. Ed. page.

Levenson: Under your name?

J. Service: Yes. One mistake I perhaps made was in not asking to check his excerpting. He cut out all the qualifying sections where I point out that, of course, the reader will know that it's a Communist country, that the Chinese don't have democratic freedoms as we know them in this country, that education, propaganda, and the press are all controlled, and things like that.

Well, those weren't interesting so far as Harrison Salisbury was concerned; so the published excerpts are more rosy perhaps than my full picture. It made me look a little bit like a starry-eyed apologist, I'm afraid. However, I can't worry too much about that.

A New Yorker Profile of Jack

J. Service: About this time I got a letter from [E.J.] Kahn of the New Yorker, asking whether or not I would consent to be profiled. We had some debate as to whether it was a good idea or not.

Levenson: What were your reservations?

J. Service: I didn't really have any reservations. It was other people, friends and Caroline, that had reservations. Certainly some of my friends here in Berkeley thought that I ought to insist on okaying the text. I didn't think we could put any real reservations on it. In other words I thought he had to be free to write whatever he wanted on the basis of what I said to him and what other people said, because his procedure is to interview a lot of people. It's not just interviewing the profilee.

It turned out that he became interested because his wife was the sister of a man named Don Munro, who was teaching at Michigan and who had spent a year at Berkeley just shortly before that. He's in Chinese philosophy.

Through that connection, apparently, Kahn had gotten interested. I agreed. He was coming out to San Francisco for some alumni chore--he's a Harvard alumnus--alumni association meeting or something of this sort. He talked to me and Caroline and various other people and was going to talk to more people, but then because of the Nixon visit, they wanted him to hurry up. He wrote it in a great hurry.

I was in New York, I think on my way to an appearance--the BBC wanted me to come to London for a talk show they had--along with Harrison Salisbury and [Ray] Ludden. At any rate, I had to read the thing in a hurry.

Levenson: So he did allow you to look at it?

J. Service: I did actually see the thing, which was just as well because it is an extremely complicated story, as anybody who has gotten this far will know by now. He had some factual errors which I was able to correct. Of course, a lot of the things he'd been told by other people--I wasn't able to really do much about that--some of them were things that I wouldn't necessarily have agreed with. But, if it was factually wrong, I'd try to correct it.

That was published in April, 1972.

• P R O F I L E S •

FORESIGHT, NIGHTMARE, AND HINDSIGHT

"Both before and after his banishment from responsible governmental affairs, Service talked extensively with the highest Communist Chinese leaders, and during the Second World War he was one of a very few American diplomats whom Mao Tse-tung and Chou En-lai knew well. The fact that this man, whom the future rulers of Peking grew to like and trust, was quiet, dignified, candid, compassionate, and that he represented the very best in America, could have been most helpful to our country."



John Service

"As another friend of Service's has remarked, few men have been so mightily defamed by nasty people and so meagrely defended by nice ones."

"Meanwhile, Stilwell's successor, General Wedemeyer, passed through Tokyo on his way home for consultation. He had a cordial chat with Service, in which he said that Service was being recommended for a medal awarded to civilians for exemplary work during the war. In Washington, Service later heard, Wedemeyer saw J. Edgar Hoover, and afterward there were no more cordial meetings and no further talk of a medal."

"The rendezvous was arranged with typical Kissinger furtiveness, but nothing much came of it; Kissinger, unlike most senior members of the United States Senate, didn't seem to be aware that Service had ever met Mao."

"Among some of the crueller jabs at Service, in his years of limbo, was the allegation that he was somehow personally responsible for the deaths of American boys in the Korean war. The fact is that if he had been listened to, and the United States had taken a realistic view of China and its Communists, there might not have been any Korean war."

From a Profile of John Service, ex-Foreign Service officer and political casualty, by E. J. Kahn, Jr. Appearing this week in The New Yorker. Yes, The New Yorker.

Generally Low Level of Press and Public Information on China

J. Service: Fulbright had wanted me to come back for another session after I'd been to China. I couldn't very well refuse, although I wasn't really seeking publicity or press. But I did agree to go. He had [Ray] Ludden at that time and also a man named Warren Cohen who's a professor of diplomatic history at Michigan State University. That was in February of '72. That wasn't much of a hearing actually.

Levenson: What was your policy on dealing with the flood of requests you must have had for speaking?

J. Service: I turned most of them down. I turned all of them down that I could. I was getting two or three requests a day, lecture agencies, commencements at universities. But I simply didn't want to do it. I made several talks at university centers. I did it where there was some personal tie or personal obligation-- I didn't want to talk to the World Affairs Council. Then they said, "Will you talk to the board?" So I said okay. Then it turned out to be a huge mob in a home of Madeleine Russell.

I got sucked into a press conference in Washington, much against my will and against my wishes. I didn't realize what was happening. My old friend Bob Barnett was in Washington, had retired from the State Department, had become Washington representative of the Asia Society. The Asia Society had always been a genteel, cultural organization, and a child of John D. Rockefeller Jr.'s, interested in Oriental art and culture.

Barnett had gotten in touch with me as soon as I came back, along with the Council of Foreign Relations, all sorts of people. I told him I wasn't looking for any platform, I had nothing to sell, I wasn't trying to do this sort of thing.

So, he said, "If you do come to Washington let me know and we'll just have a few people in my office, just people that are interested in the Asia Society, in my office."

I pictured a group of elderly worthies in an ordinary-sized office. Well, I had to go to Washington for this Fulbright thing, and was going on to London. So, I let him know.

He said, "Yes, we'll just have a few people in my office. It will be very informal."

J. Service: I had told him I wasn't giving press conferences, so I thought he understood that. When I arrived at his office it turns out that he had an office about 40 feet square. At least fifty or sixty people crowded in there, all the newspaper people from Washington, top people, who were just getting ready, a lot of them, to accompany Nixon because it was just before Nixon was due to leave for China.

Anyway, it turned out to be an unpleasant, embarrassing sort of a thing, because I thought the thing was off the record and they thought it was on the record. A lot of them were skeptical about my views of China.

They were extremely put off by the fact that I couldn't give any inside story on Lin Piao. They said, "How could you have been in China while these things were going on? After all, you're supposed to be a great political reporter, observer," and so on and so on. A lot of these people, of course, had never been in China and didn't know how things are.

Levenson: What did this tell you about the state of public information in this country on China?

J. Service: Obviously it was very poor, but then I couldn't have given them very much either. My information was also poor. But, I didn't go to China to find out what had happened to Lin Piao!

Levenson: No. What I'm trying to suggest is that they were not aware of the restrictions that--

J. Service: Oh, no, of course not. Eric Sevareid was there, and he was very disappointed. As one man put it, "It's just as if the whole top floor of the Pentagon had been fired." How could this not be known? How could this not be the subject of everybody's comments? They couldn't understand how a closed society and disciplined party could maintain so effective a control of sensational and important news.

Foreign Service Association Luncheon Honors McCarthy Era Victims,
January, 1973

J. Service: At the end of '72, the Foreign Service Association invited me to come and address a lunch. My first impression was that this was to be in my honor alone, and I declined on that basis, because, after all, there were many other people who had been involved, lost their jobs, and suffered in one way or another. I didn't think that it was fitting or appropriate that anything be done simply to honor me.

J. Service: They came back and said that their intention was to really honor the whole group, and that Barbara Tuchman would talk, and that they simply hoped that I would attend and say a few words, represent the group. They got from me the names of a lot of people who should be invited who were involved.

I agreed on that basis, and we went. The luncheon actually was January 30, 1973. Do you want to know about it?

Levenson: Yes. I know that it was reported in the New York Times and all over the place.

J. Service: Oh yes, it was a big deal. A lot of people came. I was glad to see Adrian Fisher, who had been the legal adviser in the State Department at the time that I had my go-around. Also Averell Harriman. A lot of other people came.

Levenson: And your whole family came, didn't it?

J. Service: The whole family was there, and a lot of people, old friends, Edmund Clubb. Arthur Ringwalt came up from Chapel Hill. Ludden would not go because he felt the Foreign Service Association never did anything for us, and so why should he go to "their party."

The association was rather timorous, back in 1950-51. After the reaction to their having given me an encouraging hand at a luncheon in 1950, they were attacked by McCarthy. Oh, that's too strong. They did publish editorials and gave their blessing to a defense fund. But as an association, they took no real stand on loyalty or security, or the obvious singling out of the China service.

There was a little bit of nastiness at the luncheon because of a man named Hemenway (Hemenway, not Hemingway) who passed around some fliers to every table, questions to ask Service about the Amerasia case, involvement in the Amerasia case. Some of the people who went to the luncheon did not rise and join in the standing applause at the end of my talk. I didn't see them.

J. Service: [hands interviewer list of questions] Those are the questions that this fellow, Hemenway, rushed around and put on every table.

Levenson: What prompted him, in your opinion?

J. Service: He's an extreme rightist, a bit of an eccentric, who really believes, I think, that the Foreign Service Association was making a mistake in having me.

Some Questions for John Stewart Service

The American Foreign Service Association is honoring John Stewart Service at a luncheon at the Department of State on January 30, 1973. Mr. Service is to give a talk on the subject of "Integrity in Field Reporting." Mr. Harrop, Chairman of the Board of the Foreign Service Association, has stated that Mr. Service and other "Old China Hands" are to be honored because their reporting from China in the 1940's was honest and accurate, even though what they said was unpopular. However, Mr. Harrop admits that he has not studied Service's reports, nor is he aware of any systematic evaluation of them that would justify his judgment.

A number of Mr. Service's reports from China have been published in full in The Amerasia Papers, a two-volume report published by the Senate Internal Security Subcommittee in 1970. A perusal of this study prompts us to suggest the following list of questions that those attending the Service luncheon might appropriately ask. .

1. John Leighton Stuart, our last ambassador to China on the mainland, wrote in his memoirs: "We Americans mainly saw the good things about the Chinese Communists, while not noticing carefully the intolerance, bigotry, deception, disregard for human life and other evils which seem to be inherent in any totalitarian system." A study of your reports from China reveals much praise of the Communists, but we were not able to find any criticism of them. Were you blind to their faults, as suggested by Ambassador Stuart?

2. Your colleague in China, John K. Emerson, told the Senate Internal Security Subcommittee in 1957, that the American diplomats in China in the 1940's failed to "appreciate and understand the ultimate objectives of the Communist movement." Do you share that judgment?

3. In a report dated August 3, 1944, you said: "The Communists base their policy toward the Kuomintang on a real desire for democracy in China." Do you still feel that the Communists were sincere in their claim that they wanted democracy?

4. In a report dated Sept. 8, 1944, you suggested that the aims of the Japanese Communist Party were perhaps congruent with American aims and that the U. S. should consider giving the JCP "sympathetic support." Do you think that showed deep understanding of the objectives of the Japanese Communist Party?

5. In a report dated Sept. 28, 1944, you said: "The Communist political program is simple democracy. This is much more American than Soviet in form and spirit." When you wrote those words were you aware of the fact that on May 26, 1943, the Chinese Communist Party adopted a resolution reading: "The Chinese Communist Party is one of Marxian Leninism?" Were you ignorant of the resolution, or did you simply equate Leninism with democracy?

6. In a report dated Sept. 28, 1944, you said: "The Chinese people are not yet ready for socialism and will not be for a long time to come. To talk of socialism now is impractical. The next stage in China's advance must be capitalism." This was represented as the view of the Chinese Communists. Did they (and you) really believe this, or was it merely a deception to win American support for the Communists?

7. In one of your reports you quoted Mao as saying: "The Communist Party has no intention whatsoever of overthrowing the rule of the Kuomintang...The Communist Party believes in multi-party rule...We have and will continue to stick to our promises. First, not to overthrow the Kuomintang. Second, not to confiscate land." Do you think that uncritical acceptance of such assurances was a factor in influencing the U. S. to try to force the Nationalists to enter into a coalition government with the Communists?

8. In 1945, you admitted having given Philip Jaffe, editor of Amerasia, a number of highly classified reports. You justified this on the ground that they were your own reports. Is it your view that foreign service officers have a right to give classified material which they have produced to anyone they please?

Suggested by: CONCERNED VOTERS, P. O. Box 34421, Washington, D. C. 20034

J. Service: The speeches were broadcast. Another auditorium was filled with people that heard it piped in. Then it was broadcast by a local public television station I think.

That's a copy of my speech. This last part is about Sokobin. Sam was regarded in China as being a bit out of step, shall we say. He didn't belong to the club in a sense. He was in Tsingtao, and sent in reports, which were quite factual, about Japanese successes in exploiting raw materials from Shantung, coal, grain, and peanuts, and cotton--various things.

These reports were at variance with the line that the Chinese were putting out at that time. Some of the officers in the embassy in Peking accused Sam of being pro-Japanese and thought it was very smart to arrange his transfer to Kobe. He got to Kobe just in time to be interned, and he never after that returned to China. After the war he was in Birmingham, I think.

Levenson: Right, yes. So, his career was effectively destroyed too.

J. Service: Yes.

Levenson: How good was his Chinese? I know he was a collector, but--

J. Service: He did not have any great reputation as a Chinese scholar or linguist, but I think he kept up his Chinese better than most other people. He still reads fairly well.

Levenson: I wonder how many other people there are like that who never hit the headlines.

J. Service: How does one know? There are plenty, or many, I'm sure. But, Sam was a bit of a misfit. He didn't fit the normal Foreign Service mold, as I said. He was one of the few Jews, and he [was] rather conspicuous. I don't think that we were intolerant.

J. Service: You asked me last time how I felt, and I didn't really give a very good answer. Of course, I was tremendously pleased at being there. It was a strain. I was a little disappointed, because my talk was really over the heads of some of the audience.

I told the story of Marshall Green's projection about the New Zealand elections, that the Labour Party would win by four votes. The ambassador, Avra Warren, didn't want to accept it.

J. Service: So, the first thing I was told to do when I got there was to read this report and give my opinion as to whether we ought to send it in to the Department. This very much annoyed Green, because I was brand new, had no background. This was something he'd worked on very hard, along with the help of a local New Zealand girl who worked on our staff.

Anyway, I read it and talked to Marshall about his sources, how he justified it. So, I said to the ambassador that I thought it was okay, let's send it in. And, of course, Labour won by four votes precisely.

The point of my bringing this up, which most of the audience didn't get, was that shortly before my talk there had been another general election in New Zealand, and the embassy had been caught flat-footed because they thought that National was going to win and Labour had won, a big upset victory. The ambassador was a political appointee. I thought that most of my Foreign Service audience would catch the point I was trying to make, of this political appointee down there. They didn't. They laughed about my reference to Marshall Green, but that was all.

Poor old [Loy] Henderson, as I think Caroline has probably said, was very nervous that there would be a question period afterward, and I might be embarrassed. But the people running the affair didn't allow any questions. No one got a chance. There was standing applause, and then everyone disbanded.

Levenson: It must have been a jubilant occasion for you, wasn't it, in spite of the disturbances. What were you thinking at the time?

J. Service: Actually I was trying to keep control of my emotions most of the time. You know, I'm an emotional person, and it was a very difficult business simply to keep control.

Levenson: Do you think that's a good place to pause?

Consultant on Sino-American Relations and China: Some Fan Mail

[Interview 14: November 14, 1978]

Levenson: In going through some of the files, I wanted to ask you how much time do you spend--apart from preparing for this memoir--in looking over your documents and files? Do you often have recourse to them?

J. Service: Oh, at various times. But, I don't do it habitually. [laughter]

J. Service: I've almost always been willing to talk to people. I've gotten a lot of letters from people, scholars writing a Ph.D. dissertation, or an honors paper or this or that.

Sometimes I've gotten trapped into a long, involved correspondence with somebody who has no background. Very often they're in something like diplomatic history, knowing nothing about China or the context. So, after several experiences of writing a man's book for him, I have said, "Look, if you come to California, come to Berkeley, I'll be glad to talk to you."

I've talked to--I don't know; I've lost track of how many--but I suppose fifty people over the years. One man was writing about John Carter Vincent; another was writing about Ambassador Gauss. There have been a lot of people writing about the Dixie Mission and so on. Sometimes that's required me to go back to my files or see what I could find that's relevant. It's hard to put any estimate on how much time I've spent on it.

It's been substantial, sure. Then, of course, I talked to E.J. Kahn [of the New Yorker]. That was a fairly extensive, in-depth interview. I did some refreshing of my memory. Just doing my monograph required me to do some.

Levenson: What about Barbara Tuchman?

J. Service: Barbara was more interested in what I remembered of Stilwell. She was looking for personal things, color, incidents, anecdotes, that sort of thing. I don't remember that I went into the file very much for her. She had the War Department histories, the three volumes on the CBI theater. Of course, she had the Stilwell papers down in Stanford, and she talked to the family. So that in my case she wasn't really using me as a factual source, a research source, so much as just embroidery.

Levenson: Would you comment on some of the books that have been written about you?

J. Service: Oh, goodness. First, I've got to try to think of all the books that have been written, and that's quite a job. There was [David] Halberstam's book, The Best and the Brightest. Halberstam talked to me, not a great deal. He was interested more in Vietnam than China.

A lot of people have written books about the period without talking to me, people like Brian Crozier who recently published a book on Chiang Kai-shek, The Man Who Lost China. He pretty much accepted the Kuomintang line. He had a collaborator on the book who was a Chinese newspaperman in Taiwan.

Levenson: Perhaps we should re-emphasize that the book is about Chiang Kai-shek because I was under a misunderstanding. I thought that the title referred to you! [laughter]

J. Service: No. Crozier was trying to catch a market. It was just after Chiang died, and he claims this to be the first complete biography of Chiang Kai-shek. It was the first one published after Chiang died, so he was able to say that.

There are a lot of books written about the period that are friendly, and use my reports that were written without any consultation with me. A man named Carsun Chang*, who was a leader of one of the third parties in China, cited one of my reports on the Kuomintang of which excerpts were published in the White Paper. He used that very early--in 1952.

A lot of people that have written books on the period have cited my reports from published sources, U.S. Foreign Relations or from the White Paper. Rupert Emerson, of Harvard, did one. Warren Cohen, who's in diplomatic history, America's Response to China, used quite a bit of my stuff. So that I've gotten accustomed to seeing myself in a footnote, particularly after my Amerasia Papers came out. That's now a footnote in a lot of things.

Most of the people that talked to me were not writing books directly on me. Or they were writing papers that didn't get published, term papers, seminar papers.

Generally, they ask me if I want to have a copy sent to me. I feel they will be more free if they're not, you know, thinking, "Well now, what's Service going to think of this?" I usually say, "No, don't send me a copy." But, sometimes they do.

You want to turn that off? I can get you one or two that people have sent me, I think. [tape off]

Levenson: How do you feel that you've been represented in print in recent years? I'm speaking now of friendly journalists and serious academic people.

J. Service: Kahn's New Yorker profile was excessively friendly. It's not really a profile, it's a sort of a celebration. Most of them have been very fair. I don't think there's any real criticism about them. Some of them, I think, have been annoying, particularly this Crozier book. But then Crozier's got a long history of association with the CIA.

*Carsun Chang, The Third Force in China (New York: Bookman Associates, 1952).

Levenson: He was on The Economist staff, wasn't he, for a number of years?

J. Service: Yes. But, he's got some silly mistakes.

Then, there are various other things that have come in. There's been a biography of Dean Acheson recently that has got some factual errors or misleading statements in it. But, I don't rush off and do battle now. I think they're not meant to be unfriendly. The man just is ignorant, that's all.

Levenson: Do you still receive crank mail?

J. Service: We haven't now for a long time. We still get people who want to find some way of just meeting me or talking to me, fan mail now rather than crank mail, I'd say.

Levenson: Does this bother you at all?

J. Service: [laughing] Well, sometimes it's perplexing. We had a call recently from some Chinese woman who had come up from Los Angeles. Her son was a student here. She wanted to meet me and talk to me, she admired my work so much. Somehow it just seemed a bit fishy, but I just said, "I'm sorry, but it's not convenient. I don't go to the office. I'm retired." I didn't encourage her.

People want to talk to you about things that seem quite unrelated really. Some woman was making a study of people who have been through crises in their life and how they handle a crisis, how they react, you know, this sort of thing.

Levenson: Did you talk with her?

J. Service: Yes.

Levenson: Didn't you mention that somebody just came and rang the doorbell once?

J. Service: Yes, we had somebody ring the doorbell a few months ago. It was a woman whose son is a student here at Berkeley, and she was in Berkeley.

We get letters occasionally from someone who has read, generally it's China Hands, and they feel impelled to write a friendly note.

Levenson: That's nice.

J. Service: Yes.

A Retrospective: Effects on the Family, Finances

Levenson: How interested are your children in all of this?

J. Service: I don't think very interested actually. [laughter]

They were interested in The China Hands. Kahn talked to them, asked them about their reactions. Apparently Ginny talked to him fairly frankly. She'd had some sort of a nervous breakdown when she was at Oberlin. I'm not sure whether she attributed this to the effects of the case or not. I'm not sure just what she said. I was a little worried that Kahn had it in the galleys of his book. He said he got it from her and she had mentioned it. I'm not sure whether he took it out or not, whether it's in the book. [Not in the book. Ed]

When Bob decided he wanted to go into the Foreign Service I was rather anxious, rather concerned, that he might be going into the Foreign Service out of some feeling that he had to justify the family name, remove the blot on the escutcheon, or something like that.

He was very sure that this was not his motive for going into the Foreign Service. He'd lived in the Foreign Service, he was sure that he was going to find it interesting, and liked the life. But, apparently when he talked to Kahn he did say that this was a factor.

I objected to this in Kahn's book, and Kahn said, "Well, after all, this is what he said." But, I wasn't there, so I don't know how it fitted into the context of the conversation. I assume what Bob said was that, yes probably this was one factor in going into it, but I'm sure it wasn't, at least I have always been quite sure it wasn't the real reason why he went into the Foreign Service.

Levenson: Did you ask Bob after the book was published about it?

J. Service: I don't think I ever have, no. No. I think it's rather healthy that they don't dwell on this business. We have a friend--I might as well mention her name, Mrs. [Betty] Vincent--whose life has been blighted by an obsession over the injustice done to her husband [John Carter Vincent], the ruin of their lives and so on. She doesn't talk of the ruin of her life; she talks of the ruin of John Carter's life and career. But, obviously she's very close to it, so, it affected her life too. I think it's much better for the children not to brood or feel particularly strongly about these things, or not let it get to them.

J. Service: Of course, Philip was so small that--He says he didn't really know much about this till he read The China Hands, the Kahn book.

Levenson: What about the effect on Caroline?

J. Service: This is very hard to say. Caroline, I think, has been made more nervous perhaps than she otherwise would have been, nervous about publicity. She shies away from getting into the press, believes it is apt to bring some sort of repercussion, some sort of backlash, cause something bad to happen. I think that, generally speaking, she would prefer not to have had the publicity of the Kahn article. She feels badly about some of the things, my frankness to Kahn, and self-conscious about some of the things that I told Kahn.

There's an impression that I became a wealthy man as a result of my steam trap episode. Actually, we didn't. Three hundred thousand dollars was a lot of money for stocks that had cost me five thousand dollars, admittedly. But, by the time we paid considerable sums to the various lawyers involved-- After all I'd had to pay the lawyers who had brought the lawsuit to protect my stock. Then when I had money in hand I had to pay something to Rhetts and to the people who had helped him in the Supreme Court. Then we had to pay the lawyers for the Court of Claims business. Roughly one-fourth of the money that I got went to lawyers. One-fourth of it went to Uncle Sam as capital gains tax. I was left with one-half.

A few thousand of it we gave away to various people. [We] gave some money to the man that worked with me on the trap [Midgett]. I felt he'd never gotten what he should have out of the company, out of Sarco. He got something but not very much. Some people had given us money. We tried to repay them where we could. We gave a little money to the children. So, we weren't exactly well off.

Levenson: Right.

J. Service: But, things like that bother Caroline a lot. Generally the whole idea of public attention bothers her more than it perhaps would have otherwise. She is a more cautious person than I. I generally minimize the risks and dangers [laughter], and she is perhaps more realistic than I am.

As I said before, Caroline quite sensibly didn't get herself involved in the details. She just decided she had to let the lawyers and me grapple with all the day-to-day minutia. Things like the Val Chao business, she doesn't remember now that it did

J. Service: appear, after all, in the Congressional Record, [that] it was mentioned in the Washington Post. Maybe she didn't know at the time. I can't be sure. I just assumed she knew at the time. Very possibly she didn't.

Levenson: Were you aware at the time of her confrontations with [Hiram] Bingham and David Lawrence?

J. Service: We knew of it after. We didn't know about it beforehand. She didn't tell us she was going to do it, as I recall. It annoyed the lawyers. Rhetts didn't think it was good to have people running around and-- It was something that he wasn't in control of and he didn't think it would help us any or do any good. So, I think he was a little annoyed.

I felt myself, "Well, no harm done. Why not?" Actually, as I say, I only knew of it after the event, so I couldn't have stopped it anyway.

Levenson: Do you have anything else to say on this general matter of the family and the effects of such a long drawn out affair? After all, what was it? Twelve years from Amerasia to the Supreme Court.

J. Service: I don't know, Rosemary. There isn't very much to say about it. It's just something we had to get through, that was all. I think, all things considered, we came out of it well. It might have been much worse, as far as the effect on the family goes.

On Virginia I'm not sure. There's so many factors involved. I think that probably my being in China and away from the family for almost six years was harder on the family, Caroline and me, and on the children perhaps than the Amerasia case or the firing. As I say, you can't just pinpoint it on the case. The life we led, the long separation, and my emotional involvement in China, all these things affected the family.

I said at the very beginning, when we first started, that there is in some sense a repetition of my own parents' situation, my father devoting himself to the interests of the YMCA and to China over the interests of the family, his staying out in China when he really should have come home on home leave. They were out ten years. I think that my mother paid a price for that.

But, on the whole, we've survived. I don't have any more philosophical remarks. [laughter]

Formal Retirement from Center: Collaborates on the Center's
Dictionary of Contemporary Chinese Terms

J. Service: In March, '73 I retired from the center. They gave a very nice dinner down at a Chinese restaurant. You were probably there, weren't you.

Levenson: I was, yes.

J. Service: It was not a good evening. I was not in a very good mood; I'm afraid I was very ungracious.

Levenson: I don't recall that.

J. Service: Oh yes, I was not at my best. I was annoyed because they had gotten a lot of outside people in, which I felt was unfair. They had obviously talked to Caroline and found out who our friends were outside of the center and invited them to come and pay their way. I didn't think that was good. It made a nice, big party and I'm sure a lot of people were glad to be there, but--

Levenson: Oh, I think everybody was glad to be there, without exception.

J. Service: It was not, I thought, right.

We then took a long trip to Europe, a wonderful trip, but we don't need to talk about that.

The center had been fiddling for years with a Chinese dictionary of contemporary terms. Mr. [Wen-shun] Chi had had this project going, but it wasn't getting anywhere. Nothing was really being done. He didn't seem able to pull it together and get it into publishable form.

I had always resisted getting involved. I had other things to do. But that fall when I got back from Europe, Stanford put out a dictionary of new terms which was terrible--absolutely unusable. I then decided I would cooperate, help get the center's out. That turned out to be much more of a project than I expected.

Levenson: And it is just published.

J. Service: It's just been published, July, '77. It took us almost four years, much longer than we expected.

Levenson: Where was it printed?

J. Service: It was set in type in Hong Kong but printed in the United States. Actually it's all on film now. They send that to the States and print it in the States.

We first tried Korea. They asked for bids from various people. Japan now is very expensive. South Korea was the cheapest. But they simply couldn't do a satisfactory job. We sent them manuscript by stages. As we had one section finished we sent it off. The Korean people simply were making too many errors. So we changed to Hong Kong, and they did an excellent job.

Levenson: I think you told me that they even corrected some mistakes?

J. Service: Oh yes, they found our mistakes and corrected them! There were notes from the typesetter, "Shouldn't this be so and so?" Of course, there are still errors in it.

Levenson: Was the manuscript all handwritten?

J. Service: The characters are handwritten, yes. We don't have any Chinese typewriter. It would be very difficult because we're using the new, simplified characters. This was where we made some of the errors. The man in Hong Kong was very good at picking out errors, although their font was not quite the latest font. We had some trouble because characters have been changing, eliminating one stroke here or there. Since our index was based on numbers of strokes, I had to be sure we got exactly the same form.

Levenson: Have you had any feedback from China on it yet?

J. Service: [laughing] I was in Washington recently and called at the liaison office and gave them a copy. My friend there, Mr. [Chi-mei] Hsieh, who has the same Chinese surname that I have, is a Counselor for Cultural Affairs. I apologized, in the Chinese way, for the many mistakes and hoped they will help correct them and so on.

He gave me rather a sardonic look, and he said, "Yes, we've found some." [laughter]

Levenson: Did he give you an errata list?

J. Service: No, we didn't go that far.

Jack's War-Time Despatches Published. Lost Chance in China...
Edited by Joseph W. Esherick

J. Service: In 1972, I got a call from Random House. I think this was probably just after the profile was published in the New Yorker. They wanted me to put together my reports from China. I said I didn't think it could be done successfully, that the reports were too episodic and a lot of them were repetitious. I didn't think there was enough there really to make a book.

I think the idea had come from Orville Schell. I don't know. Because they had published a book by Orville and Joe Esherick on modern China, sort of a high school textbook. At any rate, they came back after a while and asked whether I would be willing to have a scholar, a historian, look at my reports and see if he could do something. I said, "Well sure." After all, it would be no work on my part. So, why should I refuse? They came up with Joe Esherick and I was delighted. I had known Joe when he was getting his Ph.D. here.

So, Joe did it and produced Lost Chance in China. I think he did an excellent job.

By this time, of course, a great many of my reports had been published in the State Department volumes, U.S. Foreign Relations, my reports or parts of my reports. I had some. John Fairbank had some. Some came from the Lauchlin Currie files.

Kubek's The Amerasia Papers had published a lot of my reports. Then we got many more out of the State Department. Esherick was consulting me and using clues from The Amerasia Papers or from U.S. Foreign Relations. We got dates and despatch numbers to transmit.

The State Department cooperated very nicely. They dug up almost everything that we wanted. Even some of the things that they couldn't find but they said might be in my security file, sure enough, Joe wrote and got them from the security file. I'm not sure why some of them had been in the security files. Probably they were documents that we had used or submitted as evidence in my hearings, some of them.

Anyway, we got most of what we wanted. There are a few things that are missing. They said we could go to Washington and search the files ourselves, but neither Joe nor I had time or wanted to do that. Joe turned out to have far more than

J. Service: enough for a book. His first draft came out to something like 750 pages. Random House said, "You're going to have to cut this down." So he did.

A very nice thing that Joe did was to suggest that the royalties be split since the reports themselves were mine. So, actually I made a little money out of it.

It was the most painless book that has ever been written. Unfortunately I usually get all the credit for it. It's considered my book, although he's the man that did it.

One little embarrassment is the dedication which he put in, which I didn't know about, "to those who chose honesty." [chuckling] A lot of my Foreign Service friends think that it's my dedication and that I'm sort of pointing a finger at other people, which I'm not.

I don't think anyone else has taken the reports they wrote and made a book out of them without rewriting or revising or bringing them up to date.

Edmund Clubb has had one report published--it's a very small book--a report that he wrote on the Communists when he was in Hangkow. This was when they were still in Kansu, in 1932 I think.* That's been published, but otherwise I don't know of any report that basically is simply reprinting reports that are thirty years old.

Levenson: That's remarkable.

J. Service: One thing that contributed to making it possible was the fact that I was fired and cut off all connection with the State Department, so that I never had a need to hedge or revise my views. People who stayed in the State Department, who were not fired, had to join the team. Their views, in most cases, changed during the years of estrangement with China. It would be rather embarrassing perhaps for their reports to be published. But, in my case, I can stand on what I wrote back in 1944.

Levenson: Is there anything in the despatches that you regret or feel was wrong?

*Oliver Edmund Clubb, Communism in China, as reported from Hangkow in 1932. New York, Columbia University Press, 1968.

J. Service: I wasn't a hundred percent right, certainly not. We didn't foresee everything that was going to happen. We didn't foresee the rapidity of developments in China in the late 40's. We took too much at face value some of the things the Communists were saying. I think we didn't realize that they were stalling and playing for time, in much the same way the Kuomintang was. It just happened that they strengthened themselves by expanding and taking more territory when they could. They weren't really fighting as wholehearted a war against the Japanese perhaps as we thought, things like that.

They were talking of the socialization process in China taking decades. When the Communists got into power, they did it in a very few years. I don't think that I have to feel badly or regretful that I didn't foresee all those things. The general direction was correct. I wouldn't have published them if I felt badly about them.

Levenson: What about the word that caused you so much trouble, the "democratic Chinese Communists?"

J. Service: You know, we weren't writing political science papers. People like Tang Tsou have written articles and made a lot about our folly in talking about the Communists being democratic. Yes, we were careless. We didn't think we were writing for anyone except the man on the China desk in the Department of State. We were using the language and terms that were being bandied about at the time.

If you read the reports themselves I pretty much explain what I mean by being democratic, giving the people at least a sense that they had a voice in what was going on, a real feeling, in their local affairs. These are difficult issues to grapple with and pin down. We're still having trouble.

The Chinese model of Communism is certainly very different from the Russian. Even critics will agree that people do have more say about things that affect them directly than they have in the Soviet Union. That's democratic in our sense. If you insist on defining democracy as having two parties competing against each other and things like that, it's not democratic.

The fall of the Gang of Four is, in a sense, a working out of popular will in China. Chou En-lai was very popular, and there was great resentment at the Gang of Four's treatment of him after he died. The demonstration on Tian-an Men Square was in a sense a democratic gesture, a popular gesture.

J. Service: I regret certainly that we weren't more specific or more careful in using [chuckling] these terms. But, it's not all that simple.

Levenson: No.

J. Service: Of course, the problem is that people simply say, "Oh, Service said they were democratic." They don't read my report, which may be ten or fifteen pages long describing what their policies were.

But, this is, you know, part of my whole feeling about China now. It's disappointing that some of the things that we saw in Yenan have become bureaucratized and the party has become much more totalitarian than it was in those days. The regime is a heavy-handed regime in many ways. We can't even argue that people enjoy the same kind of civil rights that we would like to have them enjoy.

Levenson: How was the book received, Lost Chance [in China]?

J. Service: Oh, extremely well. It was well reviewed in almost every magazine except Esquire magazine, whose review was by Malcolm Muggeridge, who is a well known anti-Communist.

Levenson: . Editor of Punch for many years.

J. Service: Yes. He ridiculed the book in a very brief, two-sentence review. But, most of the other reviews were very friendly. The New York Times gave it a prominent review by Harrison Salisbury. Also they carried it on the page where they have the bestseller list, and have their editor's recommendations. We were listed for three weeks in that recommended category. It's been reviewed very widely over the country.

Our time had come. It was a sort of a swing back of the pendulum. As I said before, the Nixon visit to China, which was announced just before my testimony before the Fulbright committee, marked the big watershed, although before that my Amerasia Papers had gotten a few friendly reviews.

Levenson: Joe Esherick concludes Lost Chance with a statement that if the policies that you and your colleagues recommended had been followed, it's possible that the Korean and Vietnamese wars would not have occurred, but it was necessary for them to have occurred in a sense to prove that you and your colleagues were right. That's a rough and I hope fair summary of what he says.

J. Service: Well, I can't disagree. I think there's logic in it, yes. Certainly, we would never have been recognized as having been right if none of these other events hadn't happened since then.

J. Service: The Halberstam book is a little wrong. Halberstam's The Best and the Brightest argues that if we had remained in the State Department, if we had not been fired, that the Vietnam War would not have happened. This is, I think, more questionable than Esherick's statement, because if we had stayed in the Department, as I said before, our views would have had to become those of the Department. We would have had to change our views.

About this time I was asked to review a book by a Russian who was in Yenan while I was there, a man named [P.P.] Vladimirov, who was there ostensibly representing Tass, but he'd been sent then as a representative of the Comintern. These journals were published in Russian and then they tried to sell them to an American publisher. Doubleday asked me to read it.*

I wrote them a critique pointing out that I thought that things had been added to the journal--undoubtedly the man had a journal and basically it was material from his journal--but that things had been added.

One of the ironic things is that the journals pay a great deal of attention to my presence in Yenan and talks with Mao Tse-tung. Vladimirov does me the honor of calling me "the most dangerous American in Yenan," because I was encouraging Mao Tse-tung in his nationalist tendencies. It would have been very nice, of course, to have had this for the loyalty hearings.

It points up a fact that we simply couldn't convince anybody of in the 50's. John Davies, as well as myself, said our whole approach to the situation in China was basically an anti-Soviet one. We were prematurely anti-Soviet. It wasn't the fashion in those days. But, we were concerned about the postwar situation, and the desirability of trying to put a wedge between the Chinese Communists and the Russians to separate them if we could, which we thought was possible.

Three Months in China in 1975

J. Service: By 1975 we thought we'd like to go back to China. The Chinese had kept mentioning the subject, you know, "Why don't you come back?" every time I saw them. We were in Washington for another set of Fulbright hearings on the future of American foreign

*Petr Parfenovich Vladimirov, China's Special Area, 1942-1945, Bombay-Allied Publishers, 1974, and Doubleday, 1975.

J. Service: policy. I gave a very strong statement on why we should normalize relations with China. Fulbright was interested, but he felt that my views were a little too extreme, that the American public would react in favor of Taiwan. He was right. Anyway, we had lunch at the liaison office, and they came back to the same idea, "Why don't you come to China again?"

I said, "It's a long way to go and it costs a lot of money, and I don't want to go just for a two or three week trip."

So, they said, "Well, what's in your mind?"

I said, "I'd like to stay at least three months."

They were rather surprised. It took some time to get approval, but it did go through.

We said we only wanted to stay in Peking. We wanted to stay in the little hotel, an old, converted Chinese residence, where our friends the Adlers live. So we got to Peking, and we were met at the plane by several of our old friends, including the Adlers and George Hatem, the American doctor. We just settled in and had a lovely month in Peking at the Peace Hotel.

Levenson: What did you do when you were in Peking? Did you feel that you were under surveillance?

J. Service: No. We had a really wonderful woman assigned to us, a graduate of Tsing Hua University, who had majored in American literature. Her English was very good. She was not normally a guide or interpreter.

She came around every morning. I had said that I wanted to brush up my Chinese, so that she was assigned partly for that purpose. I read the papers, and I'd discuss with her the editorials or an article, something like that, and read various other things she recommended. I read several plays and a novel.

We'd have an hour session and then sometimes we had something scheduled. Once or twice a week we would go to a school or have an excursion of some sort. Sometimes she and Caroline would go out shopping. But most of the day was free.

I would generally go out for a walk or bicycle--I was going to buy a bicycle, then it turned out that Mrs. Adler had a bicycle which she wasn't using.

Levenson: Did you go out very early in the morning?

J. Service: Sometimes. It depended. I went out early sometimes just to watch the people in the parks doing their exercises, their Tai Chi and joggers, all sorts of groups going out in the early morning.

Sometimes I went out in the middle of the day to various parks. I visited all the parks in Peking. I went around the old line of the city wall. I explored Peking probably more on this visit than I ever did when I lived there, because I went systematically each day to a different part of the city.

Levenson: Did you ever have any trouble photographing?

J. Service: Occasionally, yes. If I was in an old or shabby area. Two or three times somebody would come up and say, "What are you doing?"

It was soon after the controversial Antonioni film on China had been released, and there had been a lot of hullabaloo in China about Antonioni because he was supposedly unsympathetic, unfriendly to China. It was supposed to be a Russian-inspired attack on China. It was the period when the Gang of Four was fairly powerful and there was a certain amount of xenophobia and concern about spies.

If someone objected, I would desist. If they didn't want me to take pictures I didn't insist on taking them. There was never any trouble. I never got arrested or anything like that. By and large, I just wandered free as the breeze. I was quite sure I was not under surveillance. I got a lot of pictures of Peking, and even some that showed old shabby buildings for that matter.

Then they said, "Well surely you want to travel some?"

So we said, "Yes, we would like to do some traveling. Where could we go?" I told them we would very much want to go up the Yangtze by steamer, because I'd done it as a boy many times.

Some visitors had made the trip down the river, but no one as far as we knew, no foreigners, had gone up the river. I said, "Well, boats come down; they've got to go up." It's much slower going up. You don't whisk through the gorges in such a rush. Anyway, they arranged it and we made the trip.

Levenson: I've seen your slides of the trip up the Yangtze. It looked marvelous.

J. Service: We were lucky. We had a perfect day going through the gorges. It was very clear and sunny. We started going through the gorges before dawn, and ended just about dark, so it was a full day.

J. Service: We were on the boat four days from Hangkow to Chungking. They gave us de luxe accommodations. We had our own saloon and deck and so on. It was all very nice.

We saw Yunnan again, our old haunts where Caroline first started out in China.

Levenson: Do you ever wish to go back to China to live?

J. Service: Oh yes, I would like to go back.

Levenson: And live there?

J. Service: Well, I'm not so sure of living. Certainly to visit and travel. It's much easier to get back and forth now.

I think the people that have settled there are quite happy, people like Alley and Hatem. They lead a special sort of life, though it's not like the foreigners in the old days. The attitude is very different, of course. Perhaps I could do something useful there, editing or something.

Jack's Report Published by the Sacramento Bee

J. Service: We came back in '75. I was rather anxious to get something published, partly because people kept asking, "Aren't you going to write something?"

Atlantic Monthly was interested. They have a section in the front of the magazine, "Atlantic Reports." This is what I was thinking of. The editor wrote me and said he wanted me to plan on that. But he, apparently, was already thinking of publishing a chapter of a book by Ross Terrill.

He really wanted me to concentrate on Yunnan. Well, I wasn't particularly interested in concentrating on Yunnan. He thought that would be an area that not many people visited and maybe I could make my article about that.

I didn't take him very seriously, so I just wrote my general article. He kept it for a long time but then decided that it was too similar in some ways to the chapter he was going to publish from Ross Terrill's forthcoming book. It's true Ross Terrill and I see things in very much the same way, and our approach is quite similar.

J. Service: Then I sent it to The New Yorker. Orville Schell had been in China when we were, and he was writing a book which The New Yorker was interested in. But he wasn't anywhere near finishing it, so he had no objection to my sending in a "Letter from Peking" sort of thing.

They kept it for a long time, but by that time [President Gerald] Ford was going to China. Joseph Kraft who has apparently got some sort of an in with The New Yorker--he's written for them before--apparently knew that he was going to go with Ford. So they turned my thing down, and it was finally published in the Sacramento Bee. They gave it a big spread, but of course not many people saw it because not many people see the Bee papers.

Levenson: That's a shame.

J. Service: But I think it was a much better article than the one Kraft wrote. Kraft had only a few days in China with Ford. My article reflected what I was told in China by old friends like the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Ch'iao Kuan-hua, my old friend, you remember, that I had offered blood to during the war. He had us to dinner in what used to be the American embassy in Peking. It's been fixed up recently and made into a government guest house.

He told me that Teng Hsiao-ping was going to take over when Chou died, be the premier. Naturally I reported all this. Very soon after the McClatchy papers printed it, I was proved wrong, because Teng Hsiao-ping was pushed out by the Gang of Four right after Chou En-lai died.

So once again my reputation for being a political reporter took a beating!

Preconceptions and Prejudices about China

Levenson: This is somewhat truistic, but do you think people see what they expect to see in China?

J. Service: Oh, of course. This is very definitely true. I've seen some people go to China, I could tell before they went what they were going to write. They've got preconceptions.

Levenson: How do you try to counter this in yourself?

J. Service: Well, in the first place, I probably wouldn't agree that I had preconceptions, would I? Most people don't. I don't know. I just think that I'm trained to be a little more skeptical perhaps.

What so many people who go to China lack, of course, is a background of what China used to be. Therefore, they believe a lot of things that are told them about the old China, which are exaggerated and not true.

To take an obvious example. We went to Yen'an in 1971. There's a historical museum there, quite an important, large one. We went through, and they have guides that take you and give you a spiel, explain all the exhibits and so on. It was a young man that was taking us through.

Although it was after Lin Piao's fall, the museum hadn't yet gotten the word. Lin Piao was still Mao's designated heir, and the whole exhibit was centered around him. People like Chu Teh had disappeared, and Chou En-lai appeared, but not importantly. P'eng Teh-huai, who had been number two in the army, the vice deputy commander, just wasn't there at all.

I knew the truth. I knew what really was the situation, so that I was prepared for this sort of thing. But someone who hadn't had any history could have been misled.

When I came out I spoke to our own interpreter, a man that traveled with me who was from the foreign office. I said, "It was very interesting. But, when I was in Yen'an there were always two pictures in every public room, two pictures of equal size, side by side, Chu Teh and Mao Tse-tung." He knew exactly what I meant, of course.

He said, "Chu Teh is very old now, and Lin Piao is now very important and the public has to be educated," and so on.

My background, shall we say, helped me to not be swept off my feet entirely. I think generally speaking I tend to be a little skeptical. At the same time I've got to agree that my prejudices, my sympathies, tend to be with China. I tend to find an explanation or perhaps an excuse for things.

A lot of the things that strike people that go to China as denial of personal liberties and so on, I can see in a historical context, that after all there never was much individualism in China anyway. They never valued individualism as we did. The clan system was very strong. The five Confucian relationships subordinated women to men, junior to senior, younger brother to older brother, and so on. So that the average Chinese doesn't miss any individual rights which he never knew, never enjoyed.

J. Service: This may be my prejudice. Somebody like William Buckley, of course, who talked here recently, would say that this indicates soft-headedness or a great prejudice on my part. Maybe it does. I think Caroline's and my reactions to China are somewhat different, partly because she didn't really know the old China well. She had superficial impressions of it, and she didn't like old China very much. She went back this time on a very different basis, where people were friendly and she had much more contact with Chinese, and she saw the good side.

I think I was a little more reserved, although on the whole my reactions were very good, my impressions were good. It was different for me, from what I'd known in Yen-an in 1944 and '45. China has become bureaucratized, and the people that I knew so well and so informally are now much less accessible.

Even talking to Chou En-lai, although he was very friendly and very kind in many ways, talking to a man who has been the head of state, the premier for twenty years, is a lot different from talking to a man in a cave in Yen-an who's not yet held any real government position at all. It's bound to be very different.

The general atmosphere of secrecy in China now is very different from what it used to be. They won't even tell you, you know, when you're going to see somebody. When we actually did see Chou En-lai, I was having an interview out at Peking University and got a sudden phone call in the middle of the interview, "Come quick!"

My interpreter said, "We really have to go." He wasn't even going to let us finish up what we were talking about. "We have to go right now!"

So, we had to rush down. I assumed we were going to see Chou En-lai, but we weren't told that. But all this, of course, is very different from what I remember of China.

People like Jack Belden were quite put off by the lack of openness. You can't really talk to anybody frankly or freely. It was easier in '75 than it was in '71. But by and large everyone tells you the same thing. No one can really say anything except the man at the top.

1976: A Heavy Speaking Schedule and a Heart Attack

J. Service: I don't think there's very much more to say. We'd come back from China on our '75 trip. For some reason I felt now that I'd retired and I'd had the long trip to China, I wanted to be more available for giving talks. I agreed to give quite a number of talks at various places.

The U.S. China Friendship Association had me give a keynote talk at their annual conference in '75, when we got back. I did a lot of talking around the San Francisco Bay Area. I was asked to go to a number of universities to give speeches.

I think it was a number of factors, but in July, '76 I suddenly had a heart attack, which seemed to be caused mainly by stress. There were no other factors that we could pinpoint. I did smoke rather heavily, but all the other factors were low, low blood pressure, low weight, low cholesterol.

I think it was some feeling of stress over all these various commitments I'd made. I find it difficult to write speeches or prepare speeches. I do much better in seminar discussions. In fact most of what I did when I came back in '71 was going around to different universities where I talked to Far Eastern specialist groups informally, basically just answering questions. I like that better than speeches.

There's not much to say about the heart attack. It's something past, and I'm coming along very well.

In summer of '77, about a year after the heart attack, Oberlin decided to give me an honorary degree, which I accepted with pleasure. We went to Oberlin. The children all came. We had a fine, very pleasant time.

Levenson: That must have been a splendid occasion.

J. Service: It was especially pleasant since I didn't have to say anything.
[laughter]

One thing I declined, I've had a number of bids to take up some business connection, tourist agencies and exporters and so on, people wanting to do business with China. To me that was capitalizing on my friendship with the Chinese, which I didn't have any interest in doing.

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OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT

JOHN STEWART SERVICE

Mr. President, John Stewart Service is a man with remarkable achievements in several fields - in diplomacy, in business and in education. After his graduation from Oberlin College in 1931, Mr. Service entered a career in the Foreign Service of the United States, most of which was spent in China, where he had been born and had spent his early years.

His diplomatic career reached its climax during World War II, when the United States faced serious problems in China, having to do with the prosecution of the war with Japan and with mounting rivalry between the National Government of China and the rising Chinese Communist movement. Mr. Service became political adviser to General Stilwell, the Commander-in-Chief of American forces in China, Burma and India. In addition to observing developments in areas under the National Government, he was able to spend time in Yenan, the Communists' wartime capital. His analyses of the Chinese political outlook were masterpieces: they were informed, penetrating, lucid and objective, and anyone wanting to understand why the National Government eventually fell, and why China became the People's Republic of China, cannot do better than to read Service's dispatches.

Unfortunately in the years after the war there were some Americans who did not want to hear the truth about China, and there were some politicians who tried to further their own careers and discredit the truth by smearing the truth-tellers. In 1950 Senator McCarthy brought charges against Service, and the next year the State Department dismissed him, in spite of the fact that its own loyalty review board had repeatedly found no basis for the charges against him.

Between 1952 and 1957, Mr. Service had a second successful career, this one as president of an engineering firm. Meanwhile, however, he fought to clear his good name. In 1957, some six years after the dismissal from the State Department, the Supreme Court of the United States voted unanimously in Mr. Service's favor. He resumed his career in the Foreign Services for the five years from 1957 until 1962.

After retiring from the Foreign Service Jack Service went to the University of California, where, in a third career, he made a very impressive contribution to the university's work in Chinese studies. The forewords and prefaces and footnotes of many books and articles on China coming out of the University of California provide abundant testimony to the value of the help that Mr. Service gave to many graduate students.

Through a career-span that was not only brilliant and highly productive, but also very trying, Jack Service has been admired not only for what he did but for what he was. He was and is a man of integrity, and great courage and high character. He did not allow the wrong that was done to him make him a lesser person.


Mr. President, I am very happy indeed to present Mr. John Stewart Service for the Degree of Doctor of Laws.

Ellsworth C. Carlson

John Stewart Service, loyal alumnus, faithful citizen, scholarly diplomat, devoted educator, in the name of your College I confer upon you the degree of Doctor of Laws, with all the rights, privileges and honors thereunto appertaining.

Emil C. Danenberg

May 29, 1977



Ellsworth Carlson '39, professor of history, and John S. Service '31, '77h in the "robing room."

J. Service: I've now agreed to take a group headed by Clark Kerr to China next spring. This is the first time I've been willing to do that. I think Clark Kerr's group is a good group. They're interested in the relationship between work and education, how work is brought into education at all stages from kindergarten on up, practical work. So, we'll see. So, I may go back to China next spring, '78.*

Coda

Levenson: Before I turn the tape off, do you have any wrap-up you want to make, any summary on the influences in your life and how you feel about them now? I realize that this is an interim thing. You have the big trip coming up. You have perhaps your own autobiography. You have goodness knows what coming ahead of you. So, I'm not suggesting that this is a coda, just a punctuation mark.

J. Service: I was afraid you were going to ask something like that. [laughter] I really don't have anything very world shattering, I'm afraid. People ask if you've got any regrets, would you do it differently. Generally, I say no, I don't think so. I would have been a little more wise or prudent in some of my dealings. But, on the whole, it's been good. Certainly coming to Berkeley was a very good thing. We've had a very good tapering off period.

Levenson: The Services are an ornament to Berkeley.

J. Service: Watching my friends who retire, I think we've done very well. Retirement is a trauma for a lot of people. To me coming back to Berkeley and getting myself involved again with China has been very good.

Particularly I've enjoyed the students, the people I've met at the center, and friends I made.

Even the business episode had its interesting, amusing aspects, after I got my feet into it, got shaken down a bit.

*The Services returned to China in 1978 and 1980. In 1978, they also went to Tibet, and in 1980 to Xinjiang (Sinkiang).

J. Service: People are often surprised that my son Bob went into the Foreign Service and that I don't feel badly about it. I'm quite proud of his going into the Foreign Service, and pleased. If I were bitter about the Foreign Service I wouldn't have been very happy about his going in.

I don't carry any great feelings of bitterness about the State Department. As I said before, I don't feel the State Department was responsible. Even my retirement was something that was out of the hands of the Department.

I wouldn't necessarily want to go through it all again though. I would say it's been an exciting life. Maybe not all a good life, but it ended up very well.

Talleyrand said he survived. Well, we survived. We've survived better than most of the other people that have gone through the same thing, I think. But that's not all our doing, there's also chance and circumstance, good luck. That's about all I can think of. You got more?

Levenson: No. Thank you, Jack.

Transcriber: Teresa Allen

Final Typist: Marie Herold

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APPENDIX I

1902 STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION

The following "Chronology of events" was furnished the Foreign Relations subcommittee by Mr. Charles Edward Rhetts, attorney for John S. Service:

Chronology of events

Date	Movements and activities of John S. Service	Other movements and activities
1941		
Apr. 18.....	Transferred from Shanghai to Chungking.	
May 3.....	Arrived Chungking.	
May 16.....		Ambassador Gauss arrived Chungking.
Dec. 22.....	Sent on trip to Rangoon.	
1942		
Jan. 20.....	Returned to Chungking via Burma Road.	
March.....		General Stilwell arrived in Chungking.
April.....	Trip through central Szechwan.	
July 5.....	Ordered on extensive travel through northwest China.	
Oct. 20.....	Promoted from FSO-VIII to FSO-VII.	
Nov. 2.....	Returned to Chungking after visiting oil fields and Honan famine areas.	
✓ Nov. 26.....	Left Chungking for leave in United States.	
Dec. 16.....	Arrived at home in California.	
1943		
Jan. 19.....	Commenced consultation in Department (FE).	
Jan. 23.....	Prepared memorandum on situation in China pointing to postwar policy problem (Doc. 163).	
Feb. 24.....	Completed consultation and returned to home in California.	
Apr. 21.....	Departed for Chungking.	
May 3.....	Arrived Chungking.	
May 10.....	Detailled to Lanchow "listening post."	
Aug. 10.....	Assigned to General Stilwell.	
Aug. 18.....	Commenced duty with Stilwell's headquarters in Chungking.	
September.....	Trip to New Delhi and North Burma front.	
December.....	Trip to Yunnan, Kweichow, and Kwangsi.	
1944		
January.....	Travel in southwest provinces.	
February.....	Temporarily at Chengtu and returned to Chungking.	
Apr. 17.....		Japs commence campaign on Yellow River front.
May 18.....		Japs capture Loyang.
May 27.....		Japs commence Yangtze valley campaign.
June 18.....		Japs capture Changsha.
June 20.....	Comprehensive memo on situation in China with recommendations (Doc. 157).	
June 21-24.....		Vice President Wallace visit to Chungking.
Do.....		Approval for Yen-an mission.
July 7.....		FDR message to Chiang recommending Stilwell command of all forces.
July 13.....		FDR message to Chiang notes agreement in principle.
July 16.....	Promoted from FSO-VII to FSO-VI.	
July 22.....	Arrived Yen-an with first section of United States Army observer group.	
Aug. 8.....		Japs capture Hengyang.
Aug. 10.....		FDR nominates Hurley as personal representative.

STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION 1903

Chronology of events—Continued

1944 Date	Movements and activities of John S. Service	Other movements and activities
Aug. 23.....		FDR again urges Chiang to give command to Stilwell.
Aug. 28.....		Lishui captured by Japs.
Aug. 29.....	First recommendation that consideration be given to arming Communists.	
Aug. 30.....		Ambassador Gauss proposed to Chiang desirability of broadening base of Government by a "war council."
Sept. 1 (7).....		Hurley interview with Molotov at Moscow.
Sept. 6.....		Hurley arrives at Chungking.
Sept. 22-28.....		Discouraging reports by Stilwell to Marshall.
Oct. 10.....	Memorandum recommending stronger attitude toward Chiang (Doc. 193).	
Oct. 19.....		Stilwell recalled.
Oct. 21.....	Ordered to return to United States.	
Oct. 23.....	Departed Yen-an.	
Oct. 24.....	Departed Chungking.	
Oct. 29.....	Arrived Washington, commenced consultation (CA).	
Nov. 1.....		Gauss resigned as Ambassador to China.
Nov. 7.....		Hurley flies to Yen-an.
Nov. 10.....		Hurley and Mao sign five-point draft agreement.
Nov. 12.....		Kweilin captured by Japs.
Nov. 18.....		FDR to Hurley instructing to press for immediate unification of armies.
Nov. 19.....	Completed consultation and departed Washington for leave in California.	
Nov. 22.....		Kuomintang three-point counterproposal.
Nov. 30.....		Hurley appointed Ambassador to China.
Dec. 16.....		Communists reject Kuomintang proposals.
Dec. 19.....		General McClure interview with Chen Cheng (Minister of War) on proposal for guerrilla operation in Communist area.
Dec. 26 (7).....		Colonel Bird (OSS) discusses McClure proposals with Communists in Yen-an.
Dec. 28.....		Communists propose additional four points.
1945		
Jan. 2.....	Arrived Washington and ordered to Chungking for detail to General Wedemeyer.	
Jan. 7.....	Departed Washington for Chungking.	
Jan. 9.....		Mao Tse-tung makes secret proposal through Wedemeyer that he visit United States for talk with FDR.
Jan. 14.....		Hurley telegram to FDR blaming breakdown of negotiations on McClure proposals for arming Communists.
Jan. 18.....	Arrived Chungking.	
Jan. 31.....		Hurley summary report to Department.
Feb. 3.....		Proposal for Political Consultative Conference seemed about to be accepted by Communists.
Feb. 4.....		Hurley reported Chinese desire to negotiate with Russia and offered to be middleman.
Feb. 6.....		SecState cautions Hurley on assuming responsibility as go-between or adviser.
Feb. 11.....		Yalta Agreement on Far East.
Feb. 17.....	Memorandum prepared with Ludden at Wedemeyer's request stating military necessity for flexible policy (Doc. 204).	
Feb. 19.....		Hurley and Wedemeyer leave Chungking for consultation in Washington.
Feb. 26.....		Acheson telegram summarizing situation and recommending that deadlock be broken by direct action in giving some arms to Communist.
Mar. 1.....		Chiang announces People's Congress to convene November 12, 1945.
Mar. 9.....	Left Chungking; arrived at Yen-an under Army orders to report on expected Communist Party Congress.	Communist Party rejects further negotiations because of Chiang plans for People's Congress.
Mar. 10.....		OSS raid on Amerasia offices in New York.
Mar. 30.....	Ordered to return to Washington.	
Apr. 3.....	Departed Yen-an.	
Apr. 4.....	Departed Chungking.	Hurley departed Washington for China.
Apr. 8.....		

1904 STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION

Chronology of events—Continued

Date	Movements and activities of John S. Service	Other movements and activities
Apr. 9.....		Acheson ordered to return to United States.
Apr. 12.....	Arrived Washington, commenced consultation in Department (FE).	
Apr. 15.....		Hurley interviews Stalin at Moscow.
Apr. 18.....	Met Gayn for first time.	
Apr. 19.....	Met Jaffe for first time.	Harriman in Department urges caution on Stalin assurances.
Apr. 23.....		Kennan in Moscow states Soviet assurances only good for short term.
Do.....		Department cautions Hurley and instructs to press for early military and political unification—before end of war.
Apr. 25.....	Talked to IPR, New York.	
May 8.....	Completed consultation and was assigned to Office of the Foreign Service for preparatory studies connected with projected legislation on the Foreign Service.	
May 10.....	Letter of commendation from Wiedemeyer.	
May 16.....	Promoted from FSO-VI to FSO-IV.	
May 19.....	Given permanent assignment to Department, continued work in OFS.	
June 6.....	Arrested by FBI.	
June 7.....	Placed on leave with pay.	
June 15.....		Hurley informs T. V. Soong of Yalta Agreement.
July 1.....		Kuomintang-Communist negotiations resumed; committee of seven visits Yen-an.
July (?).....		Hurley report that Communists will present no difficulty if treaty signed with Russia.
Aug. 6.....	Appeared before grand jury in Washington.	
Aug. 10.....	Grand jury returns "no true bill."	
Aug. 11.....	Appearance before Foreign Service Personnel Board.	
Aug. 12.....	Returned to active duty and temporarily assigned to FE as liaison officer with administrative divisions in connection with arrangements for reopening offices in the Far East.	
Aug. 14.....	Received letters from Byrnes and Grew.	Sino-Soviet Treaty signed.
Aug. 23.....		Hurley brings Mao Tse-tung from Yen-an to Chungking to reopen negotiations.
Sept. 7.....	Assigned to staff of United States political adviser in Japan.	
Sept. 14.....	Departed from Washington.	
Sept. 22.....	Arrived in Tokyo with Acheson.	Hurley submitted report that basic agreement had been reached and departed from Chungking for U. S.
Oct. 2.....		Hurley in conversation with Secretary Byrnes says nothing of disloyalty or sabotage by Acheson and Service.
Oct. 10.....		Representative Dondero in speech on House floor charges Amerasia "white-wash."
Oct. 11.....		Mao Tse-tung returns to Yen-an.
Oct. 12.....		Hurley in conversation with President and Byrnes makes first statement that he had not had full support but agrees to return immediately to China.
Nov. 26.....		Hurley, in conversation with Byrnes, mentions Acheson and Service for first time but again agrees to return immediately to China.
Nov. 27.....		Congressman DeLacy makes speech in House criticizing Hurley.
Do.....		Hurley announces resignation and issues statement criticizing Foreign Service.
Do.....		General Marshall appointed President's Special Representative.
Nov. 28.....		Dondero again attacks Amerasia case.
Dec. 5-10.....		Hearings conducted by Senate Foreign Relations Committee on Hurley charges.
Dec. 15.....		President's policy statement establishes principle of conditional aid.
1946		
Apr. 16.....	Hospitalized in Tokyo.	
Apr. 18.....		House passed H. R. 430 introduced by Dondero for investigation of Amerasia case.
July 19.....	Transferred from Tokyo to Wellington.	
Aug. 28.....	Discharged from hospital.	

STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION 1905

Chronology of events—Continued

Date	Movements and activities of John S. Service	Other movements and activities
Sept. 6.	Departed from Japan.	Larsen article published in Plain Talk.
Sept. 18.	Arrived at home in California.	
Sept. 28.	Left San Francisco for Wellington.	
Oct. 15.	Arrived at Wellington.	
Oct. 23.		House Judiciary Subcommittee reports on investigation of Amerasia case.
Nov. 13.	Reclassified as FSO-3.	
1947	At Wellington.	
1948	At Wellington.	
Apr. 14.	Promoted to FSO-2.	Discussion of Service case by House Subcommittee on Appropriations.
1949		
Jan. 7.	Left Wellington on transfer to Washington.	
Jan. 10.	Arrived Washington and commenced duty with Foreign Service Selection Board.	
Feb. 11.		Publication by Congressman Judd of Service memo. No. 40, Oct. 10, 1945.
Mar. 21.	Completed Selection Board duty and assigned to Division of Foreign Service Personnel as Special Assistant (actual duties to consult Foreign Service officers in regard to their efficiency reports).	
Oct. 19.		
Nov. 21.	Assigned to Calcutta as officer in charge	
1950		Attack by Senator McCarthy on Service on Senate floor.
Jan. 5.		
Feb. 3.	Left Washington for leave in California en route to Calcutta.	
Feb. 12.		
Feb. 20.		Lincoln Day speech by Senator McCarthy at Reno, naming Service. McCarthy speech in Senate giving details of 81 cases but not including Service.
Mar. 11.	Departed from Seattle by ship for India.	
Mar. 14.		
Mar. 16.	Received cable recalling to Washington.	
Mar. 23.	Arrived Yokohama.	McCarthy charges against Service presented to Senate Foreign Relations Subcommittee.
Mar. 24.	Departed Tokyo for Washington.	
Mar. 27.	Arrived Washington, D. C.	
Mar. 30.		
		Senator McCarthy repeats testimony before Tydings subcommittee re Service.

Clearances of JSS

A. Judicial

1. Grand Jury, August 1945, unanimous no-bill after testimony by JSS

(Parenthetically, Ed, there's a point here that might be relevant to some of MacGuineas' statements before the Circuit Court and to some of the discussion between the Justices and MacGuineas in the Supreme Court: you will recall that my legal ownership of my copies of the memoranda and reports involved was recognized by the fact that the Department of Justice returned to me personally after the Grand Jury action.)

2. There was also the Special Grand Jury in New York that "ran away" with an investigation of the Amerasia Case in the Spring of 1950. So far as I know the only information on their proceedings is their Presentment of June 15, 1950. No mention is made of me but note sub-paragraph (d):

"The Grand Jury has also found no evidence to indicate that the Department of Justice was remiss in its ^{prosecution} presentation of the case"..

The easiest source on this is the Tydings Report, pages 136-7.

3. District Court proceedings and opinion in my case, June, 1955

4. Circuit Court proceedings and opinion , , 1956

5. Supreme Court 22 " , 1957

This, I admit, is stretching a long bow. That I am thinking of is the Govt's stout affirmation before all three Courts that my case did not involve either loyalty or security. This was accepted inferentially by the District Court, specifically by the Circuit .. and we await the Supreme. At any rate, this argument of the Government's that my case was not one of loyalty or security may be a useful one to turn against them in case of need.

B. Legislative

1. Senate: Committee on Foreign Relations. December 1945. Hearings on charges by Patrick J. Hurley against JS and other Foreign Service officers. Service defended by Secretary of State Byrnes. Charges found unsubstantiated.
2. House: Subcommittee of the Committee on the Judiciary (the "Hobbs Committee"). Investigated Amerasia case and handling of it from April (?) to October, 1946. Heard witnesses, including Larsen, but not JS. I don't have a copy at hand. But the tenor of the Subcommittee's findings were that: no agency or officer of the Government was at fault in any way in the handling and disposition of the case.
3. House: Subcommittee of the Committee on Appropriations. January (?), 1949. During hearings on State Appropriations, Scripps-Howard got hold of the story that I was serving on the Selection Board. The Subcommittee raised the question and finally devoted considerable time to testimony from Peurifoy, Ravndal (Director Gen. of the Foreign Service) and the State Dept Security Chief. Their conclusion was that I was OK but that State's "public relations" may have been questionable in putting me in the spot. Later, one of the Republican members (Stefan of Nebraska?) was apparently interested in meeting me, had ~~lunch~~ me to lunch at the Capitol restaurant, said that the Committee was fully satisfied and he was sure I would not have any trouble in future. All this of no particular relevance. But I think the Hearings, which are in the Committee's public record and which dealt exhaustively with me (though I personally was not called) can legitimately count as an investigation and clearance.

There follow a number of investigations by various Congressional Committee. These are enumerated and described on pages 6 to 9 of the Tydings Report. They dealt generally with "loyalty" in the State Department. However, most or all of them had access to the files (including loyalty) and it may therefore be assumed that my case was included.

4. House: Subcommittee of Committee on Appropriations. Investigators "given free access to State Department files, including loyalty files". Public Discussion on the Record, Jan. 28 and 29, 1948.
5. House: Committee on Expenditures in the Executive Departments. Hearings on March 10 and 12, 1948, regarding handling of loyalty cases by State. Testimony by Peurifoy and Robinson.
6. House: Committee on Foreign Affairs. Subcommittee of One - Congressman Bartel J. Jonkman. Investigated "communism" in the State Dept and reported (August 2, 1948) that "known or reasonably suspected subversives, Communists, fellow travelers, sympathizers, and persons whose services are not for the best interests of the United States, have been swept out .. of State Department". (emphasis added)

7. Senate: Subcommittee of the Appropriations Committee. March 23, 1948.
Questioning of Secretary Marshall.

The Tydings Committee summary of these investigations:

"..the amazing spectacle of four different committees of the 80th Congress ... having considered the very same files and information which provided the predicate for the McCarthy charges -- with none of these committees so much as regarding the situation as one meriting a report or citing a single State Department employee as disloyal".

Still, perhaps, not specific enough to count as investigation and clearance of JS?

8. Senate: Subcommittee of Committee on Foreign Relations (Tydings Committee) July 20, 1950. One minority member (Lodge) issued separate report but "cleared" Service. Other minority member (Hickenlooper) made no report.
9. Senate: Committee on Government Operations (McCarthy). Sept. 3, 1953. Executive hearing. This is hardly a "clearance" (except that McCarthy apparently was convinced that I was not acting as under-cover CIA man) but might well be included in a list of "harrassment by Congressional Committee."

There are also a number of Senate Actions which, technically, might be construed as clearances. Commissions and Promotions in the Foreign Service require Senate confirmation, which of course, means approval first by Committee on Foreign Relations and then the Senate. There have been at least two such instances since 1945. There was no dissenting vote in either case.

10. Senate: Confirmation as First Secretary, September, 1946.
11. Senate: Confirmation of Promotion to Class 2, April, 1948

C. Administrative

1. August, 1945, hearing by Board of Foreign Service Personnel (~~xxxxxxx~~ Deputy Sec. for Administration - Holmes; ~~xxxxxxx~~ Chief of Foreign Service Personnel - Davis; and Director of the Office of the Foreign Service - Chapin). Hearing was after Grand Jury action. Board recommended return to active duty and assignment in Far East. Action approved by Secretary Byrnes and UnderSec. Grew. However, in discussion of Amerasia case and relations with Jaffe, Service ~~xxxxxx~~ conceded violation of State Department regulations. Although returned to active duty, Service was put on probation pending further reports from field and review. ~~xxxxxx~~ Technically, this involved a nominal efficiency rating of "satisfactory"
2. At some later date, I believe early in 1946, the Board of Foreign Service Personnel (this was the top board then .. this was before the F.S. Act and its creation of the Board of the Foreign Service) did review my case (presumably in the light of further reports and investigation), restored my normal efficiency rating, and thus removed the probation and completed its clearance.
3. 1946. Service case was considered and cleared by State loyalty-security organs (Peurifoy testimony before House Subcommittee on Appropriations: see Legislative - 3). This may possibly have been the same action as mentioned just above. However, as Peurifoy was speaking of loyalty-security, it was more likely the "Advisory Committee on Personnel Security" (ACOPS) which was set up by the Department on July 25, 1946 .. 20 days after the original passage of the McCarran Rider. See Tydings Report, pages 15 and 16.
4. 1947. Service again investigated and cleared by State loyalty-security apparatus (Peurifoy testimony, see above). This action was presumably subsequent to E.O. 9835.
5. 1949: Service again cleared (by LSB). According to State Department press releases at the time, it was this clearance which was before the LRB for post-audit when McCarthy started off.
6. 1950: LSB reached its decision in June? We were informed of this decision but I'm not able to find whether it was officially approved by the Deputy Under-Secretary.
7. 1950, October 24: LSB reaffirmed its clearance after considering further reports and this decision confirmed by Humelsine.
8. 1951, July 31: LSB reconsidered case under F.O. 10241 and their clearance confirmed by Humelsine.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
WASHINGTON



March 24, 1950

CONFIDENTIAL

My dear Mr. Service:

Under date of March 21, 1947, the President issued Executive Order 9835 prescribing procedures for the administration of an Employee Loyalty Program in the Executive Branch of the Government. Under date of March 11, 1949, the Department of State promulgated regulations and procedures, a copy of which is attached, setting forth the revised loyalty and security principles and procedures relating to employees of the Department of State.

In the course of investigations conducted pursuant to this loyalty and security program certain information has been received by the Department of State which, after initial consideration by the Loyalty Security Board of the Department of State, necessitates the formulation of a charge against you.

The specific charges are that within the meaning of Section 392.2.f of Regulations and Procedures of the Department of State, you are a member of, or in sympathetic association with, the Communist Party which has been designated by the Attorney General as an organization which seeks to alter the form of government of the United States by unconstitutional means; and further that within the meaning of Section 393.1.d of said Regulations and Procedures you are a person who has habitual or close association with persons known or believed to be in the category set forth in Section 393.1.a of said Regulations and Procedures to an extent which would justify the conclusion that you might through such association, voluntarily or involuntarily, divulge classified information without authority.

A hearing

Mr. John Stewart Service,
Department of State,
Washington, D. C.

-2-

A hearing has been scheduled under Section 395 of the Regulations and Procedures of the Department of State in order to consider this charge, with a view to making a recommendation to the Secretary of State whether or not, under the provisions of the Department of State Appropriation Act, 1950, Section 104, Public Law 179, 81st Congress, First Session, your employment in the Department should be terminated in the interest of the United States.

You are hereby notified and afforded an opportunity of appearing at such a hearing to be held by the Loyalty Security Board at 10:00 A.M. on April 20, 1950, in Room 2254, New State Department Building, Washington, D. C. You will be in regular duty and pay status pending the outcome of this hearing.

You are also informed that it is your privilege to reply to these charges in writing before the date set for your hearing or to appear before the Loyalty Security Board at this hearing, to be accompanied, if you so desire, by counsel or representative of your own choosing, and to present evidence in your own behalf, through witness or by affidavit.

In the event you desire further details in order adequately to prepare your answer to this charge, the undersigned is available to discuss the matter with you and your representative.

Sincerely yours,

For the Secretary of State:



Conrad E. Snow

Chairman

Loyalty Security Board

Enclosures:

Regulations and Procedures of the
Department of State,
Notice regarding Evidence.

IMPORTANT NOTICE
TO THE EMPLOYEE

Any and all evidence which you desire to submit in connection with the matter under consideration should be submitted at the hearing before the Loyalty Security Board. No additional testimony may, as of right, be introduced into the record on any subsequent appeal, and on such appeals additional testimony will be received only in exceptional circumstances and in the discretion of the appeal Board. It is essential, therefore, that you should take care to present all of your evidence, including your own testimony, to the Loyalty Security Board at the hearing before that Board if you wish the same to be thereafter considered in the event of an appeal.

2226 Decatur Place, NW
 Washington, D.C.
 May 16, 1951

Dear John Carter:

A man in my position knows little of what goes on behind the scenes. But a new development (or "snag") has occurred. I think this may be an attempt by Humelsine (directly or thru SY) to contact you in regard to some remarks which I made to Humelsine. Therefore I owe it to you to let you know the background. The explanation will necessarily be lengthy and, I fear, rambling. Please bear with me.

From the beginning of my case (commencing with McCarthy's accusations in March, 1950), my lawyer and I have felt that it was desirable to keep you out as much as possible. It was, of course, impossible to avoid mentioning you in factual connections — you were head of CA or FE at a certain period, you authorized my off the record talk to the IPR meeting in Washington in 1944, etc. But because of the nature of the McCarthy attacks on you, it didn't seem wise (from your interest, my interest or the interest of the Department) to ~~max~~ bring your name into the proceedings any more than absolutely necessary.

Currie, however, was far more important to a full presentation of my case — particularly for background on the vital issue of giving information regarding the situation in China to journalists and writers. We realized that for any public, political forum (such as the Tydings Committee), any testimony from Lauch would be depreciated because of the Bentley accusations against him. But the Loyalty Board hearings were to be confidential and Lauch's White House position would have given his testimony considerable importance.

My lawyer (Ed Rhetts — plenty savvy and I'm convinced the best I could have had) and I talked first to Ben Cohen, who was pessimistic as regards Lauch. We went to Lauch anyway — and got what amounted to a flat refusal to be of any help at all. Faced with this, we had no choice but to play down this aspect of the case and even to duck questions by Board members that might lead us into it to the extent of specifying names (I assume you have the full 2 volume transcript of the Tydings Hearings — see page 2329).

Of course this was not the only disability I worked under. The temper of the times, the delicacy of some of the issues involved and the difficulty in getting people to testify on such matters as provision of background information, the death of potential witnesses such as Stilwell and George Atcheson, the fact that practically everyone connected with China has already been smeared, the refusal of Pat Hurley to appear (before either Loyalty Board or Tydings Comm.), the unavailability of witnesses such as Jaffe (and their certain refusal to talk if available), the unavailability of the FBI's

"confidential informants" (at least one of whom we are certain is an FSO) — there is no need to go on cataloguing them.

But despite all this we had a strong case and they reached their first favorable decision immediately after the hearings ended in late June, 1950. Before the Tydings Committee we were somewhat more hobbled and, in effect, plead "justifiable indiscretion". This certainly made things easier for the Democrat majority, which of course was under terrific "whitewash" pressure from McCarthy and his supporters. Under the circumstances, it is hard to see that we could have done otherwise. Unfortunately, the admission of indiscretion is going to plague me: it was emphasized in both the Majority and Senator Lodge's reports although they both absolved me of disloyalty.

Perhaps it will be useful if I take time out here to give a chronology of developments. McCarthy's charges were mid-March, 1950. I got back to Washington at the end of March. Advice was to prepare a full and completely documented case. For various reasons that took a lot of time. We commenced Loyalty Board hearings (before the State Dept Board) about May 20 and they lasted until late June. Tydings Committee hearings were also in late June. The favorable Tydings findings were announced on July 18. But as soon as the State Board told me (informally) that they had reached a favorable verdict, they were forced to hold things up because the FBI turned in a new report (associating me with various people I'd never heard of). That took more investigation. Finally in October, 1950, the State Board again affirmed its favorable decision. The file then went to Humelsine for his approval before being passed to the Loyalty Review Board for the ultimate clearance. It took Humelsine until the end of November to "finish reviewing the file". Meanwhile the Scripps-Howard fuss over Angus Ward's being "exiled" to Africa, and the elections had taken place. Humelsine passed the file. But whereas in October I had been told I was definitely going to New Delhi (the change to which from Calcutta had already been publicly approved by McCarthy because I would not be in charge), I now had my assignment ^{post} cancelled. I also received, indirectly but thru responsible channels, what I took to be a feeler as to whether or not I considered resignation. My attitude was that a resignation at this time would be disastrous to both me and the Dept, because it be used by McCarthy as a victory and proof of his charges. It was decided that I would go to a quiet, class 3 post in Africa.

Humelsine's original attitude had been that I would go to my post as soon as he approved the case and sent it on the Loyalty Review Board. Now he dropped that, but was very sure that the LRB would act quickly and that I might be at my post "before the end of the year" (1950). Nothing came out of the LRB. In February, McCarthy came up with some Chinese "secret intelligence reports" (excerpts published via Fulton Lewis, Jr.) and it became apparent that the stalemate was due to the ~~xxx~~ FBI still investigating.

At the beginning of March, Bert Andrews (NY Herald-Trib) came out with his story: "Acheson, Truman Split", based largely on your Tangier assignment and my non-clearance. The Dept's reaction, as far as I was

involved, was to drop the Africa assignment and decide on assigning me temporarily to Washington, with a job in some division such as Central Services. The idea being that as soon as the case is finished I go out again to a foreign post. Any FSO can understand (much better I'm afraid than Humelsine) some of the problems and costs involved in this business of kicking a family around. Our children are already in their fourth school in 3 years. Caroline appears ~~xxxx~~ to be on the narrow edge of a nervous breakdown.

It was at this period that I had a private talk with Pete Martin. I felt that I knew Pete well (I had a good deal of close association with him when I was in ~~xxx~~ FP in 1949) and I thought I could trust his discretion. He has always appeared to be "on my side". Since Humelsine is hard to see (and because of having to act officially for the Secretary should not be placed in the position of having much personal contact with me), and because people like Durbrow (Chief of FP) are without authority and know little about the developments in cases like mine, Pete has been my chief contact with the powers-that-be. Our talk was on the new developments and what the Dept expected to do about them (see preceding paragraph). I sought a course which meant a little more consideration, not so much for me as for the family. Alternatives I saw were: to let the New Delhi assignment stand (it was an assignment that made sense and Henderson and NRA objected to cancellation); to go ahead at once with another foreign assignment (there is no regulation or requirement that I be kept in Washington for the indefinite wait for LRB action); if it must be Washington, at least make it a regular assignment with some assurance that we can get a house, unpack and keep the children for a settled period in school. Pete, to give him his due, was genuinely sympathetic. But, dropping the personal and taking on what I assumed to be the reflection of the official view of his boss, the result was nil. "Appropriation hearings, with McC on the Senate Subcommittee, are going to be very tough. Things are going to continue getting worse, not better, for the next two years. The Dept had to pull its horns in, and keep them in. Acheson's defense of Hiss had been his greatest mistake; Neurifoy's defense of me was also a mistake." The justice of this, I could go along with in general. But I still thought it to the Dept's advantage to try to bring my case to an early end and to get me out of Washington and to work (for ~~xxxx~~ a year at this point, I had not done a lick of work). ^{he} Pete's counter to that was that my case was a very difficult one and clearly inferred that my serious indiscretion and poor judgment had caused H to have grave doubts and made it hard for him to pass me. He thought I had to be kept around Washington because new hearings or investigations were likely.

At this -- I shall always regret -- I mildly blew my top. Certainly I had been, and had always admitted indiscretion. But that indiscretion had been known to and clearance given despite it by numerous State Dept Boards and officials commencing ^{with} the Personnel Board in August, 1945: the recent hearings hadn't changed that picture, or contributed to an enlargement of the facts which had been known. Furthermore, the Dept knew (or should know) that there was a background to the case, purposely not developed by me ^{for} what seemed to be the interests of the Administration and all of us, which might modify the judgment. That background was

that I had been used as an active proponent of the CBI Theater point of view, that I had had specific instructions from a White House assistant (Currie) from time to time in/ regard to giving publicity to the actual situation in China, that these general facts were known to some of my superiors in the State Department who recognized the need of preparing public opinion in the US for the changes going on in China and either had an implicit policy ~~xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx~~ ~~xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx~~ of permitting, or at least made no objection, to free discussion of the China situation. I had not sought anyone's instructions or approval of talking to Jaffe and Gayn but my relations with them were of the same character as with many others, in the field and here."

I apologized to Pete for blowing off steam. He said that he understood the matter and that it would remain between us. About two weeks later, Humelsine calls me in (with Pete present) and wants me to repeat. I replied that of course I would not withhold any information which he, in his position, wanted; but that I was sorry that the matter had been raised because I had intentionally kept it out of my case because of the danger ~~of~~ — to the Dept as well as me — of distortion and misunderstanding in the present atmosphere. Here, as well as I can remember, is what I said (omitting the Army aspect which has no relevance to you).

At the end of 1942 I came back to the US after my four months trip thru the Northwest of China considerably steamed up over what I considered to be the dangers to the war effort and long-range US interests of the developing situation in China. In Chungking, you had said that I should see Lauch (then White House man on China). I had done so and found C much interested and apparently in complete agreement. At Lauch's initiative an association began which lasted until 1945. He asked that I write letters directly to him on the situation in China after my return. He had asked me to call his attention to noteworthy or interesting reports so that he could check to see whether he had received them. He was perturbed over the effects of the Madame's visit (and Chinese prop. propaganda generally) and said that the White House wanted to set a "backfire". He discussed the problem of getting more authoritative uncensored news of China into the press and mentioned three methods. He was able (and in this connection mentioned an assistant named Greenburg) to see that appropriate things got out. He was encouraging newsmen, commentators, etc. to go to China (even if only on brief trips) and when these arrived with any introduction from him, I should feel free to be frank in giving them the whole picture. He wanted me to talk to several commentators in Washington (specifically Pearson was one — and as I remember it, he made the arrangements). I had felt uneasy about the business of writing direct to Currie and had discussed it with you. Your reply was to the general effect: "Your not very well able to refuse a direct request of a White House assistant and if that's the way the W. H. wants to operate, you had better go along." As time went on, I noted a number of instances of use of material originally written by me by writers who I had never met. A long memo I wrote in Chungking in June, 1944, on the weaknesses of the KMT was "passed around" at an IPR conference. Several writers told me quite frankly

that had been seeing some of my reports. My long-standing and positive views were well known. No restraint was placed (in 1943, 1944 or 1945) on my expressing them freely to damn near every government agency in Washington. The Dept referred a number of newspapermen to me. They approved my talking to the IPR in 1944 (your permission) and in 1945 (Ed Stanton), although writers were present and used the material (of course without attribution). The fact was well known that I had assisted in getting Brooks Atkinson's stories on the Stilwell recall into the country but I had received no admonition and the story had been passed on White House OK. A press conference had been arranged by the Dept for Ludden to tell about his trip in the guerrilla country. In addition to the more positive indications that I had received from ~~Lauch~~ Lauch (and the Army), I therefore believed that the Dept (certainly CA and to some extent FE) had an implicit policy of wanting the facts about China known. Since these facts could not help but be critical of CKS and Company, any such policy would have to be implicit and indirect -- through giving background information -- rather than open. I therefore asked no specific authority but continued as I had been doing and as I thought it was known that I was doing.

Gayn was a well known magazine writer and author and had been obviously (from his articles) been seeing some of my reports. Amerasia was a specialist magazine with considerable authority. It had also apparently had access to my material. Both supported the Gauss-Stilwell attitude on China. They were friendly with a bunch of young IPR and young ONI and CA people whom I also knew. The subjects they were interested in were normal news material of the time and were coming into the public domain by articles and books written by men who had been to Yenan. The same material had been used repeatedly by me in semi-public talks as to the IPR. The same memos I left Jaffe read (and unfortunately borrow for a few days because he claimed he had to return to New York and couldn't read then and there) had been circulated widely and I had reason to believe been read by other newsmen. There was nothing secretive, or in my mind, improper in the association.

I made it clear that I did not claim that the contacts with Gayn and Jaffe were authorized or under any instructions, but that I had no information at the time to cause me to believe that the Amerasia operation was a phoney or that giving them background in the way I did was in conflict with what I took to be an understood policy.

H said little but seemed to feel that my failure to have testimony from Lauch (and perhaps substantiation from you) had left me in an unfavorable position. My attitude was that I didn't want it and had been cleared without it. It was an area better left untouched.

To my astonishment, a couple of FBI agents call on me about a week later and start asking questions on the Currie angle which obviously indicated that H had made some sort of a report. The agents were of the usual type and clearly unable to grasp the China picture objectively. I simply refused to discuss the subject but insisted twice that I knew nothing in the matter that had any bearing as far as I could see on the

;and that it concerned only
policy regarding giving
background info to the press.

question of loyalty or the commission of any crime. Greenberg I had never met, and could say nothing about. On Currie I knew absolutely nothing that could throw any light, as far as I could see, on the Bentley accusations as I had read of them in the press. They did not press the matter and went on to various other things (such as an accusation that I'm the father of a child by an old friend in Chungking born 17 months after I left that city and saw the woman for the last time). However, I understand that they have included some reference to the conversation in a report to the Loyalty Board but merely saying that I refused to discuss it — omitting my repeated statements that I refused on the basis that it had no bearing on the question of loyalty of any of the individuals concerned.

Well, that the story. Humelsine's action is completely inexplicable to me. One logical assumption seems to be that LC is worse medicine than I had any idea of. Greenberg, at least, seems to be pretty well tagged. So instead of an association with a White House assistant (and the association being known to the head of CA) being a help to a junior FSO, it looks as though the association may yet prove to have been a harmful one.

It goes without saying that this letter had best be destroyed. Perhaps it had better not have been written; but your being uninformed on how this developed has caused me some sleepless nights.

Cheers,

PS. I told Humelsine of the reasons why I had refused to discuss this business with FBI. He made no comment.

WASHINGTON REPORT

By **Fulton
Lewis Jr.**

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WASHINGTON, Feb. 13.—Chiang Kai-shek has had a wily crew of Chinese counter-intelligence agents on his payroll for a number of years now whose principal assignment was keeping track of State Department officials and other Americans who traveled to China to hold hands with Communists there.

Senator Pat McCarran, Nevada Democrat, who is setting up a staff designed once and for all to wring out the Reds on the Federal payroll, might be able to borrow some of Chiang's files. The State Department probably would again cut off military aid to Chiang if McCarran did get access to the files, but it might be worth it in the long run.

For instance, one document in a strong box on Formosa, where Chiang is holed in with a 400,000-man army, is particularly interesting in the light of a lot of testimony by certain State Department officials regarding their activities in China.

John Stewart Service, one of the State Department diplomats arrested by the FBI in the Amerasia case, but later released; Philip Jaffe, convicted of possessing top secret State Department files, and a number of others who figured in the Tydings whitewash investigation of Reds in the Government received considerable attention from Chiang's footpads.

A copy of the document is already in senatorial hands. It makes interesting reading. For instance, it relates how an intelligence agent in a United States embassy in China kept peddling secrets to the Communists for transmittal to Vassili

M. Zubellin, chief secretary of the Soviet Embassy in Washington. Other details in the report

which lists the license number of automobiles used by Americans on inland trips in China to confer with the Communists, disclose the activities of Communist women and their American boy friends.

The report, translated from Chinese into English several days ago by experts in the Library of Congress, gives particular attention to one feminine operative.

This Mata Hari wandered from bar to bed all over China, concentrating on Americans who looked like soft touches for the Chinese Communists. Some were not so hard to persuade.

This woman is the present wife of a Chinese Communist who was in the United States not long ago as a member of the nine-man Communist cease-fire delegation from Peiping to the United Nations. Mama stayed home. She was busy.

The loyal Chinese intelligence agents on Chiang's payroll describe her in words of Oriental understatement, thus:

"Using her title as a newspaper correspondent, along with others, she frequently ran about among the personnel of the various embassies in China, the American news office, and the correspondents of various nations in order to ferret out information, even, sacrificing without compunction womanly qualities in order to accomplish the mission. A particular objective of hers was —." Until such time as the document is made part of an official record the names will not be printed here.

One or two State Department

officials at the Tydings fiasco admitted knowing the woman, one even admitted being on friendlier terms with her husband.

The Nationalist Chinese intelligence report, one of several dozen in and around Washington, doesn't overlook Owen Lattimore. This Baltimore sage got a daily workout from Senator Joseph R. McCarthy for his part in the China blunder. He is slated for another go-around before the McCarran subcommittee, principally about two of his acquaintances in China, Chiao Mu and Kung Peng, two characters who never got near a Chinese laundry but who know all about the Moscow part in the betrayal of China.

Lattimore was in on the ground floor of the sellout, but it is hard to locate any large cries of alarms he ever uttered about the danger of Communists seizing power in China. He was the late President Roosevelt's political adviser on China, in 1941, but didn't stay in China long. Chiang Kai-shek couldn't stand him, and told Roosevelt so. As a reward, Lattimore was made head of the Pacific Office of War Information. In 1944 he traveled to China with Henry Wallace. While there he was busy visiting his old pals. The Chinese intelligence report goes into detail about the visits, but I shall go into that another day.

The State Department and its China "experts" have spent many a day kicking Chiang Kai-shek around. It wouldn't be surprising if Chiang stepped up now for a little revenge. The sweetest way to get it is to dump some of his secret file data about our Government officials who wandered

FULTON LEWIS JR.
is on the air, KFRC,

around China playing tag with the Communists. Senator McCarran has a big basket handy.

"...pertinent excerpts..."

By JOHN S. SERVICE

The JOURNAL has commented generally on the current threat to the integrity and independence of Foreign Service reporting which can result from investigative autopsies without regard to context, either in time, substance or circumstance. No less ominous is that type of public investigation which by "interpretation" ascribes to a report a meaning completely unwarranted or opposite to the writer's intent and language.

A recent example of both techniques is the treatment a few weeks ago* by the Senate Judiciary Committee's Internal Security Subcommittee of a memorandum I wrote in April, 1944.

FIRST, SOME BACKGROUND is necessary. In the Spring of 1944, I was a relatively junior officer—FSO VII—attached to the staff of the Commanding General of the China-Burma-India Theater, then General Stilwell. Popularly (but never officially) called a "political adviser," my duties consisted of many minor chores and very occasionally providing a little advice. A fully operating Embassy was just down the road and routine liaison between it and Headquarters was one of my regular duties. Ambassador Gauss, by specific instruction of General Stilwell, received a copy of everything I wrote and any advice I might give the Army was always known to the Embassy.

During this Spring of 1944, there was a flurry of excitement in Chungking over a border incident in the remote Central Asian Chinese province of Sinkiang. Sometime before, the USSR—for reasons not relevant here—had withdrawn its longstanding protection of a local warlord and the Chinese National Government, for the first time, had assumed *de facto* control.

The shift in administration was amicable and the local situation peaceful. Nonetheless, the National Government, despite a still unchecked Japanese threat in China proper, proceeded to send several divisions of troops into the province.

Outer Mongolia and Sinkiang

The need for this foray was not readily apparent: the war with Japan was a very long distance in the opposite direction. There appeared to be some basis for the gossip-report from Kuomintang circles that the intention was to create a military base for post-war establishment of Chinese control over Outer Mongolia and Tibet and to provide an "impregnable bulwark" against Russia.

John S. Service, born in China of American parents, was graduated from Oberlin College, B.A. in 1931. He joined the Foreign Service in 1933, first as clerk, and in 1935 after examination as Vice Consul and Secretary in the Diplomatic Service, assigned Peiping as language officer. He served continuously in the Far East until 1946, then at Wellington, New Zealand until assigned to the Department in 1948. Posted as Counselor at New Delhi in March 1950, he was recalled when enroute to India and is now on duty in the Department in the Office of Operating Facilities.

*September 19, 1951.

There is no space here to detail the "pipe dream" aspects—politically, economically or logistically—of Sinkiang as a Chinese military bastion to dominate Central Asia. Whatever their objective, the Chinese soon began having troubles—as might have been predicted from their comparatively large scale invasion of a poor and sparsely settled desert country, with a limited and non-expansible oasis-nomad economy, and a population some 95 percent non-Chinese.

One difficulty was with the Kazaks, a hardy nomad tribe living on both sides of the Sinkiang-Outer Mongolia frontier. Chinese official sources reported in March, 1944, that planes "bearing a red star insignia" had committed repeated acts of aggression by bombing Chinese forces in this area. Tass, reporting from Ulan Bator, presented an opposite account: the Chinese were the aggressors.

While a battle of communiqués raged, the National Government plied the Army Headquarters with requests to send American officers to the spot to investigate and fix the blame. Headquarters was puzzled: we were fighting the Japanese—not the Kazaks, Outer Mongols or Russians; how to transport American investigators into that remotest part of Central Asia; and, by the time they got there, would a few shell or bomb craters on the vast Gobi mean much? I was told to watch the situation and "advise."

This was not easy from Chungking. After struggling with daily-different reports, I hit on the idea of comparing the best available maps: American, Chinese, British, Russian and any others. To my surprise there was the wildest disagreement on this particular section of Sinkiang. Even some official Chinese maps did not support the Chinese boundary claim. The "aggressor" depended on which map you used.

We could assume Russian sponsorship of the Outer Mongolian action. But how immediately important was a sharply defined line in this un-mapped, open and semi-desert country, containing no permanent settlements worthy of the name and peopled by nomads continually moving back and forth with the pasture and seasons?

I questioned the motives behind the Chinese request. To have given no inkling of the vagueness of the border was less than forthright. Chinese policies in Sinkiang had dangers which made our involvement seem unwise. Finally, we had enough problems in our relations with Russia in early 1944 without an added controversy of doubtful validity and certain futility.

I could not see that American interests would be served by our intervention. They might be harmed. I recommended that we decline the Chinese request to investigate.

China, Russia and the United States

I had written a series of reports on the border incident. In my final memorandum on the subject, I related my recommendation to the broader aspects of the situation in Sinkiang and then went on to some general remarks concerning China, Russia and the United States. The following is the relevant passage, dated April 7, 1944 (Italics have been added; their significance will be apparent later.)

"We must be concerned with Russian plans and policies in Asia because they are bound to affect our own plans in the same area. But our relations with Russia in Asia are at present only a subordinate part of our political and military relations with Russia in Europe in the over-all United Nations war effort and post-war settlement. ***We should make every effort to learn what the Russian aims in Asia are.*** A good way of gaining material relevant to this will be a careful study of the strength, attitudes, and popular support of the Chinese Communists. But in determining our policy toward Russia in Asia we should avoid being swayed by China. The initiative must be kept firmly in our hands. To do otherwise will be to let the tail wag the dog.

(1) "As for the present Chinese Government, it must be acknowledged that we are faced with a regrettable failure of statesmanship. ***Chiang's persisting in an active anti-Soviet policy, at a time when his policies—or lack of them—are accelerating economic collapse and increasing internal dissension, can only be characterized as reckless adventurism. The cynical desire to destroy unity among the United Nations is serious.***

"Do You Swear To Preserve, Protect, And Defend
The Government Of Chiang Kai-Shek?"



But it would also appear that Chiang unwittingly may be contributing to Russian dominance in eastern Asia by internal and external policies which, if pursued in their present form, will render China too weak to serve as a possible counter-weight to Russia. By so doing, Chiang may be digging his own grave; not only North China and Manchuria, but also national groups such as Korea and Formosa may be driven into the arms of the Soviets.

"Neither now, nor in the immediately foreseeable future, does the United States want to find itself in direct opposition to Russia in Asia; nor does it want to see Russia have undisputed dominance over a part or all of China.

"The best way to cause both of these possibilities to become realities is to give, in either fact or appearance, support to the present reactionary government of China beyond carefully regulated and controlled aid directed solely toward the military prosecution of the war against Japan. To give diplomatic or other support beyond this limit will encourage the Kuomintang in its present suicidal anti-Russian policy. It will convince the Chinese Communists—who probably hold the key to control, not only of North China but of Inner Mongolia and Manchuria as well—that we are on the other side and that their only hope for survival lies with Russia. ***Finally, Russia will be led to believe—if she does not already—that American aims run counter to hers, and that she must therefore protect herself by any means available; in other words, the extension of her direct power or influence.***" (2)

The Army accepted my recommendation. The Embassy raised no objection and forwarded a copy to the Department. Months later there came one of those always pleasant surprises—an instruction from the Department saying that my memorandum had been "found of much interest and value . . . given the grade of Excellent."

THE SCENE SHIFTS now to September 19, 1951—almost seven and a half years after the memorandum was written.

General Wedemeyer, who took General Stilwell's place in China and to whose staff I was attached for a short while in early 1945, is being interrogated by the Internal Security Subcommittee in public session. The General has been led to testify that *subsequent* re-examination of reports made to him by his State Department "advisers" has caused him to believe that their recommendations were pro-Communist and contrary to American policy.

Testimony

The Subcommittee Counsel (Mr. Robert Morris) has therefore turned to some specific reports to provide illustration of the General's testimony. The following is from the official transcript of the Subcommittee hearing:

"Mr. Morris. General, may I call your attention to the report of April 7, 1944, that is before you? . . .

General Wedemeyer. Yes, sir.

Mr. Morris. Mr. Mandel, will you read pertinent excerpts from that?

The Chairman (Senator McCarran). Before we go into that, what is this instrument, where does it stem from and what is the foundation for it?

Mr. Mandel (the Research Director of the Subcommittee staff). The date is April 7, 1944, "Subject: Excerpt from memorandum, April 7, 1944, by John S. Service forwarded to Department as enclosure no. 1 of despatch no. 2461, April 21, 1944, under title 'Situation in Sinkiang; Its Relation to American Policy vis-a-vis China and the Soviet Union'."

This was also introduced in the Loyalty Board proceedings before the State Department in the case of John S. Service.

'Chiang's persisting in an active anti-Soviet policy, at a time when his policies—or lack of them—are accelerating economic collapse and increasing internal dissension, can only be characterized as reckless adventurism. The cynical desire to destroy unity among the United Nations is serious.'

Mr. Morris. What paragraph is that?

Mr. Mandel. The second paragraph. Further,

'Finally, Russia will be led to believe—if she does not already—that American aims run counter to hers, and that she must therefore protect herself by any means available; in other words, the extension of her direct

power or influence?

Mr. Morris. General, can you comment on that?

General Wedemeyer. This statement was made at a time when there were a lot of people in our country who were making similar statements. Today they are on the bandwagon of opposing Communism. Quite a few Americans were making statements along that line. In fact, when I came back after the war, I found it rather dangerous and I could talk to a very few people, found it very dangerous to talk realistically about the implications of Communism in this country and in the world in general. I am very glad that Chiang Kai-shek even at that time epitomized opposition to Communism and thank God for General MacArthur out in Japan for the same reason when others were playing footsie with Communism, many others. I think Chiang showed a shrewdness, a political shrewdness, in continuing his opposition.

As far as cooperation was concerned, the Soviet Communists did not persist in the China Theater. The contribution they made in the war against Japan was negligible. The American people ought to understand that clearly.

Senator Ferguson. Might I ask in relation to this, is this not an indication that this was a warning at least to America that she had better see what Russia wanted in Asia and go along with Russia's desires rather than what was well for America or the world? That is, when he says "We should make every effort to learn what the Russian aims in Asia are," and the previous sentence that was read to you about Russia having her way. Is that right?

General Wedemeyer. It could be interpreted that way. I think that is a sound interpretation of the statement.

Mr. Morris. General, may I refer you to a report now of Mr. John P. Davies, one of the four political advisers?"

LET US ANALYZE this transcript.

We will pass over the fact that although the General was supposedly testifying concerning my views while working for him, the Counsel selected and interrogated him on this memorandum written nine months *before* I joined the General's staff. There are more important matters.

Gerrymandering an Excerpt

First, the Subcommittee did not use the whole memorandum, not to mention the series of which it was a part. It used only an excerpt from the memorandum's conclusions without any of the essential background—the border incident, the Sinkiang situation and related events of the period—which led to those conclusions. Unexplained and shorn of context, many of these statements are meaningless—or capable of varying interpretation.

Second, not even the whole excerpt was actually considered. The Research Director, by some unexplained logic, selected three unrelated sentences as "pertinent excerpts." These poor fragments are actually subordinate to the principal thesis. From them one cannot hope to discover—much less understand—what I was recommending. But they are all that are put into the transcript. The question presents itself: to what does the Research Director consider these excerpts "pertinent"?

Third, required by the Counsel to comment on these meaningless fragments, the unfortunate witness could hardly be expected to give a very meaningful response. He can scarcely be blamed for seeming irrelevancy: "... a lot of people in our country were making similar statements. Today they are on the bandwagon of opposing Communism. . . I found it very dangerous to talk realistically about the implications of Communism in this country and in the world in general . . . thank God for General MacArthur out in Japan . . .

Chiang showed a shrewdness . . . the contribution they (the Soviet Communists) made in the war against Japan was negligible. The American people ought to understand that clearly."

Should not this investigative body, after such loose criticism by innuendo, have asked General Wedemeyer how my views differed from some of his own? As late as September 19, 1947, in his report to the President after a survey of China he said:

"Adoption by the United States of a policy motivated solely toward stopping the expansion of Communism without regard to the continued existence of an unpopular and repressive government would render any aid ineffective. Further, United States prestige in the Far East would suffer heavily, and wavering elements might turn away from the existing government to Communism."

Fourth: The omission of the actually pertinent material, even from the limited excerpt used by the Subcommittee, leads a Subcommittee member to come to the apparent conclusion—and permits the witness to agree—that an isolated sentence: "We should make every effort to learn what the Russian aims in Asia are," really meant that America "had better see what Russia wanted in Asia and go along with Russia's desires rather than what was well for America or the world." Is this not the exact opposite of the meaning of my whole memorandum *and particularly* that portion of it which was omitted by the Research Director between his first and second "pertinent excerpts"?

Such an investigative technique, I submit, is neither helpful to public understanding nor fair to the reporting officer, be he an officer of the Foreign Service, the Department of State, or any other part of our government.

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October 11, 1951

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Mr. John S. Service
4608 Butterworth Place
Washington, D. C.

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Dear Mr. Service:

Reference is made to the investigation in your case by the Federal Bureau of Investigation under Executive Order 9835, as amended by Executive Order 10241, which established the President's Employee Loyalty Program, and to your hearing before the Department of State Loyalty Security Board. You are advised that the Departmental Board made a determination favorable to you on the matter of loyalty and that the complete file in the case was subsequently reviewed by a panel of members of the Loyalty Review Board under authority of and pursuant to Regulation 14 of the Regulations for the Operations of the Loyalty Review Board.

Regulation 14 reads as follows:

"The Board, or an Executive Committee of the Board, shall, as deemed necessary from time to time, cause post-audits to be made of the files on loyalty cases decided by the employing Department or Agency, or by a Regional Loyalty Board.


"The Board, or an Executive Committee of the Board, or a duly constituted panel of the Board, shall have the right, in its discretion, to call up for review any determination or decision made by any Department or Agency Loyalty Board or Regional Loyalty Board, or by any head of an employing Department or Agency, even though no appeal has been taken. Any such review shall be made by a panel of the Board, and the panel, whether or not a hearing has been held in the case, may affirm the determination or decision, or remand the case with appropriate instructions to the Agency or Regional Loyalty Board concerned for hearing or for such further action or procedure as the panel may determine. In exceptional cases, if in the judgment of the panel public interest requires it, the panel may hold a new hearing in the case and after such hearing, affirm or reverse the determination or decision."

After review of the complete file, the Loyalty Review Board has determined that "public interest" requires it to hold a new hearing in your case as provided for in the above-mentioned Regulation 14.

The hearing before the Loyalty Review Board will be based upon the charges heretofore issued to you by the Department of State Loyalty Security Board and the issues to be heard at the hearing will be within the framework of those charges. The Loyalty Review Board will arrive at an independent judgment in this matter. The transcripts of all testimony taken below are a part of the complete file now before the Loyalty Review Board. However, you are invited to present any evidence you desire in your behalf at the hearing. You may present oral argument and you may, of course, be represented by counsel or other representative.

Arrangements will be made to hold your hearing at Washington, D.C. We are not able at this time to set a date for the hearing. However, you will be notified approximately ten days in advance of the time and hearing room address.

Very truly yours,

A handwritten signature in cursive script, reading "Hiram Bingham". The signature is written in dark ink and is positioned above the printed name and title.

Hiram Bingham
Chairman
Loyalty Review Board

U.S. News & World Report

The United States News ©

World Report ©

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APPENDIX VIII

J.S.S. *Lele.*
**EVERY ABLE-BODIED
BOY TO BE DRAFTED**

Interview...

HIRAM BINGHAM TELLS ABOUT

...Catching the Disloyal



Chairman
Bingham
Of U. S.
Loyalty Board

with **HIRAM BINGHAM**

Chairman, Loyalty Review Board

CATCHING THE DISLOYAL

EDITOR'S NOTE: What check is there on the work of the 200 boards in Government agencies that test federal employes for loyalty?

If a field investigation of a person by the FBI has been found desirable but a board calls him O.K., does that end the case? What results have the loyalty hearings shown?

To discuss such questions the editors of U. S. News & World Report invited to their conference rooms Hiram Bingham, Chairman of the Loyalty Review Board, which has the final say on the loyalty of individuals in Government service.

HIRAM BINGHAM, son and grandson of missionaries, was born in Honolulu 76 years ago. He taught history, explored in South America, helped develop the Army's World War I air service and wrote several books before he was elected Lieutenant Governor of Connecticut in 1922.

Mr. Bingham was Republican Senator from Connecticut for eight years prior to 1933. Business activities and biographical and historical writing followed. Early this year President Truman named Mr. Bingham Chairman of the Loyalty Review Board of the Civil Service Commission.

Q As chairman of the Loyalty Review Board, Mr. Bingham, your work is to review the work of the 100 or more loyalty boards—is that right?

A Our first job is to lay down rules and regulations so as to make the whole procedure of the loyalty program uniform. The department and agency boards had been doing different things, so we were instructed by the President to lay down the rules and regulations for the entire program. Also, we are the highest board of appeal for any persons adjudged ineligible by lower boards, and by the heads of the different departments and agencies.

Also, we review under what's known as "post audit" cases that are cleared by the lower boards after full field investigation.

Q Your Board doesn't have any investigating machinery itself?

A No. The FBI is the sole investigating agency under the loyalty program. Loyalty boards don't investigate; they weigh the reports received from the FBI, hold hearings as necessary and decide loyalty cases.

Q You have two main considerations, loyalty and security?

A No, we have nothing to do with security.

Q What is the difference between the two as you see it?

A Security is much broader than loyalty.

Q Do you have the feeling that somebody is trying to infiltrate into the Government?

A We know that they have infiltrated. We know through the Amerasia case that confidential Government documents were given away. We know that that is the way in which the Communists operate. They try to infiltrate and learn what's going on and make trouble.

Q Do they try to get into any particular department?

A Most of our cases now are in connection with the national-defense activities of various agencies, including activities at field installations. Of course, here in Washington the cases that come up are people trying to get in the headquarters offices of Government agencies.

Q Are charges ever placed against an individual without an FBI investigation?

A No. The only cases that come to us are cases that the FBI has found it necessary to investigate. They make no charges.

Q What about all this that you hear about some employe being accused of not having any information given to him as to where the charges arise from?

A Those cases, so far as I have been able to discover are mostly in the security field, where you don't have to give specific charges, where under the law the head of any one of the 10 departments and agencies mentioned, and any others the President may put in, may be told by his security officer—they all have security officers—that he is a "security risk." The head of the agency may suspend him.

I have known of cases where a man got a letter telling him that he had been suspended and the reason that he had been suspended was too confidential to tell him. There is something wrong about that, but that has nothing to do with loyalty.

Q Is he eligible for another Government job?

A No, under the law he is not.

Q Then do you take over his case?

A No, we have nothing to do with security.

Q If you find that a man was a member of the Communist Party at one time, say, 10 years ago

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does that mean that he is ineligible under your rulings?

A If he was a member 10 years ago and has had nothing to do with it since, he probably would be cleared. During the first three years of the loyalty program, the standard for ineligibility was that we must find reasonable grounds to believe that the individual is disloyal.

Q *At present?*

A Yes, that was the way in which most lawyers interpreted it. You can imagine a case where a man had been a member of a Communist organization from, let us say, 1940 to 1945. In 1946 the Communist Party started calling in all membership cards. There may be no evidence whatever of his being active since then. However, when he applies for a job, let us say, in the Philadelphia Navy Yard and the record shows that he was a Communist for five years back in the early '40s and that he hasn't been a Communist so far as anybody knows in the last three or four years, under the old standards the chances are that the lower board and the agency head would have declared him ineligible. Then he would appeal the case to the Loyalty Review Board, and it would be my duty to appoint a panel of three from the 24 members of the Board who would look at all the papers, hold a hearing and listen to the case. They might decide, as sometimes they did, that they find no reasonable grounds to believe that the person was "presently" disloyal.

Tighter Loyalty Standards

It was the discovery of cases of that kind which I made when I became Chairman on the 3d of January, 1951, where some of the lawyers on our Board—and we have a number of very distinguished lawyers—felt that since there was no evidence of disloyalty for three or four years they ought to hold him eligible because there was nothing to make them believe that he is "presently" disloyal. There was no question that they might have had a reasonable doubt of his loyalty and under such a standard they could have declared him ineligible.

Cases of this kind led me to ask the Loyalty Review Board to request the President to change the standard and make it "reasonable doubt of loyalty." Now, if a person had been a Communist for five years and hadn't done anything for the last three or four years—you know that the Communists have told him not to carry a membership card; you can't find positive proof—you can still have reasonable doubt of his loyalty.

Take the hypothetical case where a man has mar-

ried a Communist and has a job with the Government. He himself has not taken any part, except for going to some meetings with her and having a subscription to a Communist paper at home. Under security standards, he might very well be regarded as a risk because his wife could find out what he is doing.

You remember the case of that man who stole the secret of the atom bomb from Los Alamos, and who was allowed by the Army to leave Los Alamos for week ends to visit his wife in Santa Fe or Albuquerque. His wife got all the dope and passed it on to Russian agents.

We in the loyalty program are in the difficult position at the present time of not having anything to do with a security risk; our job is to find out whether there is a reasonable doubt about the loyalty of the individual to the United States Government.

Separating the Security Cases

Q *Why isn't your Board empowered to consider the security risk?*

A The President, in the last paragraph of Executive Order 9835, says, "You will have nothing to do with security cases."

Q *But why is that?*

A It may be because the Acts of Congress relating to security matters gave the authority to dismiss for security reasons to only a few departments and agencies, whereas the order establishing the Loyalty Review Board is more comprehensive.

Q *Wouldn't it be better if just one board did it?*

A It would be much better, in my opinion. There are a number of times when our panel is in doubt about a person but cannot say that there is a reasonable doubt.

Incidentally, if you look in the dictionary for the terms "loyal" and "disloyal," you will find that one is not just the opposite of the other. A loyal subject is one who is more than a faithful subject. He is a loyal friend who will go to bat for you. A loyal citizen, under the modern meaning of loyal, will do more than is required for his country. He'll put his country first rather than himself. Now, disloyal means something infamous, perfidious, treacherous.

Under the old standards—"on all the evidence, reasonable grounds exist to believe a person is disloyal"—I have had to sign a paper stating that the Loyalty Review Board has found reasonable grounds to believe a person is disloyal! I have hated to do that, because to brand a person with disloyalty is a very serious thing. I don't mind saying that we find reasonable

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. . . 'It is difficult to pin anything on topflight Communists'

doubt of loyalty. So I am much happier under the new standard.

Q Do you think that the present standards ought to be changed in any way? Could they be improved?

A The right standard for eligibility is that which was put into effect at the beginning of World War II, in 1942. It is the standard we are now working under. The President and the Civil Service Commission said that no one could be employed by the Government concerning whose loyalty there was reasonable doubt.

Q A lot of people got into the Government, then, under that change in standard?

A There were some people declared eligible prior to the recent change in the standard that may not be declared eligible today. Such cases are being reviewed.

Q Do you think that there ought to be any changes in the standard of loyalty?

A No. I don't think so.

Communist Agents Under Cover

Q If the Communists had an important agent whom they wanted to get into the Government, would they permit him to clutter up his background with memberships in various organizations?

A At one of the New York *Herald-Tribune* Forum sessions the other day, Mr. Philbrick, who was one of the principal witnesses at the trial of the 11 Communists, who had served in Boston for nine years as undercover agent for the FBI and was one of the most successful undercover men that the FBI has ever had, told of how, after he had been a Communist for five or six years, he was told to destroy all evidence and was no longer supposed to be a Communist and was told not to associate with his former party comrades. There is no doubt that the very topflight Communists are so very well protected that it is difficult to pin anything on them.

Q So that membership in an organization doesn't mean anything?

A It is an opening wedge, and the FBI makes a comprehensive investigation.

Q Couldn't people infiltrate into a place like the State Department as Communists and not be known as Communists?

A Yes, or any other agency. There's the famous case of Alger Hiss. He got very far.

Q Did his case ever come before any loyalty review board?

A No.

Q Did it ever come before any departmental board?

A No. He left Government service before the loyalty program went into operation.

Q From what is known of the Hiss case, would he have been made ineligible from any evidence on him, or would he have been passed except for the disclosures that came later?

A That I don't know.

Q There is no open evidence that he was a member of the Communist Party?

A I don't know. I have been told that it was reported to certain Government officials that he was a Russian agent, and it was not believed.

Q Was he checked for loyalty? Did the FBI check him?

A This happened before the loyalty program was set up.

Q But everybody was checked during the war, even though they had been in the Government before—I suppose some of that mass checking was pretty routine?

A The first time that the Civil Service Commission was authorized to do anything resembling a character investigation from the loyalty angle was as a result of the Hatch Act passed by Congress in 1939. Then, in 1942, after we had gotten into the war, the President decided to give the Commission the right to refuse employment to applicants when investigation showed that there was a reasonable doubt of their loyalty. The Commission, however, could investigate only a small percentage of persons entering the service. While the Commission adjudicated these cases, it did not have jurisdiction over persons already employed. The various departments and agencies handled loyalty matters involving their own employees, each in its own way. There was lack of uniformity. That was one reason why in 1946 the Congress asked the President to set up a committee to advise him on a review program, and the committee reported in the early part of '47. In March, 1947, the President issued Executive Order 9835 to make the loyalty program uniform and more effective.

FBI's Investigating Job

Q Does the FBI investigate the activities of these persons in the Government outside of their offices, or do they investigate where they are active at their jobs?

A My understanding is that they don't go directly to the person.

Q I mean, do they have any investigation of what the person does in a Government office?

A Oh, yes, the FBI does investigate wherever it is necessary. Practically all Government employees have been screened. That was virtually completed last year. Under Executive Order 9835 the President has said that the head of each department and agency in the executive branch of the Government is personally responsible for an effective program to make sure that disloyal employees are not retained in employment in his department or agency. He is responsible for prescribing and supervising the loyalty-determination procedures of his department or agency in accordance with the provisions of the executive orders and the rules and regulations of the Loyalty Review Board.

... 'We reversed many cases that came to us'

Q They have what they call "security officers" in a department, for example. Do their reports go to a loyalty board?

A No, that's security. But in most departments it is the same board. In the State Department the board is called the loyalty and security board. The Commerce Department is the only one that separates them, and has a loyalty board and a security board.

Q Such a double board, then, might know from security channels damaging facts that could be used in judgment on the loyalty question?

A Yes.

Q Does anybody keep any check on the disloyal former employes, what becomes of them afterwards, where they go to get jobs, whether they drift back into these Communist-front organizations?

A No.

Barriers Against 'Disloyal'

Q How do they make a living?

A Having chosen to act in a manner which led the Loyalty Review Board to find a reasonable doubt as to their loyalty, they have put themselves in a very bad position to get a job requiring loyalty. For instance, they couldn't get a job in one of the plants that make Government defense material. It's just too bad when a man does something of that kind. It's too bad when a man who happens to be a bank teller finally, under pressure from his family, helps himself to the till. He has put himself outside of the pale of high-grade citizens.

Q When they are dismissed from the Government, they are dismissed because they are assumed to be dangerous, or disloyal, and then they go somewhere else to get a job where they might continue their disloyalty?

A They have to try to get a job. We never publish the names. We give no publicity to any of our activities. If there's any publicity, it is all given by the man himself or his counsel.

Q It has been charged, or implied, that some of the loyalty boards are unwilling to believe what the FBI considers to be pretty conclusive evidence. Do you believe that the boards pass up such cases?

A The FBI never reports an analysis. It is their duty to investigate and give you the result of all the investigation they were able to make.

Q It simply provides a complete file on a man?

A Yes.

Q It's the duty of the board to determine whether that evidence is worthy or not, isn't it?

A Yes. The FBI furnishes us with a report of a full field investigation.

Q Well, to put it more directly, do you think that the department loyalty boards have done a good job?

A Yes. They do a very faithful job, by and large.

Q If a Government employe within the last six months knew that he was being checked on by the FBI, that his family and home town were being interrogated, could he infer that he was under suspicion?

A I should think that he might draw that inference. Perhaps that's one reason why 1,800 of the 16,000 resigned before the investigation was completed.

Q It wouldn't be checked on to that extent unless there was some degree of suspicion? I'm thinking of someone who has been in the Government a few years—

A Of course, everyone was asked to reply to questions, which were drawn up in consultation with the FBI, when the President first put the loyalty program into effect. Everyone was subject to investigation then.

Q Do you think it's possible that some of these 1,800 quit because they felt that they wouldn't have any chance for a fair hearing?

A Undoubtedly they quit for various reasons. I hope that nobody quit because they wouldn't get a fair hearing.

Q But at a time when accusations are made rather freely in high places, sometimes a man can be smeared and never get rid of it?

A Unfortunately, that's true. I don't know what we can do to prevent it.

We have reversed many of the cases that have come to us from the lower boards.

Q What kind of reversals do you mean—where they have been convicted by the lower board?

A Where the lower board has ruled that they are ineligible.

Who Can Appeal

Q You get an appeal only when they are found guilty by a lower board, don't you? Can the department appeal it to you if the lower board clears a man and the department head thinks he is guilty?

A No. In all cases where there are field investigations, and there has been a hearing below, and it is passed favorably, it comes up to us on "post audit." We have a section which is known as the inspection section. Three or four of our examiners inspect all cases that are passed by the lower boards as eligible.

Q Do those cases that you have reversed fall into any particular category, any particular reason, or any particular situation?

A I couldn't say that there is any general reason. I think, after reading a great many of the cases that have come to us, my impression is that sometimes a lower board is, perhaps, unduly influenced by the personality of the individual. Most of the cases now are applicants. If the applicant appears to be uncertain in his answers and, perhaps, doesn't do himself justice, the members of a lower board may go too far in giving the Government the benefit of the doubt.

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... 'Sometimes the lower boards are too strict'

I have read cases from lower boards that the Loyalty Review Board reversed because the lower board was inclined to spill over into the field of security. Our panels try to be very strict and stay in the field of loyalty.

Q That's a strange and hard distinction to make, isn't it?

A Yes, it's a difficult distinction.

Q There are cases, aren't there, which could be a security risk without having anything to do with disloyalty, like persons who talk too much when they're drunk and various other categories? You can be ruled out as a security risk and it has nothing to do with loyalty?

A Certainly.

Problem of Unfairness

Q But can't there be some way for all the problems to be dealt with centrally?

A The only criticism that I have to make of the program as it is at present is that the individual has no right of appeal from a decision on security outside the agency. If the security officer makes up his mind that this person is a bad risk, that person can be heard by the agency, but—perhaps you remember in the middle of July the President decided that this question needed investigation by the National Security Council. He is the Chairman of it himself. About the middle of July he wrote a letter to the executive secretary of the National Security Council, asking the Council to investigate the question of security and the charges of unfairness, and to make recommendations to see if anything should be done about it.

Q You said that some of the lower boards have resolved a doubt in favor of the Government. Does that mean that the Review Board would resolve doubts in favor of the individual rather than in favor of the Government?

A No. The business of the Review Board is to try to do right by the Government and the individual. The President, in establishing the loyalty-review program, said that it was of vital importance that persons coming into the Government be of unswerving loyalty. He also said that it was very important that individuals in the Government service should not be thrown out for trivial reasons, reasons of prejudice and imaginary doubts. You can have a doubt about any person. When we put the new standard into effect with regard to reasonable doubt, we stressed the point that, under the courts' interpretation, reasonable doubt means doubt based on reason.

Now, sometimes the lower boards go overboard in being too strict. The Loyalty Review Board is composed of seasoned veterans who have supposedly had lots of experience and who try to maintain a position of absolute fairness, to protect the individual against any unfairness and, at the same time, to protect the

Government against having to take any individual concerning whom there is reasonable doubt.

Q Have you reversed any cases that were cleared?

A In "post audit," yes.

Q From the State Department?

A That I can't answer.

Q Well, there haven't been any "post audit" cases from the State Department?

A Oh, yes, all those that were field checked. There are cases that come up from the State Department for "post audit." Philip Jessup's case is an example.

Q But you haven't had any "post audit" reversals on the State Department to date?

A That I can't answer.

Q How many cases have you reversed?

A That I can't answer.

Q You are not permitted to answer, or you don't remember?

A I'm just not supposed to answer that question.

Q That refers to the number of cases that have been reversed on "post audit"?

A Yes. I can give you a general impression. We have had about 25 "post audit" cases that were ordered for hearings.

Q On "post audit"?

A Yes. Of those, seven or eight resigned rather than face the panel examination.

Q That is, your panel now?

A Yes.

Q They've never been before your panel?

A No. I think about 5 cases have been definitely decided unfavorably in "post audit," and about 12 have been finally cleared on the hearing in "post audit," and about 8 resigned rather than face the review on the merits of the case.

Q In view of the very small number there and the rather large proportion reversed on the other side, that is, the 150, or so, ruled ineligible that you reversed—you reversed half of them, did you not?

A Yes. I think we've decided about 300 appeals from the entire Government, and about half of them were cleared by us.

Errors in Lower Boards

Q In view of the very small number of reversals on favorable cases and the very large proportion of reversals on unfavorable cases, would you say that that indicates that the lower boards, when they do err, err on the side of the Government's security? Assuming you have caught them in error, you've caught half the cases of error favoring the Government?

A Yes. We have "post audited" over 9,000 cases, and "post audit" means that the lower board found the person to be eligible. The examiner's first duty is to see whether the lower board followed the procedure correctly in issuing the interrogatory, in taking testimony under oath, and so forth. If the case has been properly

... 'An oath means nothing to the Communists'

handled, the examiner clears the case right away without referring it to a panel.

Q *In other words, when the report of the lower board doesn't prove anything?*

A That's right. When I say "properly handled," let me give you an imaginary case that would cause the examiner to ask for a panel to study it. Let us say that a new appointee has married a Communist. He is not a Communist. She is the stronger character of the two. He has belonged to one or two of the mild organizations, and taken no active part in them, and he is investigated, and a loyalty board sends him an interrogatory. The answer to his interrogatory was dictated by his wife, and he swore to it. When he is before the lower board and a question is asked, he says, "What did I say on the affidavit. I'll say that now."

When our examiner reads that answer and finds that the lower board was willing to accept such a reply and had accepted the applicant as eligible, he notes that that is not a proper procedure and he submits it to a panel of the Loyalty Review Board. The panel would then probably remand the case to the lower board for a rehearing.

Sometimes the lower board passes a man but doesn't seem to have given attention to certain things in the FBI report that should have been brought out in the hearing. The examiner spots that and refers it to a panel for action. But in the great majority of cases, 99 per cent of the cases, the procedure is correct, and we don't question them.

Methods of the Reviews

Q *How many cases has this Loyalty Review Board had to consider from the beginning?*

A To carry out the President's order, the FBI was ordered to investigate all Government employees and all applicants. Up to date more than 3 million persons have been screened. About 16,000 full field investigations have been made. When they find somebody whose record calls for a field investigation, they make a field investigation, and as soon as it is completed, they do not pass upon it, but send it to one of the 200 junior boards. The Navy Department and the Air Force each have many loyalty boards in the field in addition to a central board; the Department of the Army has 14 lower boards. The Commerce Department has one large board which meets in several panels, and the State Department has a similar arrangement.

Every executive agency must have at least one board. In addition, the Civil Service Commission has 14 regional loyalty boards for cases of persons seeking appointment in the competitive Civil Service.

So there are some 200 lower boards altogether. All these loyalty boards look into the records.

In about half of the cases the investigation disproves the derogatory information upon which the investigation was initiated. The board does nothing

more about it; the person is found eligible for employment with the Government.

It's the board's privilege to decide whether to rate the applicant eligible or to proceed further. Now of the 16,000 cases in which the FBI conducted full field investigations, almost half—over 7,200—were held by lower boards to be worthy of further scrutiny. That is to say, the loyalty board concerned decided to send the individual an interrogatory or a letter of charges, charging him with having belonged to this or that organization on the Attorney General's list, with having associated with Communists, with having solicited subscriptions to the *Daily Worker*, etc.

The individual involved is given at least 10 days and usually about two weeks to answer such questions. The answers must be under oath and the affidavit must be sent in to the board. The individual under charges may request a hearing, or the board may decide that a hearing is necessary; some 2,500 cases have required hearings by the lower board. Or, a board may decide that an individual's written answers to charges are perfectly satisfactory and let it go at that.

Incidentally, 1,800 of the 16,000 individuals whose cases went to loyalty boards decided before they got through answering the questionnaire, or before going through a hearing, or at some point prior to a decision, that they would rather work elsewhere—perhaps they didn't care for any more inquiry into their activities—and so they just dropped out of the federal service.

Also, one of the interesting things is that not nearly so many applicants today are found to be requiring field investigations as when the program started. In other words, if you know that you are active in some of these organizations you may decide not to apply for a Government position.

Great Majority Were Cleared

Of the 2,439 loyalty cases that the lower boards have held hearings on, the great majority have been cleared. Of these individuals, 542 were found to be ineligible. Quite a number dropped out at once; about two thirds of those found ineligible by lower boards appealed.

As a result of appeals to agency heads and to the Loyalty Review Board, some 204 of the 542 were cleared and restored to duty or permitted to enter the Government service. These figures were taken from a recent recapitulation.

Q *Have you any idea from an examination of these cases whether these people are directly connected with foreign governments, or whether they are sympathizers with foreign governments?*

A They never admit it. Of course, in the usual case they deny everything. One of the things you have to do at these hearings is to try to see if they are lying or not. An oath means nothing to the Communists. At the hearings we try to find out the truth.

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62	7th from bottom	"along" should be "alone"
142	11th from top	"we had a hassle" should be "Butrick and I had a hassle"
195	24th from top	"Albert Kohlberg" should be "Alfred Kohlberg"
214	20th from top	"interested" should be "interesting"
228abc	all	Should be placed after p. 268
369	bottom line	"Nelson, Johnson" should be "Nelson Johnson" (one man)
378	19th from top	"four hundred thousand" should be "Four hundred"
391	3rd from bottom	"Albert" should be "Alfred"
407	14th from top	"or to" should be "or Ed to"
423	7th from bottom	"So Bob" should be "So our son Bob"
425	6th from bottom	"were none" should be "were almost none"
441	15th from bottom	"Caroline's parents" should be "Caroline's family"
446	21st from top	"Miles Reber" should be "Sam Reber"
467	17th from top	"had my political" should be "had no political"
493	6th from bottom	Date of interview shown as 1978; should be 1977
516	2nd from bottom	"January 23" should be "June 20"

Rosemary Levenson

Grew up in England; B.A. in History from Cambridge University, 1948. Graduate work in History and International Law at Cambridge and Radcliffe. M.A. in Sociology at the University of California Berkeley in 1969.

Moved to Berkeley in 1951 and worked as free-lance editor and anthropological photographer. Volunteer service in groups related to the public schools, religion, and University of California faculty wives.

Travel in Europe and the Far East. Joined the staff of the Regional Oral History Office in 1970.

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